Separation of powers in new democracies: Federalism and the judicial power in Mexico. by Berruecos Garcia Travesi, Martha Susana
Separation of Powers in New Democracies: 
Federalism and the Judicial Power in Mexico
Martha Susana Berruecos Garcia Travesi
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy





INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615716
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 






I declare that this thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the 
outcome of the work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the 
text
Susana Berruecos Garcia Travesl Date: December 2009
Abstract
In the matter of a few decades, the Supreme Court in Mexico has gone from being a 
passive institution that served the interests of the federal executive to a genuine 
enforcer of law and the final arbiter in an increasing number of disputes over power and 
resources between different branches and levels of government. My thesis traces how 
and why this change happened and analyses the consequences of a more 
independent and active Court for the processes of federalism and democratisation in 
Mexico.
My research contributes to a growing body of literature on the judicialisation of politics 
in Mexico. I analyse the ways in which a more genuine separation of powers has begun 
to take shape in Mexico. Specifically, I look at how a more independent Supreme Court 
has provided different government powers at the federal, state and municipal levels 
with a means of defending their respective jurisdictions against competing powers. 
While I focus on the Supreme Court, my research situates the judiciary within the wider 
web of government institutions; increased political pluralism has enabled the legislative 
branch and state and local governments to exercise stronger checks and balances on 
the federal executive, with attendant consequences for the emboldened Court when it 
comes to involvement in the policy-making process.
At the core of my thesis is an empirical analysis of the Supreme Court’s involvement in 
federalist issues via the use of constitutional controversies filed before the Court 
between 1995 and 2005 to resolve federal intragovernmental (between the three 
branches of government) and intergovernmental (between levels of government) 
disputes. The analysis operates on two levels: the national, and the subnational via an 
examination of legal recourses in seven case study states. It also looks at the role of 
the electoral tribunal in national and local election disputes.
A wide variety of political actors are resorting to legal channels in order to resolve 
political deadlock. The Supreme Court in Mexico has had the last word on issues that 
range from the generation of electricity to indigenous rights. While my research focuses 
on Mexico, I compare judicial reform in Mexico with parallel processes in the other 
three presidential and federal systems in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil and 
Venezuela). Methodologically, my PhD thesis includes a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methods, including structured and semi-structured interviews and
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extensive documental research in public and private sector archives, as well as 
national and local newspapers and specialist magazines
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I declare that this thesis consists of 92,690 words (excluding references). 
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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS
Glossary of legal and political terms
Amparo A constitutional legal means of defending individual
guarantees established in the constitution against the violation by any government 
authority.
Ayuntamiento Municipal government
Causales de improcedencia Recourses for appealing against Supreme Court rulings
Constituyente Permanente Body with authority to reform the constitution, the federal
legislature and a majority of state legislatures
Delegaciones Local councils of the Federal District
Distrito Federal Electoral The 300 constituencies or electoral districts into which
Mexico is divided for the purpose of federal elections
Incompetence of origin A jurisprudential thesis referring to problems relating to a 
public office holder who was not lawfully elected or appointed into office 
Sobreseimiento Dismissal of complaints by the Supreme Court on the
grounds that they lack legal foundation
Supreme Conservative Power A five-member elected body responsible for overseeing 
the executive, legislature and judiciary during the period 1836-43
Glossary of terms used by the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF)
Apelacion Por Imposicion De Sanciones Administrativas (ASA) Appeal against
administrative sanctions
Asunto General (AG) General issue
Asuntos Especiales (AES) Special issues
Conflictos Laborales entre el TEPJF y sus Servidores (CLT) Labour disputes 
between the TEPJF and its staff members 
Contradiccion de Criterios (CDC) Contradiction of criteria 
Innominado (INN) Unspecified
Juicio de Inconformidad (JIN) Legal challenge against of electoral authorities for 
violation of constutional or other laws regulating gubernatorial, congressional or 
municipal elections
Juicio de Revision Constitucional Electoral (JRC) Legal challenge by political parties 
against electoral authorities for acts committed or resolutions issued in gubernatorial, 
(peal congressional and municipal elections
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Juicio para Dirimirias Diferencias Laboraies de ios Servidores del IFE (JLI) Legal
challenge relating to labour disputes involving IFE employees
Juicio para la Proteccion de Ios Derechos PoliticchElectorales del Ciudadano (JDC)
Trial for the protection of politico-electoral rights of citizens
Juicios Laboraies (ELI) Labour disputes
Opinion Solicitada porla SCJN Respecto deAccion de Inconstitucionalidad (OP)
Opinion requested of the SCJN regarding an unconstitutional act
Queja Por Responsabilidades Administrativas De Los Servidores Publicos (QRA)
Complaint regarding adminstrative responsiblities of public servants
Recurso de Apelacion (RAP) Appeal recourse
Recurso de Reconsideracion (REC) Appeal recourse for challenging sentences of 
regional tribunals relating to juicios de inconformidad
Recurso de Revision en Materia de Transparencia y Acceso a la Informacion (RVT) 
Review recourse for issues relating to transparency and access to information 
Solicitud de Ejercicio de la Facultad de Atraccion de la Sala Superior (SFA) Request 
for the higher court to hear a case
Abbreviations
AD Accibn Democratica, Democratic Action party (Venezuela)
ADIN Agao Direta de Inconstitucionalidade, Direct Actions of
Unconstitutionality (Brazil)
CC Constitutional controversy
CCE Consejo Coordinador Empresarial, Coordinating Council for Businesses
CEE Codigo Electoral Estatal, State Electoral Code
CFE Comision Federal de Electricidad, Federal Electricity Commission
Cocopa Comision de Concordancia y Pacificacion, Commission for Peace and
Reconciliation (between the government and EZLN in Chiapas, Mexico)
COPEI Comitb de Organizacibn Politica Electoral Independiente (Venezuela)
CNBV Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, Banking and Securities
Commission
CUD Convenio Unico de Desarrollo, Sole Development Agreement
CNDH Comisidn Nacional de Derechos Humanos, National Human Rights
Commission
Cofipe Codigo Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales Federal,
Federal Electoral Code
Congress Lower Chamber of Congress
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Coparmex Confederation Patronal de la Republica Mexicana, Mexican Business
Leaders Confederation
COPRE Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State, Venezuela
CRE Comision Reguladora de Energia, Energy Regulating Commission
DF Distrito Federal, Federal District (informally known as Mexico City)
EZLN Ejertito Zapatista de Liberation National, Zapatista Army of National
Liberation
FDN Frente National Democratico, National Democratic Front
TFE Tribunal Federal Electoral, Federal Electoral Tribunal (created by the
1990 reform)
Fobaproa Fondo Bancario de Protection al Ahorro, Banking Fund for the
Protection of Savings
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IEDF Instituto Electoral del Distrito Federal, Electoral Institute of the Federal
District
IPAB Instituto para la Protection de Ahorro Bancario, Bank Savings Protection
Institute
IFE * Instituto Federal Electoral, Federal Electoral Institute
LFOPPE Federal Law on Political Organisations and Political Processes (1977)
ILO International Labour Organisation
LCF Ley de Coordination Fiscal, Fiscal Coordination Law
MVR Movimiento Quinta Republica, Fifth Republic Movement (Venezuela)
MXN Mexican Peso
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NGO Non-governmental organisation
PAN Partido Action Nacional, National Action Party
PANAL Partido Nueva Alianza, New Alliance Party
PARM Partido Autdntico de la Revolucidn Mexicana, Authentic Party of the
Mexican Revolution
PGR Produraduria General de la Republica, Attorney General’s office
PPS Partido Popular Socialista, Popular Socialist Party
PRD Partido de la Revolucidn Democratica, Democratic Revolutionary Party
PRI Partido Revolucionario Institutional, Institutional Revolutionary Party
PRIE Integrated State Reform Programme (Venezuela)
PSS Partido Socialista del Sureste, Socialist Party of the Southeast
PT Partido del Trabajo, Workers Party
PVEM Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico, Ecologist Green Party of Mexico
SCJN Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion, National Supreme Court of
Justice
Senate Upper Chamber of Congress
SFP Secretarfa de la Funcion Publica, Ministry of Public Administration ()
SFT Supreme Federal Tribunal (of Brazil)
SHCP Secretarla de Hacienda y Credito Publico de Mexico, Treasury Ministry
STJ Superior Court of Justice (of Brazil)
TEPJF Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federacion, Federal Electoral
Tribunal of Justice
TET Tribunal Electoral de Tabasco, Tabasco Electoral Tribunal
TSJ Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Supreme Court of Justice (of Venezuela)
Tricoel Tribunal de lo Contensioso Electoral, Tribunal of Electoral Contention
UVE Unidad de Vencedores Electorales (Venezuela)
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Background to this thesis
I started researching this thesis in 1998, the same year in which Gibson, Caldeira, and 
Baird wrote that “[t]he degree to which the field of comparative politics has ignored 
courts and law is as remarkable as it is regrettable” (1998: 343). Indeed, at the time, as 
a political scientist working on the fringes of the judicial arena I faced two significant 
obstacles: first, the lack of published material by political scientists on the impact of the 
judiciary on political processes and, second, the sometimes guarded attitude of lawyers 
and judicial professionals in Mexico over their field of study.
In the intervening years, much has changed. The literature straddling the fields of 
judicial politics and comparative politics, which is where my thesis is situated, has 
mushroomed. A growing number of political scientists are looking at diverse aspects of 
the judiciary, including judicial reform, judicial performance and the judicialisation of 
politics.
In Mexico, where my study is based, the amount of information made publicly available 
by the courts has expanded exponentially, making it easier to scrutinise judicial 
performance and its impact on domestic politics at the local and national levels. When I 
first became aware of the potential of the Supreme Court of Justice to become a new 
arena of political contestation between local and federal actors through the resolution 
of constitutional controversies, I started to create my own database of these recourses, 
more than 1,500 filed between 1995 and 2005. A decade later, in 2006, the supreme 
court created an entire department devoted to judicial research; some 20 researchers 
within the department spent three years building a database of constitutional 
controversies, with parallels with mine. Constitutional controversies are the legal 
mechanism for defending the federal nature of the Mexican political system and the 
principle of separation of powers. They can be filed against different levels and 
branches of government when these exceed their constitutional jurisdiction.
My thesis therefore now sits within an established field of study. Its contribution to the 
research field is that it provides a detailed case study of an important but often 
neglected aspect of the democratisation process in Mexico: the progressive institutional 
differentiation of the judiciary vis-a-vis the political executive. It offers an empirical 
analysis of constitutional controversies, revealing how the judiciary became the venue
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of choice for opposition-led governments to contest constitutional and other political 
issues.
While the focus of this dissertation is Mexico after the profound judicial reforms of 
1994, I contextualise this period by providing historical background as well as regional 
comparisons. The first chapter looks at reform processes and their impact in the other 
three Latin American federal democracies: Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. The 
institutional focus throughout the thesis is the Supreme Court of Justice, which in 
Mexico has been transformed over the past decade from being a pure enforcer of 
legality that was generally subordinated to the executive, into a real interpreter of the
Constitution and the final arbiter in many political disputes.
Hypotheses and key questions
This thesis analyses the nexus between judicial reform efforts and the increasing 
separation of horizontal and vertical powers of government in Mexico since the early 
1990s. The main questions I attempt to answer are:
1) While legal forms remained important under authoritarian government, the
judiciary was largely subordinated to the executive and successive reform efforts to 
strengthen its independence lacked substance. Yet in 1994 a profound judicial reform 
was implemented. Why did the Mexican authorities elect to empower the judiciary at 
that time?
2) In which ways did the judicial reform process change the role of the Supreme
Court?
3) What impact has the revitalised Supreme Court had on other powers and 
levels of government, and on federalisation processes more generally?
4) Is there a correlation between political party affiliation and propensity to file 
constitutional controversies, or their outcome?
At the heart of my thesis is an empirical analysis of the constitutional controversies 
presented since the reform (Chapters 3 and 4). My central hypothesis is that behind 
most of them is a clear conflict between opposing political parties regarding resources 
and powers. In the context of a more genuine separation of powers, the supreme court 
is becoming the final arbiter in such conflicts, a true “third power”. Arguably the court’s 
enhanced role is a reflection of a lack of political negotiation skills of branches and 
levels of government that are under the control of different political parties, rather than
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of a new respect for the judicial institution. Nonetheless, the final outcome is that the 
Court is increasingly deciding a wide variety of issues and is becoming the subject of 
political pressure in certain contexts.
My sub-hypothesis is that through the increased use of constitutional controversies, the 
very process of federalism has been reinforced. Lower levels of government power 
have most commonly made use of the legal recourse to demand increased devolution 
of political and fiscal resources to the local level. But the recourse has also been used 
by the very highest government authorities, namely the federal executive and 
legislature, to defend their respective spheres of competence.
The main theoretical contributions I see my thesis making to the scholarly and policy 
debates stem from the fact that it looks at the legal sphere from the political science 
perspective. First, as one of Latin America’s few federal systems, Mexico offers an 
ideal laboratory for the study of the political conditions that facilitate or hinder judicial 
reform efforts. More importantly, Mexico represents a special case in terms of the 
theory of democratic consolidation because during the most complicated political, 
economic and social contexts— including the post-electoral conflicts of 2006—the 
actors and political parties have opted to pursue a legal-institutional route to power. 
This contrasts with countries such as Venezuela or Argentina which in recent years 
have seen the status of their democracies severely questioned. My research makes 
clear that the judiciary should not be underestimated in studies of presidentialism, not 
only for the role it plays as a check on presidential power, but for the leverage it 
provides other tiers of government to assert claims on the central executive authority.
Second, I provide case study material of the ways in which the decisions of the 
supreme court contributed to the re-development of federalism in Mexico by providing 
effective judicial arbitration of election disputes in local and state government. In terms 
of the seven case studies, I present political-electoral and judicial analysis in states that 
were key to Mexico’s democratic transition, such as Baja California, Chihuahua and the 
Federal District, as well as in states such as Tamaulipas, Puebla and Nuevo Leon, 
which have not been the focus of much comparative subnational research in Mexico.
In sum, I think my thesis makes significant contributions to the understanding of a) the 
judicialisation of politics b) federalism c) the role of the judiciary in processes of 
democratisation and d) presidentialism.
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Methodology
There are many theoretical and methodological approaches to determining how judicial 
institutions perform. In previous research for my undergraduate and Master’s degrees I 
used statistical analyses of electoral results and polling data from the state of Veracruz 
to analyse how different sectors (oil, sugar, industrial and farming) voted and how 
opposition parties started to grow steadily, the National Action Party (PAN) in the urban 
corridor and the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) among oil and sugar 
producers. Here again I decided that quantitative analysis of particular aspects of the 
constitutional controversies under examination would help to uncover certain trends, 
such as the levels of government and political parties that most commonly use them, 
who is challenging whom or the direction of rulings. Yet my ambitions for the research 
were broader than this and so I have combined quantitative with qualitative methods. I 
decided to apply a case-oriented, historical (evolutionary) and qualitative approach that 
would allow me to conduct a narrative and institutional analysis of the dynamics 
affecting political and institutional change in Mexico, specifically in the area of judicially- 
created federalism. My thesis applies a narrative structure (Barzelay, 2001) to establish 
the chain of events that needs to be explained.
My approach was to select a certain number of representative case study states 
according to their relevance to my main hypothesis. This would enable me to delve 
deeper into the topic than a national-level study would have permitted. It also meant 
that I could be brought into contact with primary source material, including interviewing 
the protagonists of some of the reforms and cases I wished to analyse. By narrowing 
my field of study, I was able to provide historical and political context for the 
constitutional controversy cases, and was able to consider the role of individual agents 
in effecting change, that is, in pushing to defend or expand their jurisdictional demands 
for political and fiscal power. Thus my institutional analysis is nuanced by the inclusion 
of information about individual actors and their interests, as well as the political party, 
governmental or judicial institutions in which they participate. I also offer an explanatory 
framework in terms of which the case narratives are crafted and compared, which 
allows common narrative to emerge across the cases. The concept of narrative 
explanation and the idea of multi-case narratives are discussed by Abbot (1992, 7 2 -  
80). According to Eriksson (2000) narrative explanations are theories about 
happenings that may consist of diverse forms of explanations, interpretations and 
explanatory sketches. In his view, there is no single form of narrative explanation; 
rather, narrative is seen as a form for synthesizing various explanations. By
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considering historical characteristics and the case-specific context, a case-oriented 
approach is more holistic (Ragin, 1987: 54).
In selecting my methodology I was mindful of the words of Dunleavy who succinctly 
summarises the split in the social sciences between cross-national studies which use 
many countries and aggregate data (quantitative) and very specific case studies which 
treat phenomena separately (qualitative). He cites the pros and cons of both 
approaches as listed by Ragin (1987). Variable-oriented approaches “have the 
advantage of providing a means by which to test theory based on large numbers of 
cases and the rigorous treatment of a question armed with vast quantities of concrete 
data”, but can be "vague and abstract”, lacking in connection with human agency and 
process (Dunleavy, 2003). Restricted sample groups can produce unreliable results. 
Case-oriented studies on the other hand are limited since “few general conclusions can 
be drawn because of the limited amount of data, and many studies therefore become 
mired in specificity and exceptionalism.” But they do “permit sensitivity to complexity" 
and are “well suited to addressing actual empirical history and generating conceptual 
ideas.” Moreover, as befits my intentions, “human agency and process are 
accommodated and there is a strong connection between the research and actual 
events” (Dunleavy, 2003). Given this specificity of the cases, however, there is an 
obvious limit to the generalisations that can be drawn from them. Indeed, while I 
include a cross-country comparative analysis of the judicial reform processes in 
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, I do not attempt to generalise to them any of the 
conclusions relating to the use of judicial review tools to deepen federalism.
While the core of my thesis is an empirical analysis of constitutional controversies, the 
context and the qualitative analysis of these controversies is informed by more than 50 
interviews conducted in the course of my research. According to Flick (2002: 96), "an 
alternative to approaching individual worlds of experience through the openness that 
can be achieved in semi-structured interviews is to use the narratives produced by 
interviewees as a form of data...narratives allow the researcher to approach the 
interviewee's experiential world in a more comprehensive way, the world being 
structured in itself."
One potential shortcoming of this method is the possibility of that "is presented in a 
narrative is constructed in a specific form during the process of narrating, and 
memories of earlier events may be influenced by the situation in which they are told" 
(Flick, 2003: 103). As will be seen, this could be argued in reference to my interview
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with former president Ernesto Zedillo. The interview was conducted seven years after 
he introduced the 1994 judicial reform and so his memories of the motivations for the 
reform could be biased, especially since the reforms have had such a profound and 
generally well-regarded impact. It was therefore important to include other interviews 
with notable political actors (including court justices, congressmen, senators, and 
federal government ministers) to counterbalance the information. Similarly, the 
numerical analysis presented in most of the chapters lends weight to the interview 
material.
In order to ensure that my case study analysis is rigorous, I set out certain parameters 
for my research. I elected to study the decade following the judicial reform, 1995 to 
2005. I decided to consider all of the controversies, rather than a specific sub-group of 
them, as I did not want to prejudice my findings. A first step was to identify and 
describe the administrative and jurisdictional processes used by the Supreme Court to 
track constitutional controversies. I then analysed these information flows to determine 
the variables for my database and to design the data entry forms. It is important to note 
that while the empirical analysis covers the decade 1995-2005, I make reference in 
several places to more recent cases in order to illustrate ongoing trends.
Although I was able to develop a very extensive and complete database, I wanted to 
provide a summary table (Annex 1) with the most relevant information for the reader or 
researcher. All data were checked on a case-by-case basis against the Supreme Court 
website. I include the following variables, which head each of the columns in Annex 1:
• Case file number
• Complainant, categorised according to the actors (government power, organ or 
entity) listed in Article 105 as having the authority to present controversies, and 
according to whether they belong to the federal, state, municipal or Federal 
District (Mexico City) level of government. I include the initials of the state 
where the complainant is based in the same column, while in column four I 
include the initials of the defendant’s state.
• Political party of the complainant. This is not included where the controversy 
was presented by the judiciary or an actor that does not have legal authority to 
present constitutional controversies. In cases presented by a state or federal 
legislative body, efforts were made to include the political party that dominated 
the legislative body when the recourse was presented.
• Defendant and complaint. Below the defendant and marked with an asterisk, is 
the theme of the complaint. Complaints are classified into the following
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categories: allocation of public resources, territorial conflicts, suspension or 
dismissal of public servants, municipal autonomy.
• Political party of the defendant.
•  Resolution of the case. This identifies whether the Court determined that the
controversy was well-founded, partially founded, unfounded, rejected, 
withdrawn, expired or disqualified for other technical reasons.
•  Dates of presentation and resolution of the complaint. Constitutional
controversies presented to the Court after the 15 December are registered
under the following year. From the two dates it is possible to determine how 
long the Court took to resolve each case.
My next task was to choose the case studies. My starting point was very simple: I 
decided to include the seven states which were the most legally active just after the 
1994 judicial reform was implemented. These states also happened to be 
representative across a number of variables that I was interested in examining: they 
have been governed by different political parties, but, since the 1980s, have all shown 
an increasing level of opposition representation at the local level; they differ 
significantly in terms of population, size and number of municipalities, as well as level 
of cultural difference and indigenous representation.
Data gathering
My research is built upon five main data-gathering activities:
a) Documentary research of archives dating to 1917. Extensive reviews of national and 
local newspapers, and a number of specialist magazines such as Nexos, Voz y Voto 
and The Economist I reviewed material held in the following Mexican national 
archives: Supreme Court of Justice, Electoral Tribunal, Biblioteca del Congreso de la 
Union (Mexican Congressional Records), Instituto Nacional de Estadlstica, Geografla e 
Informatica (INEGI); and in the state electoral institutes of Baja California, Chihuahua, 
Federal District, Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca, Puebla, Tabasco, Tamaulipas and Yucatan. I 
was fortunate to have access to the following libraries: LSE, ITAM, UNAM, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Juridicas, Georgetown University, Federal Electoral Institute, 
Secretaria de la Funcion Publica.
b) Interviews with senior figures from within the government and the judiciary. Fifty 
personal interviews were conducted, including with former President Ernesto Zedillo, 
Supreme Court justices, Electoral Magistrates, Electoral Councillors, politicians and 
academics.
c) Systematic data collection on constitutional controversies.
d) Systematic data collection on electoral results, particularly of case study states.
e) Systematic data collection on Electoral Tribunal reports.
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My first task was to search for information on constitutional controversies. In contrast to 
today, in 2000 the search function on the Supreme Court’s website was all but 
unusable. Very little information was published on the web and most of the detail about 
specific controversies was missing. I therefore had to spend the first few years of my 
research asking the Court’s Transparency Unit (via third parties in Mexico who helped 
present the necessary written requests) for detailed information about the cases I was 
studying. The response time was rarely less than four months.
During the past decade, the quality and access of public information produced by the 
Court has been transformed. It is now possible to access each Supreme Court case file 
online, at <http://www.scjn.gob.mx/ActividadJur/Consulta/Paginas/indice.aspx>, which 
theoretically opens a database (http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/expedientes/) of all the case 
files resolved by the Court, including controversies, unconstitutional acts and, in the 
near future, amparos.
The reality is that while the database represents a good effort to systematise Court 
information, the information it contains had to be complimented from additional 
sources. Thus a case-by-case search of controversies on the database was only my 
starting point. The most recent case files contain links to 200-plus-page PDF 
documents of the entire case, which I could then summarise, but for the majority of 
cases the database only provided a very thin summary containing the date the 
recourse was filed, the presiding judge, the date of the resolution and the parties 
involved. The content of the case, when it was included at all, tended to be limited to 
references to the local or federal articles in question, which I had to look up before I 
could understand the conflict at issue.
The most difficult step in building my database was to identify the political party 
affiliation of the parties to the case. This was vital to test my hypothesis that it was 
opposition political parties that most often used controversies to clarify the scope of 
their powers at each level of government. For the most part this information was 
entirely absent from the case files, which meant I had to search the archives of the 
electoral institutes of the relevant state or federation, by date, to identify the political 
party involved in the dispute. This presented its own challenges since most electoral 
institutes only provide information on the most recent elections. The database of 
electoral results created by the think tank Centro de Investigation para el Desarrollo 
A.C. (CIDAC, http://www.cidac.org/es/index.php) was very useful in this regard,
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particularly for identifying political affiliations of the parties involved in constitutional 
controversies filed in 1995-2000. Its database contains all federal results from 1964 to 
2006, and state election results from 1980 to 2008 
(http://www. cidac.org/es/modules. php?name=Encyclopedia&op=list_content&eid=1). In 
a few cases where the controversy was filed near to an electoral period it was 
necessary to trace the electoral history of the individuals involved, which often led to 
fascinating digressions into the histories of local politicians—the case of Rfo Bravo in 
Tamaulipas is a notable example. Where local legislatures were parties to a case, it 
was necessary to look at local congressional results to identify which party held the 
majority at the time the case was filed.
In late November 2009 I was able to meet the General Manager of Judicial Planning of 
the Supreme Court, Jacqueline Martinez, who showed me the first draft version of the 
Court’s own database of constitutional controversies, the result of three years’ work by 
a large team of researchers. It is important to note that the Court database includes 
information that the researchers were able to access through the original paper case 
files. Martinez said these had to be transported by armoured truck to the Court offices 
as they are considered national heritage documents. Given this access to the case 
files, the researchers who built the Court database were able to specify the political 
party affiliation of complainant and defendant in those cases where it is mentioned in 
the original text. They did not, however, consult electoral results to supplement missing 
information.
On how the judicial reform was adopted, I include an analysis of the different 
responses to the 1994 judicial reform as well as the congressional discussions and 
approval process. I also describe the election of Supreme Court Justices following the 
reform, for which I analysed different newspapers and political magazines dated from 
November 1994 to April 1996. Although some Mexican newspapers have modern 
websites and electronic archives, none of them had the information for the period in 
question and so I spent several weeks in the newspaper archives of the UNAM where I 
was able to analyse contemporary media responses to the reform initiative, its approval 
and the new Supreme Court appointments.
The majority of my research was carried out in Mexico, where I travelled to gather data 
in May and December 2001 before I moved there in mid 2003. I also carried out a 
research trip to Argentina in March 2 0 0 8 .1 was able to conduct research interviews on 
extensive trips to three of my case study states, Nuevo Leon, Puebla and Yucatan.
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Key definitions
a). Separation of powers
A central concept used in my thesis is the separation of powers of government. I take 
my lead in speaking about the doctrine of separation of powers from the classic text by 
Montesquieu in which he identifies three functions of government that should be 
separated: the making of law, the enforcement and administration of law, and the 
adjudication of controversial cases where the law has to be applied (Montesquieu c. 
1748). These legislative, executive and judicial functions should be performed by
separate branches of power and no one person can be a member of any two of the
branches as, according to Montesquieu:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty... 
there is no liberty if the power of judging is not separated from the
legislative and executive... there would be an end to everything, if the
same man or the same body... were to exercise those three powers. 
(Montesquieu c. 1748)
Montesquieu outlined a second condition for preventing abuse of power: there should 
be an overlap in functions such that each branch performs one main function and some 
aspects of the other functions. This evolved into the system of checks and balances 
introduced into the U.S. Constitution and defended by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 
(Manin 1997).
That the branches of government are separate does not mean that they are equal, 
however. For Montesquieu, the legislative is the preeminent power. Judges apply the 
law, but do not exercise political power (Rios-Figueroa 2007 citing Pasquino 2001, 
210-13). Madison argued for greater equality among the powers and for a more active 
role for judges in their relationships with the other branches of government (Pasquino 
2001, 210-13). By either view, the judiciary is dependent on the other branches of 
power for implementing its decisions and for securing its economic and political 
independence. Thus if the other two powers of government are strong and coordinated 
the judiciary can be expected to have a deferential attitude towards them and be less 
inclined to be involved in policymaking. This was the case in Mexico for most of the last 
century when both were controlled by the same party and the legislature did little more
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than rubber-stamp executive decrees. As Rios-Figueroa (2007) writes, “[t]he common 
assumption in all separation-of-powers arguments is that judges behave strategically 
when making decisions, taking into account not only legal constraints— i.e., precedent 
and legal coherence— but also political circumstances— i.e., their relative situation vis- 
a-vis the other branches of government."
b). Independence of the judiciary
This brings me to a second key concept, which is the independence of the judiciary. 
Separation-of-powers principles require the judicial branch, like the legislative and 
executive branches, to be institutionally independent. It should have the authority to 
govern and manage its internal affairs, free from undue interference by the other 
branches of government, although not free from the scrutiny of those other branches or 
of the public (Tarr 2007). As well as having institutional independence, the members of 
the judiciary need to be independent in their handling of individual cases, what Tarr 
terms as having decisional independence (Tarr 2007). Given the potential number of 
cases in which the government has an interest and its power over the institutional 
aspects of the judiciary, one of the most important aspects of judicial independence is 
to insulate judges from other branches of government and judicial selection from 
partisan politics. As Garoupa and Ginsburg (2008: 201) point out, the selection of 
judges is a central factor in most theories of judicial independence. Although there is no 
consensus on the best selection mechanism to guarantee independence, a growing 
scholarly consensus has emerged in favour of “merit selection” (2008:202).
The following are generally understood to be necessary for promoting judicial 
independence:
• Fair appointment and removal procedures (the President or Minister of Justice 
cannot directly appoint or remove judges)
• Security of tenure (which sometimes includes life tenure for Supreme Court 
justices)
• Non transferability of judicial posts
• Secure salaries and pensions (underpinned by a fixed budget for the judiciary)
• Provision for disciplinary proceedings
• Court hearings are public
• Judgeships are held by professionals
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According to Gudino Pelayo (2001: 426), in addition to these institutional and legal 
guarantees, judicial independence also has a subjective component, which is the 
technical and moral training of those responsible for imparting justice. Kristy 
Richardson (2005) writes about yet another dimension of judicial independence. If the 
above institutional safeguards of independence can be thought of as protecting judicial 
“insularity” and “impartiality”, then a third component of judicial independence is judicial 
“authority”. The judiciary can promote its authority by: being involved in making the law 
and not just applying it; promoting and maintaining public confidence; providing 
accurate information about the workings of the court and responding to criticism; and 
participating in the legal review of actions by the other branches of government.
Another distinction often made by scholars is between de facto and de jure concepts of 
judicial independence (Feld and Voigt 2003). De jure judicial independence is based on 
the arrangements for the judicial functions found in legal documents pertaining to the 
highest court of a country. The concept of de facto judicial independence reflects the 
fact that the degree of actual judicial independence may differ from the de jure. Judicial 
independence is balanced by the need for judicial accountability (e.g. Tarr 2007).
My thesis looks not only at the horizontal separation of powers of government, but at 
vertical separation of powers, that is between the federal, state and municipal 
government. It sees the Supreme Court as a check on separation of powers, as the 
arbiter of legal challenges over jurisdictional disputes.
c). The Mexican political system: from central government to the municipalities 
The Mexican system of government comprises 31 state governments, a federal district 
and 2,445 municipalities. Each state is divided into municipalities, except for the 
Federal District (Mexico City), which has delegaciones. The number of municipalities 
varies from state to state, from five in Baja California and Baja California Sur to 570 in 
Oaxaca. At the federal, state and municipal levels, power is divided among executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of government. For almost 80 years the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated the entire political system and consolidated a 
system of power that was presidentialist and authoritarian, with political and 
administrative authority centralised in the hands of the presidency. To illustrate the 
degree of centralisation, in 1982 at the height of fiscal centralisation, 91 cents of every
33
peso collected by the Mexican government remained at the federal level, with 8 cents 
going to the states, and 1 cent going to municipal governments (Barraca 2005).1
A process of devolution of power to local governments began in 1983 with the 
Municipal Reform introduced by President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88). The reform 
was aimed at strengthening the financial and administrative capacity of municipal 
governments. It was part of an effort to deepen democracy as the PRI took the first 
tentative steps towards opening up areas of governing to the opposition. An increasing 
number of opposition victories was recognised at the municipal and, later, state levels; 
these became the most vocal in pushing for more power for local governments.
The reforms, while wide-ranging on paper, had little impact on actual power-sharing. 
Barraca (2005) explains that this was due to the persistent financial and administrative 
weaknesses of municipal governments, but also to the limitations of the democratic 
opening since the PRI maintained a monopoly of power at the state level and so “had 
incentives to obstruct reforms in order deny opposition governments the ability to take 
credit for improved municipal administration.” State governments were given wide 
discretion in deciding how the reform should be carried out in individual cases.
Although President Carlos Salinas (1988-94) joined the pro-democracy chorus, in 
practice he used the doctrine of decentralisation to restore presidential legitimacy and 
enhance presidential power. It was not until 1999, well into the administration of 
President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), that a profound municipal reform was 
implemented that achieved the goals set out in 1983. The reform granted municipalities 
the status of government bodies (not just administrative bodies) with exclusive 
competencies including over policing and fiscal issues, which only the town hall has the 
authority to transfer to or share with state governments. It also modified Article 115 of 
the constitution, which outlines the structure and powers of Mexico’s municipal 
governments (or ayuntamientos). It transferred public services and financial resources 
from the state to the municipal level and specified which public services would be 
under the purview of the municipal government. Crucially, unlike the 1983 reform, the 
procedure for implementing the reform reduces the discretion of state governments and 
gives greater recourse to municipal governments, including the right to appeal against 
the state (or federal) government by filing a constitutional controversy before the 
Supreme Court (Barracca, 2005).
1 Citing E. Cabrero Mendoza, Los dilemas de la modemizacidn municipal: estudios sobre la gestidn 
hacendana en los municipios urbanos en Mexico (Mexico, 1996), p. 19.
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Pressure for increased autonomy through devolution increased as the opposition 
gained ground at the local government level. Whereas prior to 1989 no opposition party 
had ever controlled a state government, by 2000 the opposition controlled 14 state 
governments (ten by the PAN and four by the PRD). Since Vicente Fox of the PAN won 
the presidential elections in 2000, a large number of PRI governors and municipal 
presidents found themselves in the role of political opposition and have added their 
voices to calls for greater devolution of power and resources.
Municipalities currently have regulatory power over law enforcement, government and 
public administration at the municipal level. They have control over water and drainage, 
street lighting, public security, traffic, cemeteries and parks, though they can agree for 
state governments to provide public services if this results in better service. In 
coordination with the state and federal governments, municipal governments can assist 
with education, emergency services, health services, environmental health and the 
maintenance of historic monuments and sites.
The main sources of municipal government income are:
Property taxes, which are established by the laws of each state;
Federal transfers, which are made up of Ramo 33 resources sent by the federal 
government to a specific municipality for a specific item or project; and federal 
allocations to states, which are then allocated according to local state law;
Fees for the provision of public services;
• Loans from the development bank or commercial banks in the case of income- 
generating projects (not for current spending).
d). The Mexican federal judiciary and its component parts
As a political scientist it was important for me to understand the way the Mexican court 
system is organised. The key pieces of legislation for the judiciary are Article 94 of the 
Federal Constitution and Article 1 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power of the 
Federation of 22 November 1996 which establish that the "Judicial Power of the 
Federation (Poder Judicial de la Federacion) is vested in a Supreme Court of Justice, 
in an Electoral Tribunal, Circuit Collegiate and Unitary Courts, and in District Courts." 
The Federal Judicial Council (Consejo de la Judicatura Federal) is responsible for the 
administration, supervision and discipline of the judiciary (except the Supreme Court).
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According to Article 1 of the Organic Law, the bodies that comprise the federal 
judiciary are:
• Supreme Court of Justice
• Electoral Tribunal




• The federal jury of citizens {El jurado federal de ciudadanos)
• The courts of the states and the Federal District in cases outlined in Article 107, 
section XII of the Constitution and in other cases when the law dictates that they should 
act in support of federal justice.
The work and jurisdiction of all federal courts, as well as the responsibilities of those
who work for the federal judiciary are regulated by the pertinent federal legislative
enactments, in particular the Organic Act of the Federal Judicial Power {Ley Organica 
del Poder Judicial de la Federacidn), the Amparo Act, the Federal Code of Civil 
Procedure {Codigo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles), the Federal Act of 
Administrative Procedure {Ley Federal de Procedimiento Administrative)) and 
secondary legislation regulating paragraphs I and II of Article 105 of the Federal 
Constitution {Ley Reglamentaria de las Fracciones I y II de la Constitucion Federal).
The Federal Judicial Council is empowered to determine the number, circuit divisions, 
territorial jurisdiction and, when appropriate, the subject matter jurisdiction of the Circuit 
Collegiate and Unitary Courts and Federal District Courts (Art. 94).
Mexico's Supreme Court of the Nation comprises 11 justices {Ministros) who sit either 
as a full court {en Pleno) or in chambers {Salas). Its sessions are public except in 
cases which for moral or public interest reasons require secrecy.
Courts are divided into those of "ordinary jurisdiction" (including, civil, commercial and 
criminal jurisdiction) and administrative courts or courts of "special jurisdiction". Courts 
of ordinary jurisdiction include federal and state courts. At the federal level, the 
Supreme Court {Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion) is the highest court in the 
land and decides the most important cases in the country. The second most important 
courts in terms of their authority and significance are the Circuit Courts {Colegiados de 
Circuito), which hear cases on appeal and amparo cases. The third tier of courts is the
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District Courts (Juzgados de Distrito), which have jurisdiction over amparo cases in the 
first instance, and which function as courts of ordinary jurisdiction on matters of federal 
law, such as commercial law cases.
Administrative law in Mexico has grown so quickly as to make it difficult to control the 
diversification of administrative regulation in the different legal areas. Administrative 
courts also exist at both federal and state levels. At the federal level are the so called 
Federal Boards of Conciliation and Arbitration (Juntas Federales de Conciliacidn y 
Arbitraje), which hear labour matters. They are very important because Mexico's 
Federal Labour Law controls every employer-employee relationship. They also include 
the Court of Agrarian Justice (Tribunal de Justicia Agraria)', the Court of Military Justice 
( Tribunal de Justicia Military, the Court of Jurisdiction over the Electoral Process 
(Tribunal de Jurisdiccidn de Proceso Electoral)', and other special courts. Local 
administrative courts include the Administrative Court of Contentions (Tribunal 
Contencioso Administrative), the Justice of the Peace Courts (Tribunales Calificadores) 
and others of minor importance.
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Chapter outlines
My thesis is organized into five chapters. The first two provide the theoretical and 
historical context for the empirical analysis contained in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The 
rationale, contents and key findings for each chapter are briefly outlined in this section.
Chapter 1. Democratic Consolidation and Judicial Reform in Latin America: is the 
Judiciary the Weakest Link in Latin American Democracies?
Although the principle of judicial independence is included in most Latin American 
constitutions, Mexico was in no way unique in having a relationship between the 
executive and the judiciary that was characterised for most of last century by complete 
subservience to the will of the executive. This chapter looks at the process of 
consolidation of Latin America’s so-called third wave democracies in Argentina, Brazil 
and Venezuela, focusing specifically on their respective processes of judicial reform.
The chapter also offers a review of new scholarship dedicated to the topic of 
accountability and rule of law in Latin America. The books and articles featured cover 
issues of relevance to this thesis such as: horizontal accountability (Schedler, Diamond 
and Plattner, 1999; Magaloni, 2003); access to justice (Mendez, O’Donnell and 
Pinheiro, 1999); judicial reform in comparative perspective (Prillaman, 2000); the 
development of political jurisprudence (Shapiro and Stone Sweet, 2002); and 
intervention of the judiciary in public policy decision (Kelman, 1987). The recent articles 
related to the Mexican judiciary concur with my conclusion that the expansion of judicial 
power within Mexico is directly related to a more plural political scenario, with greater 
separation of powers and alternation of political power in office.
Chapter 2 The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice: From Supine to Activist in a Decade 
of Judicial Reform (1995-2005)
As has been well documented, the Mexican judiciary up until the 1990s was always 
supportive of the executive though with some relative judicial autonomy around the 
amparo. This Chapter focuses on the 1994 judicial reform which represents a rupture 
with this tradition. It asks how and why the authorities adopted the reforms.
Coupled with judicial reform under Zedillo was a move towards fiscal and budgetary 
decentralisation, which brought with it foreseeable conflict between the various levels 
over rival budgetary rights. As municipalities became more fiscally powerful their 
powers needed more interpretation and so the Supreme Court was called on with
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greater frequency to resolve disputes. The chapter therefore also assesses a series of 
municipal reforms, beginning in 1983, which have fed into the process of judicially- 
created federalism.
A final section of this chapter looks at recent polls of public perceptions of the judiciary, 
as one indicator of the success of the reforms. Polling data suggest that citizens remain 
concerned about judicial independence.
Chapter 3 The Supreme Court as the Lynchpin of New Federalism: An Analysis of the 
Constitutional Controversies (1995-2005)
This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the constitutional controversies 
presented in the decade after the 1994 judicial reform. As the first building blocks of 
political and administrative organisation and the first entities to be governed by 
opposition parties, the chapter reveals that it is municipalities that are making 
increasing use of this judicial process. Some of the claims have been upheld by the 
Court, which has led to the creation of a type of legally-defined federalism. In other 
words, political pluralism has brought with it the upgrading of traditionally weak 
institutions such as Congress and the judiciary.
Chapter 4 Party Politics, Fiscal Devolution and the Separation of Powers: 
Constitutional Controversies in Seven Case Study States
This chapter provides a more detailed analysis of constitutional controversies filed in 
seven case study states. I examine the ways in which the 1994 judicial reform and the 
secondary law regulating Article 105 (outlined in Chapter 2) have created new 
opportunities for subnational actors, especially the municipalities, to assert their claims 
and agendas within the constitutional framework. The seven case study states are 
those that generated the highest number of cases filed before the Supreme Court in 
the 1995-2005 periods: Baja California, Chihuahua and Nuevo Leon, which are 
prosperous northern states and PAN strongholds; Tamaulipas, Puebla and Oaxaca, 
which are still governed by the PRI, but have multi-party structures and important 
municipalities that are controlled by the oppositions; and the Federal District, which 
was the first state entity to be governed by the PRD, in 1997.
The case studies all show how the experience of governing, even if only at the 
municipal level initially, has been vital for opposition parties and for the entire 
institutionalisation process in Mexico. Municipalities and state governments with a
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longer tradition of opposition have been more legally active and more successful in 
defending their constitutional attributions through legal channels.
Chapter 5 Electoral Justice in Mexico: State Sovereignty and the Role of Mexico’s 
Electoral Tribunal
Whereas most of my thesis looks at issues to do with federalism and the resolution of 
constitutional controversies, this chapter shifts the focus onto the electoral process 
itself. This is because it is impossible to institutionalise democracy or the rule of law in 
a democracy without public confidence in the electoral process. And a central role for a 
credible judiciary is the correction of fraudulent or biased electoral practices.
The main arbitrating body in cases of disputed elections and electoral legislation is the 
Federal Electoral Tribunal of Justice (TEPJF). Its creation in 1996 is undoubtedly 
positive in terms of electoral institutionalisation and democratic consolidation since until 
recently there were practically no mechanisms for reviewing the legality of local 
elections. Yet its performance has been controversial for a number of reasons, which 
are analysed in this chapter. The chapter discusses the TEPJF’s intervention in 
conflictive gubernatorial elections in Yucatan in 2001 and Colima in 2003; and 
municipal elections in Chihuahua in 2001; as well as the TEPJF’s new role regulating 
political party and campaign financing, in particular in connection with “Pemexgate” 
(when funds from the Pemex union were allegedly funnelled to the PRI’s campaign 
coffers) and the “Amigos de Fox” case involving alleged foreign donations.
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CHAPTER 1
Democratic Consolidation and Judicial Reform in Latin 
America: Is the Judiciary the Weakest Link in Latin American
Democracies?
A major criticism of Latin America’s third wave of democractisation—which began at 
the end of the 1970s and swept away all but a few authoritarian governments2—has 
focused on the need to develop and stabilise solid institutional structures. Scholars 
have emphasised the lack of effective accountability mechanisms in the so-called third 
wave democracies (Mainwaring and Welna, 2003; Schedler, Diamond and Plattner, 
1999; O’Donnell, 1998 a, 1998b). As Latin American countries aspire to consolidate 
their democratic institutions and secure a satisfactory level of economic, social and 
political development, adequate mechanisms of judicial accountability and rule of law 
become imperative. There is widespread recognition that judicial reform is vital to 
strengthen democratic governance and social justice and so democratisation has 
tended to be followed by a renewed interest in institutional reform, including judicial 
reform.
Within presidential systems, judicial independence is generally institutionalised through 
the principle of separation of powers. An independent judiciary serves as the ultimate 
guarantor of constitutionalism, ensuring that no agency of government acting on behalf 
of the people violates the principles of the rule of law. Although the principle of judicial 
independence is included in most Latin American constitutions, the relationship 
between the executive and the judiciary was characterised for most of last century as 
one of complete subservience to the will of the executive. Typically, Latin American 
judiciaries have been weak and over-politicised, often failing to act as effective control 
mechanisms and checks on political power. A few judiciaries, such as the Brazilian and 
Chilean, were considered quite conservative and were insulated from normal 
mechanisms of accountability. It was only with the process of democratisation 
throughout the region that judicial reform came to represent an important issue on the 
agenda. The role of the judiciary in strengthening democratic systems has not been 
openly debated until very recently.
2 Dominguez (2003) considers the decay of two of Latin America’s longest-lived democracies, Colombia 
and Venezuela; the abuse of presidential power in Fujimori’s Peru; the fragility and instability of the 
democratic regime in Ecuador (Jamil Mahuad, the only constitutionally elected civilian president, 
overthrown in 2000) and the disastrous economic performance that hurt Argentine stability in 2002.
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An examination of current changes in legislatures and judiciaries as well as other 
oversight agencies in Latin America signals that these institutions are becoming 
reasonably strong. According to Gibson, Caldeira and Baird (1998: 343) “...one of the 
most significant developments in comparative politics is the growing influence of 
judicial institutions in national and international politics”. The trend has been generally 
described as a “judicialisation” of politics (Couso, 2008; Tate and Vallinder, 1995; 
Shapiro and Sweet, 2002; Ferejohn, 2002). For Latin American specialists, too, the 
term “judicialisation of politics” can be rightly applied to Latin America given the 
growing role for courts in the region (Domingo, 2005; Sieder, Schjolden, and Angell, 
2005; Rios Figueroa and Taylor, 2006). Maravall and Przwersoki (2003: 14) agree that 
“the general consensus is that during recent times the victors in these conflicts have 
been the courts”. Even in countries with presidential systems, Supreme Courts have 
become more independent and assertive (Dominguez, 2003: 351).
This chapter offers a counterpoint to the subsequent chapters on Mexico by providing a 
comparative perspective on judicial reform as experienced in the other federal and 
presidential regimes in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. Although the 
rule of law clearly varies from country to country, certain patterns and concerns 
regarding these judiciaries can be identified: primarily, that Latin American courts have 
progressed in some areas but still remain inaccessible for all of the population, mainly 
the poor. A second common denominator is the lack of judicial independence that has 
characterised a majority of Latin America’s judiciaries. This chapter looks at the 
frequent intervention by the executive in the judiciaries of Argentina, Brazil and 
Venezuela, and the changes experienced within these judiciaries since the 
implementation of judicial reforms as part of the democratisation process.
As with the chapters on Mexico, this chapter focuses on the role that these 
judiciaries— particularly the high courts— are playing in the context of democratic 
consolidation. More specifically, it describes how the Supreme Courts in these new 
democracies have become crucial actors within their respective political systems. I 
analyse how high courts in each country have ruled on significant political and 
economic cases. For each case, I refer to the historical background of the judiciary and 
I identify the main actors or “agents of change” (Domingo, 1999) and circumstances 
which motivated and explain the recent trend towards judicial reform. This will provide 
the background needed for the following three chapters, where I study the influence 
that the Mexican Court has had on national politics since the 1994 judicial reform.
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I begin with a brief summary of the most significant literature related to the role of the 
judiciary in a democratic system, particularly in new democracies such as those that 
have emerged in Latin America. First, I will briefly refer to Kelman’s book Making Public 
Policy: A Hopeful View of American Government (1987). In terms of the US Supreme 
Court’s role in the political process, Kelman identifies the considerable formal authority 
of the US courts compared with those of other countries. In terms of its judicial review 
powers, the US Supreme Court can declare laws that Congress has passed to be 
unconstitutional and hence void. According to Kelman (1987: 115), “the Supreme Court 
has (through 1985) ruled 114 provisions of federal laws and 1,088 provisions of state or 
local laws unconstitutional.” In many cases the Court has the last say in political 
processes as many actions are not final until the Court rules so.
Kelman makes the point that although the US Court appears to have been less 
important than the other two branches of government, the impression of its increased 
importance may be misleading. In his view, the frequency with which provisions of laws 
have been declared unconstitutional is not necessarily a sign that the role of the Court 
is growing, because the number of laws itself has increased dramatically. What is true 
in the Mexican and other Latin American countries’ experience is the fact that courts 
have been getting involved in public policy in ways they rarely did in the past. Both the 
Court and Congress, which were generally neglected in the context of the Mexican 
authoritarian system, have clearly expanded their political activity in conjunction with 
the democratisation process. Although in Mexico the Supreme Courts’ jurisdiction is 
limited in terms of the types of cases it can hear, its workload has increased 
significantly and its justices have been involved in a wide range of political and 
economic issues.
Kelman also discusses the relative insulation of the Court from democratic opinion, 
which makes it easier to give effect to the values embodied in legal arguments. “The 
importance of courts in the political process thus means that rights are taken more 
seriously than they otherwise would be” (Kelner, 1987: 126). The US Court has formal 
authority separate from that of democratically elected officials, but there are also 
institutional arrangements (and informal norms) such as life terms and fixed salaries to 
insulate and encourage them to behave differently from politicians. The Court’s 
institutional design has, however, allowed for some democratic influence since justices 
are named by the president and ratified by the Senate, as has happened in Mexico 
since 1995.
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Literature review: Latin American judicial politics
Up until recently there were few political studies of the judiciary and the role it has 
played in the democratisation process in Latin America. In general, this institution was 
simply neglected for being subordinated to the executive’s will and for decades it was 
only lawyers who referred to the judiciaries. As the waves of democratisation touched 
Latin America, interest grew in discussing issues other than the achievement of 
electoral democracy, however. It is easy today to identify a growing trend of new 
scholarship dedicated to the topic of accountability and rule of law in this region. As 
Tate (2007: 1) rightly points out, a vibrant new interest in “comparative judicial politics” 
pervades the field.
In 1993, Irwin Stotzky edited one of the first major publications examining the 
significance of the independence of the judiciary, Transition to Democracy in Latin 
America. The book’s 26 articles focus on the role that the judiciary might play in 
peaceful transfers of power to reinforce the defence of human rights. The book 
concentrates on Argentina and Chile, although some authors do make references to 
other Latin American judiciaries. In 1995, Tate and Vallinder edited one of the largest 
comparative judicial politics book: The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. Substantial 
theoretical and historical contributions are offered in most of its 26 chapters, none of 
which deals with the Latin American region.
The Self-Restraining State (1999), edited by Schedler, Diamond and Plattner, collects 
articles that explore how new democracies can establish autonomous institutions of 
accountability (specialised oversight bodies) and what those agencies can do to 
achieve credibility. The book looks from various vantage points at the concept of 
horizontal accountability—the capacity of state institutions to check abuses by other 
public agencies and branches of government, as defined by O’Donnell (1994). A 
theoretical section discusses conceptual and normative aspects of public 
accountability, while empirical case studies provide descriptive accounts on electoral 
administration, judicial systems, anti-corruption bodies and central banks. The section 
on judicial systems reviews efforts to enhance judicial independence in three 
continents. In the article on Latin America, Domingo (1999) analyses the crucial role of 
the judiciary in a democracy, but also describes the obstacles that have hindered the 
development of credible legal institutions in the region. She identifies the agents of
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change that have promoted judicial reform processes and concludes with an evaluation 
of Latin America’s most recent wave of judicial reform. Eisenstadt describes regime 
change without governmental change (“democratisation through elections”) to explain 
the building of a more credible electoral administration system in Mexico.
Mendez, O’Donnell and Pinheiro’s book The (Un)Rule of Law and the Underprivileged 
in Latin America (1999) collates a series of articles that summarise the shortcomings of 
a variety of Latin American institutions, lamenting the incompleteness of the region’s 
democratic transition. The authors suggest that legal and justice systems can be used 
to reverse the region’s history of extreme inequality and injustice. Only the third and the 
last sections are related to my subject of interest. In the former, Mendez and Correa 
present articles on judicial and institutional reform and access to justice in a number of 
Latin American countries. Although the contributors acknowledge recent progress in 
the modernisation of the courts, they call for legal change and a reorientation of state 
institutions, specifically to benefit the underprivileged. In the final section, O’Donnell’s 
partial conclusion is that the potential benefits for the dispossessed have not been 
realised and a “densification” of civil rights is needed.
In their book Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition Latin America (1999), Aguero 
and Stark have coined the term “democratic fault lines” to describe pressure points that 
call into question the depth, quality and even durability of many of the post- 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America. A democracy with a weak judiciary will be 
unlikely to ensure a healthy arrangement of checks and balances on elected officials 
who may at times test the bounds of constitutionalism. “A democracy with a weak or 
politicised judiciary will have great difficulty ensuring a fair degree of horizontal 
accountability between the various branches of government” (O’Donnell, 1994).
Prillaman’s book Judiciary and Democratic Decay in Latin America (2000) focuses on 
judicial reform processes in El Salvador, Brazil, Argentina and Chile. He uses an 
interesting comparative framework of analysis to evaluate the successes and failures of 
specific reform strategies adopted in these countries. The case studies are assessed in 
terms of three variables which, in Prillaman’s view, are key concerns in judicial reform 
programmes: independence, efficiency and access. For this author, only the Chilean 
case represents a success story, because of its comprehensive approach which 
addressed all three variables simultaneously. The other reform attempts are criticised 
on the grounds that they tackle a single variable of judicial reform in isolation, that 
reforms are not implemented in logical sequence and that their design and
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implementation fails to take account of the broader political and economic context. He 
concludes that the inadequacies of judicial reform efforts in Argentina, Brazil and El 
Salvador are contributing to democratic decay in much of the region.
Shapiro and Stone Sweet’s book On Law, Politics and Judicialization (2002) is a 
compilation of eleven articles that discuss different aspects of the politics of law. It is 
theoretical, although the authors do analyse how legal systems develop in countries 
such as France, Germany and the United States, as well as the European Union. 
Shapiro argues that while the notion of an independent judiciary may have been carried 
further in the United States than anywhere else, “the central place of the Supreme 
Court in the American political scene has kept us from equating independence with 
apoliticism or defining independence in terms of an isolated sphere of competence only 
peripherally related to public affairs” (2002: 23). In his view, at least since 1937, the US 
Court and its constitutional decisions have consistently played a significant and 
controversial role in this country’s political history. Particularly interesting is the author’s 
description of the development of political jurisprudence and the subsequent 
understanding of law as politics under the theoretical framework of new institutionalism. 
The new jurisprudence has been an attempt to integrate the courts into the general 
framework of governmental institutions and political processes. Shapiro refers to the 
courts as political agents and judges as political actors, integrating the judicial system 
into the matrix of government and politics. He addresses the debate over judicial 
modesty (fundamentally apolitical in their jurisprudence, conceiving courts as non­
political institutions) versus judicial activism in order to define the political role of the 
Courts.
A historical perspective underpins Mark Ungar’s book Elusive Reform: Democracy and 
the Rule of Law in Latin America (2002). He unravels historical patterns to highlight the 
challenges facing Latin American nations as they strengthen democracy and establish 
the rule of law. He looks at a number of law enforcement agencies including the police, 
provincial governors and the judiciary, in particular in Argentina and Venezuela, 
although he also refers to other Latin American nations.
Mainwaring and Welna’s book on democratic accountability, Democratic Accountability 
in Latin America (2003) addresses a critical issue for Latin American countries: how 
democratic leaders in the region can improve accountability in order to strengthen the 
quality of democracy and deepen democratic legitimacy, while simultaneously 
promoting governmental effectiveness. Some articles on the legislature and the
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judiciary are included in a section analysing the interaction between mechanisms and 
institutions of accountability. Beatriz Magaloni’s contribution on the Mexican Supreme 
Court is a valuable piece of work, especially for this thesis. Magaloni’s argument about 
horizontal or intrastate (in Mainwaring’s terms) accountability and the courts is two- 
sided: on the one hand, she recognises that the Supreme Court has become a more 
significant actor in Mexican politics, while on the other, she emphasises the weakness 
of local courts and law-enforcement agencies. It is worth mentioning that although she 
does refer to the federal judiciary and the Court’s new role after the 1994 reform, she is 
more inclined to analyse topics related to crime and public insecurity. More recently, 
with Arianna Sanchez (2006), Magaloni presented a paper on the role of the Supreme 
Court in enforcing the constitutional order in Mexico’s emerging democracy. The 
authors analyse Court rulings in order to assess the extent to which the Court acts as 
an “authoritarian enclave” to protect the interests of their autocratic appointers. Their 
analysis provides evidence that the Court more often sides with the former autocratic 
ruling party, especially in important cases where the fiscal federal pact is challenged.
In the book Democracy and the Rule of Law (2003), edited by Maravall and 
Przwersoki, the relationship between the rule of law and democracy is analysed. The 
authors ask why governments sometimes act and others fail to act according to law, 
concluding that the rule of law results from strategic choices of relevant actors. In their 
view, distribution of power is the key factor that distinguishes the rule of law because 
“when power is monopolized, the law is at most an instrument of the rule of someone” 
(2003: 3). This idea, where no group is strong enough to dominate the others and when 
the many use institutions to promote their interests, constitutes an important basis for 
this thesis. I agree that the law rules only when conflicting actors seek to resolve their 
conflicts by recourse to law. Rule of law will only be pre-eminent if rulers and subjects 
conclude that it is in their interest to obey the law, if the rule of law becomes self- 
enforcing. The only Latin American experience discussed in this volume is the Chilean 
dictatorship, although Smulovitz’s chapter refers to Argentina and Brazil. Ferejohn and 
Pasquino’s piece is very relevant for this thesis since both authors describe the trend 
toward the displacement of the political by the juridical, of elected and accountable 
organs by non-accountable courts, especially in fragmented political systems.
Gloppen, Gargarella and Skaar’s Democratization and the Judiciary: The accountability 
function of courts in new democracies (2004) examines the political role of courts in 
new democracies in Latin America and Africa. In this volume, authors question some of 
the premises underlying the present drive towards strong constitutional government
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and judicial powers, and what happens when judges themselves are not made 
accountable. The book assesses the hyper-presidential nature of some of these new 
democracies and so it is surprising that Mexico was not considered.
From Rebecca Bill Chavez’s book The Rule of Law in Nascent Democracies: Judicial 
Politics in Argentina (2004), this thesis makes use of the idea that fragmentation of 
political powers is a necessary condition for the rule of law: party competition sets the 
stage for independent courts. Bill Chavez shows how this argument applies to the 
Argentinean case, as I will try to do while explaining the functioning of the Mexican 
Supreme Court in the context of increased political pluralism. In particular, she argues 
that the distribution of economic resources among members of a divided elite fosters 
competitive politics and can therefore lead to the requisite political fragmentation.
The book Judiciaiization in Latin America (2005), edited by Seider, Schjolden and 
Angell, offers research on the role of courts in politics and judiciaiization in the region’s 
new democracies. This volume is organised by country, with the different chapters 
analysing the role of courts and judges in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. These country chapters are complemented by a 
few topical studies on domestic violence and an introduction and afterword by 
Guillermo O’Donnell. Three relevant questions are addressed in this book: 1) where did 
the impetus for judicialisation come from, elite actors or institutional reform (“from 
above”) or from society (“from below”) or from international development agencies 
(“from abroad”)? 2) Have courts modified their decision making practices or taken 
broader roles as a result of judiciaiization? 3) How have the different types of 
judiciaiization affected regimes, politics and courts themselves? Pilar Domingo narrates 
a top-down elite-led story of judicial reform for the Mexican case. This is similar to 
Rogelio Perez Perdomo’s account for Venezuela, in which he identifies two phases of 
judiciaiization: one in which the Court was more active (1992-1999) and the second 
when politicians used it to further their own ends following Hugo Chavez’s victory. 
Catalina Smulovitz discusses the successful development in Argentina of two types of 
judicialisation “from below”, while Rogerio Arantes recounts a “mixed model” for Brazil: 
“from above” in 1988 with more impetus from within judicial institutions themselves and 
“from below” after the reform.
In 2006, Silvia lncl£n presented a paper on the relative strength of judicial 
independence in Mexico compared with other experiences of judicial reform in Latin 
America (Argentina, Peru and Ecuador). She explores the extent to which electoral
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incentives and divided governments explain the levels of executive power and the 
incentives for and capacity to strengthen judicial independence both at the initiation 
and the implementation stages of reform. She concludes that Mexican judicial 
independence can survive only for as long as conditions of divided government prevail 
or until Court rulings present a politically vital threat to the executive.
Linn Hammergren’s (2007) book Envisioning Reform: Improving Judicial Performance 
in Latin America analyses the problems in the judicial reform process in Latin America 
over the past two decades and suggests how “to keep the movement on track” and 
strengthen the rule of law. In the first part, the author presents an overview of the 
history of judicial reform since the 1980s, in order to examine and evaluate five 
approaches that have been taken to judicial reform. Her work is interesting since she 
manages to trace the historical and strategic development of judicial reform in the 
region, as well as its intellectual origins and the role of local and international actors.
Also in 2007, Cornelius and Shirk edited Reforming the Administration of Justice in 
Mexico, which includes articles on five key themes in Mexican justice reform: crime and 
criminology, policing and police reform, legal actors and judicial reform, civic 
mobilisation and oversight in the justice system and policy recommendations for future 
improvement of the justice system. The book examines the challenges Mexico faces in 
reforming the administration of its justice system while presenting an up-to-date 
analysis of the functioning and imperfections of the Mexican justice system.
Again in 2007, Julio Rios Figueroa published a revised version of an IFE article (2004) 
in which he argues that the fragmentation of political power can enable a judiciary to 
rule against the interests of power holders without systematically being challenged. By 
analysing Mexican Supreme Court decisions, Rios demonstrates that the probability of 
the Court’s voting against the PRI increased as the PRI lost the majority in Congress in 
1997 and the presidency in 2000.
In sum, the recent articles related to the Mexican Judiciary concur that the expansion of 
judicial power within Mexico has been directly related to a more plural political 
scenario, division of power and alternation of political power in office. While Magaloni 
and Sanchez argue that the expansion of judicial power has worked primarily to the 
benefit of the former autocratic regime by “dismissing important cases” that could hurt 
the former ruling party, Rios Figueroa shows that the rulings against the PRI increased 
as this party lost the majority in Congress in 1997. Moreover, while exploring some of
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the strategies that the Mexican Court has used to build political capital as it gained a 
more active role, Staton (2004) points out that the Court has attempted to legitimise 
itself by “going public” and appealing to the general population to publicise 
controversial decisions, especially those which struck down important public policies.
World Bank Literature
The World Bank introduces judicial reform in Latin America as “a necessary 
precondition for encouraging new investment” (Dakolias and Said, 1999: 1). Both 
authors argue that, as opposed to Eastern European countries, Latin America did not 
include the judiciary as part of the initial public-sector reforms, but left it until the 
second generation of reforms which focus on institutional strengthening. Overall, the 
main aim of the judicial reform project is to build an impartial, predictable, accessible 
and efficient judicial system. As opposed to these authors’ narrow, mainly economic, 
explanation of the national and international factors that explain judicial reform 
processes in the region, I will argue that in Mexico judicial reform was also motivated 
by the more pluralistic political scenario and the emergence of an increasing number of 
disputes between different levels and branches of government under the control of rival 
political parties. The cases of Argentina and possibly Venezuela are perhaps a better fit 
with the World Bank’s analysis. However, as will be seen in this and subsequent 
chapters, judicial reform in Brazil and particularly in Mexico also responded to national 
aspects of the democratisation process and the need for internal actors to have a more 
independent judiciary. Thus, not only has public opinion begun to play a larger role in 
decision-making as democracies stabilise (Dakolias and Said, 1999: 1), but the 
judiciary has become a crucial actor in policy-making in the region.
In 2002, World Bank Institute researchers Kaufmann and Kraay presented a revised 
empirical strategy organising a large set of indicators measuring subjective perceptions 
regarding the quality of governance across countries (2002: 7). The authors draw 
conclusions that are in line with the existing evidence on the importance of good 
governance for economic development. The authors identify the term of ‘state 
capture’— referring to the illicit influence of the elite in shaping the laws, policies, and 
regulations of the state (2002:30)— as a fundamental governance challenge in many 
transition economies. Mexico is one such country that has gone through periods of illicit 
influence by powerful elites, especially during the long PRI era.
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In their updated set of worldwide governance indicators (covering 175 countries for the 
period 2000-01), the authors argue that while the majority of countries in Latin America 
fare well on the “voice and accountability” measure, most do surprisingly badly on the 
other three dimensions of governance: government effectiveness, rule of law and 
control of corruption. Particularly interesting are the results for the rule of law category 
which includes
several indicators that measure the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions 
of the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness 
and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. These 
indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment 
in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social 
interactions (2002: 6).
Democratisation and federalism in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela
Before looking at judicial reform in the three comparison countries, it is worth 
remembering that many of the initial publications on democratic transitions emphasised 
the importance of the mode of transition for explaining the subsequent likelihood of 
democratic consolidation.3 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) have emphasised the 
differences between transition by regime collapse and pacted transitions, concepts that 
overlap with Juan Linz’s (1978) terms ruptura por golpe and ruptura pactada. Share 
and Mainwaring (1986) refined the typology by breaking down the category of pacted 
transition into “transition through extrication” and “transition through transaction”, 
depending upon the strength of the authoritarian government throughout the process.4 
Huntington (1992) groups processes into three broad types, transformation, 
replacement and transplacement,5 according to the group that took the lead in ending 
the authoritarian system, the elites in power, opposition groups, or joint action by 
government and opposition groups, respectively.
3 According to O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead, transition “is the interval between one political regime 
and another", delimited on the one side by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian 
regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of 
authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative (1986: 6).
4 Share and Mainwaring (1986) introduced the term “transition through transaction" to characterise the 
institutional framework that supported the democratic transitions in Spain and Brazil, where there was an 
enormous need to negotiate crucial features of their transitional processes.
5 A more inclusive typology is that of Karl (1990) and Karl and Schmitter (1991) which with four polar ideal- 
types addresses the differences between “transitions from above” and those in which mass actors played 
a much more defining role. One of their major findings (also noted by Stepan and discussed by O’Donnell 
and Schmitter) was that “transitions from below", such as Guatemala (1946), Bolivia (1952), Cuba (1959) 
and Nicaragua (1979) did not generate stable democracies.
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Garreton and Newman (2001: 9) introduced four democratic scenarios reflected in the 
process of political democratisation in Latin America. Firstly, they refer to transitions 
where democracy is the result of movement away from a military or formal authoritarian 
regime through political mechanisms. Of my case study sample, both Argentina and 
Brazil are examples of this. They also talk about the scenario of democratisation 
through reform, where the process is initiated by the government to extend or enlarge a 
restricted or semi-authoritarian democracy (Mexico and Colombia). Thirdly, the authors 
refer to a democratic foundation scenario where democracy is installed for the first time 
after civil wars and revolutions, mainly in the Central American region. Finally, they also 
talk about regression and crisis when a new or consolidated democracy suffers a major 
crisis that threatens to regress to a non-democratic situation, such as Venezuela.
As I argue in the subsequent chapters on Mexico, some of the critics of presidentialism 
(Lijphart, 1984; 1999; Stepan, 1999) neglect to take federalism into account, as one of 
the institutional arrangements that can alleviate the majoritarian feature of presidential 
systems by providing channels of expression for the opposition parties at the 
subnational level. The thesis will put forward that it is not only the Congress and the 
judiciary that can counterbalance the executive power, but also the federal condition of 
a presidential system such as the Mexican where there can be several opposition 
regional governments that counterbalance the presidential power. As will be discussed 
in subsequent chapters, the federalist arrangement in Mexico has not only provided the 
path for a gradual political change, but has also made it possible to strengthen regional 
governments under the “new federalism” trend in the context of democratic 
consolidation. Moreover, authors such as Holland (1991) and Shapiro and Stone 
(1994) coincide that federalism contributes to legitimate judicial activism, because it 
imposes discipline on the states with respect to the federal Constitution. It is interesting 
to note that in contrast to Mexico, where constitutional controversies are now regularly 
used to resolve problems between different levels and branches of government, both 
vertical and horizontal, Brazil and Argentina, do not have a legal instrument specifically 
designed to address conflicts between vertical levels of government (Navia and Rfos- 
Figueroa 2005, 204-205).
Argentina’s judiciary: the legacies of human rights abuses and corruption
Unlike other countries in Latin America, Argentina had a relatively independent 
judiciary throughout the nineteenth century. Despite several attempted rebellions, 
between 1862 and 1930 Argentina enjoyed constitutional stability and the Court was
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capable of resolving conflicts with sufficient neutrality.6 This independent democratic 
tradition started to disappear with the rise of Peronism in the 1930s. According to Miller 
(2002: 78-85), the most serious event was the impeachment of all but one of Court 
judge in 1946 and 1947 under the civilian government of Juan Peron.7 Although the 
Court continued to operate during the military administrations, it is worth noting that 
between 1930 and 1976 the Court was replaced on seven occasions. It also suffered 
attacks under democratic governments. These arbitrary interventions curtailed judicial 
independence by modifying retirement ages or simply placing the courts in recess and 
prohibiting some judges from returning to the bench (Biles, 1976).
After the 1976-83 period of military rule, President Raul Alfonsln (1983-89) took office 
with broad popular support, pledging to “restore ethical values and the rule of law” 
(1993: 43). In general terms, Alfonsln was committed to strengthening institutional 
independence and the defence of human rights. He highlighted the importance of the 
separation of powers and the judiciary’s role in controlling the exercise of power by the 
executive and legislative branches (1993: 41-42). His main objective was to replace 
the military-appointed Supreme Court with a civilian one that would be democratic 
enough to trial the military officers accused of human right violations during the Dirty 
War (1976-83). He managed to overturn the military’s 1982 amnesty law, a move that 
was ratified by the Court together with another bill that guaranteed that federal civilian 
courts would have the last word on trials involving human rights abuses. This created 
tension since having independent judges judging military officers while ensuring the 
stability of a civilian regime were not mutually reinforcing activities.
In sum, Alfonsin’s government focused on strengthening the individual and institutional 
independence of the courts, rather than improving their efficiency and accessibility. His 
main goals were to:
• Completely revamp the criminal justice system
• Establish small claim courts
• Increase decisional output of the Supreme Court (an additional set of laws 
was established to expedite the appeal process)
• Redefine the scope of responsibility of courts presiding over non­
commercial conflicts such as inheritance disputes. (1993: 48)
6 The Argentine judicial system comprises 25 independent judicial branches which include the National 
Judicial Branch, 23 provincial judiciaries and the City of Buenos Aires Judicial Branch. Other important 
offices within the judicial system are the Attorney General’s Office, the Ombudsman’s Office, the Ministry 
of Justice and Human Rights and the Federal Penitentiary Service.
7 As vicepresident of the military government between 1943 and 1946, Peron had several confrontations 
with the Court. After Per6n was elected in 1946, he wanted to eliminate the Court as an opposition source 
(Miller, 2002: 80). The Peronists had a two-thirds majority in Congress as well as control of the Senate, 
which meant the outcome of the impeachment process was a foregone conclusion: the only member of the 
Court not to be sacked was the newly appointed Tomas Casares, who sympathised with Peron.
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According to Prillaman (2000:116), Alfonsm’s most impressive achievement was to 
reduce the sharp judicial partisanship that had characterised the courts of virtually all 
his civilian predecessors: “Alfonsln offered two of the five seats to judges that had even 
served in past Peronist administrations, the only Radical Party president ever to make 
such an offer...The nomination and approval proceedings in the Senate went smoothly 
and were widely recognised as a noncontroversial process.” In Smulovitz’s (2005: 161) 
terms, the Argentinean judicialisation process was promoted “from below” as a 
“discourse of rights”.
It is also worth noting the judiciary’s increasing assertiveness vis-3-vis the other 
branches of government: the courts went so far as to challenge government policies, 
as in the case of the Austral Plan. Nevertheless, as expected, the military opposition 
strongly rejected what they felt was persecution by a left-leaning president. Because of 
the military reaction, the courts were unable to bring all the military figures involved 
before a judge, and what was called the “politicisation of the judiciary” began. Several 
thousand cases involving human rights abuses by the military were presented before 
the courts which resulted in an intolerable caseload and, eventually, in the decision by 
Alfonsin’s government to pursue charges only against senior commanders who ordered 
the crimes (under the Law of Due Obedience, sent to Congress in 1987). Trial delays 
increased dramatically between 1983 and 1989 to the point where according to 
Buscaglia and Dakolias (1996) the courts were not accessible because they were 
inefficient.8 This motivated people to solve their problems by negotiation rather than 
through legal means (in contrast to the Brazilian case, discussed below).
The decision to stop certain military trials affected the credibility of the courts, giving the 
impression that the executive had not been strong enough to pursue the judicial reform 
and, more importantly, that judicial processes were still defined by political rather than 
legal considerations.9 But on the other hand, confrontations between civilian judges
8 Almost 80 percent of the Argentines described the courts as inefficient and nearly half thought they were 
inaccessible (Buscaglia, et.al., 1995: 5)
9 Chile’s first democratic governments started a legal battle against members of the military government. 
After the 1997 judicial reform, human rights prosecutions produced modest successes. While the judiciary 
was a respected institution prior to the 1970s (Valenzuela, 1989), scholars criticised its conservative 
position and resistance to judicial modernisation. During Pinochet’s regime, the courts accepted the claims 
of the military government. In his last months in government, Pinochet appointed 9 of the 17 Court judges. 
Following Pinochet’s detention in London, the Chilean Court lifted his parliamentary immunity, though it later 
argued that he was not fit to stand trial. In July 2002, former Mexican president Luis Echeverria was called 
to explain his involvement in the 1968 and 1971 massacres. In October 2002, a historic military trial 
against generals Francisco Quirbs and Arturo Acosta got underway after the Military Attorney General's 
Office established that both had ordered the assassination of 143 guerrilla members during the 1970s dirty
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with the still strong military sector in many cases compromised their individual 
independence and personal security, putting at risk the efficacy of civilian institutions 
and raising the threat of future military rebellions. Added to these complexities was the 
difficult economic situation the country was going through, together with the loss of 
presidential control over Congress. Overall, the entire democratic transition process 
was compromised as conflicts between the executive and the military increased, to the 
point where Alfonsln was forced to resign six months before his administration ended.
In sum, while the Argentine judiciary became more professional and independent at the 
end of the 1980s, it was not necessarily more effective or attractive to foreign investors. 
The judiciary under Alfonsln was not only perceived as inefficient and inaccessible, but 
also became less credible and effective over time. His judicial reform showed how 
difficult it ist to isolate this complex but relevant institutional process from the broader 
political-transitional context.
Carlos Menem (1990-94) and his judicial reform: the ghost of reelection 
When Carlos Menem took office in 1990, the need to reform the judiciary became 
evident, especially given his ambitious free-market economic programme and plans to 
modernise the Argentine state. Menem did not want to risk the judiciary overturning 
parts of his economic legislation as it did Alfonsln’s Austral Plan. According to 
Prillaman (2000), Menem pursued two main objectives within the judiciary: increasing 
access and efficiency, and strengthening “juridical security”. Menem’s reform efforts 
were backed by World Bank experts and were wide-ranging, encompassing reforms of 
the internal judicial bureaucracy.10 In reality, though, this was a period when the 
judiciary was seen as being clearly subordinated to the executive and over-politicised.
Menem’s main reforms to the judiciary were:
1) The number of Supreme Court justices was increased from 5 to 9, ostensibly to 
improve judicial efficiency (Ley No. 23.774, 16 April 1990).
war. This was the only product of a long political transition and the victory of an opposition party in the 
presidential elections. While comparing the cases of Argentina, Chile and Mexico, Fernandez (2002) 
argues that although the ajuste de cuentas in Chile was insufficient, the consolidation of the Concertacion 
coalition was possible and Aylwin transferred power peacefully to Eduardo Frei and then Socialist Ricardo 
Lagos in a stable economic and social climate. In the Mexican experience, most accountability cases 
against senior politicians have been little more than political spectacles, far from achieving true justice.
The agreement between Argentina and the Inter-American Development Bank (Support Program for the 
Judicial System Reform-BID Loan OC-AR 1082) was signed on 18 February 1998 (Gershanik 2002: 11). 
From an international perspective, the Argentine judiciary had been left for last, after structural reforms had 
taken place. Although the initial idea of judicial reform came from the executive, the pilot experience in 
Argentina is an example of a cooperative effort between the judiciary and the executive (Dakolias and 
Said, 1999: 14).
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2) A two-third Senate approval was now required as opposed to the previous 
simple majority to select Supreme Court justices.
3) Constitutional guarantees for the salaries of members of the Supreme Court 
and lower Tribunals were introduced.
4) The Judicial Council (Consejo de la Magistratura, article 114) was created and 
later regulated by Law 24.937 and its “corrective” 24.939 (Boletin Oficial, 6 
January 1998), with responsibility for administering the judicial budget,11 and 
upgrading the Justice Secretariat to a full ministry.
5) Declaration of the public prosecutions service (Ministerio Publico) as an 
independent body (article 120).
6) Creation of a Trial Jury (Jurado de Enjuiciamiento).
Menem also introduced a number of measures to improve efficiency and access to the 
courts. Yet despite these strategies poorer citizens still faced long delays for 
resolutions: between 1989 and 1996 the total of pending cases more than doubled. As 
Prillaman points out, the modest progress in the areas of efficiency and access was 
overshadowed by the unreformed aspect of judicial independence.12 For the average 
person, the politicisation of the courts was clear, and Menem was widely thought to be 
using the courts to protect himself against accusations of corruption. As scandals 
involving members of the judiciary were published by the media, a main issue of 
concern for Menem was the need to control the courts so that justices would not hold 
his administration accountable. He offered incentives such as ambassadorships to 
justices affiliated to the Radical Party and was able to appoint six of the nine justices 
thanks to the expansion of the Court and the resignation of two justices.13 Menem also 
doubled the numbers of public prosecutors and judges in Buenos Aires and created a 
new appellate court, appointing more than 90 percent of all the judges in this province.
As opposed to the Brazilian case, Argentina’s justices did not challenge a single 
presidential decree under Menem, and even ruled that these were legitimate in times of 
economic emergency and congressional inefficiency (Rogers, 1994). This was 
especially significant since, although Menem had a congressional majority at the 
beginning of his term, most of his reforms were implemented by emergency executive 
decrees; he issued more than 200 of them during his first three years in government. 
According to Miller (2002: 75), the Court’s obedience to President Menem reached
11 Several provinces in Argentina introduced councils before the adoption at the federal level. The 
Argentine Federal Judicial Council is one of the largest in Latin America comprising 20 members who are 
elected for a four-year term with one possible reelection (Hammergren, 2002). The Supreme Court drafts 
its budget and sends it to the Judicial Council for observations. As in Mexico, the Court's Chief Justice is 
also President of the Judicial Council, which can sometimes lead to conflicts of interests (Nazareno, 1999: 
30). For instance, nine out of 22 judges and magistrates removed by the Mexican Judicial Council between 
1995 and 2007 were reinstalled by the Supreme Court (Fuentes, Reforma, 8 December 2008).
12 By the end of Menem’s administration, Argentina ranked 43 out of the worst 46 countries for the lowest 
confidence in fair administration of justice (International Institute for Managerial Development, 2000).
13 The Senate approved Menem's choice on 19 April 1990 during a seven-minute secret congressional 
session without any opposition representation. The resignation of judge Jorge Bacqu6 insured an 
"absolute majority" for Menemism.
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ridiculous heights, for instance when in 1993 the Court forced the Central Bank to pay 
the expenses of the lawyers who had collaborated in the liquidation of a bank, and then 
withdrew this decision to rule in favour of the government.
According to Skaar (2003: 156), the only motivation behind Menem’s judicial reform 
was his reelection. Where Alfonsin’s bid to promote reelection had failed, Menem was 
able to secure congressional approval for the reelection amendment to the Constitution 
in 1994 in exchange for a number of constitutional reforms, including the 
depoliticisation of the courts. Yet the promised measures such as a non-partisan 
Magistrates Council and the creation of a Public Ethics Department were never 
successfully implemented as true independent offices that could counterbalance the 
executive.
During the periods of economic recession under President De la Rua (1999-2001) the 
Argentine Court adopted the Latin American trend of judicial activism. In February 2002 
the Supreme Court ruled that a freeze on bank accounts decreed by the federal 
government, commonly called the “corralito”, was unconstitutional. After this ruling, and 
in the context of financial collapse, President Duhalde (2002-03) called for the 
opposition to impeach the Court, which was accused by many politicians of being 
corrupt and completely subordinated to political interests.14
Kirchner (2003-07): attempting to breathe life into the Supreme Court
There was renewed interest in reforming the judiciary under President Nestor Kirchner, 
who was elected in 2003, after what was probably the most serious economic and 
institutional crisis in Argentina in recent times. Kirchner promised to address the 
perceived lack of independence of the Supreme Court and to restore the rule of law. 
According to Daniel Brinks, Kirchner faced a dual dilemma:
on the one hand, a politicized and openly partisan Supreme Court, 
discredited and the subject of popular and elite demands for 
resignation or impeachment while on the other, the appearance 
that by removing all sitting justices he would himself be simply 
perpetuating a long tradition of appointing subservient justices that 
would compound and extend the problem [of the perceived lack of 
independence]. (Brinks 2005: 608)
14 Some 30 challenges related to incompetence were filed against the Court, which became the subject of 
intense protests. One of the most controversial rulings released from house arrest Menem and his brother- 
in-law Emir Yoma who faced charges of organising illegal arms sales during his time in office. After more 
than five months, the 6-to-3 ruling was that there was not enough evidence of such an illicit association (21 
November 2001). Another ruling in July 2001 related to salary and pensions cuts by President de la Rua.
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In June 2003, the Supreme Court was reformed by decree 222/03. With this reform, 
Kirchner implemented two strategies: one to address transparency in the judicial 
appointment process and another to replace some, but not all, of the Menemist 
Justices on the Court. Kirchner promoted a gradual and more transparent, public and 
deliberative appointment process, limiting his own discretion through a self-imposed 
presidential decree (Law No. 30175, 19 June 2003).
Impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress in 2003 resulted in the replacement of 
four judges who were perceived to be subordinated to Menem. On 27 June 2003 Chief 
Justice Julio Nazareno resigned his post before the impeachment could be held. Within 
two years of his taking office, the Court was made up of four judges named by 
Kirchner, two of them women, one by President Duhalde and two judges remaining 
since Alfonsin’s administration (see Table 1.1). Kirchner’s proposed candidates were 
perceived as more independent from political parties. The final impeachment approved 
by the Congress was of Antonio Boggiano on 23 June 2005. Augusto Belluscio 
resigned in June 2005 when the amnesty laws were declared unconstitutional and 
annulled by the Court.
Table 1.1 Arigentine Supreme Court Justices 2009
Elected Judge Election Date Main Features
Named by N6stor Kirchner
Ricardo Luis Lorenzetti December 2004 
Replaced Adolfo Vazquez
Chief Justice since 
November 2006
Elena Highton de Nolasco June 2004 
Replaced Eduardo Molin£
Deputy Chief Justice since 
September 2005 following the 
resignation of Augusto 
Belluscio
Eugenio Raul Zaffaroni October 2003 Born in 1940
Carmen Marfa Argibay February 2005 Born in 1939
Named by Eduardo Duhalde
Juan Carlos Maqueda December 2002 Born in 1949 
Former Senator
Named by Raul Alfonsln
Carlos Santiago Fayt Court justice since 1983 Born in 1918 
Chief Justice in 2003
Enrique Santiago Petracchi Court justice since 1983 Born in 1934. Chief Justice in 
2004-06.
Source: http://www.csin.aov.ar/autoridades.html; http://www.adccorte.org.ar/
On 13 August 2003, Kirchner issued Decree 588/03 which established a transparent 
procedure for the appointment of staff from the public prosecutions service and judges 
sitting in lower courts. In 2004 the government launched the “Strategic Plan on Justice 
and Security 2004-2007” to address public concern about crime and increasing 
insecurity. According to Walker (2006: 3), it is still uncertain whether Kirchner’s reforms 
will reinforce the judiciary, but there is no doubt that he helped to restore some public
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confidence in the Supreme Court by increasing transparency in the nomination 
process. However, the reforms have their critics, including Chief Justice Eugenio 
Zaffaroni, who was appointed by Kirchner in 2003 and said “The Court issue was really 
a reform of people. I think we need to focus on the institutional aspect... the reforms 
were incomplete and absolutely irresponsible” (La Nacion, 16 December 2007).
In December 2005, Kirchner was forced to withdraw from Congress a controversial 
judicial reform that would have given him greater control over the judicial council 
(Consejo de la Magistratura). The proposal had been introduced by his wife, then 
Senator and now current President Cristina Fernandez, who argued that the reform 
was necessary because the judicial council had suffered from bureaucratisation since 
its creation in 1994. Opposition congresswoman Elisa Carrio criticised this initiative, 
saying it would bring about “the end of justice” (El Reloj, 27 December 2005). The 
reform was finally approved by 149 votes in favour and 89 against (Ley 26.080, 24 
February 2006), but was criticised for having long-term implications for judicial 
independence. The number of councillors was reduced from 20 to 13 and the number 
of political representatives among them increased to seven, thereby giving them the 
majority needed to veto candidates and block removals. The impeachment tribunal 
(jurado de enjuiciamiento) was also politicised by Kirchner’s reforms. The number of 
members was reduced from nine to seven: four legislators, two judges and one federal 
lawyer, guaranteeing once again the majority to political representatives. Following the 
defeat of the ruling party in the 2009 legislative elections, new Minister of Justice Julio 
Alak promised to revise the composition of the judicial council (El Clarin, 11 July 2009).
Brazil’s independent judiciary: resistant to reform
According to Wesson and Fleischer (1983: 84), the Brazilian High Court has generally 
been free from the intense politicisation and recurring purges that characterised other 
judiciaries in the region. The only exceptions were in 1893 and in the post-1930 coup 
context, when President Getulio Vargas politicized the judiciary through court-packing 
and several dismissals, and by reducing the number of judges from 15 to 11. The 
Brazilian judiciary was modelled after the US Constitution with guaranteed fixed and 
non-transferable terms for judges, irreducible salaries and extensive powers of judicial 
review over acts of the other two branches of government. The judiciary gradually 
became considerably decentralised, but presented problems in terms of effective 
disciplinary action and accountability.
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It was not until after the April 1964 military coup that judicial independence became 
severely compromised. The Brazilian military regime (1964-85) placed itself above the 
1946 Constitution, wiping out powers of judicial review and reducing institutional 
independence of the courts through 17 Institutional Acts and more than 100 
Complementary Acts (Prillaman, 2000: 77). With Institutional Act (Al) No. 1, the juntas’ 
decrees were presented as the highest law and were excluded from judicial review. 
Institutional Act No. 2 expanded the Court from 11 to 16, as the military regime forced a 
number of justices allegedly sympathetic to former presidents Getulio Vargas and Joao 
Goulart to step down, and replaced them with justices more willing to uphold the 
government’s extensive use of emergency decree powers. Moreover, on grounds of 
the threat to national security, the military regime was allowed to decide over local 
issues by reallocating them to the Supreme Court. The military centralised resource 
disbursement and conditioned it on the Court’s political loyalty. Institutional Act 5 was 
introduced in 1968, giving the president the power to remove or retire any sitting judge. 
A subsequent institutional act reduced the number of justices to 11, forcing several 
justices who had been appointed by previous civilian governments into retirement.
In 1977, Congress failed to approve a constitutional amendment proposed by the 
military junta to curtail the purview of civilian courts and create an external oversight 
body to discipline judges. In response, General and President Ernesto Geisel merely 
suspended Congress and declared that the judicial reform bill would be an amendment 
to the Constitution. Brazil’s first judicial council was created in 1977 with no budgetary 
or administrative functions, only disciplinary (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2008: 209). 
Although it was designed to provide the appearance of judicial independence, in reality 
this council could not constrain military interference with the courts and was abolished 
in 1988 with the return to democracy.
Despite this situation, Courts continued to challenge the federal government in specific 
cases: they ruled in favour of political detainees and on the unconstitutionality of the 
National Security Law (Prillaman, 2000: 78). During this time, the military tried to 
maintain the fagade of legalism. There are parallels to be drawn with Mexico, where the 
institutionalisation of the regime was aimed at achieving legal support for the 
hegemonic government. Skidmore (1988: 58) has argued that the military government 
had a “frenzy for law” and “penchant for formal legitimacy”. In the mid 1970s, the 
military allowed the courts to assert their authority on increasingly controversial issues 
and re-establish some degree of independence. Court decisions against the military 
government became more common and the judiciary gained political power.
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Table 1.2 Number of judges. Brazil’s Federal Supreme Tribunal (1808-2004)
Name Period Number of 
Judges
Casa da Suplicapdo do Brasil (10/05/1808-08/01/1829) 23
Supremo Tribunal de Justipa /IMPERIO (09/01/1829-27/02/1891) 17
Supremo Tribunal Federal Since 28/02/1891
a) 1891 Federal Constitution 15
a) Decree 19.656, 1931 
(Revolutionary Government))
11
Supreme Court c) 1934 Federal Constitution 11
d) Federal Law 1937 (Estado 
Novo):
11
e) 1946 Federal Constitution 11
f) Institutional Act n° 02/1965 16
g) Federal Law 1967 16
h) Institutional Act n° 06/1969 11
i) Carta Federal de 1969 11
j) 1988 Federal Constitution 11
Source: http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=sobreStfConhecaStfHistorico
Brazilian democratisation and judicial reform
The return to civilian rule in the 1980s brought a desire for further democratisation. 
Judicial reform entered onto the political agenda, especially after the election in 1985 of 
Tancredo Neves who in his cam paign promised a new dem ocratic Constitution. The  
tragic death of this politician before taking office dam aged prospects for a more 
independent judiciary. He was succeeded by his vice president, Jose Sarney, who, 
because of his non-elected status and his previous support of the military governm ent’s 
judicial reform bill, lacked the legitimacy necessary to implement a coherent 
institutional reform, especially in the context of economic downturn, political disarray  
and with the heterogeneous cabinet he was forced to accept. The focus of the political 
discussion shifted to the possibility of adopting a parliam entary form of government.
According to Prillaman (2000: 79), the counterproductive role played by President 
Sarney is one of the key factors that explain the failure of judicial reform. Others 
include the nature of Brazil’s opportunistic and extrem ely divided political class, and the 
country’s populist approach to judicial reform. Congressm en elected in 1986 started 
drafting the new Constitution and opened the process to civil society. According to 
M acaulay (2002: 2), the resulting 43  articles of the 1988 Constitution that lay out the 
structure and powers of the courts and the public prosecution service bear the stam p of 
the chaotic drafting process and the corporate interests of judges and lawyers groups 
whose influence shaped the final text. The Brazilian courts acquired more political and
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operational autonomy than anywhere else in Latin America, but this hyper-autonomy 
and insulation appeared to create more problems than it solved.
The 1988 Constitution: enhancing judicial independence
The 1988 Constitution strengthened the Brazilian judiciary in relation to the other 
powers, but at the same time it created a strong area of conflict among them. Since the 
main aim was to avoid the centralisation that characterised the authoritarian period, the 
judiciary was made structurally independent of the executive. The eleven members of 
the Supreme Federal Tribunal (STF) would be appointed by the President, while judges 
would be chosen on the basis of a civil service exam conducted by senior courts.15 The 
redefinition of the judiciary’s attributions established the STF as the highest organ, 
which would be predominantly constitutional and act as a court of exceptional appeal.
Three main changes were introduced in the new Constitution to increase judicial 
independence:
• The courts would have more control over their financial, personnel and 
administrative issues and state courts would have the power to prepare the 
annual budget for the judiciary and present it directly to congress; judicial 
salaries could not be reduced. The rationale for these changes was to 
safeguard impartiality and autonomy, but the result was a lack of accountability 
for the judicial system, which left the door open to nepotism and corruption.
• All judges were given life tenure (Art 95) until the age of 70, with the possibility 
of removal by the Senate in specific cases. Aspiring judges would be required 
to pass a rigorous professional entrance exam. This led to a crisis due to the 
lack of qualified judges, with implications for efficiency.
• In an attempt to strengthen regional judicial independence, the power to 
assume jurisdiction from a lower court was removed from the STF. The lower 
court judges consequently acquired high levels of discretion; in contrast to the 
other federal countries in Latin America, Brazil is the only country in which 
decisions of higher courts exert no power of binding precedent over lower 
courts (sumuia vinculante), including in constitutional disputes. An attempt was 
made to create of a nationwide system of small claims courts, but it proved 
unsuccessful and was replaced in 1995 by a federal small claims court system.
According to Koerner (199: 12), “the 1988 Constitution strengthened the judiciary in 
relation to the other powers by creating new control procedures regarding the 
constitutionality of the laws, instruments for the defence of collective interests, etc. At 
the same time, it strengthened its external independence, extending the guarantees of
15 While the Senate could remove Supreme Court justices through a judicial impeachment process, the 
lower court judges could only be removed by senior courts.
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its members, organisation and performance.” However, O’Donnell (1999: 116) has 
warned that “judicial autonomy is tricky...[because] it could mean that the courts will 
become dominated by a political party or coalition of not very commendable interests, 
or that judges will adopt the notion of their powers and mission that leaves no room for 
accountability to other powers in the state and society.” He has criticised the Brazilian 
judiciary in this respect, arguing that it has acquired great autonomy in relation to the 
executive and Congress with no visible improvement in its performance. Judges and 
other court personnel earn high salaries and senior judges enjoy enormous privileges.
Judicial review and the risk of politicisation
In an effort to reduce the caseload of the federal STF, the 1988 Constitution created a 
separate Superior Court of Justice (STJ). The 33-member STJ would function as a final 
court of appeal, while the STF would serve as a constitutional court. As such, and as in 
Mexico, the STF has the exclusive power to hear a direct challenge to any federal or 
state law in what is known as Direct Actions of Unconstitutionality (Agao Direta de 
Inconstitucionalidade, ADIN). Whereas during the military regime, cases of 
unconstitutionality could only be brought by the Attorney General, following the 
democratisation process, the following political and social actors could also do so: the 
President, the Chair of the Federal Senate, the Chair of the Federal Congress, the 
Chair of Legislative Assemblies, state governors, the Federal Council of the Brazilian 
Bar Association; a political party represented in Congress; and a trade union, 
confederation or national professional association (Sadek, 1995).
As happened in Mexico (see Chapters 2, 3 and 4), the number of cases taken to the 
Court multiplied to the point of becoming unmanageable. Faro de Castro (1997: 246) 
calculates that between 1988 and 1992, 113 ADINs were filed by political parties and 
the Court only managed to rule on six of them. As has been said for the Mexican case, 
several claims referred to routine political or economic activities that were motivated by 
partisan interests and did not involve genuine constitutional issues at all. As political 
actors and society in general demanded more agility and coherence in its rulings, the 
Brazilian Court was increasingly exposed to strong criticism for assuming a political 
role as an ultimate referee in sensitive issues.16
16 Bastos and Kerche (1999) have argued that since the judiciary can also interfere in the political decision­
making process through an extremely open and decentralised system of control over the constitutionality 
of the laws, it is committed to the political sphere, increasing the cost of government.
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In 1993, a constitutional reform authorised a limited number of entities to request a 
declaratory judgment from the STF confirming the constitutionality of a law or other 
federal norm, including presidential decrees. As Brinks (2005: 618) argues while these 
rulings were given erga omnes effect, decisions in direct actions challenging the 
constitutionality of legislation remained inter partes, which favours the party in power.
A notable case was the unprecedented congressional impeachment of President 
Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992 in which the Court was cast as arbiter between the 
executive and congress. The Court also decided other cases of corruption involving 
well-known politicians. Equally important was the frequent need to call on the Court to 
define the legality of executive decrees, which has become a common feature of the 
Brazilian government since the 1990s. As has been happening in Mexico since 1994, 
in Brazil the Court had the crucial task of deciding whether a President, by issuing 
provisional measures, was exceeding his constitutional authority, while at the same 
time defining the roles and prerogatives of each branch of government. In Mexico, too, 
the authoritarian regime’s tendency to reform the Constitution continuously (Chapter 2) 
also affected the supremacy of Supreme Court decisions.
According to Sadek (1995), the current state of separation of powers in Brazil has 
forced the Court to act as political arbiter in institutional confrontations between the 
federal government and Congress, rather than as a constitutional court. Sadek and 
Batista (2003: 203) argue that the institutions that comprise the justice system have 
begun to occupy a central position in the political arena, even influencing how public 
policy is being implemented. “The political performance— either against the executive 
or the legislative, or against the two powers— has shown how a system based on multi­
vetoes can be the root of the country’s ungovernability, and how it has contributed to 
soil the image of the judiciary” (Sadek 1995:161).
In sum, the goal of promoting individual and structural independence clearly was 
successful (Prillaman, 2000: 75; Macaulay 2000). However, a relevant question in a 
country that has suffered decades of politicisation of the judiciary is whether it is 
desirable to insulate the judiciary entirely from the more political branches of 
government. As Prillaman describes, during the 1993-94 constitutional review process, 
“12 of the 18 proposals for judicial reform called for introducing some form of external 
oversight of the judiciary” such as publicised internal disciplinary measures and 
external bodies to investigate the courts (2000: 86). Unsurprisingly, judges argued that
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such reforms would pose a threat to judicial independence. The judiciary clashed with 
the executive when Cardoso introduced a law in 1996 banning federal judges from 
hiring relatives, including in-laws; and it clashed with the legislature after the Senate 
created a commission to investigate judicial corruption in 1999. Another important 
question is whether reforms that increase access to the courts and allow even minor 
disputes to be presented as constitutional challenges have made the Court’s workload 
unmanageable. Compounding matters, in an effort to ensure that politically sensitive 
cases would not be shelved indefinitely, the STF was denied the writ of certiorari,17 
which stripped the Court of its control over its own timings and decisions.
Brazil under Lula: how to reform an unaccountable judiciary?
With higher crime indicators and the government suffering from a crisis of confidence 
brought on by corruption scandals, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003-) was more eager 
than ever to push judicial reform. From his first days in office, he publicly confronted 
Chief Justice Mauricio Correa over the independence of the judiciary and the need to 
include the judges in the public service pension cuts (Gosman, El Clarin, 7 June 2003). 
Judges threatened to strike over their pensions, which stirred popular anger. Supreme 
Court Justices’s salaries are higher than the public sector ceiling that the government 
wanted to impose, at more than 70 times the minimum wage, or 17,170 reais (Gosman, 
El Clarin, 7 June 2003). According to report published on 25 March 2004 in The 
Economist, the “16,900 judges seem old-fashioned, out of touch and unaccountable to 
the citizens they serve." The same report states that GDP growth is a fifth lower than it 
would be if Brazil’s judiciary were up to first-world standards.
In terms of the isolation and unaccountability of Brazil’s judiciary, Lula’s government 
created a new judicial council (Consejo Nacional de Justicia) with a very different 
structure from its predecessor to monitor the management and probity of the judiciary 
(Enmienda No. 45, 8 December 2004). As expected, Correa and most of his fellow 
judges opposed this measure on the grounds that a council of this type would 
undermine Judicial independence. Lula’s government agenda also contemplated 
allowing federal courts to take over human rights trials and to finance management 
training forjudges. Reforms designed to streamline civil justice were approved in 2006, 
while other reforms related to criminal law were passed in Congress in 2008.
17An order by a higher court directing a lower court, tribunal, or public authority to send the record in a 
given case for review.
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Since Lula was inaugurated in office in 2003, he has nam ed eight of the eleven  
Suprem e Court Justices, a record since the reestablishm ent of dem ocracy in 1985 (see  
Table 1.3). In June 2003, Lula nam ed three Justices: Antonio C ezar Peluso (current 
deputy chief justice), Carlos Aires Britto and the first black justice, Joaquim Benedito 
Barbosa G om es. The next Justices to be nam ed w ere Eros Roberto Grau (June 2004), 
Enrique Ricardo Lewandowski (March 2006) and Carm en Lucia Antunes Rocha (June 
2006). After the death of Carlos Alberto M enezes, Lula nam ed the youngest Court 
judge, a 4 1 -year old lawyer who had worked on his electoral campaigns, Jose Antonio 
Dias Toffoli (October 2009). Justice Gilm ar M endes is the current Chief Justice.
Table 1.3 Number of STF Justices appointed 
by each Brazilian President (1930-2009)
PRESIDENT NUMBER OF MINISTERS
Getulio Vargas 21
Jose Linhares (*) 3
Eurico Gaspar Dutra 3










Fernando Collor de Mello 4*
Itamar Franco 1
Fernando Henrique Cardoso 3
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva 8
Source: http://www.stf.aov.br/institucional/notas/
*ln December 2000, Collor named the first woman to the Court bench, Ellen G. Northfleet.
In sum, there is wide agreem ent that the 1988 Constitution extended unprecedented  
power to the judiciary, making it probably the most autonomous and independent in 
Latin Am erica. Unlike the experiences in Argentina under M enem , in Brazil guarantees  
of judicial independence granted in 1988 such as life tenure and non-transferability of 
judges have not been modified. W hile Brazil’s executive and legislature reinvented  
them selves through elections, the latter becoming a serious counterweight to the 
executive, the judiciary remains unaccountable, even as it decides over an increasing 
num ber of significant political and social issues involving other branches of 
government.
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Venezuela’s judiciary: a battleground for competing political ideologies
As the crisis of the Venezuelan political system deepened during the 1980s, 
successive governments made efforts to introduce reforms of the 1961 Constitution. 
The Presidential Commission for the Reform of the State (COPRE), established via 
presidential decree on 17 December 1984 under the government of President Jaime 
Lusinchi (1984-89), presented in 1986 an Integrated State Reform Programme (PRIE) 
containing a series of reforms aimed at developing internal party democracy. The 
corruption and incompetence of the judicial system was widely perceived as propping 
up the old Venezuelan state. But although the need for judicial reform was included, it 
was not taken up.
President Carlos Andres Perez (1989-93) resumed the discussion on constitutional 
18reform. A central proposal was to reduce political parties' influence over the judicial 
system and to establish a High Commission of Justice with authority to remove judges. 
Traditionally, the majority party in Congress appointed judges and members of the 
Supreme Court. A quarter of the Court held permanent positions, but the rest could be 
easily dismissed, which made them vulnerable to reprisals if their decisions went 
against the interests of politicians or powerful businessmen. For instance, during the 
1994 banking scandal, judges decided to drop charges against more than 20 bankers 
who had come close to bankrupting Venezuela’s financial system. Similarly, the 
recommendations to investigate corruption charges against former President Lusinchi 
were ignored, even after one of the Court justices resigned in protest. As in Argentina, 
with the implementation of a drastic economic adjustment programme, legal certainty 
and the reliability of the judicial system became key issues of interest since the courts 
were not able to settle disputes between public authorities.
Rey argues that "in modern, democratic Venezuela, the distrust of judicial power has 
risen as political parties have taken over the judiciary by increasing their control over 
the judicial branch appointments and decisions" (1998: 126). Party control over the 
judiciary explained why, as accusations of corruption became more common, judges 
were unable to act against political interests and even began to "sell" their sentences. 
By the end of the 1980s, the judicial system was suffering from a serious case backlog. 
Between 1970 and 1991, the ratio of judges to the population decreased by 29 percent
18 In the wake of the Chavez coup attempt in 1992, the "Special Joint Chamber Commission for the 
Revision of the Constitution", presided by former president Rafael Caldera, published a draft reform project 
and presented it to Congress. Little consensus emerged, however, and it was abandoned in August 1992.
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and the time to process cases exceeded the legal standards. Poorly trained judges 
were derided for their partiality and dishonesty.
As Kornblith (1998: 15) has argued, "the poor functioning of the administration of 
justice is generally recognised in the country as a major cause of the loss of democratic 
legitimacy and, as a result, it has been another crucial issue on the agenda for political- 
institutional change." In his view, after the period of instability derived from the 1992 
coups was over, judicial reform returned to its fundamental place on the agenda of 
institutional change.
President Rafael Caldera (1994-98) attempted to revive the idea of a new Constitution 
under his Agenda Venezuela programme, but with little success. In 1996, the Senate 
Special Committee's report recommended a minimum allocation to the administration 
of justice of 5 percent of the national budget, the creation of a constitutional division 
within the Supreme Court and a disciplinary system for judges. There was no power 
strong enough to lead and implement the much needed judiciary reform, however, and 
though Caldera resuscitated the High Commission for Justice and at one point a coup 
against the judiciary was mooted, no significant progress was achieved.
The World Bank: an underwhelming reform plan
International organisations have been far more active in promoting the development of 
the judicial branch in Venezuela than in other countries in the region. In the early 
1990s, the Venezuelan government requested assistance from the World Bank to 
combat corruption and promote public transparency, and the judiciary was identified as 
the ideal institution in which to start such reforms. The implementation of the Judicial 
Infrastructure Project to reduce private and social costs of justice began in 1995.
Court Chief Justice Cecilia Sosa in her speech at the 1999 Ibero-American summit of 
Supreme Courts acknowledged “the input of the World Bank, which has economically 
and technically supported the Venezuelan judicial reform process...This is the first 
time, in my opinion, that an international organisation has had no intention of imposing 
ideas, but rather contributed technical professionals, experiences and economic aid” 
(1999: 15). For the US-based Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights and the 
Venezuelan NGO Provea, this hands-off approach by the World Bank was one of the 
reasons for the reform project’s failure. The say the project was not designed as part of 
a comprehensive long-term reform programme, and merely identified a range of
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problems without developing a corresponding series of reform initiatives. They argue 
that international support has focused only on specific infrastructure improvements and 
has not developed a wider programme encompassing judicial independence.
The scope and content of the judicial reform project were negotiated between the 
World Bank, the Judicial Council and President Carlos Andres Perez’s administration. 
There was a limited input from the judicial community and the private sector and no 
input from NGOs or the general public. The project’s political viability was entirely 
dependent on the support of President P6rez and was almost concluded during the 
waning days of the Velazquez interim presidency. One result of the lack of consensus 
on the scope of reform was a fragmented, uncoordinated discussion of reform options 
among executive ministries and legislative committees.
Chavez’s administration: a new era fora diminishing Supreme Court
Hugo Chavez’s victory in the 1998 elections ushered in a new era in the history of 
Venezuela.19 Upon taking office, the former military coup leader signed a decree for a 
national referendum on whether elections should be held for a National Constituent 
Assembly that would draft a new constitution. This was held in April 1999 and 
supported by 88 percent of voters.
Once in place, Chavez asked the New Constituent Assembly, which was largely filled 
with Chavez supporters, to produce a new constitution in the shortest time possible, 
providing a draft of his own. Since then, judicial reform has been tightly linked to the 
constitutional changes promoted by Chavez, resulting in the domination of the judiciary 
by the executive power. Judicial reform had been high on Chavez’s list of priorities, 
since it had been a main motivator of the 1992 coups. In Chavez’s opinion, "justice is 
not agile, it only reaches those who can afford it. Is that justice? It is impossible to 
restore the rule of law unless the undermined institutional framework is reformed” 
(1999: 14).
After weeks of political turmoil, on 14 August 1999 the National Constituent Assembly 
abolished the 1961 Constitution. The new Constitution established a single legislative 
chamber and strengthened political decentralisation with more accountability at the
19 In December 2005, the Movimiento Quinta Republics (MVR) in coalition with Unidad de Vencedores 
Electorates (UVE) gained the majority in the National Assembly. The MVR took 114 congressional seats 
out of 167, as most parties, including Accidn Democratica (AD) and the Comite de Organizacidn Polltica 
Electoral Independiente (COPEI), did not present candidates fearing electoral fraud. On 15 December 
2006, President Chavez announced the end of MVR and created the Partido Socialista Unido de 
Venezuela (PSUV).
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local level and new powers to the indigenous population Invigorated by the 1999 
referendum result, the Assembly granted the president emergency powers and 
supported a general drift towards a more presidentialist system. In terms of the 
judiciary, the Assembly reduced the congressional input in the appointment of judges 
and pushed for civil society participation in the nomination of judges at all levels. On 25 
August 1999, Chavez decreed a "judicial emergency” and appointed nine members to 
form a Commission with full powers to dismiss the Court (Decree 310.499). A “judicial 
emergency commission” was set up within the Assembly to draft the legal clauses of 
the new constitution and to evaluate the work both of judges and of Court members. 
Despite bitter opposition from Chief Justice Sosa, eight of the 15 Justices supported 
the decree. Sosa resigned, declaring that the country's democratic system was in 
danger. According to Ellner, the new Chief Justice Ivan Rincon “collaborated with 
Chavez to a certain extent, although he also sharply criticized some of his actions” 
(2001: 8). A new disciplinary commission headed by the lawyer Manuel Quijada, found 
that at least half of the country's 1,200 judges were guilty of corruption or 
incompetence and should be sacked.
On 5 November 1999, the Supreme Court and the Judicial Council were dissolved and 
replaced by a new Supreme Tribunal of Justice (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, TSJ), 
organically different from the Supreme Court, which adopted both functions.20 The TSJ 
incorporated a new Constitutional Court and introduced oral arguments in order to 
make justice more expeditious. The TSJ was given functional and financial autonomy; 
in contrast to Mexico, the judiciary is guaranteed at least 2 percent of the general 
federal budget. TSJ judges are named for a single 12-year period in a selection 
process managed by a Nominations Committee with civil society participation, and 
approved by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly. The 30-year old Judicial Council 
was replaced with the Executive Management Council for the Magistracy (Direccion 
Ejecutiva de la Magistratura).
Before enacting the new constitution, Chavez issued a decree to modernise the judicial 
system in 2000. Quijada's commission began to draft the legal clauses, which
20 Because the new Supreme Court was appointed by Chavez’s slim majority, its independence from the 
executive was severely questioned. In June 2000, the Court dismissed well-documented charges of 
corruption against Legislative Commission President Luis Miquilena. In the meantime, the Commission on 
the Functioning and Restructuring of the Judicial System started to replace judges in December 1999. By 
the end of March 2000, 294 judges had been suspended, 47 others fired, and 101 new judges appointed 
(Coppedge, 2003: 189). It was argued that most of these judges were corrupt or had ties with one of the 
traditional parties, as the courts had been long infiltrated by partisan or family-based “tribes”.
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suggested new procedures for the selection and training of judges, as well as new 
monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms.
In August 2002, the Court dismissed a case against four senior military officers 
involved in a coup attempt against Chavez in April 2002. The Court absolved the 
officers of the charge of rebellion, arguing that there were no grounds to judge them. 
However, the justices were deeply divided: 11 out of the 20 magistrates voted to 
absolve the officers, eight voted to put them on trial and one did not show up to cast his 
vote. Although the Court had previously been known for its loyalty to Chavez, the 
verdict was considered a sign of its increasing independence (Economist, 2002). It 
coincided with a rupture between Chavez and his former interior minister, Luis 
Miquilena; some of the judges appeared to have followed Miquilena into opposition. 
Following the ruling, Chavez called for constitutional reform. He strongly disagreed with 
the Court’s decision, describing it as “absurd” and demanded that the judges be 
investigated. He accused them of corruption, favouritism and even drunkenness (CNN, 
21 August 2002).
Venezuela's Court gradually became a battleground in a divided country as opposition 
leaders pushed for constitutional measures to oust the president. These measures 
included a referendum, an attempt to shorten his term and a number of lawsuits 
against him on the grounds of corruption, mental insanity and crimes against humanity. 
For Chavez's supporters, in contrast, the Court was a bastion of the political opposition, 
with a history of influence-peddling, political interference, and corruption.
The National Assembly weighed into the dispute by repealing the 1976 Organic Law of 
the Venezuelan Supreme Court and replacing it with the Organic Law of the Supreme 
Court of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Gaceta Oficial N° 37.942, 20 May 2004, 
http://www.tsj.gov.ve/legislacion/nuevaleytsj.htm). The 2004 Organic Law expanded 
the Court from 20 to 32 justices, which government supporters interpreted as a 
strategic move to counter the influence of pro-coup judges, while for government 
detractors it represented an executive branch attempt to gain control over the judiciary. 
The law regulating the functioning of the new TSJ stipulates that the new nominees can 
be named by a simple majority, should efforts to name them with a two-thirds majority 
fail three times in a row. The justices can be removed “for serious offences” by a two- 
thirds vote of the National Assembly. Another controversial provision is that the 
appointments can be annulled if the judge does not fulfil all the requirements laid down 
in the constitution.
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The new law gave the Assembly's slim governing coalition the power to obtain an 
overwhelming majority of the Court's seats. Moreover, the National Assembly gave 
itself the power to annul the appointments of sitting justices on subjective grounds. 
Immediately after the law was approved, pro-Chavez legislators started taking action 
under the law, voting to remove one justice from the Court and to initiate proceedings 
against other justices perceived as hostile to Chavez and his views.21
With the Assembly now enjoying the power both to pack and purge the Court, the 
threat to judicial independence is clear. A Human Rights Watch report (2004) urged the 
Venezuelan government to suspend the new court packing law, and called on the high 
court to take steps to ensure that lower court judges are not subject to political 
persecution. The report even suggested that the Organization of American States 
(OAS) closely monitor the situation of the Venezuelan judiciary.
In May 2007, the Court declared "inadmissible" an injunction request by Radio Caracas 
Television president Marcel Granier against Chavez’s decision not to renew his 
station’s broadcast license. This led to serious national and international protests 
against Chavez’s influence on the Court and its lack of freedom. The truth is that since 
Chavez came to power a decade ago, the independence of the judiciary has been 
undermined and once again subordinated to the executive’s will.
Conclusions
This chapter has focused on judicial reform as part of the process of democratic 
consolidation in Latin America. In presenting a brief summary of the most significant 
literature related to the role of the judiciary in a democratic system, particularly in new 
democracies such as those that have emerged in Latin America, it becomes clear that 
whereas this was an understudied area in the past, recently there has been a 
significant growth in comparative judicial political research. This new body of literature 
recognises and analyses the political nature of the courts. In this review I looked most 
closely at scholarly books on Latin American judiciaries by political and social scientists 
who have perceived a growing role for the courts in the region. This trend justifies the 
assertion that there has been a “judicialization of politics” in Latin America.
The case studies on Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela highlight how much judicial 
reform has been undertaken in Latin America following redemocratisation. In some
21 On June 2006, Supreme Court judge Luis Velasquez Alvaray was permanently removed from his post 
after refusing to appear before the National Assembly to defend himself from corruption charges. He 
argues that Chavez’s supporters in the National Assembly have instigated the proceedings because he 
would not let them control him in the Supreme Court.
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countries, such as Argentina, the effect of reform has been to strengthen the judiciary. 
This, for the most part, is the story in Mexico as I will reveal in subsequent chapters. 
However, the strengthening of judicial powers is not an inevitable consequence of 
reform. In Venezuela, but way of contrast, significant efforts have been made by 
successive administrations, helped by the World Bank, and yet its judiciary is now more 
politically controlled than ever.
Much of my discussion of reform efforts focused on the need to create an independent 
judiciary. Given my focus on federalism and the separation of powers, I am keen to 
understand the changing role of Supreme Courts within their respective political 
systems in these comparison countries over the last few decades, and hence an 
appreciation of their autonomy vis-a-vis de other branches of government is crucial. 
After highlighting the lack of judicial independence which characterised Argentina, 
Brazil and Venezuela in the past, including the frequent intervention by the executive, I 
unravelled the changes these judiciaries have undergone since the implementation of 
judicial reforms as part of the democratisation process and showed how high courts in 
each country have started to rule on significant political and economic cases.
The judicial reform strategies and their motivations have been quite different. Certainly 
across all three countries democratisation and economic liberalisation, within the 
framework of global governance, constituted an important incentive for several 
governments to implement judicial reform projects in the late 1980s and 1990s. The 
dramatic rise in crime rates and public insecurity in the region and the involvement of 
international donor agencies were other push factors for reform. In Argentina, the main 
drive for legal reform responded to historical factors, namely the need to deal with past 
human right violations (Kritz, 1995; McAdams, 1997). In his own words, Raul Alfonsin 
argued that his first objective as President “was to implement effective judicial 
protection of human rights” (1993: 43). However, in Brazil the opposite happened. The 
1988 Brazilian Constitution mostly introduced structural changes within the judiciary. In 
Venezuela, reform became the battleground for competing ideological visions, with the 
judiciary representing, variously, the corrupt heart of the ancient regime, or the 
stomping ground of an overreaching authoritarian president.
Venezuela offers an interesting case study of the involvement of international donor 
agencies in Latin American judicial reform. According to Domingo and Sieder (2001) 
the World Bank became a major actor in promoting judicial reform efforts at critical 
moments in the democratisation processes in many Central and South American
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countries. Similarly, as Mendez (1999: 223) points out, although judiciaries have been 
particularly resistant to change, they have not generally rejected offers of outside 
assistance. Yet while too much money has been wasted— partly due to the failure to 
consult users of judicial services or beneficiary communities—the fault does not lie 
entirely with the naivete and inexperience of international donors (1993: 224). In 
Mendez’s view, one of the main problems has been the lack of creativity of national 
governments to understand how they could best use this assistance. Another problem 
is that, mindful of not intervening in sensitive issues, international donors failed to pay 
much attention to crucial issues such as the independence and impartiality of the 
courts. The international community’s priority, as exemplified in Venezuela, has been to 
improve judicial infrastructure, to ensure efficiency in terms of delivery of service and to 
promote expeditious resolutions of investment disputes.
Despite the differences in motivation and approach, there are some parallels in terms 
of the results of the reform efforts. In general, these Latin American courts have been 
strengthened in some areas, particularly in terms of judicial appointments, but remain 
inaccessible for all the population. Some strategies, such as those followed by Kirchner 
and by Ernesto Zedillo in Mexico (which will be analysed in Chapter 2), placed great 
importance on the need for a strong judiciary to act as a horizontal check on 
presidential power within a more plural political scenario.
Brazil offers an interesting case study in terms of independence. The Brazilian judiciary 
enjoys unrivalled levels of independence within Latin America as well as extremely 
generous terms of office. Yet for some analysts, Brazil’s pivotal 1988 judicial reform is 
a clear example of failure, since, in the words of Prillaman, “reformers successfully 
created the independent judiciary they desired -  but in the process swept aside the 
balancing constraint of accountability. In failing to tackle judicial efficiency, reformers 
did not anticipate the potentially disastrous results when an inefficient judiciary is, in 
turn, given excessive independence. And finally, neither the extremely modest 
efficiency measures nor the ambitious access strategies could be isolated from the 
broader political and economic forces in Brazil” (2000: 82-83). In other words, 
comprehensive judicial reform strategies are needed to reinforce Latin American 
judiciaries so that they can serve as real horizontal checks on power, and it is important 
to acknowledge that not all judicial reforms are mutually reinforcing.
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CHAPTER 2
The Mexican Supreme Court of Justice: From Supine to Activist 
in a Decade of Judicial Reform (1995-2005)
One of the main objectives of my research is to understand an important but somewhat 
neglected aspect of the democratisation process, namely the progressive institutional 
differentiation of the judiciary vis-a-vis the political executive. The Mexican experience 
in this regard makes for a critical case study. Throughout the thesis, I will explain how 
the Mexican governmental system came to be reformed so as to provide scope for 
such differentiation. This offers the backdrop for understanding how the judiciary 
became the venue of choice for opposition-led state governments to contest 
constitutional and other political issues (the subject of the empirical analysis in 
Chapters 3 and 4). I examine how formal institutional changes to the judiciary led to 
substantive changes in the role played by Mexico’s Supreme Court, especially in 
political controversies. This case study aims not only to illuminate this sub-process of 
democratisation as it occurred in Mexico, but also to attract wider research efforts to 
the law-politics connection in Latin American studies of democratisation.
Whereas the previous chapter analysed the Argentine, Brazilian and Venezuelan 
judiciary, in this chapter I focus on the Mexican judicial system. My main unit of 
analysis is the Supreme Court of Justice, which I selected to emphasise the importance 
of its new role in the context of democratic consolidation. I show how the Mexican 
Supreme Court has been transformed during the past decade from a pure enforcer of 
legality, which was generally subordinated to the executive, into a real interpreter of the 
Constitution and even a final arbiter in many political disputes.
The chapter looks briefly at some of the most significant judicial reforms since 
independence (see Table 2.1), before honing in on the judicial reforms instituted since 
1994, the reactions of political parties and the media to these reforms, and the recent 
selection of Supreme Court judges. The 1994 reforms sit within a context of continual 
reform of the judiciary since it was first created as part of the independent republic in 
1824, but they represent a rupture with previous (mostly cosmetic) reforms in that they 
actually enhanced judicial autonomy and independence. This chapter takes a crucial 
look at why the Mexican authorities adopted this deep judicial reform in 1994. In 
analysing the reforms, I trace shifts in the relationship between the judiciary and the 
other powers of government. While not always the main aim of reforms— in 1994, for 
example, the need for a predictable justice system to underpin economic development
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was at the forefront of President Zedillo’s mind—the effect in terms of increased 
autonomy of the judiciary in its dealings with the executive and legislatures at federal, 
state and municipal levels is clear. Two indications of this shift are: public perceptions 
of the judiciary’s independence and performance (discussed below); and the number of 
constitutional controversies presented at the different levels of government over the 
past decade (analysed in Chapter 3).
Although the key arguments posited by this thesis focus on judicially-created 
federalism and therefore on the relationship between the judiciary and the executive, 
the third power of government also comes into play. This is because fragmentation of 
power among executive and legislative bodies can contribute to a more effective 
judiciary by diffusing the pressure on the Court that can emanate from a single source 
of power; in Mexico’s case up until recently this was the federal executive.22 In this 
scene-setting chapter, I therefore begin with short sections on federalism and on 
fragmentation of power with a focus on the executive-legislature relationship, before 
discussing judicial independence and the 1994 reforms.
Political pluralism and the institutionalisation of federalism in Mexico
Although according to Article 40 of the Constitution, Mexico is a “federal, 
representative, and democratic republic,” for most of the past century federalism 
remained inert in Mexico because of the lack of competition and the absence of 
political plurality. Since independence Mexico has always held elections, even under 
authoritarian conditions, but for years these were largely meaningless exercises in 
legitimating. Yet the system did permit small opposition parties to play a limited part in 
the process of government and very occasionally, even before 1989, opposition parties 
were declared the winners in municipal elections. This distinguishes Mexico from most 
Latin American authoritarian systems, which did not have regular elections.
The presence and absolute dominance of a hegemonic party was sustained by a series 
of ever-changing laws designed to build electoral institutions that could oversee non­
competitive elections. During the long period when the PRI was dominant and elections 
were widely considered fraudulent, electoral institutions were the main point of 
negotiation between opposition parties and the government. Even though Mexico was 
a highly centralised country with a virtually unchecked executive power, it was the 
possibility of forging an electoral opening that preoccupied the opposition.
22 For a discussion of fragmentation of power and its impact on Mexico’s judiciary, see Rfos-Figueroa 
2007.
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The first steps toward democratisation involved greater pluralism in local elections, 
thanks largely to the political reform of 1977, the municipal reform of 1983 and the 
introduction of proportional representation in state governments in 1986. These made 
the electoral process in municipal and state government more important to Mexican 
democratisation than in other patterns of democratisation. They also led to a rapid 
increase in electoral conflicts (Loaeza, 2000; Middlebrook, 1986; Molinar, 1991). 
However, it was not until the so-called “definitive" reforms of 1996 that a free and fair 
democratic process can be said to have become entrenched.
A key agent of change in this process was the centre-right PAN, which had been 
protesting electoral fraud since the 1940s and by the mid-1980s governed more than 
30 municipalities, including the state capitals of Chihuahua, Durango, Hermosillo, San 
Luis Potosi and Guanajuato. A pivotal moment was the controversial 1988 election 
which resulted in a sharp fall in the PRI’s historic levels of voter support. The centre-left 
National Democratic Front (FDN, which later became the PRD) and its popular 
candidate Cuauhtemoc Cardenas claimed victory and refused to recognise the 
presidency of PRI candidate Carlos Salinas. Had the PAN sided with the PRD, the PRI 
would have faced a political crisis that it might not have been able to surmount. 
Instead, the PAN offered a negotiated solution that would facilitate its gradual path to 
power via political alternation at the local level.
A decisive step came with the PAN victory in the Baja California elections of 1989. 
Once it became clear that this opposition victory would be allowed to stand—which was 
a controversial question at that time and required the intervention of the Courts—the 
question of how governance would work in practice with different parties governing at 
different levels could not be avoided. The issue became more salient still as opposition 
victories in local and state elections became increasingly common after 1989.
Yet while the PAN steadily accumulated governing experience in a number of strategic 
states and major cities, the fate of the PRD was bleak. Without a solid party structure 
and facing deep internal conflicts, the PRD lost much of its electoral support after 1988 
and failed to win a single gubernatorial contest until 1997. Moreover, reprisals for its 
confrontational stance towards Salinas’s government were severe. It has been well- 
documented that the Salinas administration was characterised by the selective nature 
of its democracy, to the clear detriment of the PRD (Bruhn, 1998). For instance, during 
the state elections of July and December 1989 in the leftist strongholds of Michoacan 
and Guerrero, massive fraud was registered in order to avoid a PRD-controlled local 
congress. Another example of the failure of central government to relinquish control
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over subnational governments was the practice of removing governors at will; Carlos 
Salinas removed 17. Thus, although Salinas spoke the language of political reform in a 
bid to re-legitimise the regime as he tried to drive an economic liberalisation and free 
trade agenda, state and local elections continued to be conflictive events involving tacit 
pacts and backroom deals that systematically jeopardised regional autonomy.
As democratisation developed further electoral transparency finally ceased to be the 
main focus of discussion in Mexican politics, and the issue of separation of powers 
became tied in with broad issues such as judicial reform and fiscal decentralisation. 
This has theoretical significance for the study of presidentialism since it demonstrates 
that judicially-led federalism can have positive outcomes for pluralism even under 
presidentialism. In sum municipal and state governance was important in Mexico 
because it gave the system something to bargain with. The system could, at least 
initially, make non-threatening concessions that were large enough for the opposition to 
accept and fostered democratisation at a whole variety of levels.
The watershed moment in terms of institutionalising democracy in Mexico came when 
President Ernesto Zedillo took office in 1994 with a “new federalism” agenda. In a 
personal interview in 2001 he described a need to end with the “decadence” of blanket 
decision-taking from the centre. Under Zedillo, the PRI-PRD relation changed and 
there was a clear commitment to recognise victories by any opposition party. Profound 
electoral, judicial and devolutionary fiscal reforms altered the juridical and political 
landscapes.
The 1997 mid-term elections resulted in the first non-PRI-dominated Congress, the first 
PRD governorship (in the Federal District) and further gains for the PAN. Although a 
number of PRI hardliners resisted democratic progress, the PAN’s presidential wins in 
2000 and 2006 proved without doubt that political pluralism at the subnational level can 
enhance the likelihood of gradual democratisation. William Riker (1964) has argued 
that the most important variable for defining the nature of a federal system is the party 
system and its competitiveness. Although other studies insist that the authenticity of 
federalism is measured by the distribution of fiscal resources, Riker was one of the few 
who argued that it was useless to decentralise the fiscal system when the centre still 
dominated the political scene. I follow his line of argument, suggesting that for the 
Mexican case fiscal federalism was important but not as significant as political 
pluralism, which has facilitated an institutional discussion by a plurality of political 
forces at the state level of the other issues of the federal agenda.
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The context for reform: political fragmentation, the legislature and the status
There is a body of literature on fragmentation within the political organs of government 
(also known as divided government) which posits that the more fragmented political 
power, the less pressure the judiciary will face to rule in favour of the government’s 
interests (e.g. Chavez 2004, cited in Rfos-Figueroa 2007). Indeed as the below 
sections show, for the many decades when the PRI dominated the federal executive 
and legislative powers as well as most state governments, self-interest would dictate 
that judges rule in the government’s favour since reprisals for not doing were severe, 
including court packing and purging or curtailing the judiciary’s budget. Moreover, the 
fact that the judiciary depends on the other organs of government for implementing its 
decisions can also foment a deferential attitude. Separation of powers theorists also 
suggest that there is a link between greater fragmentation and the increased 
involvement of courts in policymaking since individuals or organs of government that 
seek to resolve conflicts will tend to gravitate toward institutions from which they can 
get solutions (Ferejohn 2002, 9-14; Bednar, Eskridge, Ferejohn 2001, 233, cited in 
Rios-Figueroa 2007).
In this section I trace the results of federal and state elections in Mexico to show how 
the composition of Congress has become more fragmented in recent years (see Table 
2.5) and assess the impact this has had on policy-making, including by the judiciary.
During the long period of PRI hegemony and especially during the 1935-88 period, the 
President was able to push bills and constitutional reforms through Congress without 
needing to build legislative coalitions. For the past decade, however, not only 
Congress but also the state legislatures have become more active in the process of 
policymaking. It is worth noting that a constitutional reform initiative must be approved 
by a two-thirds vote in both houses of congress and ratified by 16 of the 31 state 
legislatures.
As Figure 2.1 shows, the PRI lost its two-third majority in Congress in 1988, hence all 
reforms passed since then reflect in one way or another some bargain with at least 
one opposition party (see Pozas-Loyo 2005). The PRI lost its absolute majority in 
Congress in 1997 and the two main opposition parties combined to form a majority in 
the lower chamber, producing the first partially divided government in more than half a 
century. For the first time in many decades, the parliamentary behaviour of the
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opposition defined the coalition-building process, as opposition parties were 
transformed from mere symbolic checks into pivotal actors within the Congress (Nacif 
2002: 255).
Shifts in the balance of powers between parties began to have an impact on the output 
of Congress even before 1988, however: from 1982 to 1988 the executive ceased to 
be the main initiator of bills, though the approval rate for presidential initiatives 
remained very close to 100 percent. But the change was much more profound after 
1988 when there was a notable rise in the number of bills introduced by legislators. As 
shown in Figure 2.2, the LIV Legislature (1988-91) was characterised by radical 
obstructionism strategies by opposition parties that wanted to force changes in 
legislation and parliamentary proceedings. Only 44.5 percent of the bills were passed 
during this period compared with 53.8 percent approved by the Lll Legislature (1982- 
85).
The PRI increased its majority in Congress at the 1991 elections, and the new PRI 
leadership introduced new rules aimed at preventing obstructionism by the opposition. 
The approval rate during this period increased to 60.7, but fell again to 43.2 percent in 
the period after the 1994 election when the opposition made gains in Congress. 
Probably the most indicative figure is the very low 16.9 percent approval rate 
registered after the 1997 elections when the PRI lost its historic majority in Congress. 
It is also important to note that the number of bills introduced during this period 
compared with the previous one increased by 147 percent, many introduced by the 
opposition.
The first partially-divided government did not produce legislative paralysis, however. 
Of the 37 presidential initiatives presented to the LVII legislature, 32 were approved by 
the lower house; on many important issues this was thanks to alliances forged by 
President Zedillo with the PAN, which supported his economic reforms. Thus the 
divided government did not necessarily affect the presidential initiative approval rate, 
but rather the number of the executive’s share of bills presented to Congress. Of the 
500 bills presented by congressmen, only 99 were approved. In sum, the loss of the 
PRI majority in the lower chamber did not produce deadlock in the law-making 
process.
The government became completely divided when President Fox of the PAN was 
inaugurated into office in 2000. The PRI retained its dominance over the Senate while
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the PAN fell well short of having a majority in Congress, with only 208 of the 500  
seats. But just as the PAN becam e the centre of the coalitional system under Zedillo, 
the PRI becam e the main supporter of Fox’s government, in the first half of his term at 
least. The  resulting relationship between Fox and Congress was not free from tension, 
however, and the most important of his reforms were rejected by the divided 
Congress. The  Suprem e Court was drafted in to adjudicate in an increasing num ber of 
important discussions, including the indigenous rights bill, deregulation of parts of the 
electricity sector and tax exemption for beverages m ade with corn syrup. The Court 
was also asked to intervene in disputes between the executive and the Senate on 
various occasions, typically over nominations of judges to various courts. These cases 
are discussed in Chapter 3.
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Source: Adapted from Maria Amparo Casar (1999), Benito Nacif (1997).
Ju d ic ia l in d ep e n d en ce  and the  legacy  o f the  h eg em o n ic  reg im e
Traditionally, M exico’s judiciary was viewed as a branch that had been subordinated to 
the executive in a strongly presidentialist and essentially undemocratic regime. The  
national Suprem e Court of Justice and its state-wide equivalents enjoyed little effective 
independence. Towards the end of the 19th century and especially through the 
Porfiriato (1 8 7 6 -1 9 1 1 ), the Court was still subordinated to the executive branch. In 
1900, the Ministerio Publico (public prosecutor’s office) was m ade independent of the 
judiciary and ensconced within the executive, which further limited the scope of 
jurisdiction of the court. The principle of non-political intervention by the court in 
electoral matters was well established by the beginning of the 20th century and was  
maintained in the 1917 Constitution.
Yet, although judicial independence has been practically non-existent in Mexico, 
constitutional rule has been essential for underpinning the legitimacy of the regime and 
for upholding a theoretical separation of powers. Under the 1917 constitutional 
settlement, the judiciary granted the Mexican political system the veneer of legal 
authority it required to maintain the unique hegem ony it had achieved during the post­
revolutionary period. Up until the m id-1990s, electoral processes were generally
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considered fraudulent; the judiciary’s concern was to uphold a “state of legality” 
although not necessary the rule of law.
Since 1917, and despite its traditionally passive role, the judiciary has undergone 
numerous constitutional reforms. In contrast with the United States, where the 
Constitution has been modified on few occasions in order to overturn Court rulings, in 
Mexico almost 400 reforms have been approved in diverse areas during the last 
century, showing the importance that the hegemonic regime gave to legal forms (Lopez 
and Fix, 2000: 13). The reforms have been both progressive and regressive in terms of 
judicial independence, but were a clear disincentive to the exercise of judicial 
interpretation and constitutional evolution due to the relative ease with which the 
Constitution could be modified (Fix Fierro 2000: 179).
The relationship between the judiciary and the executive has not been static; during 
certain periods the judiciary has enjoyed greater independence than others. The 
various constitutional reforms approved since 1917 reflect this dynamic relationship. 
Many of the reforms concern the appointments process and tenure for Supreme Court 
judges. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show how changes to the appointments process and to the 
size of the Supreme Court enabled a large number of the presidents who served last 
century to significantly alter the composition of the bench. The reforms introduced in 
1928 and 1934 were among the most blatant in this regard since they involved 
replacing the entire Supreme Court with new members.
Yet in his classic work, Gonzalez Casanova (1970) presents data from 1917-60 
indicating that the Supreme Court operated with a certain degree of independence with 
respect to the executive power. Similarly, Schwarz (1977: 147) argues that “the 
Mexican federal courts, especially in their exercise of amparo jurisdiction, are not as 
passively oriented to the executive as is commonly assumed. In a few areas such as 
the broad reviewability of federal and state tax laws and military courts-martial, they are 
even more activist than their counterparts in the United States.”
83
Table 2.1 Key institutional reforms affecting Supreme Court 
appointments and tenure
Reform Impact on Tenure and Appointments
1824 Constitution Lifetime tenure established for Supreme Court justices (11 justices 
distributed in three sa/as); Supreme Court justices elected by the 
state legislatures and ratified by the federal Congress; direct 
election introduced in 1844
1857 Constitution Six-year term established; indirect election
1865 Provisional Statute 
of the Mexican Empire 
(Emperor Maximiliano de 
Habsburgo, 1864-67)
Judges and magistrates to be tenured and not substituted
1882 reform of 1857 
Federal Electoral Law 
(President Manuel 
Gonzalez, 1880-84)
Supreme Court justices given the power to elect their chief justice 
by an absolute majority of votes; chief justice to serve for one 
year, with no possibility of reelection; vice-president to be named 
who could substitute the chief justice on specific occasions.
1897 Federal Procedural 
Code (Porfiriato, 1 87 6 -  
1911)
President to nominate magistrates and judges following specific 
proposals from the Court; Supreme Court made up of 11 justices 
{numerarios), four supernumeraries, one fiscal and a General 
Prosecutor
Constituent Congress of 
1916-17
Full tenure re-established for the 11 Supreme Court justices; 
election by an absolute congressional majority (both chambers in 
Electoral College functions) in a secret ballot from a list of 
candidates proposed by the state legislatures. Changes 
introduced in 1923 stipulate that Supreme Court Justices, Circuit 
Magistrates and District Judges can only be removed if they act 
improperly.
1928 decree (President 
Plutarco Elfas Calles, 
1924-28)
Lifetime tenure eliminated; Supreme Court justices to be 
appointed or ratified by each successive president with Senate 
approval; entire Supreme Court replaced with new members; 
Article 111 introduces the possibility of removal for poor conduct 





Six-year terms for Supreme Court justices reintroduced, coinciding 
with presidential terms; entire Supreme Court replaced with new 





Lifetime tenure re-established; president to name Supreme Court 
justices with Senate approval; Supreme Court to name Circuit 
Magistrates and District judges
1951 decree, 1967 
reforms
Decree ratifies lifelong tenure at all levels within the judiciary and 
increases number of Supreme Court judges from 16 to 21**; 
reinforced by reforms in 1967 establishing that Supreme Court 
justices could only be removed following a juicio de 
responsabilidad (“trial of responsibility”, a process of 
impeachment).
1988 reforms Supreme Court justices to remain in post until the age of 70
1994 reforms (President 
Ernesto Zedillo, 199 4 - 
2000)
Lifelong tenure reduced to a 15-year position; Supreme Court 
justices to be selected by the Senate with a two-thirds majority 
vote from a list of three candidates nominated by the president 
(Article 96); number of justices reduced to 11.
* This clause applied until 1982. According to Carpizo (2004), between 1928 and 1976 only three 
members of the Court were removed by this procedure, but the very existence of the clause posed a risk 
for the judiciary in its confrontations with the executive.
** In reality the number of Supreme Court justices was increased to 26 due to the creation of a sala auxiliar 
(auxiliary court) made up of five supernumerary judges.
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Table 2.2 Number of Supreme Court Judges appointed by each 
_______________ Mexican President (1934-2004)_______________
President Num ber of Judges
Lazaro Cardenas (1934-40) 24
Manuel Avila Camacho (1940-46) 24
Miguel Aleman (1946-52) 12
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-58) 18
Adolfo Ldpez Mateos (1958-64) 9
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz (1964-70) 14
Luis Echeverrla Alvarez (1970-76) 13
Jos6 L6pez Portillo (1976-82) 16
Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-88) 20
Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) 8
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) 11
Vicente Fox Quesada (2000-06) 3*
Felipe Calderon Hinojosa (2006-12) 3**
Source: Adapted from Magaloni (2003: 288)
* During Fox’s administration, Jose Ramon Cossio (Nov 2003), Margarita Luna Ramos (Feb 2004) and 
Sergio Vails (Oct 2004, after Humberto Roman died in June 2004) were elected as Court judges. It was 
agreed that even though it was a replacement, Sergio Vails would serve for a full 15-year period. 
**Fernando Franco was elected on 13 December 2006, when Felipe Calderon (2006-12) had just 
assumed office. Calderon selected two more Court judges, Luis Maria Aguilar and Arturo Zaldivar, to 
replace Genaro Gongora and Mariano Azuela from 1 December 2009.
Cardenas G racia (1996) has identified four different stages in the executive-judiciary  
relationship since 1917. The first one covers 1 9 1 7 -2 8 , when the judiciary enjoyed a 
considerable degree of independence from the executive based on the 1917 Mexican  
Constitution. During the second period, 1 9 2 8 -4 4 , power was centralised in the hands 
of the executive and the official party was strengthened by presidents Plutarco Elias 
Calles and Lazaro Cardenas. The reforms introduced in 1928 and 1934 clearly affected 
judicial independence by replacing the entire Suprem e Court with new members. 
These reforms w ere reversed by President Avila Cam acho in 1944.
The third period covers 1 9 4 4 -8 8 , when a process of internal institutionalisation and 
administrative consolidation em erged. Despite its relative stability, the Court was  
subordinated more strongly to the executive’s will during this period.23 Finally, since 
1988, Cardenas argued that several reforms have enhanced judicial autonomy. Indeed, 
1988 was a crucial year for political pluralism and the move towards a clearer 
separation of powers. Cardenas Gracia suggests that President Ernesto Zedillo’s 
pivotal 1994 reform augm ented the Court’s autonomy, although it still left a long way to 
go.
23 According to Gonzalez Casanova (1965: 19-21), during the 1917-60 period there were a total of 3,700 
ejecutorias, in which the president is mentioned as the responsible authority.
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In sum, the greatest weakness of the Mexican judiciary over most of the last century 
has been the very fragile nature of its independence vis-a-vis other branches of 
government. According to Fix Fierro (2000: 176), this weakness can be explained by 
three main factors: constitutional interpretation; the reach of the amparo suit as a 
mechanism of constitutional control; and the organisational context of the federal 
judiciary. In the final analysis, in the context of a hegemonic regime, presidential power 
easily overruns the Courts’ independence by constantly shaping their internal rules 
through the manipulation of appointments, the dismissal of undesirable judges and 
even the shutting down of courts. In the next section I look at issues of constitutional 
control, with reference to the amparo suit and a more detailed discussion of the legal 
recourse of constitutional controversies, the analysis of which forms the basis of the 
empirical research presented in Chapters 3 and 4.
Judicial independence and constitutional control
During the 19th century, conflicts between different powers and levels of government 
were considered political disputes and so were resolved in political terms. Both the 
1824 Constitution (Article 137) and the 1842 Bases Orgcinicas granted powers to the 
Supreme Court to hear disputes between the states and the federation. But for the first 
half of that century the judiciary did not hold this role exclusively. The 1836 Second 
Constitutional Law established that the Supreme Conservative Power was responsible 
for annulling laws, while the Seventh Law recognised the power of Congress to resolve 
constitutional conflicts and the 1847 Reform Acts gave Congress the authority to annul 
general laws or local laws that breached the Constitution. Hence it was the General 
Congress, the Government Council and the Supreme Conservative Power that usually 
resolved conflicts between different levels of government while the Supreme Court’s 
role was reduced to little more than making the public announcements connected with 
the cases, although it still resolved conflicts between states.
Later on, the 1857 Constitution created a judiciary that would have clear political and 
constitutional powers, mainly through the amparo suit. The amparo was conceived in 
1842 and in 1857 became a constitutional guarantee of protection of individual civil 
rights against any violation by a public authority (Arteaga, 1999: 498). This provides 
scope for some relative judicial autonomy, though in practice the amparo generally 
represented a very limited form of judicial review since it applies only to individuals and
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does not set precedents for future cases (Burgoa, 1986).24 In addition to the amparo 
suit, the Constitution also included a second defence recourse: the auto control (Article 
121). Article 116 established that the federal powers would protect the states against 
any invasion or external violence. In cases of internal conflict within a state, however, it 
was the President who acted as the final arbiter.
Secondary legislation approved during Benito Juarez’s presidency, in 1870, activated 
Article 98 of the 1857 Constitution, which granted powers to the Supreme Court to 
resolve controversies between states or with the federation. During 1867-76, the Court 
defended its political power mainly through the thesis of “incompetence of origin” which 
had been established with the Amparo Morelos during Jose Marfa Iglesias’s 
administration (1873-76). In this case the Supreme Court granted an amparo to 
landowners from Morelos who opposed the Law of Local Property introduced by 
Governor Leyva whose re-election, they argued, was illegal under Article 16 of the 
1857 Constitution. Some months after this historic resolution, the Court received 
another similar amparo against the re-election of the governor of Puebla. The Court’s 
resolution again emphasised the need to protect individual rights against authoritarian 
acts. With these two consecutive rulings, the Court assumed the authority to take part 
in controversies of a political nature, regardless of whether the violating authority was 
at the federal, state or local level.
Iglesias’s position was reversed by Chief Justice Ignacio Vallarta (1878-82), who faced 
increasing criticism of the Court’s excessive interpretative power. Vallarta established 
that political issues were not individual rights and therefore should be excluded from 
the amparo protection at the federal level. Vallarta insisted on the need to depoliticise 
the Court to the point where the concept of “competent authority” was abandoned 
altogether. Although the right to be governed by legitimate authorities remained, 
Vallarta thought that the Court was not the appropriate institution to deal with such 
issues. Instead, the Electoral Colleges were strengthened as the proper channel for
24 For most part of last century, the “F6rmula Otero” limitated the amparo law by establishing that 
judgments granting amparo do not set binding precedents for application in subsequent similar cases. The 
only binding case law precedents that exist in Mexico are through the so-called jurisprudencia. To qualify 
as a jurisprudencia definida, the legal principle set forth in an amparo suit must be reinforced in five 
consecutive cases by the majority vote of the judges. Such rulings are binding only on equal or lower 
courts and administrative courts, not on executive administrative agencies. Different drafts have been 
produced in recent years to reform the amparo law, mainly proposing that the “Formula Otero” be 
quashed. As will be discussed below, in December 2009 the Senate finally approved fundamental changes 
to modernise the amparo Law.
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challenging the validity of political acts. The debate between the priority given by 
Iglesias to preserving individual rights as opposed to Vallarta’s defence of a strictly 
neutral Court dominated much of the contemporary constitutional debate. 
Nevertheless, Vallarta’s thesis of “non-intervention” by the judiciary in electoral conflicts 
delineated the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction for almost 150 years.
In this context, several constitutional projects were presented with the aim of 
strengthening the Supreme Court’s role in the aftermath of the revolution. In the end, it 
was Venustiano Carranza’s project and the 1917 Constitution which clearly 
demarcated the types of conflict that could emerge between different levels of 
government and how they should be addressed: political conflicts were reserved to the 
Senate, which according to Article 76, Section II, could quash powers within a state, 
while constitutional conflicts had to be presented before the Supreme Court, according 
to Article 105.
The original Article 105 considered the following types of conflicts:
a) Between two or more states
b) Between different powers within a state over the constitutionality of their acts
c) Between the federation and one or more states
d) And those in which the federation played a part.
In sum, constitutional controversies were included in the Mexican Constitution in 1824 
(Art 137, Section I), in 1857 (Arts 97 and 98) and in 1917 (Art 105). Yet the only actors 
allowed to use this legal mechanism were the federation, the states and the three 
powers within a state; neither the Federal District nor the municipalities were included. 
Article 105 was modified in October 1967 when Congress was granted the power to 
determine in which controversies the federation was involved, and which of them would 
be presented to the Court. It was modified again in October 1993 as part of the Federal 
District’s political reform, when the different powers within the Federal District were 
authorised to take part in legal controversies.
Prior to the 1994 reforms, discussed in the next section, some municipalities had 
attempted to use this recourse but were unsuccessful. The most important antecedent 
to the involvement of municipalities in constitutional controversies was the amparo suit 
(4521/90) presented in 1990 by the municipality of Mexicali, in Baja California, against 
the federation (Gonzalez Oropeza 2000: XXIV). In its resolution of the case on 7
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November 1991, the Court established that the municipality did indeed have the legal 
authority to make use of controversies. This contradicted previous rulings in which the 
municipality was not recognised as a legitimate actor.
A second groundbreaking case was the constitutional controversy filed by the 
municipality of Delicias—then governed by PRI municipal president Rogelio Bejarano 
Garcia— against the Chihuahua state government, which was led by the PAN (SCJN, 
CC 1/93, 29 April 1993). This was one of the earliest uses of a constitutional 
controversy to resolve a political conflict. The municipality filed the recourse to 
challenge the constitutionality of the Fourth Agreement signed by governor Francisco 
Barrio Terrazas on 26 January 1993 relating to the state government’s refusal to allow 
municipalities to offer civil registration services, with the consequent impact on their 
budget (SCJN, CC 1/93, 29 April 1993). The municipality had already been 
unsuccessful in filing an amparo suit on the same grounds. It argued that the Fourth 
Agreement violated several constitutional articles, as well as local Article 125; the state 
administration’s response was that the municipality was not yet recognised as a formal 
political power.
More than a year after the recourse was filed, the Court ruled in favour of the 
municipality, declaring that both the executive and the municipal presidents could offer 
civil registration and that the Fourth Agreement violated Article 138 section I of the local 
Constitution and Federal Constitutional Articles 115 (refering to municipal jurisdictions) 
and 124 (refering to powers of state and federal jurisdictions) (SCJN, 30 August 1994). 
According to a Supreme Court publication (2005:183) the Court ruling of “30 August 
1994... was understood by the two parties and should have been obeyed... despite 
this and in open defiance of Francisco Barrio, the doors were opened in the parallel 
office of the Civil Registry of Delicias” (SCJN, 2005: 184). Rogelio Bejarano is said to 
be close to former PRI governor Fernando Baeza, and so questions were asked within 
the same Court document about whether the motivation for opening the office in 
Delicias was not simply to defy the then governor.
The ruling followed the judicial precedent set by Mexicali’s amparo suit and also 
referred to Constitutional Article 115 which acknowledges municipalities as having full 
legal status since they are bodies of government. The relevance of this ruling is self- 
evident: in recognising municipalities as a separate power from the legislature, 
executive and judiciary it reinforced a crucial federal aspect of the Mexican political 
system. The Court defended the rights granted to municipalities by the 1983 and 1987
89
reforms (Cardenas, 1995: 2) and from then on decided to recognise constitutional 
controversies presented by municipalities. The case also made manifest the need to 
regulate constitucional article 105, as President Ernesto Zedillo eventually did.
Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000): The judiciary and the 1994 reform
President Ernesto Zedillo took office in December 1994 promising “to promote a 'state 
reform’ to modify the regulations and institutions governing electoral processes, the 
integration of the legislative branch, the juridical-political status of the Federal District 
and the party system as a whole” (Office of the Presidency, 2000). During his electoral 
campaign, he spoke repeatedly of the need to strengthen the rule of law and ensure 
that no one could be above the law. True to his campaign pledge, only four days after 
being inaugurated in office Zedillo presented Congress with his initiative to reform the 
judiciary (Office of the Presidency, 1994, 5 December 2002). The judicial reform 
initiative had three main purposes: to modify the structure of the judiciary: to legalise 
the coordination of public security: and to create mechanisms of appeal against the 
public prosecutor (Ministerio Publico) if it decided not to prosecute a criminal case.
This reform amends 27 constitutional provisions,25 transforming the nature and size of 
the Supreme Court and creating the Federal Judicial Council (Consejo de la 
Judicatura), whose main functions are to appoint and oversee the circuit and district 
courts, as well as to approve and administer the judicial budget. The main aim of these 
changes was to relieve the Supreme Court of its administrative work and to establish 
more rigid and meritocratic criteria for career advancement. According to Fix-Fierro and 
Fix-Zamudio (1996), the Judicial Council was granted considerable powers including: 
the government and administration of the tribunals; the administration and discipline of 
the judicial career, including magistrates and judges; regulatory powers over 
administrative areas; and the resolution of conflicts within the judiciary, except those of 
the Supreme Court. The seven-member body comprises the Chief Justice, two circuit 
court judges, a district judge, two members nominated by the senate and one by the 
executive. All seven members, except the president (whose term lasts four years, with 
no immediate reelection), would remain in their position for five years, without 
reelection, and would be replaced sequentially.
25 The decree, published in the Official Gazette on 30 December 1994, reforms the following constitutional 
articles: 76, section VIII, 89 section XVIII, 94 to 101, 103 to 107,110 and 111. A second decree published 
in the Official Gazette on 26 May 1995 after the 11 new Supreme Court judges had been approved, 
reforms the 1988 Organic Law of the Judiciary of the Federation (Ley OrgSnica del Poder Judicial de la 
Federacidn).
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The idea of maintaining judicial independence through financial autonomy was retained 
in the 1994 reform. It should be noted that since 1976, the budget law (Ley de 
Presupuesto, Contabilidad y Gasto Publico) has established that the judiciary does not 
require executive approval of the administration of its budget. However, there has been 
increased pressure from the Court to establish a fixed judicial budget of at least 1.5 
percent of the national annual budget to guarantee “financial autonomy to protect their 
impartiality and independence” (SCJN, Comunicado 503, 6 February 2002).
Even though Chief Justice Gdngora had meetings with congressmen to lobby for 
financial autonomy, the judiciary’s budget was decreased in 2001 to just 1.04 percent 
of the national budget. The following year the judiciary was the most affected by budget 
cuts, receiving less than 18 billion pesos, 22 percent less than requested (Boletin 1528, 
Camara de Diputados, 15 December 2002). At the end of 2003, for fifth year in a row, 
the lower chamber cut the budget requested by the judiciary by more than 4 billion 
pesos. A number of observers support this type of legislative control over the judiciary 
given the dramatic expansion of the judiciary following the 1994 reform. According to 
Miguel Sarre (Milenio, 2002), “the decrease in the judiciary’s budget implies a simple 
moderation on the speed in which the juzgados have multiplied”.
Since 2005, the judiciary's budget has been equivalent to 0.3 percent of GDP. It is 
worth noting that in 2009 the judiciary requested an increase to its budget for 2010 of 
23 percent with respect to the previous year (see Table 2.5), despite President 
Felipe Calderon pushing for austerity measures. Senior members of the judiciary 
defended their request before members of the congressional budget and public 
accounts commission by pointing to the significant increase in cases that the judiciary 
as a whole is having to attend, for which planned spending on infrastructure will 
quadruple against 2009.
Table 2.3. Budget requests for the judiciary (millions of pesos)











Source: Presupuestos de Egresos de la Federacidn 2000-2010, Secretaria de Hacienda
(http://www.shcp.aob.mx1
From 1995 onwards, the Supreme Court would comprise 11 judges (reduced from 26) 
appointed for 15 years (no longer lifetime positions), each one to be selected by a two- 
thirds majority vote in the Senate from a list of three candidates nominated by the 
President. Candidates must have a law degree and ten years of work experience, 
preferably with experience in the judicial system. There were significant attempts to 
ensure that justices would be impartial by guaranteeing that they did not draw any 
other form of salary or remuneration and had not held a political position for at least a 
year prior to the appointment, in an attempt to draw potential candidates from a 
constituency of distinguished career judges rather than senior political appointees.
Before 1994, it was established that the salaries of the Supreme Court and lower court 
judges could not be reduced while in office. According to the constitutionalist Elisur 
Arteaga, even the new Supreme Court salaries, which are set at the same level as 
those of under-secretary of state plus some discretionary bonuses, will not attract many 
well-established jurists from the private sector. Moreover, Arteaga argued that by 
receiving discretionary bonus payments, the court judges undermined their autonomy 
as they became indebted to the executive.26
In sum, the Supreme Court was not only granted more constitutional power but also its 
jurisdictional and administrative functions were separated due to the creation of the 
Judicial Council. Since the 1994 judicial reform, constitutional and legal reforms have 
multiplied at the federal and local level. According to a Supreme Court study, between 
1994 and 2002 almost all the judicial powers in the country implemented structural 
changes (SCJN, 2006: 67). Between 2003 and 2005, 565 initiatives to reform the 
judiciary at the federal level were identified (SCJN, 2006: 68).
In terms of public security, the 1994 initiative called for the appointment of the Attorney 
General to be ratified by a Senate vote, following a process similar to that for Supreme 
Court judges. The reform highlighted the need for improved coordination on public 
security among the federal government, the Federal District (Mexico City), the states 
and the municipalities. It also laid the foundations of a National System of Public 
Security which aimed to reduce crime and violence across the country as a whole. 
Profound changes to the police force were considered and proposals were made to 
create an integrated national system of information on habitual offenders, to
26 Author interview with Elisur Arteaga, professor of constitutional theory at the Universidad Autdnoma 
Metropolitana and of federalism at the Universidad Autonoma del Estado de Mexico, 20 May 2001, Mexico 
City.
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professionalise the police and to increase links between the police and the 
communities they serve. While this represents an important part of the judicial reform 
initiative, my focus will be on the changes that reinforced the Supreme Court as a 
constitutional court with the power to resolve claims between different branches and 
levels of government in the context of increasing pluralism.
The 1994 reforms and constitutional controls
The reform initiative sought to strengthen the principal appellate legal tools against 
government in Mexico, namely individual citizen claims through the amparo, and the 
resolution of conflicting claims between government jurisdictions via constitutional 
controversies. The reform also created a second mechanism of constitutional control: 
unconstitutional acts. The expansion of the Supreme Court’s powers to protect the 
constitutionally based jurisdiction of each branch and level of government strengthened 
the state’s balance of powers, as noted by the architect of the reforms, former 
President Zedillo (First State of the Nation Report, 1995).
As mentioned above, one of the key modifications of the constitutional review 
mechanisms brought in by the 1994 reforms was the explict inclusion of the Federal 
District and municipalities among the entities given legal standing to request review by 
the Court via constitutional controversies of conflicts arising between the governmental 
levels (see Table 2.4). According to Supreme Court Justice Olga Sanchez Cordero, 
speaking 15 years after the reform was introduced, “the main client of the controversies 
is the municipalities, without doubt. Everybody complains about the invasion of 
competencies and the Court has to enter into defining competencies.”27
A second important modification was brought about by a piece of secondary legislation 
approved in 1994 to regulate constitutional controversies. Only when a controversy 
ruling is resolved by at least eight of the eleven Court Ministers and is “top-down” in 
nature or relates to equivalent levels of government, does it set wider precedent (Article 
42, Secondary Law of Constitutional Article 105). In practice, successful ”bottom-up” 
rulings apply only to the parties presenting the specific controversy.28 Moreover, it has 
also been argued that Article 76, which recognises the power of the Senate to resolve 
political conflicts between powers within a state, clearly affects the scope of 
constitutional controversies.
27 Author interview with Supreme Court Justice Olga Sanchez Cordero, Mexico City, 4 December 2009.
28 Author interview with Elisur Arteaga, 20 May 2001, Mexico City.
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Table 2.4 Constitutional controversies before and after the 1994 reform:
Who can request them?
Original Article 105 
1917 Constitution
Article 105 after the 1994 Judicial Reform
Two o r  m ore states Federation and one state or the Federal District
Pow ers within a state Federation and a municipality
Federation and one or more states Executive and Congress
Controversies in which federation was 
part
Between states
A state and the Federal District
The Federal District and a municipality
Two municipalities from different states
Two powers within a state
A state and one of its municipalities
A state and a municipality from other state
Two Federal District government bodies
Source: 1917 Constitution and 1994 Judicial Reform
In the case of unconstitutional actions, one third of a legislative body may challenge the 
constitutionality of actions of other branches of government and even suspend the 
enforcement of a law. Thus, cases of unconstitutionality can be brought by 33 percent 
of the lower or upper chamber of Congress against federal or Federal District laws or 
resolutions or by 33 percent of the members of a local legislature against their own 
state laws or resolutions. The Attorney General can also challenge federal or Federal 
District laws. However, an important criticism of this new legal mechanism is the short 
time frame allowed for presenting these legal challenges, since it is difficult to study 
and intelligently oppose constitutional legislation within only 30 days (Arteaga, 2001).
In sum, the 1994 judicial reform was an important first step in strengthening the 
credibility of the judiciary as an independent and impartial system of justice since it 
granted it enhanced powers within a context of increasing political pluralism and new 
federalism. According to Domingo (2000: 711), the 1994 reform “marks a break with 
the past, and potentially represents a qualitative change in terms of judiciary-executive 
relations. However, if it proves to have inaugurated a new period in the judiciary’s 
history, this will be as much a result of changing political circumstances."
Motivations for and responses to the 1994 judicial reform
While few question the impact of President Ernesto Zedillo’s 1994 judicial reform in 
terms of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, for most academics, it is 
doubtful that the motivation for the reform had much to do with a new federalism 
agenda and the resolution of constitutional controversies. Rather, in their opinion, it
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was primarily targeted at reforming the criminal justice system in the context of further 
economic liberalisation; it was vital to strengthen the judiciary as a means to create the 
conditions for adequate levels of economic development.29 For example, the Director of 
Jurisdictional Statistics of the Supreme Court, Jacqueline Martinez said “I don’t know 
whether Zedillo really had the vision— I honestly don’t think so—to provide a scheme of 
separation of powers within a context of political pluralism, but his reform was 
fundamental for resolving political conflicts, notably municipal ones, via legal- 
institutional channels.”30
I was able to interview former President Zedillo in 2001 when he was Distinguished 
Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Global Governance, London School of Economics. His 
explanation of the motivations for the reform was that there was a clear need to reform 
the judiciary to achieve a true separation of powers in the context of more plural 
politics. At the end of Carlos Salinas’s administration, the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, 
the assassination of Luis Donald Colosio and the unexpected nomination of Ernesto 
Zedillo to replace him as the PRI’s presidential candidate were auguries of a very 
different future political scenario for Mexico. As Jacqueline Martinez said, “with Salinas 
the system seemed so consolidated, with a lot of leadership and management; 
everything seemed to be working but that image was shattered suddenly.” Zedillo 
arrived to fill a huge institutional vacuum. He was seen by many commentators as a 
technocrat, a solid economist who could successfully manage the country’s finances 
but would be unlikely to understand the complex political needs of the time. Perhaps for 
that reason his vision of reform was underestimated, and for many he was seen as 
simply following the trend for “second generation reforms” by strengthening the 
judiciary to underwrite investment and the economic well-being of the country.
A decade on from the end of Zedillo’s term, I find the reasons he gave me for pushing 
for judicial reform convincing. He insisted on several occasions that one of the main 
aims of the 1994 reform was to reinforce the rule of law, but also, specifically, to shore 
up the independence of the Supreme Court of Justice as the highest legal tribunal in 
order to strengthen its decisions. He argued that in the context of increasing political 
pluralism, it would be more necessary than ever to have a means of resolving political 
disputes between rival parties governing different levels and branches of government.
29 Institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have tried to quantify the 
extent of damage caused by a weak judiciary in terms of economic development (Eduardo Buscaglia, 
Beatrice Weder). While campaigning in Guadalajara, Zedillo presented his “Ten proposals for a new 
security and justice system”, with six of the ten proposals dealing with security issues (July, 1994).
30 Author interview with Jacqueline Martinez, Mexico City, 24 November 2009.
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A stronger Supreme Court would help avoid continuous presidential interventions and 
the subsequent deterioration of his power.31 Zedillo was particularly aware that Article 
105 did not take into account the many types of conflict between federal, state and 
municipal governments that were emerging in the new political reality. This point, as 
opposed to considering the 1994 judicial reform as part of the second-generation 
reforms, was confirmed by other interviews conducted during my fieldwork such as 
Virgilio Andrade, Hugo Concha and Francisco Cuevas.32
In a personal interview in December 2009, Justice Olga Sanchez Cordero explained 
that “since the administration of President Miguel de la Madrid the idea of a 
constitutional court was given support. Collegiate Circuit Courts were created to review 
constitutional issues... There were some very good, great judges, but the attitude of 
the Court was different. There was less transparency and communication with the 
general public, and so there was an almost total lack of appreciation for the Court. 
Zedillo saw the need to radically change the administration of justice so that it was 
more efficient and less corrupt”.33
Whether Zedillo envisaged the importance of the reform in terms of political federalism 
at the time is doubtful, Sanchez Cordero argues. “He was a pure liberal who deeply 
defended the rule of law. By transforming the Supreme Court, changes would 
permeate the rest of the judiciary and the local judicial powers. While Zedillo was 
conscious that there was a stronger [political party] opposition, I don’t really think that in 
1994 or early 1995 he could have imagined or appreciated the magnitude and 
transcendence of his reform.”34 Regardless of his ambitions for the reform, according to 
Sanchez Cordero, granting autonomy to the judiciary as well as to Mexico’s national 
bank, were the two acts that Zedillo will be remembered for. She describes the 1994 
judicial reform as the “most important change in the modern era of Mexico’s judiciary”, 
which gave the country “an important institutional support". It was not until 1996 that 
the Court was given jurisdiction over electoral matters, however, and “today 90 percent 
of unconstitutional acts submitted before the Court are over electoral issues. For the 
Court, political questions were a huge taboo, so it has been a crucial step to enter into 
such themes.”
31 Author interview with Ernesto Zedillo, London, 23 November 2001.
32 Author interviews conducted in Mexico City on 8 December 2003, 18 October 2003 and 4 December 
2009, respectively.
33 Author interview with Justice Olga Sanchez Cordero, Mexico City, 4 December 2009.
34 Auhtor interview with Justice Olga Sanchez Cordero, Mexico City, 4 December 2009.
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Zedillo’s judicial reform initiative received an unusually high level of media attention 
(Fix Fierro, 2004) and a detailed analysis of newspapers and political magazines dated 
from December 1994 to April 1996 reveals some interesting findings.35 First, it 
becomes clear that the official presentation of the presidential initiative to reform the 
federal judiciary emphasised the need to respond to the most important citizen demand 
of the 1994 electoral campaign: improved public security and enhanced capacity of the 
state to guarantee protection against crime and violence (Ernesto Zedillo, 5 December 
1994). In response to this demand from the electorate, President Zedillo argued that it 
was necessary to strengthen the rule of law and the institutions in charge of providing 
justice and public security. The appointment of the first non-PRI member of the cabinet 
to the position of Attorney General was crucial in this respect. The recruitment of a 
member of the opposition, Antonio Lozano Gracia of the PAN, sent meaningful signals 
to the public— and to the Senate, which would have to approve his appointment—that 
the issue was being taken seriously.
Initial reactions to the presidential judicial reform initiative were positive, even from 
traditionally critical sectors, such as opposition parties, the media and some human 
rights organisations. The general consensus was that the initiative was “good, prudent 
and sensible” (La Jornada, El Universal, 6-10 December 1994). The PAN claimed that 
it chimed with its party’s own historic demand for respect for the rule of law (Felipe 
Calderon, La Jornada, 6 December 1994). The PRD agreed that the initiative was 
important, though pushed for the President to relinquish his power to nominate the 
Supreme Court judges. Supreme Court Director of Jurisdictional Statistics Jacqueline 
Martinez remembers the PAN and a number of academics being the strongest 
proponents of the reform, while the PRD and PT were the most vocal opponents and, 
paradoxically, are now the parties that make most use of the judicial recourses that 
were strengthened or introduced by the reform.36
According to Aguayo Quezada (1994: 9), the presidential initiative had two main merits: 
it was comprehensive and it demonstrated a new presidential disposition to renounce 
some of the traditional prerogatives of the Mexican presidential system. Finally, a 
representative of the private sector agreed on the importance of the reform, arguing 
that “only a strong judicial system would guarantee macroeconomic stability, fiscal 
discipline and price stability” (Concanaco, El Universal, 8 December 1994: 1). More
35 These newspapers and magazines are not available electronically and were viewed at the archives of 
the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). Fix Fierro (2004) suggests that public opinion of 
the judicial reform initiative was generally positive.
36 Author interview with Jacqueline Martinez, Mexico City, 24 November 2009.
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than a decade after the judicial reform was implemented, Chief Economist of Bank of 
America Edgar Camargo and Flavio Torres, Technical Director of the Asociacion de 
Bancos de Mexico said that there is broad agreement in the financial sector that the 
Mexican judicial system is much stronger and independent in its resolutions.37
In spite of this positive atmosphere, a number of opposition voices started to emerge 
as Congress began to feel pressure to vote on the initiative before the end of the 
ordinary period of sessions on 24 December 1994, less than three weeks after it had 
been presented. Some senators, including a few PRI members, criticised the rush to 
adopt such an important reform {La Jornada, 10 December 1994) and pushed for an 
extraordinary session to be called in early January 1995 to discuss it. The main 
objections were the creation of a National System of Public Security, the possibility that 
the reform undermined the jurisdiction of individual states via the creation of the 
Judicial Council and administrative changes that would affect the role of state courts.
Two PRI senators who were also former Supreme Court judges, Jose Trinidad Lanz 
and Salvador Rocha Diaz, lent their weight to the campaign to delay the vote on the 
reform so that it could be debated thoroughly. They were particularly concerned about 
the need to establish a rigorous judicial career structure in order to avoid politicised 
appointments {El Universal, 16 December 1994: 1, 16). The new Chief Justice had to 
be elected at the beginning of January 1995 and “[wjith less than 20 days until New 
Year it is not clear which rules will apply in terms of the election of the new Chief 
Justice” (Rivera, 13 December 1994: 4).
A number of well-known lawyers who were invited to analyse the judicial reform 
initiative {Foro de Analisis de la Iniciativa de Reforma Judicial, 13 December 1994) 
highlighted the need to avoid the “political use of the Court.” According to the initiative, 
the 26 jutices would leave their positions and 11 new members would be selected by 
the President and ratified by the Senate. This divided opinion. Emilio Krieger (14 
December 1994: 10) argued that the reform represented a threat and a possible “coup 
d’etat” by President Zedillo, who would guarantee the subservience of all judges, since 
they would all owe him their appointments. In Krieger’s view, tenure offered a small 
degree of judicial independence, which was then negated by the wholesale 
replacement of the court. Ignacio Burgoa even compared Zedillo’s reform to Fujimori’s 
closure of the Peruvian Court {El Universal, 12 December 1994: 1). Other voices 
considered the initiative to be a reform to “macro-justice” because it only refers to the
37 Author interviews with Edgar Camargo and Flavio Torres, Mexico City, 18 December 2008.
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composition of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Council, but leaves aside important 
aspects of “micro-justice” which would be far more relevant to the majority of the 
population (Garcia Ramirez, 15 December 1994: 11).
The Supreme Court was silent during this period. The media speculated that some of 
the justices were not entirely happy with the presidential initiative and with the prospect 
of losing their jobs, preferring to resign rather than accept the proposed retirement 
scheme. Tension was heightened on 15 December with the formal closing ceremony of 
the second period of sessions of the Supreme Court when Chief Justice Ulises Schmill 
presented his annual report of activities. There was growing confusion among the 26 
justices as to their future {El Universal, 16 December 1994: 1, 10). In a recent 
interview, justice Genaro Gongora confirmed that “the decision to select new Supreme 
Court judges in 1995 left many of the previous judges clearly unsatisfied. In fact, some 
still have a deep resentment” (Reforma, 19 November 2009: 8).
The PRI senators rejected the PRD’s call for more time to discuss the judicial reform 
initiative. The PAN was less unified in its position since it also had to consider the 
discussions on the appointment of one of its members to the position of Attorney 
General. Many Panistas felt it was important for him to begin his new job with a proper 
constitutional framework in place. The PAN representatives in Congress therefore not 
only wanted to approve the initiative before the end of 1994, but were pushing hard for 
some of their own initiatives to be included in the reform. A final report was approved 
by the PRI and PAN senators present (108), while the eight PRD senators left the 
building. The report called for 70 modifications to the presidential initiative {Dictamen 
del Senado, 16 December 1994). Some of the changes were more about the form than 
about the truly substantive issues, such as stricter qualifications requirements for future 
judges, the confirmation of tenure for judges who would only be removed by an 
impeachment procedure (juicio de responsabilidad), the selection process for judges 
and magistrates which would be by lot (insaculation), and the new composition of the 
Judicial Council with a majority of representatives from the judiciary.
The modified initiative was finally approved by the PRI and PAN congressional 
benches of the lower chamber of Congress on 21 December 1994, against the 
opposition of the PRD and the Workers’ Party (PT). According to Gonzalez Luna, an 
opposition congressmen, “yesterday we had an economic devaluation, today we have 
an even deeper and more serious devaluation: that of the justice system” (La Jornada, 
22 December 1994: 18). Reforms to 25 articles were confirmed and passed to the state
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legislatures for their approval. Further substantive changes were deferred to later 
discussions on 16 related secondary laws; these included reforms to constitutional 
Article 105 which deals with constitutional recourses.
Judicial elections (1995-2009): A revitalised or newly stacked Supreme Court?
For the last few of weeks of 1994 and the first two weeks of 1995, the Supreme Court 
had no judges. After some delay, on 18 January 1995, President Zedillo presented a 
list of 18 established lawyers, including three women, for the 11 positions. Each was 
called before the Senate on 20-23 January to make a 30-minute presentation followed 
by questions. Successful candidates would need the votes of two-thirds of the 
members of the Senate. One candidate, Guillermo Guzman, was disqualified during 
the nominations process for legal reasons.
A number of well-regarded lawyers who had been left off the list insisted that the 
executive should abstain from nominating the judges, while two of the candidates, 
Juventino Castro and Jorge Garcia, suggested they should be elected by popular vote 
to have the same level of legitimacy as the legislature and executive. Burgoa went 
further, saying that the new judges would be practically inactive since historically 
problems between the federation, the states and the municipalities have never been 
resolved through the judicial channels, but by political means {El Universal, 20 January 
1995: 10). As will be shown in Chapters 3 and 4, Burgoa’s comment proved misguided 
since the Court acquired a very active role in resolving an increasing number of cases 
after the 1994 reform.
Table 2.5 Court judges elected in 1995






























On 25 January 1995 11 new judges were inaugurated in office, following a process that 
was widely criticised because previous members were suddenly dismissed and PRI
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senators could ’’pack” the Court.38 All 11 Justices appointed by Zedillo were prominent 
lawyers at the peak of their careers who were known for favoring an independent and 
effective judiciary” (lncl£n 2004: 121 cited in Rios Figueroa 2007). The PRD voted 
against the nomination procedure arguing that most of the candidates were 
“conservative, linked to the PAN and even representing the Pro-life group” (Hector 
Sanchez, El Universal, 26 January 1995). The PRD senators argued that the lack of 
time to discuss the reform in detail had affected the quality of the candidates. They said 
“the new Court would not be autonomous because the members approved by the 
Senate come from the business sector, the political bureaucracy and the authoritarian 
elite” (Felix Salgado, El Universal, 26 January 1995). During the voting procedure there 
were complaints about electoral fraud, in particular that the ballots had already been 
printed with the names of the favoured judges. Only two Supreme Court judges— Juan 
Diaz Romero and Mariano Azuela Guitron—were carried over from the previous Court; 
they were supported by the PRI (95 votes), PAN (25 votes) and the divided vote of the 
eight PRD senators (La Jornada, 27 january 1995). According to Justice Sanchez 
Cordero, the radical removal of all Court judges was necessary and the President 
consulted widely with various sectors including bar associations, judicial councils and 
universities to identify a shortlist of 18 candidates. The Senate selected the final 11 
“and not all were to the liking of the President or the PRI. One of Zedillo’s candidates in 
particular was heavily criticised by the PRD and the name didn’t get through.’’39
Vicente Aguinaco was elected Chief Justice and head of the Judicial Council on 1 
February 1995 in a private session by consensual vote. The media argued that the 
judges’ votes had been agreed ahead of time and criticised the failure to hold the 
election in public as had been announced. Four years later, in January 1999, Gongora 
Pimentel was elected as the second Chief Justice, in a historic session, which, for the 
first time, was opened to the public and in which there had apparently not been prior 
agreements over voting. His victory was confirmed in a second round with eight votes 
in favour and three against (ballots are secret and six votes are needed). According to 
some interviews, Gongora Pimentel’s election initiated a more radical period for the 
Court since he insisted on the need for it to be more independent and was willing to 
become involved in controversial decisions.40 For example, he was the only judge to 
vote in favour of ruling on the case of Aguas Blancas, Guerrero, where police 
massacred 17 peasants (La Jornada, El Universal, 5 January 1999).
38 Author interview with Arteaga, 20 May 2001, Mexico City.
39 Author interview with Justice Sanchez Cordero, Mexico City, 4 December 2009.
40 Author interview with Reyes Rodriguez Mondragdn, Supreme Court, 11 November 2007, Mexico City.
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Although the selection procedure established in 1994 introduced stronger Senate 
control over presidential appointments (Article 96), the PRI’s significant majority in the 
Senate carried the election in 1995. In the context of dominant party rule and a highly 
centralised presidential system, senatorial approval did not have the significance 
intended until November 2003, when the first two of the new bench of Supreme Court 
judges were replaced.
The 2003 appointments process proved more complicated since it took place in the 
context of a plural Congress. On 19 November, President Vicente Fox sent two lists 
with different options of well-known lawyers to replace justices Vicente Aguinaco and 
Juventino Castro. Two weeks later, the Senate voted unanimously in favour of Jose 
Ramon Cosslo, a young, academically-oriented constitutionalist, to replace Aguinaco. 
But it took three months to decide on the second replacement. In the first round of 
voting Margarita Luna Ramos received 37 votes, while in the second one she received 
only 72 of the 81 Senate votes required for ratification (Gaceta Parlamentaria del 
Senado, 27 November 2003).
In the process, it became clear that Luna had the support of the PRI, PRD and its ally 
Convergencia, while the PAN senators favoured Elvia Diaz (43 votes) and the 
Ecologist Green Party of Mexico (PVEM) preferred Jose Luis de la Peza (6 votes). The 
Senate returned the President’s proposals to him in the knowledge that their lack of 
consensus gave the executive the power to nominate the new justice himself. On 10 
February President Fox proposed a new, all female, list: Gloria Tello Cuevas, Marla del 
Carmen Arroyo (whom Zedillo had proposed in 1994) and, once again, Margarita Luna. 
Nine days later, 83 Senators, including some PAN members, voted in Luna’s favour 
(Gaceta Parlamentaria del Senado, 19 February 2004). As opposed to Cosslo, who 
had a more academic background and only had worked in the Supreme Court as an 
advisor, Luna Ramos is the only justice with a judicial career.
The death of judge Humberto Roman Palacios led to a fresh nomination process at the 
end of 2004. On 28 November, Sergio Armando Vails Hernandez was elected 
Supreme Court justice for a full 15-year period and not only until the end of Roman 
Palacios’s period in 2006. Vails received 85 votes from PRI, PRD and PVEM Senators, 
against 29 votes each for Felipe Borrego and Bernardo Sepulveda. In January 2007, a 
new Chief Justice was elected: Guillermo Ortiz Mayagoitia. Even though six justices 
made clear that they wanted to be considered for the post, the decision in favour of
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Ortiz M ayagoitia was unanimous. To some, he represented continuity with Gongora  
Pim entel’s leadership.
T ab le  2.6 M ex ican  S u p rem e  C o u rt ju d g e s  (1 9 9 5 -2 0 2 1 )
E lec ted  ju d g e  
(D a te  and  p lace  o f b irth )
P rev io u s  post Period  ends
1) Juventino Castro y Castro 
(Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, 16 
July 1918)
Entered the judiciary in 1948. Former 
Director of Amparo at the Attorney 
General’s Office (PGR)
President of Primera Sala (1995-97)
30 November 
2003
2) Jose Vicente Aguinaco 
(Salamanca, Guanajuato, 14 July 
1919) Died in 2007 aged 88




3) Fernando Franco Gonz£lez- 
Salas
(Mexico City, 4 December 1950)
REPLACED: Juan Diaz Romero 
(Putla, Oaxaca, 5 November 
1930)
Former Electoral Magistrate at the 
Electoral Tribunal; Under-Secretary at 
the Ministry of Work (2000-06).
Entered the judiciary in 1962. Former 
Supreme Court justice (since 1986). 





4) Sergio Armando Vails 
Hernandez (Tuxtla Guti6rrez, 
Chiapas, 20 May 1941)
REPLACED: Humberto Rom£n 
Palacios (Pueblo Viejo, 
Veracruz, 15 April 1936)
Magistrate Superior Tribunal Federal 
District. Judicial Director at I MSS 
(social security ministry).
Local PRI President in Chiapas.
PRI congressman 1995-98.
[District and circuit judge since 1970; 
appointed Supreme Court justice in 






5) Mariano Azuela Guitrbn 
(Mexico City, 1 April 1936)
Entered the judiciary in 1960. Former 
Supreme Court justice (since 1983)
30 November 
2009
6) Genaro Gbngora Pimentel 
(Chihuahua, Chihuahua, 8 
September 1937)
Magistrate, Third Collegiate Tribunal for 
Administrative Affairs, Mexico City 
(1978-95). Supreme Court justice 
since 1995; Chief Justice (1999-2003)
30 November 
2009
7) Guillermo Ortiz Mayagoitia 
(Misantla, Veracruz, Feb 1941)




8) Sergio Salvador Aguirre 
Anguiano (Guadalajara, Jalisco, 
1 February 1943)
Notary public and Regidor of 




9) Jos6 Gudifio Pelayo (Autl£n, 
Jalisco, 6 June 1943)
Entered the judiciary in 1971.
Magistrate of the Collegiate, Third 
Circuit (Civil, Guadalajara) (1990-94)
30 November 
2015
10) Juan Silva Meza (Mexico 
City, 13 Septiembre 1944)
Entered the judiciary in 1970. Electoral 
Magistrate of the Primera Sala
30 November 
2015
11) Olga Ma. Sanchez Cordero 
(Mexico City)
Magistrate of the Superior Tribunal of 
Justice (Sexta Sala Civil) (1993-95)
30 November 
2015
FIRST REPLAC EMENTS IN THE NEW SUPREME COURT  
N O V  2003  -  FEB  2004
1) Jose Ramdn Cosslo
(Mexico City, 26 December
1960)
REPLACED: Jos6 Aguinaco
Worked at the Supreme Court from 
1989 to 1995 with Jorge Carpizo and 
as chief advisor of ex-Chief Justice 
Ulises Schmill (1991-95)
Former Director of the Law Department 





2) Margarita Luna Entered the judiciary in 1975. November 2 0 0 3 -
(San Cristobal, Chiapas, 4 Councillor on the Federal Judicial 30 November
January 1956) Council since February 2003. 2018
REPLACED: Juventino Castro
Source: Directorio de Ministros, SCJN (http://www.scjn.gob.mx/Consultas/lnicial_Consultas.asp)
Also on Zedillo’s initial list were two former judges: Mariano Azuela (de la Madrid) and Juan Diaz Romero (1984), as 
well as Guillermo Guzman (1982), Guillermo Ortiz Mayagoitia (1986), Humberto Roman Palacios (1987), Carlos 
Sempe Minivielle, Maria del Carmen Arroyo (Magistrada, 1992), Refugio Gallegos Baeza (Magistrada, 1987) Jos6 
Gudifto Pelayo (Magistrado, 1986) Genaro David Gdngora (Magistrado, 1978), Juventino Castro, Juan Silva Meza, 
Olga Maria Sanchez Cordero, Jorge Garcia Ramirez and Raul Medina Mora.
Finally, two of the most visible and controversial of the Supreme Court justices, 
representing opposite poles of the political spectrum, were replaced in December 2009. 
They are the left leaning Gdngora Pimentel and more conservative Mariano Azuela, 
both former Chief Justices. As mentioned above, Gongora in particular is identified with 
a period of Court activism. Azuela had been one of the longest serving judges and had 
survived the 1995 judicial reform.
Asked to describe the differences between the Court as he found it in 1995 and 
presently, Gongora argues that “the Court was limited and didn’t want to get into 
trouble. Once when as judges and magistrates we went to the office of the Chief 
Justice we heard him say 'every time the Supreme Court gets involved in political 
issues it gets covered in filth.’ Now, with the reform of constitutional article 105 we have 
been flung into the political arena with controversies and actions that we have strived to 
resolve in the best way possible” (Reforma, 19 November 2009, p.8).
The process to replace Gdngora and Azuela began on 19 November 2009, when 
President Calderon sent the Senate his two lists of preferred candidates for the 15-year 
seats. The six candidates appeared before Senate commissions on 26 November in a 
process that was questioned by PRD and PT congressmen, who said it was 
inadequate and did not eliminate the risk that the PRI and the PAN could have come to 
prior arrangements over whom to support (Becerril, La Jornada, 29 November 2009). 
In view of the criticism, the senators agreed to bring the candidates in for a second 
session, this time in front of the entire Senate on 1 December 2009. As expected, Luis 
Maria Aguilar and Arturo Zaldivar were elected in a secret ballot through a system of 
identity cards, with 91 and 90 votes, respectively, from the PAN, PRI and PRD. They 
both achieved the two-thirds Senate majority needed in the first round of voting. Aguilar 
takes up his seat on the Court after a long career within the judiciary, while Zaldivar 
has a more independent and academic profile. Zaldivar has described the past decade 
as having been dominated by cases involving different powers competing over spheres 
of competency, but he anticipates that the development of fundamental rights will gain
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ground in future years. According to Arteaga (Mendez and Aranda, La Jornada, 2 
December 2009), the election will help “renew the doctrines of the Supreme Court as 
both jurists are innovators when it comes to constitutional studies and the amparo.”
Table 2.7. Lists of candidates to the Supreme Court (2009-24)
LIST TO REPLACE MARIANO AZUELA 
(Judicial Career)
LIST TO REPLACE GENARO GONGORA 
(Academics)
Luis Maria Aguilar Morales
General coordinator of advisors to the Chief 
Justice; general secretary of the Presidencia 
and Oficial Mayor; Circuit Magistrate
Jorge Adame Goddard 
Researcher, UNAM, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurldicas
Luisa Martinez Delgadillo 
Actuary and former secretary to several 
collegiate circuit courts; judge in Zacatecas 
and San Luis Potosl; Circuit Magistrate
Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor 
Researcher UNAM, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurldicas
Jorge Mario Pardo Rebolledo 
Judicial actuary and former secretary to 
several courts, judge in the Estado de M6xico; 
criminal judge and civil circuit magistrate
Arturo Zaldivar Lelo de la Rea
PhD in Law at UNAM, lawyer from the Escuela 
Libre de Derecho
Zedillo’s third judicial reform: 1999
After the important 1996 electoral reform, which formally incorporated the Electoral 
Tribunal into the judiciary (See Chapter 5), a third reform was implemented in June 
1999, this time more closely related to the judiciary. On 9 December 1999, President 
Zedillo submitted initiatives to reform the Organic Law of the Judiciary and the Law of 
Constitutional Protection to strengthen the capacity of the Circuit Courts and the status 
of the Supreme Court of Justice as a Constitutional Tribunal.
The initiative, proposed by the executive, modified the text of four constitutional articles 
94, 97, 100 and 107. For some scholars this was a counter-reform, because it 
subordinated the Judicial Council to the Supreme Court, making it difficult for judges 
and magistrates to maintain internal independence (Carbonell, 2000). The main 
changes brought in by the reform are:
•  Granting the Supreme Court the power to send general agreements to the 
Circuit Collegiate Tribunals in cases in which jurisprudence has been 
established or when the cases are not deemed particularly relevant to the 
Court (Article 94, paragraph 6). Constitutional controversies and 
unconstitutional actions are the only cases that would be resolved by the 
Supreme Court.
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• Regulating the selection procedure for the Judicial Council, through the 
introduction of new pre-requisites for Council members (Article 100).
• Introducing a recourse through which the Supreme Court could verify that 
Judicial Council decisions relating to appointments and removals comply 
with the Organic Law of the Judiciary of the Federation (Gudino Pelayo, 
2001: 428) (Article 100, paragraph 9).
• Introducing mechanisms for determining the “importance and 
transcendence” of certain types of resolutions related to constitutional 
matters, in order to admit them for analysis and revision (Article 107, Section 
IX).
Panista administrations, Vicente Fox (2000-06) and Felipe Calderon (2006-12): 
signaling future judicial reforms?
During Vicente Fox’s administration discussion intensified over the need to 
approve not only an amparo law but also a further judicial reform that could 
guarantee more effective independence from the other powers of government. In 
2002, the ruling party, PAN, defended an initiative which aimed to restructure the 
Judicial Council. This initiative, which would also prohibit the Chief Justice from 
simultaneously fulfilling the role of president of the Judicial Council, was criticised 
and even considered a counter-reform (Milenio, 12-13 March 2002).
In 2003, the Supreme Court agreed to carry out a detailed and inclusive national 
consultation process on the need for further judicial reform. The response was 
overwhelmingly in favour of reform. Some 200 reform proposals were received 
covering all of the main issues relating to administration of justice, both at federal 
and state level. These were distilled by the Court into a series of 33 actions to 
reform the Mexican justice system. The subjects of proposed change that are 
most relevant to this thesis are:
• Strengthen the Supreme Court so that it can act as a Constitutional Court
• Create a consolidated Mexican constitutional defence system
• Reform the amparo law
• Judicial federalism
• Set a fixed budget for the judiciary to guarantee its independence and 
autonomy
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• Improve the appointment process for Supreme Court justices (more detailed 
professional profile for prospective candidates; participation of two government 
powers in the appointments process; greater transparency)
• Improve the administration of justice and functioning of the Judicial Council
• Consolidate the judicial career structure
• Apply strict standards of professional ethics
• Enhance the Court’s power to initiate laws.
• Standardise laws across the federation and states
• Review the Supreme Court’s existing investigative powers
• Improve transparency and accountability
• Reform the criminal justice system
Source: Libro Blanco de la Reforma Judicial. Una Agenda para la Justicia en Mexico (2006), 
Supreme Court of Justice.
http://www.scjn.gob.mx/RecJur/ReformaJudicial1/LibroBlancoReformaJudicial/Paginas/TextoLibroBlan
co.aspx
In March 2004 Vicente Fox presented the Senate with a judicial reform initiative that 
would modify 23 constitutional articles and seven laws. The main proposals were to:
• Unify federal police corps under an interior ministry
• Replace the current Attorney General of Justice with an autonomous General 
Prosecutor’s Office which would head all of the public prosecutor’s offices 
(ministerios publicos)
• Include the presumption of innocence in article 20, which currently gives the 
accused certain guarantees
• Replace written processes with public and oral hearings on the grounds that 
this will expedite justice.
The Court created a group of federal judges to analyse Fox’s initiative. Its response 
was that “the reasons given to justify the constitutional, criminal law and public security 
reforms lack foundations” {El Universal, 11 November 2004). The group pointed out 
that the proposal would double the number of judges without any guarantee that the 
judiciary would be granted the resources necessary to cover the increase {El Universal, 
11 November 2004).
In August 2004, the Supreme Court, the Judicial Council and the Electoral Tribunal 
published the Code of Ethics of the Judicial Power of the Federation. Despite the 
creation of the National Commission on Judicial Ethics (CNEJ), concern remained on 
the part of the general public that the judiciary lacked legitimacy and could not be
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trusted. According to the academic Javier Saldana, judicial ethics “is still in nappies” 
and both federal and local judiciaries are plagued by nepotism (on some occasions 
carried out when two judges agree to promote each others’ friends or relatives), poor 
treatment of subordinates, arrogance, and poorly trained judges (Milenio, 13 December 
2009).
Although no more judicial reforms were approved during Fox’s administration it should 
be noted that in recent years the Supreme Court has become more open in a number 
of ways: it held a public consultation on judicial reform; information on the Internet is 
updated with increasing regularity; since mid-2005 it has been possible to use the 
I nternet for simultaneous access both to the Court sessions and judge’s discussions; it 
approved a Transparency Law and has started to formally open more resolutions and 
specific cases to public scrutiny.41 Secondary legislation affecting the judiciary was 
issued on 2 April 2004 (Reglamento de la SCJN y del Consejo de la Judicatura Federal 
para la aplicacidn de la Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Informacidn). It 
calls for increased transparency in all matters relating to the structure of the judiciary, 
including its budget, management, organisation and operation. In terms of case files, 
the law provides a unified definition for reserved information, and establishes that 
peoples’ names should not be considered confidential.
President Felipe Calderon succeeded in passing legislation to reform the federal 
judicial system in March 2008. The reform legislation, which basically targets the 
regulation of the accusatorial criminal justice system, set a timetable of eight years for 
full implementation.42 On reaching the mid-term of his administration, Calderdn 
announced that he would also present an ambitious political reform plan, which will 
seek to enhance the Supreme Court’s power to initiate laws by establishing the 
principle of "preferential initiative" (Office of the Presidency, 29 November 2009). On 15 
December 2009, Calderon formally presented his political reform initiative to Congress. 
It aims to introduce a second-round of voting for presidential elections and referenda 
and to streamline the legislature, reducing the number of congressmen to 400 from 500 
of which 160 would be elected by proportional representation, and Senators to 96 from 
128 (http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/prensa/presidencia/?contenido=51465). The 
president’s bill would also allow for independent candidates to stand for office and
41 The 2002 Federal Law on Transparency and Access to Information was transformational in terms of the 
way the public sector operates.
42 Author interviews with Efrain Cardenas and Eduardo Amerena, both criminal lawyers with Buffet 
C£rdenas-Amerena Abogados, 26 March 2008, Mexico City.
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takes aim at an enduring political taboo: the reelection of congressmen and municipal 
presidents.43
Also in December 2009 the Senate finally approved changes that modernise the 
amparo law and grant new related powers to the Supreme Court. According to 
Senators Pedro Joaquin Coldwell (PRI), Alejandro Zapata (PAN), Ricardo Monreal and 
Pablo Gomez (PRD) this amparo reform is the most important of the last 25 years in 
terms of judicial life of the country and the strengthening of the judiciary (Gaceta 
Parlamentaria Senado, 10 December 2009). The changes are aimed at allowing the 
Court to concentrate on the most important cases while other amparo cases are dealt 
with by lower courts. Among the changes is the introduction of a “General Declaration 
of Unconstitutionality" which can be issued by the Court when jurisprudence is 
established in the case of indirect amparo judgments under review. This brings an end 
to the so called “Formula Otero” whereby the amparo only protects the complainant. 
According to Justice Sanchez Cordero there is a lot of resistance to this amendment 
among litigants and judges in district courts who do not want the possibility of direct 
amparos to disappear. “I don’t think there is real independence of local powers as 
governors have a lot of influence over local issues,” she said.44
Public perceptions of the impact of judicial reform: a public relations success
In terms of judicial independence, it is important that the judiciary is not only 
independent but that it is perceived as such by the general public. Impartiality, both real 
and apparent, influences public confidence in the courts, the judges and the judicial 
process. Yet closer public scrutiny of the justice system and other societal and 
governmental institutions is a concomitant of the move towards a more democratic 
society. Greater access to information and greater recourse to the law in Mexico has 
given rise to concerns over delays and backlogs of cases in the courts. Concerns have 
also been raised over the activism of the courts, specifically the Supreme Court in 
political matters. Public criticism is directed at all aspects of the administration of 
justice, including judicial decision-making, judicial conduct, judicial appointments, court 
procedure and court management, as the following sample of polling data shows. Yet 
the Court’s standing in public regard has improved in the last few years.
Reforma newspaper published a survey of 851 adults in November 2003, which 
revealed that only 16 percent of respondents were even aware that two Supreme Court
43 Author interview with Alejandro Poire, Under Secretary of the Interior, 23 December 2009, Mexico City.
44 Author interview with Justice Sanchez Cordero, Mexico City, 4 December 2009.
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judges were in the process of being selected, and only 2 percent knew that the court 
w as m ade up of eleven judges. Slightly more than half of respondents, 51 percent, 
described the Suprem e Court’s decisions as opaque (“little/non-transparent”). Thirty-six 
percent of respondents thought the Court lacked independence and took political 
repercussions into consideration when issuing judgm ents, though only 35 percent were  
in favour of high salaries fo rju d ges  to guarantee independence in their work. Six-out- 
of-ten respondents w ere against the pensions-for-life granted to retired Suprem e Court 
justices. W hen asked how much the Suprem e Court has contributed to dem ocracy in 
Mexico, 53  per cent said “little or nothing”, while 44  per cent said “som e or a lot”. 
Despite this negative perception, Suprem e Court justices fared better than other 
elem ents of the justice system, in particular the public prosecutor’s office, as the 
following tables show.







The system of administering justice in 
Mexico 32% 36% 24% 8%
Judges 29 38 24 9
Officials at the public prosecutor’s 
office 23 36 33 8
Supreme Court judges 35 36 18 11
Table 2.9 And at different levels what is your opinion about the justice 
system?
Very good/good Average Bad/very bad Don’t know
Federal 38% 18% 42% 2%
State level 33 20 45 2
Municipal level 27 21 50 2
W hen viewed as a series over time, the polls indicate a worsening opinion of the 
Suprem e Court among the general public during the years 2000  to 2003  (see tables  
2 .10  and 2 .11 ), though a subsequent poll shows some improvement (see table 2 .12). 
The following data come from a series of national telephone surveys conducted by 
Reform a  newspaper.
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Table 2.10 What is your opinion of the Supreme Court?
V ery  g o o d /go o d A verag e B ad /very  bad
December 2000 50 [2?“ 7
February 2001 53 25 8
October 2001 47 26 11
January 2002 40 31 16
March 2002 36 32 18
May 2002 39 33 14
July 2002 43 34 13
7 September 2002 35 39 17
5 October 2002 40 35 14
November 2002 37 36 14
January 2003 37 36 14
April 2003 38 34 13
June 2003 50 35 16
August 2003 50 38 12
October 2003 36% 36% 15%
A later poll taken in D ecem ber 2004  by the sam e pollster using the sam e  
methodology45 asks about the judiciary’s role in approving the budget and reveals an 
appetite for judicial involvement in political controversies. Som e 58 percent of 
respondents said President Fox should ask the Suprem e Court to intervene to modify 
the budget, while only 30 per cent said he should accept the budget as approved by 
Congress. Half of respondents trusted the Suprem e Court to act independently to 
resolve the budget dispute between the president and the lower cham ber of Congress, 
against 40  percent who did not trust the Court’s independence in the matter.
Another M exican pollster, Param etria, grouped different public institutions into three  
categories according to the level of confidence they inspire among the general public:
1) High confidence in the public institution: the Church, priests, the military and 
T V  news programmes.
2) Medium confidence: newspapers, radio news programmes, the National 
Commission for Hum an Rights and the Federal Electoral Institute
3) Low confidence: the President, judges and magistrates, congressmen and 
Senators, and political parties.
Still, as the following and other polls show, the public has more confidence in the 
courts than in other governm ent institutions or political parties.
45 National telephone poll of 850 adults conducted on 18 December 2004 by Grvpo Reforma.
I l l
Table 2.11. Trust in Mow confidence’ institutions
President High/some trust (%) Low/no trust (%)
June 02 45 46
May 03 47 52
August 03 48 49
May 04 40 55
June 05 41 57
Judges and magistrates High/some trust Low/no trust
June 02 24 64
May 03 30 64
August 03 26 68
May 04 22 65
June 05 34 62
Congress and Senate High/some trust Low/no trust
June 02 22 68
May 03 27 67
August 03 30 65
May 04 25 65
June 05 28 68
Political parties High/some trust Low/no trust
June 02 25 63
May 03 28 70
August 03 26 72
May 04 24 69
June 05 27 70
Source: June 2005, Parametria.
Consulta Mitofsky used a similar approach in a 2009 national survey that suggests that 
the Supreme Court is one of the institutions whose levels of confidence has increased 
with respect to 2004-05. As can be seen in Table 2.12, since October 2008, the Court 
has maintained a 70 percent approval rating which places it in the “medium institutional 
confidence” category.
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Table 2.12 Trust in ‘medium-low confidence’ institutions (2004-09)
MEDIUfI/I LOW







6.7 6.1 5.7 4.2 4.7 4.7
JUL
05
7.1 6.2 6.1 4.5 5 5.1
FEB
06
7.1 6.9 6.2 5.6 5.7 5.9
MAY
06
7.8 6.9 6.6 5.8 6.1 6.2
AUG
06
6.9 6.9 6.8 6.1 6.3 6.2
FEB
07
7.1 6.8 6.7 5.4 5.6 5.6
NOV
07
7.1 6.8 6.7 5.6 5.8 5.3
OCT
08
7.0 6.9 7.0 5.7 6.1 3.6
FEB
09
7.2 7.0 7.1 5.9 6.1 5.8
MAY
09
7.3 7.2 7.1 6.0 6.4 6.0
NOV
09
6.8 6.7 6.9 5.6 6.0 5.6
Source: Monitor Mitofsky (Nov 09), Economla, Polltica y Gobierno. Monitor Mensual d
Consulta Mitofsky ( http://72.52.156.225/Docs/FusionCharts/EPG.pdf).
Today, both supporters and detractors of the reform agree that the 1994 judicial 
reform was very important for the country and that the Supreme Court continues to 
be one of the most respected institutions in Mexico, even though its increased 
activism has exposed it to higher levels of public scrutiny than ever before. 
Criticisms are regularly made in the national news media about the salaries and 
benefits offered to justices and the size of the judiciary, but most polling data show 
that the general public does consider the Supreme Court to be a respected 
institution for resolving conflicts, with the final say on issues of great relevance for 
the country’s present and future.
Conclusions
Important reforms to the judiciary have been implemented since 1994 and have clearly 
led to significant improvement in terms of judicial structure, performance, 
independence and transparency. Throughout this chapter I have argued that the 1994 
judicial reform was an important first step in strengthening the credibility of the judiciary 
as a more impartial system of justice since it granted the Supreme Court of Justice
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enhanced powers within a context of increasing political pluralism and new federalism. 
Not only was the Court granted more constitutional power but also its jurisdictional and 
administrative functions were separated thanks to the creation of the Judicial Council. 
Since then, constitutional and legal reforms have multiplied at the federal and local 
level. As will be seen in the following chapters, all these changes have clearly changed 
the relation between the executive and the judiciary.
There can be no doubt that the Supreme Court has become more open and 
transparent to public scrutiny. There is still a long way to go, however. The fact that the 
Court has become more active in deciding extremely topical political, economic and 
social issues has put this institution under the spotlight. As the surveys presented in 
this chapter show, citizens seem to doubt the independence of the court, though the 
Court’s reputation does seem to have improved in recent years. In many ways, and 
despite the Supreme Court’s public outreach efforts, public opinion of the Court 
seemed until very recently to be out of step with modernisation efforts and with the real 
change in its role vis-a-vis other branches of power. Since 2000 all Supreme Court 
justice appointments have required the support of all three principal parties, which no 
doubt has an impact on perceptions as well as the reality of increased independence. 
In the context of competitive elections, such as the 2006 presidential race or the 2009 
federal election, a number of political actors questioned the performance and 
independence of court judges and of the Electoral Tribunal Magistrates, though it is 
perhaps of greater significance that the court’s rulings were complied with.
This chapter addressed two main questions: why and how Mexican authorities adopted 
a judicial reform in 1994. Based on thorough archival research and several personal 
interviews, including with former President Ernesto Zedillo, I could confirm that an 
important motivation for the reform had to do with a new federalism agenda and the 
resolution of constitutional controversies. One of my main hypotheses is that in the 
context of increasing political pluralism it would be more necessary to have a means of 
resolving political disputes between rival parties governing different levels and 
branches of government, in particular involving municipalities which needed a legal- 
institutional channel to resolve their conflicts about resources, power and party politics.
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CHAPTER 3
The Supreme Court as the Lynchpin of New Federalism: An 
Analysis of the Constitutional Controversies (1995-2005)
' This is the first time that we began hearing the word 'controversy'... What we could win (with regard to challenges to the 
indigenous reform bill) is that the government will understand that we are not going to let this lie"
Consejo Regional Indlgena, May 2002
As discussed in Chapter 2, within presidential systems judicial independence is 
generally institutionalised through the principle of separation of powers. Although this 
principle was included in the 1917 Mexican Constitution, the executive tended to 
prevail over the other two branches of government. Furthermore, subnational 
governments were in practice clearly subordinated to the central authority in the 
context of a party system dominated by the PRI for more than seven decades. With a 
political system that concentrated most political power in the presidency and was highly 
centralised, the Mexican judiciary was characterised by its weakness and passivity, 
and often failed to act as an effective check on political power.
As opposition parties started to win strategic municipalities in the mid-1980s, there was 
increased pressure to move toward further democratisation and a more genuine 
balance of powers within Mexico’s federal system of government. Within this process, 
the ambitious 1983 municipal reform represented the beginning of vertical 
decentralisation. The reform granted responsibility to municipal governments in specific 
areas such as sanitation, water and sewage, environmental protection, transportation 
and urban roads, traffic, local police, public lighting and land use planning. 
Nevertheless, little change was achieved and gradually the centre regained its political 
control. According to Cornelius (1999) and Rodriguez (1997), non-PRI municipal 
presidents frequently found themselves financially and politically marginalised in their 
relationship with state and federal governments. The impact of this reform and 
subsequent decentralisation efforts over the course of the decade was therefore limited 
and served mainly to shore up the regime’s diminishing legitimacy rather than to 
revitalise subnational governments.
A decade later, President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) promoted a shift in the balance 
of power to the state and local levels (Zedillo, 1994).46 His project promised a more 
equitable distribution of resources with increased financial and administrative
46 Also author interview with Ernesto Zedillo, 2001, London.
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autonomy, as well as the institutional strengthening of state and municipal 
governments.
Overall, the gradual process of political liberalisation contributed to the ongoing 
progress of vertical decentralisation and to a more effective horizontal separation of 
powers. It became clear that a profound reform of the justice system would be key for 
resolving conflicts emerging between different branches and levels of government 
under increasing political pluralism and new federalism.
The 1994 judicial reform, discussed in Chapter 2, reinforced the Supreme Court’s role 
as a check on the separation of powers through two types of recourses for the control 
of constitutionality: constitutional controversies and unconstitutional actions. Although 
rarely used during the decades of hegemonic PRI rule—when the regime opted to 
resolve political conflicts through internal negotiation channels— since 1995 the Court 
has been increasingly ruling over controversies between different levels of government, 
including the municipalities and the Federal District. For the first time in history, the 
Court is also ruling on cases of unconstitutionality presented by one third of a 
legislative body against federal or Federal District resolutions or laws.
Constitutional controversies are the legal mechanism for defending the federal nature 
of the Mexican political system and the principle of separation of powers, and form the 
focus of this chapter. They are used to prevent the different levels and branches of 
government from exceeding their constitutional jurisdiction and invading others. I will 
argue that increasing party competition and the consequent alternation of political 
power in several municipal (especially since the mid-1980s) and gubernatorial elections 
(since 1989) have made the judicial mechanism of constitutional controversies 
increasingly important and cast light on the need for a Constitutional Court. In sum, I 
will argue that over the last 15 years there has been a clear process of judicialisation of 
politics (Fix Fierro, 2000: 170) where rival political parties are increasingly using the 
Court to resolve a wide diversity of policy disputes, including in situations of political 
deadlock.
I have organised my empirical analysis of constitutional controversies into four broad 
areas (see Annex 1 for details of each individual constitutional controversy). First, I 
determine which levels of government have been involved in the disputes that have 
been taken to the Court and which types of controversies have been more common in 
the 1995-2000 period. I expect to find that most disputes are between municipalities
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and state governments—the first building blocks of political and administrative 
organisation and the first entities to be governed by opposition parties—with fewer 
against the federal government.
Second, I identify the political parties governing in the entities that presented the legal 
recourses. I expect most of them to be from the opposition to PRI state and national 
governments. The centre-right PAN—the first opposition party to experience the 
responsibility of local and state government— has been particularly active in taking 
legal action to defend political and jurisdictional disputes. Indeed its strategy for 
reaching presidential power was for gradual change through political alternation at the 
local level, which proved crucial for further democratisation at the federal level.
Third, I look at the content of the demands in order to identify the issues under dispute. 
I look specifically at eleven areas: allocation of public resources (fiscal issues, budget 
expenditure, fiscal and income laws); responsibility of public servants (impeachment/ 
revocation of mandate/suspension); functioning and organisation of institutions; 
geographical issues (creation/elimination of a municipality/ territorial conflicts); 
appointments (restitution/ non-ratification); administrative justice/jurisdictional rulings; 
municipal autonomy (tax revenue); planning, infrastructure and public works; internal 
administrative agreements; invasion of spheres of competence and others. I show that 
most are related to fiscal-budgetary claims by municipalities and state governments 
seeking the proper allocation of public resources assigned for regional development 
under new federalism. I conclude by assessing the role the Supreme Court has played 
in preserving basic federal divisions and reinforcing the separation of powers during the 
ongoing process of institutionalisation. I also look at whether this process has resulted 
in more credible constraints on the federal government.
Fourth, I present a regional analysis of the constitutional controversies, showing that 
some states have been much more legally active than others. I demonstrate that most 
of the northern states— in which crucial municipalities have been governed by the 
opposition since the mid-1980s— have proved to be the most active in presenting legal 
recourses challenging the state and federal government in diverse areas. PAN 
strongholds such as Nuevo Leon and Baja California have been particularly activist 
since the 1994 reform, as has the PRD government of the Federal District since it 
gained power in the city in 1997. Also notable are the cases of PRI-governed states 
such as Puebla, Tamaulipas and Oaxaca, where opposition-governed municipalities 
show increased legal activism.
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In the final part of this chapter, I discuss how a greater balance of power has been 
made possible by a stronger opposition presence in Congress. Since the election of the 
first opposition majority in the lower chamber in 1997, Congress has radically changed 
the nature of its relation vis-^-vis the executive, not only in terms of its traditional 
rubber-stamping attitude, but also by showing an increasing legal activism to defend its 
constitutional powers.
Open floodgates: Analysis of constitutional controversies (1995-2005)
This section offers an overview of the constitutional controversies presented by 
different levels of government before the Supreme Court in 1995-2005. The analysis is 
divided into two periods that coincide with important events that had a clear impact on 
the level of use of constitutional controversies. The first period covers the controversies 
presented before the Supreme Court immediately after the 1994 judicial reforms were 
introduced. The Court was headed by Chief Justice Jos6 Vicente Aguinaco Aleman 
(1995-99) at a time still characterised by PRI dominance at the federal and subnational 
levels. I expect to find that there would be an immediate increase in the use of legal 
mechanisms to defend jurisdictions after the 1997 elections, when the PRI lost the 
majority in the lower chamber of Congress and three further governorships, including 
the crucial Federal District. The second period covers the administration headed by 
Chief Justice Genaro G6ngora Pimentel (1999-2003), who took over the post on 4 
January 1999, and part of Mariano Azuela’s (2003-07) administration as Chief Justice. 
The analysis shows that municipal authorities have been responsible for most of the 
recourses presented before the Supreme Court.
During the eight decades prior to the 1994 reform (1917-94) only 55 constitutional 
controversies were presented before the Court, less than one per year. Of these, the 
majority, 22, were between powers within a state, followed by 14 between the 
federation and a state and 12 between municipalities and states (Cosslo, 1995: 1039). 
According to Arteaga (1999: 1376), the lack of operability of constitutional 
controversies was mainly due to the undemocratic nature of the regime, strong 
presidentialism and excessive centralisation of power.47 Table 3.1 provides an analysis 
of the 28 (of the 55) controversies for which information is publicly available.
47 One of the last judicial conflicts between the federation and a state was resolved by the Supreme Court 
in December 1932. The case was presented by the government of the southern state of Oaxaca against 
the federal government, and concerned the state law on jurisdiction of archaeological monuments, issued 
in February 1932. The Court annulled the local law, which had been issued in reference to the discovery of 
the Montalbdn tomb, on the grounds that it invaded the federal jurisdiction established in Article 73, 
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35 1920 Representative of 





Declaration of annulment of 
powers and naming an interim 
governor
2 1921 Executive Michoacan Legality of elections
4 1921 Enrique Moreno 
Ram6n Martinez
Case dismissed by 8 votes to 3




Dispute between two groups of 
congressmen





(electoral procedures were 
violated)




2 1932 Federation State of Oaxaca, 
Executive power
Governor’s February 1932 'Law 
on Ownership and Jurisdiction 
of Archaeological Monuments’ 







Lawsuit dropped by the 
governor





Decree validating the results of 
local elections






Decree validating the results of 
local elections
8 1936 Durango Electoral 




and the Ministry 
for War and the 
Navy
Incursion into the sovereignty of 
Durango on electoral matters. 5 
Oct 1936, claim disallowed on 
the grounds that complainants 
do not represent the state
1 1939 Judges of the First 
and Fifth District 
Courts
Commercial lawsuit, 26 January 
1940. First Circuit Court 
prohibited for legal reasons from 
taking on the case





Refusal to hear a case involving 
alleged metals theft,
29 Aug 1940 
No grounds for the lawsuit, 
unanimous decision (four votes)





1 July 1941 
Court abstains from intervening 
on grounds that it lacks 
competency (17 votes to 1)
9 1941 Guerrero Elimination of powers; substitute 
governor named; new elections 
called. 1 July 1941 
(carried by 17 votes to 1)
5 1943 Congressmen 
XXXV Legislature, 
State of Mexico
Executive Power Complainants were no longer 
acting congressmen since they 
had had their parliamentary 
privileges withdrawn;
27 February 1945 
Case withdrawn (by 16 votes)
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Fraud and abuse of trust, 20 
July 1946 
No sanctions, unanimous 
decision (four votes)






Refusal to proceed with 
instructions to carry out arrest 
for fraud, 20 July 1946 
No sanctions for either judge; 
unanimous decision (four votes)






Allegations of crime and 
carrying firearms, 22 March 
1947
No sanctions; unanimous 
decision (four votes)
1 1947 Governor Jalisco Legislative 
Power, Jalisco
Failure to publish the legislative 
decree reforming Art 28, which 
extended the government 
administration to six years.
Rejection of the naming of an 
interim Governor to replace 
Marcelino Garcia Barrag^n 
9 vs 6 votes
259 1948 Mexico City Judge 




(First Trial Court 
Judge)
Refusal to hear a lawsuit on 
theft 
9 July 1951







Refusal to proceed in cases of 
murder, attempted murder, and 
criminal association 
5 Jul 1949 
21 Jul 1951




Municipality’s right to offer civil 
registration services; the SCJN 
declares the case well-founded 
Presented: 15 June 93 
Resolved: 30 Aug 94
2 1993 Municipality of San 
Pedro Garza 





powers in Nuevo 
Le6n
Freedom to administer 
municipal public taxes; 
declarations of assets and 
income of public servants need 
to be approved by Congress 
Presented: 28 Oct 93 
Resolved: 10 Feb 97









requirements; invasion of areas 
of the municipality. The SCJN is 
competent to take on the case, 
but declares it to be unfounded







Income and tax laws; road 
vehicle licensing services; law 
on tax coordination (for 
transport services) 
Presented: 31 Jan 1994 
Resolved: 10 Feb 1997




Invasion of spheres of influence; 
rejection of transfer of three 
pieces of land; procurement 
process for roadwork 
concessions 
Presented: 14 Dec 94 
Resolved: 25 Feb 97 




The Supreme Court did not rule in any of the above controversies, bar the more recent ones involving municipalities. In 
each of the other cases either the plaintiff desisted or the Court rejected the case due to lack of proper jurisdiction.
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In contrast, 103 constitutional controversies were registered in the first three years 
following the reform (1995-97). After the 1997 mid-term elections, 102 controversies 
were taken to the Court in just four years (1998-2000). In 2001, just after the 
alternation of power, 329 controversies were presented by a number of municipalities 
from eight different states exclusively relating to the indigenous law approved by 
Congress on April 2001. In 2002-03, 179 recourses were taken to the Supreme Court, 
while in 2004 109 controversies were resolved. In 2005, a decade after Zedillo began 
his process of judicial reform, 83 constitutional controversies were registered, taking 
the total for the 1995-2005 period to 947. In 2006-08, 399 controversies were 
registered while in 2009, more than 100 such cases were taken to the Court. In the 
1995-2009 period, 1,450 controversies have been presented to the Court.
Table 3.2.




























Source: Mexican Supreme Court of Justice, Semanario Judicial de la Federacidn y  su Gaceta, 9a 6poca. 
Informe de Labores (2001-2009), SCJN Data Bases.Actividad Jurisdiccional/Consulta de 
Expedientes/Textos de Engrose (http://www2.scin.gob.mx/expedientes/)
Note: Total numbers differ from data in Alex, Portal de Estadlstica Judicial, Suprema Corte de Justicia, 
Controversias Constitucionales (http://www2.scin.gob.mx/alex/) . especially for the 2000-2005 period.
Although the mechanism of constitutional controversies existed in the past, the novelty 
of its use can be explained by the fact that it represents an ideal method for legally 
resolving disputes emerging in a more plural political scenario. Unconstitutional
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actions, which are relatively new legal recourses, have also been used to a 
considerable degree, particularly since 1996. However, their use is complicated by 
strict time constraints: they have to be presented as formal cases before the Suprem e  
Court within 30 days. Constitutional controversies, in contrast, have existed for longer 
and municipalities appear comfortable using them to defend their autonomy vis-a-vis 
state governm ents or even the federation, or to resolve internal political disputes that 
may involve taking unpopular decisions. As can be seen in Table 3.2, while 33  
constitutional actions had been presented by 1998, the num ber of constitutional 
controversies was almost five times higher; there were 57 such constitutional 
controversies filed in 1996 alone. There can be no doubt that these legal mechanisms 
have becom e more common and even routine in Mexico.
From 200 0  to 2006, the num ber of unconstitutional actions taken to the Court was 
relatively stable, on average 40  cases per year, com pared with 140 constitutional 
controversies on average per year presented in the sam e period. However, it is worth 
noting that in 2007  and 2008  the number of unconstitutional actions tripled to 173 and 
134, respectively. More than 60  percent of all these cases challenged electoral laws, 
while close to 20 percent dealt with fiscal issues. Overall, in the 1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 9  period, 707  
actions and 1,401 controversies were taken to the Court.
Figure 3.1
Number of constitutional controversies taken to the Supreme Court
(1917-92//1994-2009)







1917-1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
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In view of the high numbers of legal recourses that have been filed before it since 
2000, the Supreme Court has begun to refer many cases to lower courts so that it can 
concentrate on issues of “exceptional interest” for the country. Such issues include 
cases related to the indigenous law, the construction of a new airport close to Mexico 
City, geographical disputes over state borders and unconstitutional actions related to 
electoral disputes (SCJN, April 2002, ‘Comunicado de Prensa 516’). This step has 
clearly reinforced the Supreme Court’s position as a Constitutional Court along the 
lines of the US Supreme Court. Indeed, as Kelman points out, “a court cannot make a 
decision on a policy question unless court procedures classify the policy question at 
issue as something appropriate for a court to hear in the first place” (1987:118).
Parties involved in the constitutional controversies
Vertical separation of powers: the municipalities as new actors
Since 1995, municipalities have presented a significant proportion of the constitutional 
controversies taken to the Supreme Court. Table 3.3 shows that 80 percent of the 
controversies up to 1998 involved disputes between municipalities and state 
governments and/or local congresses. The immediate interpretation of this is that since 
political pluralism became a reality first at the municipal level, this level of government 
has been legitimated to formally use these types of recourse and is doing so 
increasingly. On the one hand, municipalities have been formally included among the 
entities with the right to access the Supreme Court to defend their jurisdiction. On the 
other, as opposition parties started to govern municipalities, there has been a 
significant increase in their legal activism. However, it could also be argued that clear 
weaknesses remain in the state-level regulations preserving municipal autonomy, 
which reflects deficiencies within the Mexican federal system.
All five controversies filed in 1993 and 1994 were between municipalities and state 
governments, four of them presented by northern municipalities and one by the central 
municipality of San Luis Potosi. The number of controversies escalated in the 
aftermath of the 1994 reform: 19 recourses were presented in 1995, 18 by 
municipalities and one by the government of Tabasco against the federation.
Seventeen of the disputes involving municipalities were against state governments. 
The remaining one was between a municipality (Tijuana) and the federal government 
over the validity of the 1995 national budget, specifically through the budget line known
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as Ramo 26, formerly PRONASOL and later called Ramo 33, discussed below. Sixteen 
cases involved northern municipalities; the other two dealt with a political conflict in 
Tepoztlan, in the central state of Morelos.





























1995 17 1 1 19
1996 54 1 1 1 1 57
1997 20 3 3 3 6 36












1999 24 9 1 2
1
37














Source: Author’s analysis based on figures from the CD-Rom 'Unconstitutional Actions and Constitutional 
Controversies’ (SCJN, 2000)
* Two of these recourses were presented by the municipality of Tultepec in the Estado de Mexico initially 
against the municipality of Cuautitten (CC 19 & 20/98), but were later reformulated against the state 
government and the local congress. ** Two recourses were immediately dismissed as they were presented 
by actors who were not legally recognised to use this mechanism— recourse 24/00 was presented by the 
Governor of Morelos who at the time had taken a leave of absence (con licencia), and 26/00 was 
presented by a local party representative in Chiapas.
A similar pattern can be found in 1996 when only one of the 57 disputes was between 
a municipality (Merida) and the federation, again over Ramo 26 (CC 2/96). The first 
claim to be presented by the federation against a municipality (Guadalajara) took place 
in 1996, over the Savings Protection Law (“Ley de Proteccion al Ahorro", CC 56/96).48 
The remaining disputes were all between municipalities and state governments, 
including two different blocks of 22 controversies from diverse municipalities in Oaxaca 
against the PRI state government (see Chapter 4). Three cases were immediately 
ruled unfounded on the grounds that they had been presented by parties that lacked 
constitutional authority to file the legal recourse.
48 The controversy rested on the decision by the municipality of Guadalajara to establish certain conditions 
to safeguard the banking sector. The federal government claimed that this area was an exclusive domain 
of the federation. Indeed, the Court ruled in favour of the federation, arguing that although Article 115 
allowed municipal authorities to regulate public security issues within their jurisdiction, regulation of the 
protection and security of banks was the domain of the federation.
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Two further disputes between a municipality and the federation were registered in 
1997. Tuxtla Gutierrez once again challenged the annual budget (1997) that 
determined the formula for distributing Ramo 26. The municipality of Berriozabal, also 
in Chiapas, presented a controversy against the President, the Senate and the state 
government challenging the appointment by the President of Julio Cesar Ruiz Ferro to 
replace governor-elect Eduardo Robledo.49 That same year Quintana Roo challenged 
Campeche for failing to respect the state border, in what was the first constitutional 
controversy between different state governments.
Again in 1998 more than half (18) of the controversies presented were between 
municipal authorities and state governments. Another involved a dispute between the 
municipality of San Nicolas Ruiz in Chiapas and the federal and state governments 
(CC 21/98, 5 August 1998) in connection with a military operation aimed at dismantling 
four Zapatista autonomous municipalities (SIPAZ, 1998). The case was immediately 
dismissed. Of the remaining controversies, two were submitted by the governments of 
Oaxaca (CC 2/98) and Puebla (CC 23/98) against different municipalities; three were 
between two states regarding geographical limits (CC 1 and 3/98, Jalisco and Colima); 
and two involved disputes among different municipalities (CC 19/98 and 20/98). The 
latter two recourses were presented by the municipality of Tultepec in the Estado de 
Mexico, initially against the municipality of Cuautitl£n regarding a housing project which 
was interpreted as a geographical dispute, but later reformulated in several 
controversies against the state government and the local congress.
As expected, given the more plural composition of the lower chamber and state 
governments since 1997, each year new actors have become involved in the use of 
constitutional controversies. In 1999, the lower chamber of the federal Congress (CC 
26/99) and the Federal District initiated legal challenges against the federal executive 
(CC 5/99, 35 and 36/99). That same year nine controversies between state 
governments and the federation were registered. Three of these are particularly 
interesting and will be discussed in Chapter 4: the controversies involving the local 
judiciaries of Guanajuato (CC 3/99) and Baja California (CC 8/99) in disputes over 
economic resources and autonomy; and the dispute over vehicle registration in 
Chihuahua. In the same category are two recourses presented by the governments of
49 Robledo was inaugurated in office on 8 December 1994 but in the context of the Zapatista uprising 
separated “temporarily” from the governorship two months later. In April 1996, Robledo was appointed 
Mexican Ambassador to Argentina and President Zedillo announced that he would be replaced by Ruiz 
Ferro. Nicolas Acero, the PRI municipal president who presented this legal recourse against the 
federation, was elected in October 1995 but was removed from office in December 1996 on corruption 
charges.
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Nayarit (CC  13/99) and Coahuila (CC  34 /99) challenging the federal Congress for 
creating a special commission to oversee that no federal resources were diverted to 
local electoral campaigns. It is interesting to note that the first recourse presented by 
President Zedillo against a state governm ent concerned Chihuahua (regarding a local 
public security regulation, CC 7 /99) where the state governor was from his sam e party, 
the PRI. Important political disputes w ere also resolved through the mechanism of 
constitutional controversies, as is clearly shown by the case of Morelos (CC  21/99), 
discussed in Chapter 3.
Figure 3.2
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In 2000  once again most controversies were presented by municipalities against state 
governments. Several controversies w ere filed against the governm ent and local 
congress of Veracruz for issuing a new local Constitution (CC  15-19/00). O ne  
controversy was presented by the municipality of Hermosillo in Sonora against the  
federation, but was dismissed (CC 36/00). Seven controversies involved disputes 
among different powers within a state, including the first case in which a D eleg atio n  
(local council) in the Federal District challenged the local executive (CC  37/00). 
Similarly, two recourses were taken to the Court by the head of the Federal District, 
Rosario Robles, against the federal congress and executive power (CC  11 and 32/00); 
the response to one of them was a further controversy presented by the federal 
executive against the Federal District regarding the Education Law (CC 29/00).
In sum, as can be seen from Table 3.3, most of the controversies were presented by 
the lowest level of governm ent (municipal authorities) against higher levels of 
governm ent (state governm ents and even the federation). The vast majority w ere
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presented by municipal authorities against state governments, almost 80 percent in 
1995-98, declining to 64 percent in the 1999-2005 period. This change is closely 
related to the increase in recourses taken to the Court by (mainly opposition-controlled) 
state governments against the (still PRI-controlled) federation. The study also identified 
an increasing number of disputes among different powers within the states, which had 
also become more plural in composition by 1999.
Resolution of constitutional controversies: Founded and unfounded cases
Up until 1998, the success rate for constitutional controversies was very low, only 6 
percent (12 cases). Among the cases that were deemed to be well-founded in the 
1995-98 period was the controversy presented in 1996 (CC 56/96) by the federation 
against the municipality of Guadalajara, which resulted in the Court annulling the 
municipal regulation. The Supreme Court also gave a favourable ruling in the case 
brought by the municipality of Rio Bravo (CC 19/95) against the state government in 
1995, establishing that public security and transit are areas of the exclusive 
competency of the municipality (see Chapter 4).
Table 3.4. Resolution of constitutional controversies (1995-2005)
FOUN PAR FOUN UNF DISMISS REJECT OTHERS TOTAL
1995 1 0 9 5 2 2 19
1996 1 1 26 26 2 0 56
1997 7 1 9 12 3 4 36
1998 3 3 3 11 7 2 29
1999 1 3 3 17 10 3 37
2000 6 6 5 17 2 1 37
2001 9 6 2 15 6 0 36
332
2002 11 5 16 19 16 0 67
2003 10 5 15 63 16 3 112
2004 12 8 36 31 19 3 109
2005 14 6 9 28 26 0 83
TOTAL 66 44 133 244 109 18 614
Post 1997, the Supreme Court has ruled in favour of the claimant in an increasing 
number of cases, which no doubt reflects experience gained in presenting 
constitutional controversies. In 1997, the Court decided in favour of the claimant in 
seven controversies. Three were between municipalities and the state government (CC 
27/97; 32/97 and 35/97), one between the state executive and legislature of Colima 
(CC 36/97) and two favoured the judiciary of Jalisco in challenges against the state 
legislature regarding two impeachment procedures against local judges (CC 19/97 and 
26/97). In CC 32/97, the Court ruled in favour of the municipality of Valle de Bravo and
127
against the state congress’s resolution to strip the municipal president of his mandate 
(SCJN, 2000: 155-56). Since then the Supreme Court also ruled in favour of the 
claimant in a number of crucial cases, including the first three controversies presented 
by the opposition-dominated federal congress against the executive— one against 
former President Ernesto Zedillo and two against former President Fox—and a 
challenge by the PRD governor of the Federal District against President Fox.
In the 1995-2005 period, 100 cases were ruled founded or partially founded, while 133 
were unfounded; 244 were dismissed and 109 were rejected. As shown by the data, up 
until 1998 68 percent of cases were deemed to be unfounded, meaning that the 
Supreme Court had analysed the controversy but did not rule in favour of the claimant. 
Some 13 percent of cases were dismissed, which means that the controversies were 
not analysed in depth and there was no final ruling. Bearing in mind that close to 90 
percent of rulings have been unanimous, it appears that in many cases the claimants 
failed to present a solid constitutional case. Yet even more relevant than the quality of 
claim presented might be the criteria set by the Supreme Court justices for 
interpretation of the controversies they have resolved. As will be seen in the next 
section, the criteria employed shifted as more controversies were presented. This was 
certainly the case in the challenge against the power of Congress to approve annual 
municipal budgets on the grounds that it violated municipal autonomy as established in 
Article 115. To begin with the ruling on the case was unanimous, but two judges 
subsequently changed their opinions (CC 13/95).
A study published by the newspaper Reforma in August 2005 shows that the 
percentage of Supreme Court decisions that were split soared in the first half of 2005 to 
63.3 percent, which is three times as many as the average of the previous seven years. 
Half of the 69 split votes in 2005 were issued by a majority of fewer than seven judges. 
There have been fewer unanimous rulings since Chief Justice Mariano Azuela replaced 
Genaro Gongora in 2001, when approximately one-quarter of rulings were split. The 
Court’s discussions have been made public since January 2005. According to Omar 
Guerrero, a well-known private lawyer “since the sessions are public one gets the 
impression that the judges feel they have to study the issues because they can’t 
remain silent and be shown up for lacking knowledge.”50
50 Author interview with Omar Guerrero, 23 October 2005, Mexico City.
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Finally, it should be noted that while the normal procedure for resolving constitutional 
controversies generally lasts three months, it is taking as long as 15 months to resolve 
crucial issues that require prompt resolution. In the 1995-2009 period, the average time 
taken to resolve controversies was 452 days (SCJN, Annex 1). According to critics of 
the 1994 reform, the mechanism has therefore proved quite unsuccessful given that 
the intention was that it would cover the defects (slowness) of the amparo suit. In order 
to rule over the constitutionality of different acts, it was necessary to accelerate and 
facilitate procedures, to guarantee that the resolutions would have general effect and to 
simplify the task of presenting the mechanism. Yet, according to Arteaga, the 
revamped constitutional controversy mechanism has been plagued by the “disease of 
bureaucratisation” (1999:1372)51. In fact, some of the sluggishness that has been seen 
in practice was actually written into the reform. Longer periods are allowed for 
presenting, countering, responding to and expanding the challenge, and even for 
responding to an expanded claim. The reform also created different recourses for 
appealing against the rulings (causales de improcedencia) and for dismissing 
complaints on the grounds that they lack legal foundation (sobreseimiento).
Categorisation of constitutional controversies: fiscal federalism
In this section, I offer a categorisation of the controversies presented up until 2005. As 
mentioned above, the controversies are grouped into eleven areas. In analysing the 
types of controversies I am able to show that most relate to fiscal and budgetary 
issues, pertaining in many cases to the allocation to state governments of funds 
assigned under ’’new federalism” for regional and social development through budget 
line Ramo 26. The nature of the controversies related to exclusive competencies and 
jurisdictional disputes is so varied that I do not analyse these in depth. I found that 
many of the claims involving the alleged invasion of spheres of competence by different 
levels of government were not properly made. Rather, the motivation for many of these 
particular controversies was political. There can be no doubt, however, of the 
expanding role of the Supreme Court in responding to intergovernmental disputes.
As discussed earlier, the Mexican President has enjoyed tremendous influence over 
state and local governments through his control of the federal budget, on which they 
depend for most of their income. Mexico’s federal budget is divided into Ramos or 
budget lines, which generally correspond to a specific investment or expenditure 
programme. Up until 1997, federal assistance was distributed among the states
51 Also author interview with Arteaga 18 May 2001, Mexico City.
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through two main sources: federal allocations (participaciones federates) and 
decentralisation agreements (convenios de descentralizacion). The most important of 
these were Ramo 26, for social policy and poverty alleviation (via a programme called 
Solidaridad in 1989-95) and Ramo 28, which corresponded to the allocations to states 
and municipalities. Solidaridad’s budget line was integrated into each state’s Social 
Development Agreement (Convenio de Desarrollo Social, which replaced the earlier 
Convenio Unico de Desarrollo, CUD), while all other federal investment after 1989 
became the Programa Nacional (Ward & Rodriguez, 2000:104-07). These individual 
development agreements were discretionary mechanisms to fund state and local 
governments, signed annually between the federal government and each state.
Under the Fiscal Coordination Law (LCF), federal assistance was distributed among 
the states through the General Participation Fund and the Municipal Development 
Fund according to a formula linked to poverty indicators in states and municipalities. 
According to the law, which was reformed in 1990, states must distribute among their 
municipalities at least 20 percent of the allocations from the first fund and 100 percent 
from the second (Rodriguez, 1995: 154). The LCF was reformed again in 1998 as part 
of the drive to reignite federalism, with the creation of Ramo 33 {Aportaciones 
Federates para Entidades Federativas y Municipios, formerly called Pronasol, 
relabelled Superacion de la Pobreza and later called Ramo 26).52 Whereas prior to 
1998 only half of federal funds were allocated according to distribution indicators, under 
Ramo 33 more than 90 percent is allocated to the states “without any type of 
discretionality, based on clear regulations approved by the federal Congress” 
{Presidencia, 2000). Following the 1998 reform, more than 40 percent of Ramo 33 
resources were allocated to the most populous states, which also have high levels of 
poverty (Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Estado de Mexico, Oaxaca, Puebla and 
Veracruz), while 65 percent of the resources allocated under the poverty fund were 
allocated to the ten states with highest levels of poverty. In sum, the main aim of this 
reform was to give judicial security to the lower levels of government, since the 
decentralisation of funds was established in law and no longer the subject of 
discretional agreements. According to Zedillo, almost 70 percent of the total resources
52 Ramo 33 was originally made up of five different funds: Fondo de Aportaciones para la Educacion 
Basica y  Normal (FAEB), Fondo de Aportaciones para los Servicios de Salud (FASSA), Fondo de 
Aportaciones para Infraestructura Social (FAIS), Fondo de Aportaciones para el Fortalecimiento de los 
Municipios y  del Distrito Federal (FAFMyDF) and Fondo de Aportaciones Multiples (FAM). With the 1998 
reform, two more funds were included: Fondo de Aportaciones para la Educacidn Tecnoldgica y  de los 
Adultos (FAETA) and Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Publica de los Estados y  del Distrito 
Federal (FASP). The LCF and the Bases de Coordinacion Administrativa and intersecretariai introduced 
specific transparency rules, which require the Ministry of Finance to publish in the Diario Oficial each 
January the amounts and schedule of federal allocations to the states (Escalante, 2001).
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in Ramo 26/33 were to be distributed directly to the municipalities. By promoting more 
equitable and transparent distribution processes, half of this amount was to be 
allocated by the state governments to the municipalities for social and development 
programmes while the other half was to be incorporated in the annual Social 
Development Agreement.
Table 3.5 Categorisation of constitutional controversies (1995-2005)
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Given the context, it is not surprising that most controversies have been related to the 
proper allocation of public resources to lower levels of government. Numerous 
municipalities and state governments have presented legal complaints about the 
proper allocation of the funds under Ramo 33, according to which the allocations 
should have been legally set rather than influenced by partisan politics. Table 3.4 
shows that fiscal controversies account for the highest number of cases presented 
against state and federal governments (173). Although closely related, I decided to 
separate out those controversies that relate more closely to internal budgets and
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remunerations within states and municipalities or to administrative municipal autonomy 
over tax collection, which according to the constitution are the responsibility of these 
lower levels of government.
A few controversies have been filed against local judicial institutions and regulations. 
Particularly interesting is the case of Ciudad Victoria, which presented a controversy 
against the reforms to Article 124 in which the local Tribunal of Justice was empowered 
to oversee not only civil conflicts but also constitutional ones (CC 7/95). State 
judiciaries in Jalisco (CC 10/98) and Guanajuato (CC 17/98) filed controversies to 
demand greater autonomy from the executive in appointment decisions for local 
justices. Another subject of controversies was the need to enforce human rights 
recommendations (CC 18/98). The category "exclusive competencies” also differs from 
the purely financial claims since it deals with other broader areas of municipal 
autonomy, generally in opposition to state governments.
It is important to note that most fiscal disputes were either dismissed or decided in 
favour of the higher level of government. It is clear that, at least up until 1988, the 
presentation of genuine and well-founded cases involving incursions into the 
jurisdictions of other levels of government was problematic, although several more 
recent cases were more successful. Thus, many disputes had and still have a political 
tone. Particularly relevant is the case of Tabasco where Ramo 26 funds were allegedly 
misused for electoral purposes. The federal Attorney General found evidence that the 
PRI candidate for governor, Roberto Madrazo, spent 50 times the legal limit on his 
1994 campaign. The federal Supreme Court debated whether the federal government 
was empowered to conduct such a probe of Tabasco state matters, deciding that the 
Tabasco State Attorney General was the proper authority to investigate the matter. The 
investigation was subsequently turned over to that agency, which was dominated by 
the PRI and ruled that Madrazo had indeed violated spending laws, but would not be 
punished since no punishments for “electoral crime” were specified in the state penal 
code. The federal lower chamber of congress tried to reopen a federal probe in 1997, 
but was stalled by a controversy (CC11/95) presented by Governor Madrazo and the 
president of the local congress who argued that the federal congressmen had neither 
the jurisdiction nor the right to investigate how a local congress spent its resources. 
The Supreme Court made no pronouncement on whether the funds had been misused, 
but in November 1997 ruled (CC33/97) that it was lawful for congress to investigate the 
possible misuse of federal funds allocated under the 1997 "combating poverty” budget 
line, and that doing so would not violate Tabasco’s spheres of competence.
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Another relevant political case focused on Morelos governor Jorge Carrillo Olea who in 
1998 was charged with corruption, incompetence and having links to drug barons. 
Carrillo Olea, a retired army officer from the PRI, was roundly criticised by the federal 
Human Rights Commission, the local legislature, opposition parties, the church and 
business leaders, and in mid-May he finally succumbed to pressure from Mexico City to 
step down. In August 1999 a constitutional controversy (CC 21/99) was presented by 
the PAN-dominated state congress against the Chief Justice of the local judicial 
tribunal and the local judicial tribunal for their refusal to keep the “governor on licence” 
under house arrest and for declaring the impeachment process invalid. In February 
2000 the Supreme Court decided unanimously that state governors are accountable for 
their actions and agreed to the proposal by the local congress to impeach Carrillo. The 
Morelos constitution was the only state-level document that protected governors from 
impeachment procedures. Both rulings clearly show how the Supreme Court’s 
intervention put an end to a situation of political deadlock, setting important precedents 
for future inter-governmental disputes.
Regional analysis: northern vs central region
This section offers a regional analysis of the constitutional controversies presented and 
resolved in the 1995-98 period. It shows that some states have been much more 
legally active than others: particularly active were municipalities from the northern part 
of the country, where opposition parties, generally the PAN, had their first experiences 
of governing at the local and state levels. In the case of the PAN-governed 
municipalities, Nuevo Leon leads field in terms of willingness to use legal recourses to 
defend their attributions and powers, followed by Chihuahua and Jalisco. Opposition- 
governed municipalities in states still governed by the PRI, such as Puebla, 
Tamaulipas and Oaxaca, also show a notable level of legal activism. More recently, the 
first PRD governorship has also presented different controversies in defence of the 
jurisdiction of the Federal District vis-a-vis the federal government.
The states that presented the highest number of constitutional controversies before the 
Supreme Court between 1995 and 1998 were Tamaulipas (18); Nuevo Leon (12); 
Puebla (9); the Estado de Mexico (8); Chihuaha (5) and Jalisco (5), followed by states 
such as Chiapas, Morelos, Michoacan and Sonora with less than five recourses in 
each. Most of the controversies were presented by strategic urban municipalities, 
generally those dominated by the main opposition parties. From this first set of states I 
selected five to analyse in the following chapter (Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Puebla,
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Estado de Mexico and Chihuahua). I also included Baja California because it was the 
first state to be governed by an opposition party and also because Tijuana was the first 
municipality to present a controversy against the President, regarding the 1995 
expenditure budget. Finally I selected the Federal District because of the relevance it 
acquired particularly after 1997 when it started to be governed by the PRD and became 
more legally active.
Table 3.6 Regional analysis: states and municipalities that present
controversies, by state
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Oaxaca 45 4 1 1 2 7 5 4 1
Estado de 
Mexico
4 4 5 7 6 16 4 10 8
Nuevo Le6n 8 3 1 4 7 3 8 6 1 1
Sonora 1 2 4 1 4 1 25 0
Jalisco 2 3 2 2 2 2 5 7 8
Morelos 2 1 1 3 3 0 0 5 4 3
Tamaulipas 5 3 5 5 2 0 1 0 5 0 1
Federal
District
1 2 2 9 7 4 2
Chiapas 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 2 2 0
Federal
Powers
1 2 1 2 2 5 7 4
Veracruz 2 2 6 0 11 4 3
Puebla 1 4 5 0 0 1 2
San Luis 
Potosf
1 1 1 2 3 1 0
Baja
California
1 2 1 1 4 6
Tabasco 1 1 0 0 3 1
Chihuahua 1 1 1 3 1 6 8 1
Yucatan 1 1 0 2 5 4
Michoaccin 1 1 0 2 2 0
Quintana
Roo
1 0 4 5 0
Aguascalien-
tes
1 1 1 1 5 1 1
Guanajuato 1 1 1 1 0 0 2
Colima 1 1 1 1 6
Guerrero 1 1 0 7 3 7
Nayarit 1 1 1 14 2 3
Coahuila 1 0 0 0 3
Hidalgo 1 4 1 0 2 8
Tlaxcala 2 3 1 6 1 1
Zacatecas 1 2 2 2 5 1 1
Quer6taro 1 0 0 0 1
Durango 1 3 0 2 0
Campeche 1 0 0 0 1
Others 1 2 1 1 2 0
TOTAL 19 56 36 29 37 37 41
368
67 112 109 83
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In terms of the most legally active municipalities following the 1994 judicial reform, Rio 
Bravo made use of 12 legal recourses, PAN-governed Monterrey presented six 
controversies; Ciudad Victoria in Tamaulipas and the municipality of Chihuahua each 
presented four cases, and the northern San Pedro and San Nicolas Garza Garcia in 
the state of Nuevo Leon each presented three cases.
Rio Bravo, discussed in more depth in Chapter 4, presents an interesting case, since 
the legal route for defending the municipal jurisdiction was pursued by successive 
governments led by two different opposition parties. From 1992 to 1995, while 
governed by the PAN, Rio Bravo filed two controversies against the state government 
(CC 14/95 and 19/95). The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the second of these, 
which challenged the validity of local Article 91 on the grounds that public security and 
transit policies are the exclusive domain of the municipalities (CC19/95, 5 December 
1995). The Supreme Court did not rule favourably in any of the ten controversies 
presented by the Rio Bravo municipal government during the two consecutive periods 
since 1995 when it was controlled by the PRD. One of the issues in question—the 
Planning Law and the distribution of federal resources under Ramo 26—was the 
subject of a separate but simultaneous claim by PAN-governed Tampico in May 1996, 
which was also unsuccessful.
Partisan legal activity: opposition contestation against PRI regime
In this section, I establish a link between the actors involved in the constitutional 
controversies and their political parties to test the main hypothesis of this chapter: that 
behind most of the controversies is a clear conflict between opposing political parties 
over resources and powers. My analysis indeed demonstrates that these were disputes 
between rival parties, mainly presented by opposition local and state governments 
against a different party occupying a superior level of government, most commonly 
PAN- and PRD-controlled entities in opposition to PRI-controlled state and federal 
governments.
Table 3.7 shows that municipalities governed by the PAN presented the highest 
number of controversies against PRI state governments. Next were the PRD 
municipalities, also against PRI state governments. It is interesting to note that five 
municipalities governed by the PRI filed controversies against the PAN state 
government in Chihuahua. Even more notable is the fact that all five of the 
controversies presented by municipalities against the federation were governed by the
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PAN; the two states that brought challenges against the federation were also controlled 
by the PAN. These cases are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
Table 3.7 Political parties that presented constitutional controversies





1995 15 3 0 0 0 1 0 19
1996 15 4 32 0 0 1 4 0 56
1997 12 14 5 3 0 2 0 0 36
1998 8 3 12 3 1 1 0 1 29
1999 10 13 10 1 0 2 0 1 37
2000 17 9 6 2 1 0 1 1 37
2001 17 6 2 5 1 1 2 2 36
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2002 36 10 15 1 3 0 0 2 67
2003 50 25 17 6 10 0 0 4 112
2004 56 26 15' 4 2 0 0 6 109
2005 42 16 12 9 0 0 0 4 83
The PAN-governed municipalities that filed the lawsuits included urban cities and 
capitals in Nuevo Le6n, Baja California, Puebla and Tamaulipas. In Nuevo Leon, the 
prosperous municipalities of San Nicolas de los Garza, San Pedro Garza Garcia and 
Santa Catarina, which had been governed by the PAN since 1991, and the capital, 
Monterrey, controlled by the PAN since 1994, all pursued legal defences of their 
respective local jurisdictions against the PRI state government until 1997, when the 
PAN won control of the state. Most of the cases referred to municipal autonomy in 
administrative matters, in particular control over pay for local employees, annual tax 
declarations and dismissal procedures. Although most of the recourses were 
unsuccessful, the Supreme Court ruled partially in favour of San Nicolas de los Garza’s 
claim against the Fiscal Coordination Law and the validity of a number of official 
documents that had been approved by the PRI state government (Oficios 531/97 Y C- 
3-785-97, CC 18/97, Supreme Court, June 2001).
In Baja California, as discussed in Chapter 2, the amparo suit (4521/90) presented by 
the municipality of Mexicali against the federation in 1990 was crucial in paving the way 
for the involvement of municipalities in constitutional controversies. Five years later the 
municipality of Tijuana, which has been governed by the PAN since 1989, presented 
the first recourse (CC 6/95, 9 June 1995) against the federation, regarding the 1995 
Social Development Agreement between the governor and the federal executive. 
Although the Court ruled in favour of the federation, the municipality set an important 
precedent by opposing the involvement of the Social Development Ministry in matters
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that, they argued, should be decided independently by the municipality in accordance 
with Article 115, section IV.
In Puebla it was PAN-controlled urban municipalities, including the capital city, which 
adopted a confrontationist attitude against the PRI state government. Legal activity 
began in September 1996, when the capital, Puebla, and other PAN municipalities 
opposed the creation of a system to operate water services (CC 51/96 and 52/96), as 
well as the so-called “Ley Bartlett”, which altered the formula for distributing Ramo 33 
fiscal resources to municipalities so as to favour poorer municipalities, which tended to 
be governed by the PRI, over wealthier urban cities controlled by the PAN (discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4). The PAN claimed that the local congress was acting 
unconstitutionally by circumventing the national laws for the allocation of fiscal transfers 
to municipalities (CC 4/98 and 6/98). In February 2000, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the state legislature and the executive had asserted their rights to determine the nature 
of revenue sharing in the state and had not acted improperly, but that the Planning 
Committees involved did affect municipal jurisdiction (SCJN, 1998: 219-20). Most of 
the other disputes filed by authorities in Puebla were presented by the state 
government against PAN-governed municipalities in connection with the urban 
development programme known as Angelopolis, designed by then Governor Manuel 
Bartlett. Most were deemed to be unfounded.
In Tamaulipas it is notable that although the state remains a PRI stronghold, opposition 
parties have gradually won more municipalities and have consolidated their political 
presence in the most populated areas. Important cities that were governed by the PAN 
in the 1992-95 period, such as capital Ciudad Victoria, Rio Bravo, and industrial centre 
Tampico (1995-98), presented recourses before the Supreme Court against the PRI 
state government. For instance, the PAN government in Ciudad Victoria presented 
three such controversies, the first challenging the income tax law on the grounds that it 
violates municipal autonomy (CC 3/95, 25 May 1995); the second challenging aspects 
of municipal revenue streams such as licences for selling alcohol as well as municipal 
authority to regulate police services (SCJN, CC 5/95, 8 June 1995); and the third 
opposing local judicial reforms that empowered the State Tribunal to decide not only on 
civil, but also on constitutional conflicts between different levels of government (CC 
7/95, July 1995). The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favour of the state 
government in all three cases.
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The case of the Federal District, analysed in depth in Chapter 4, provides a good 
illustration of the argument that opposition governments have been crucial in 
reinforcing an authentic federalism, on occasion through the increasing use of the law. 
In 1997 Cuauhtemoc Cardenas was elected governor of the Federal District, the first 
governorship to be won by the centre-left PRD. Since then relations between the PRD 
government of the capital city and the federal government have been strained, 
increasingly so after Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador won the local election in 2000. 
Among the most problematic issues are the budget allocated to debt, federal spending 
cuts, the Fiscal Coordination Law and the withdrawal of revenue-sharing with the 
Federal District from 1999 onwards. During the period in question the PRD 
governments in the Federal District presented five constitutional controversies before 
the Supreme Court. Most of the controversies related to the demands by the three 
successive PRD governors— Cardenas, Rosario Robles and Lopez Obrador—for an 
equal allocation of federal resources. Another interesting case relates to the Education 
Law presented by Robles’s administration and approved by the PRD-dominated local 
Assembly on 8 June 2000. After more than a year of discussions, the Supreme Court 
ruled unanimously that the Legislative Assembly of the Federal District does have 
constitutional powers to legislate over education, clearly determining the Federal 
District’s attributions in the federal context (SCJN, 16 November 2001).
During L6pez Obrador’s administration, a renewed source of conflict with the federation 
focused on the presidential decree imposing a “daylight saving summer timetable” (CC 
5/2001). The Court ruled that President Vicente Fox had misused his constitutional 
attributions specified in Constitutional Article 89, Section I, and had overstepped into 
the congressional sphere (SCJN, Comunicado No. 444, 4 September 2001). For L6pez 
Obrador this ruling proved that “the Court is not entirely subordinated anymore to the 
executive, as happened previously” (La Jornada, 7 September 2001: 5). In 2001, 
Lopez Obrador’s government presented another legal recourse before the Supreme 
Court against President Fox, challenging the decision to build a new terminal of Mexico 
City’s airport in Texcoco (SCJN, 4 December 2001). Even if in the final analysis these 
cases are not about substantive issues or rulings go against the claimants, they clearly 
show the increasing use of the law to determine a wide variety of issues with the aim of 
improving personal and political prospects of certain politicians or policies.
Horizontal disputes have emerged within the Federal District since 2000, when a more 
plural local Assembly and PAN leadership in several delegaciones (local councils) were 
elected. The local Assembly filed a lawsuit against the PRD-controlled executive for not
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applying the compulsory SUVA car insurance in the metropolitan area. A second 
constitutional controversy against Lopez Obrador’s government was presented by 
three of the six PAN heads of delegaciones in the Federal District, over the validity of 
an agreement on social communication (SCJN, 1 April 2002). Other claims presented 
by the PAN-led delegaciones covered issues ranging from the use of partisan colours 
on official documents, the prevention of a preparatory (senior secondary) school in the 
Colonia del Valle from operating, and the devolution of the administration of 
Chapultepec Park. Many of the disputes appear to be political in tone rather than 
constitutionally based (see Chapter 4 for more detail). My analysis of these cases 
shows how the Court has become a sort of “super-referee” that is increasingly being 
used to resolve political disputes between rival parties.
In sum, political competitiveness among the different branches and levels of 
government has revitalised the issue of federalism and the separation of powers. Since 
the 1994 reform, the legal route has been increasingly used to defend specific 
jurisdictions. Gradually, more actors have used constitutional controversies and have 
gained experience in presenting solid constitutional cases to defend their jurisdictions 
against competing government powers. While in the 1995-98 period few cases were 
decided in favour of the claimant, this pattern has begun to change as more cases 
have been declared well-founded. In the last part of this chapter, I discuss an important 
feature of the horizontal separation of powers: the relationship between the federal 
Congress and the executive.
Horizontal separation of powers: disputes between Congress and the executive
Since 1997, when the PRI lost its majority in the lower chamber, not only has Congress 
fundamentally changed its traditional rubber-stamping attitude towards the executive 
but it has also become much more active in legally defending its constitutional powers. 
This section looks at three of the controversies presented by the federal Congress 
against the executive over the Fobaproa bank rescue, the electricity decree and the 
presidential decision to exempt the beverage industry from taxes.
First, in September 1999, the lower chamber presented a recourse (CC 26/1999) 
against the executive power demanding full disclosure of information about the trust 
fund operated by Banca Union in connection with the bank rescue agency (Fondo
139
Bancario de Protection al Ahorro, Fobaproa).53 Almost a year later, the Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled in favour of the opposition-dominated lower chamber in its 
interpretation of Articles 73 and 74. The ruling forced the President to give the 
information required to the legislature within 30 days (SCJN, 24 August 2000). This 
case was historic because it was the first resolution against the President (Semanario 
Judicial, Novena Epoca, 2000). As part of the ruling, the Supreme Court Judges issued 
six new jurisprudence texts reinforcing the jurisdiction of the legislature, including a 
constitutional mechanism of control over the executive regarding loans which gives 
Congress full autonomy to recognise and pay the national debt. The Court also 
established that “banking secrecy” should not be an obstacle for the prosecution of 
illicit acts or the supervision of financial institutions. According to Justice Sanchez 
Cordero, the Fobaproa ruling is probably still the most important to have been issued 
by the Court in the case of a constitutional controversy because it is about "the 
autonomy of the Court and the independence of Congress.” She said “Zedillo abided 
by the ruling, arguing that the Court’s decision was necessary’,n54
After the 2000 presidential elections, for the first time in Mexico’s history the Congress 
in plenary—the PRI and PRD factions in both lower and upper chambers, through the 
Permanent Commission— presented a controversy against the executive (CC 22/2001, 
4 July 2001). This recourse demanded that the presidential decree announced on 24 
May 2001 relating to secondary legislation regulating the electricity sector (Reglamento 
de la Ley de Servicio Publico de Energla Electrica) be declared invalid. The decree 
authorised the Energy Ministry to modify the percentage of excess capacity that 
independent generators could sell to the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) without 
the need for public auction. According to the Permanent Commission, President 
Vicente Fox’s decree violated constitutional Articles 73 and 89, which clearly establish 
that Congress has exclusive power to modify laws or regulations in this area.55 The
53 Fobaproa was a government-sponsored trust fund created in 1990 under the Law of Credit Institutions. 
In 1995, the Treasury Ministry (SHCP) and Mexico's central bank activated Fobaproa to provide 
“preventive support” by absorbing bad loans made by banks and businesses. This was in response to the 
1994 Tesobono collapse and the flight of USD 30 billion from Mexico's banking system. Fobaproa gave the 
banks 552 billion pesos in loan guarantees in an attempt to inject liquidity into an ailing financial sector. 
Author interview with Edgar Camargo, Economist for Latin America for Merrill Lynch, 1 September 2000, 
Mexico City. The information requested included all those trusts with expiry dates up to 30 June 1998. It 
should be noted that it was only the lower chamber which had an opposition majority, since the Senate 
was still controlled by the PRI in the 1997-2000 period.
54 Author interview with Justice Sanchez Cordero, Mexico City, 4 December 2009.
55 Many sectors in Mexico have been fiercely opposed to ending the state’s monopoly of the energy 
industry. Electricity was nationalised in 1960, partly to rescue struggling private companies. Since then, 
nationalists have tried to link this to the expropriation of foreign oil companies in 1938 by President L&zaro 
Cardenas. In this context, changing the state’s role would require changing the constitution. During his 
administration, President Ernesto Zedillo tried to part-privatise electricity but gave up under a hail of
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Court had a crucial issue in its hands and finally ruled that the constitution barred the 
President from issuing decrees affecting this sensitive area (SCJN, 25 April 2002). The 
Court was divided in its final ruling; the "last-minute" vote by Justice Olga Sanchez 
Cordero, the only woman on the bench, gave the eight votes needed to decide the 
case against the executive.56 According to Magaloni and Sanchez (2006: 3), the 
Court’s decision resulted in the defeat of President Fox’s attempt to promote private 
investment in the electricity sector and revived the economic nationalism embedded in 
the constitution that was drafted during the autocratic PRI era.
In 2002, Congress presented a legal recourse against President Fox’s decision to 
suspend a 20 percent tax on beverages made with high-fructose corn syrup— most of 
which is imported from the United States or produced in Mexico by US 
manufacturers—for a period of six months from 5 March 2002 (SCJN, CC 32/2002, 2 
April 2002).57 The recourse demanded the invalidation of the presidential decree in 
which, Congress argued, the president had invaded, once again, its sphere of 
competence by revoking the fiscal reform approved by Congress in December 2001. 
By exempting from the tax only beverage producers who used sugar cane, the fiscal 
reform had been aimed at helping the domestic sugar cane industry, which had 
struggled since the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).
The PRD bench in Congress led the motion to take the case to the Supreme Court and 
was supported by all of the other parties in Congress, apart from the PAN (with 255 
votes in favour, 198 against). The case demonstrates how legal challenges have 
become common not only to defend jurisdictional attributions against different branches 
and levels of government, but also as a means of political protest. The political 
argument used by most congressmen was that the presidential decree benefited 
foreign producers over national ones, a view compounded for many by the fact that Fox 
is a former chief executive and possibly a share-holder of Coca-Cola in Mexico.
protest. Years later, as soon as Vicente Fox was inaugurated in office, opposition legislators went to court 
to block his decree (Economist, August 25, 2001: 48).
56 According to constitutional Article 105 and Article 42 of the secondary law, eight votes are required to 
invalidate laws that have generalised effects. Had only seven ministers voted in favour of the resolution 
project, drafted by Judge Juan Silva, a legal paradox would have ensued: the presidential decree would 
have been considered valid even though the majority of judges considered it unlawful (Granados Chapa, 
25 April 2002). When it appeared that only seven judges would vote in favour of the project, the session 
was cancelled and resumed two days later. The three judges who voted against the ruling were former 
Chief Justice Jos6 Aguinaco, Sergio Aguirre and Jos6 Gudino. The private sector and a number of foreign 
investors who were planning to invest in the electricity sector strongly criticised the Court’s ruling and the 
impact it would have on the Mexican economy (Reforma, May 2002).
57 If this tax had been applied normally, it would have represented an income of 1.3 billion pesos.
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Given that the tax suspension period had already begun, the Court was quick to 
discuss the case, fitting in the hearing before the close of its first semester of activities. 
Following intense discussions, the Court ruled that only the legislature could decide on 
taxes and therefore the executive had acted illegally. In the judges’ view, the executive 
was not authorised in this case to use Article 39, section 1, of the Fiscal Code. The 
ruling, drafted by former Chief Justice Jose Aguinaco, came into effect on 16 July
2002, the day it was published in the Diario Oficial. It represented the third legal victory 
for Congress over the executive (SCJN, 12 July 2002). The Court had apparently been 
concerned to ensure that the ruling should not be perceived as a confrontation with 
President Fox but rather as a formal recognition of the legislature’s powers during the 
“judicial re-alignment of change” (La Jornada, 12 July 2002). The ruling in favour of 
Congress emphasised that secondary legislation should not prevail over the 
Constitution.
Three more controversies were registered between the executive and the legislature in
2003. For the first time since 1997 the President confronted the Senate in a case 
concerning the nomination of agrarian court judges who had not been proposed by the 
executive (CC 9/2003, Ruling of 5 December 2002).
The second controversy concerned Fobaproa and was filed by the executive against 
Congress and the senior federal auditing body (Auditorfa Superior de la Federacidn) 
’’with regard to the review of the 2000 public accounts which ordered the finance 
ministry and the Bank Savings Protection Institute (IPAB) to carry out certain acts to 
regularise the alleged irregularities.” The executive called for the suspension of any 
audits aimed at reducing the fiscal cost of the bank rescue (CC 36/2003, 25 April 
2003). The Court initially rejected the suspension, but in August 2004 revised its ruling 
and partially concurred with the executive (CC 61/2004). The final ruling limited the 
scope of the suspension and softened the impact of a number of prior legal challenges 
against the executive by Congress and by the government of the Federal District.
A further controversy (CC 91/2003) was presented by the executive against the lower 
chamber and the senior federal auditing body over alleged unconstitutional actions 
committed by the body in connection with the review of the public accounts for 2001. 
The auditing authority had asked the Ministry of Finance (SHCP), IPAB and the 
Ministry of Public Administration (SFP) to regularise supposed anomalies. The 
Supreme Court ruled in favour of the executive two years later, on 23 June 2005.
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A further four controversies involving the executive and Congress were registered in
2004. One of them was again filed by the executive against the Senate for ratifying an 
Agrarian High Court judge whose nomination the executive had not proposed (CC 
48/2004). The second involved an ongoing dispute over the powers of senior federal 
auditing body (CC 84/2004). A third was filed by Congress against the executive, the 
ministers of finance and the interior and the Senate, and called for the invalidation of 
secondary legislation concerning the Federal Law of Gaming and Lottery issued by the 
executive on 17 September 2004.
The fourth in the series of controversies was one of the most important to have been 
presented before the Supreme Court. It concerned a dispute that had been ongoing 
since the PRI lost its congressional majority in 1997 between Congress and the 
Executive over their respective powers to determine the federal budget. The executive 
filed the controversy (CC 109/2004) after the legislators refused to adopt presidential 
amendments to the 2005 budget. It called on the Court to clarify whether the President 
has the power to veto the budget, and to determine whether Congress had violated 
constitutional provisions by interfering in the sphere of competence of the executive. 
The legislators argued that the executive does not have the authority to make 
observations on the budget, as the constitutional provisions granting it power to do so 
apply only to legislation or decrees issued by both chambers of Congress.
Five months later the Supreme Court issued a divided ruling (six votes to five) 
asserting the executive’s right to make observations to the congressional decree 
approving the budget (SCJN, 12 May 2005). Even though the resolution applied only to 
the 2005 budget, it set a useful precedent for future disputes that might arise unless the 
Constituyente Permanente reformulates the text of the constitution to clarify the scope 
of the respective powers without need for judicial interpretation.
In 2005, Congress once again challenged the executive over the energy sector. It filed 
controversy 54/2005 against a decree that brought into force secondary legislation for 
the Law of Energy for Rural Areas (Diario Oficial, 4 December 2003), which authorised 
the restructuring of electricity supply and sale rates. The recourse was presented in
2005, but was not resolved until 6 January 2009, when the Court decided to dismiss 
the case with only one vote against from Court Judge Sanchez Cordero.58
58 Decision available at <http://www2.scin.qob.mx/iuridica/enaroses/cerrados/295/05000540.009.doc>.
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Also in 2005, the Senate challenged the executive (CC 58/2005) for failing to ratify 
judge Guillermo Dominguez Bello, but the controversy was superseded a year later by 
a decree abrogating secondary legislation regulating the section on judicial 
appointments and ratifications of the Organic Law of the Federal Court for 
Administrative Fiscal Justice (6 September 2006). A final controversy involving the two 
powers was filed that same year by the executive against Congress and the senior 
federal auditing body (74/2005) concerning requirements to review licenses granted for 
generating electrical energy (Oficio ASF/1565/05). The document called on the energy 
regulator (Comision Reguladora de Energfa) to revise electricity generation permits, 
but in 2008 the Supreme Court finally declared it to be invalid.
Some of the cases discussed above illustrate the new role that the Supreme Court is 
playing in the policy-making process and even in the future economic development of 
Mexico. The two rulings in favour of Congress affecting the electric energy sector and 
imports of fructose generated particularly strong reactions among the federal 
government, the private sector and foreign investors. The first case led to 
announcements by at least two foreign companies that they would scrap planned 
investments in the Mexican energy sector.59 The US Commerce Department reportedly 
criticised the ruling on the tax on fructose since it would affect their corn producers 
(Milenio, 17 July 2002). The truth is that a more active Court ruling over such a wide 
variety of issues will have implications for the political and economic well-being of the 
country, but will also become more exposed to domestic and international scrutiny. 
Another relevant example of this trend is the case related to the planned new airport in 
Estado de Mexico, discussed in chapter 5. The federal government plan was cancelled 
even before the Court ruled on the recourses, following of a series of protests 
organised by the communal landowners affected by the proposal and the presentation 
of a number of legal recourses by the municipalities affected (Presidencia, 1 August 
2002).
59 The representatives in Mexico of Electricite de France (EDF) and US company Intergen announced the 
reallocation of USD 3 million in the wake of the Supreme Court ruling {Reforma, 29 April 2002). The 
president of Mexico’s business sector (Consejo Coordinador Empresarial, CCE), Claudio X. Gonz&lez, 
argued that although the CCE respected the Court’s final decision, it urged the executive and the 
legislature to carry out legal changes needed to allow the private sector to participate in the energy sector. 
Similarly, the governor of the central bank, Guillermo Ortiz, noted that “the delay of the structural reforms 
that the Mexican economy needs will imply losing extremely valuable time.” The president of the 
Confederacidn Patronal de la Republica Mexicana (Coparmex), Jorge Espina, went further, strongly 
criticising Congress for hindering the electricity reform. He even argued that the “state reform that the 
country needs should start with the modernisation of the legislature” (La Jornada, 27 April 2002).
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Other relevant rulings: autonomous constitutional bodies
In 2007 the Supreme Court was forced to determine whether autonomous bodies have 
powers to file constitutional controversies. According to Article 3 of the Federal 
Transparency Law, the following constitutional bodies are considered autonomous:
• Federal Electoral Institute (IFE)
• National Human Rights Commission (CNDH)
• Banco de Mexico
• Universities and other higher education institutions that the law considers 
autonomous
The issue first arose when the CNDH presented a constitutional controversy against 
the federal executive demanding the invalidation of certain actions by the Ministry of 
Public Administration and the Institute of Administration and Valuation of National 
Goods (CC 150/2006, 8 December 2006). Justice Gongora was in charge of the case 
and, alongside Justice Luna Ramos, accepted the controversy on 4 January 2007. 
Gbngora argued that the case should first be heard and only then should the Court 
determine whether the CNDH has legal authority to file the controversy. A month later, 
while resolving reclamation recourse 20/2007 presented by the judicial advisor to the 
Presidency, Daniel Cabeza de Vaca, justices Franco, Aguirre (the presiding judge in 
the case) and Azuela argued that the CNDH does not have the right to file 
constitutional controversies because it is not specifically mentioned in constitutional 
Article 105, although it has been recognised since 1996 as a legitimate actor to present 
unconstitutional actions (SCJN, 14 February 2007).
The issue came to light again on 12 February 2007 when the Federal Electoral Institute 
(IFE) presented a controversy against the federal budget decree for 2007, which 
reduced the IFE’s operational finances. The IFE itself was divided about whether to file 
the controversy, with only five of nine councillors voting in favour of doing so (IFE GC, 
31 January 2007). As president of the General Council Luis Carlos Ugalde argued, 
since 1996 the IFE has enjoyed autonomy in deciding how much funding to allocate to 
political parties and yet the 2007 budget proposal stipulated that the reduction by 720 
million pesos should affect only the operational budget of the IFE and not political 
parties. Ugalde confirmed in an interview that this could have affected IFE’s 
autonomy.60 Ugalde’s position was supported by councillors Arturo Sanchez, Andres 
Albo, Teresa Gonzalez and Alejandra Latapi. Their view was opposed by lower house 
representatives Carlos Armando Biebrich (PRI), Adrian Fernandez (PAN), Rafael
60 Author interview with president of the IFE General Council Luis Carlos Ugalde 4 February 2007, Mexico 
City.
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Hernandez (PRD), Miguel Angel Jimenez (New Alliance Party, PANAL), Abundio 
Peregrino (PT) and Jorge Legorreta (PVEM), who argued that the IFE’s autonomy had 
not been violated. Legorreta even criticised the fact that “none of the councillors is a 
lawyer to understand that there are no legal bases at all for presenting a controversy” 
(IFE General Council, 31 January 2007: 13).
Of the four councillors who voted against the project, Lourdes Lopez and Marco 
Antonio Gomez argued that constitutional article 105 makes clear that the IFE does not 
have legal authority to present a controversy before the Court. The other two, Virgilio 
Andrade and Rodrigo Morales, thought the claim was relevant since it would force the 
Court to clarify whether the IFE is authorised to use these type of claims, but voted 
against the project because they lacked the time to analyse it thoroughly.61 Andrade, a 
well-regarded lawyer, made reference to the possible legislative invasion of 
competence regarding the IFE’s autonomy to determine levels of financing for political 
parties.
The Court accepted the controversies the following day (CC 11/2007, 14 February 
2007) by three votes to two, with the argument that under article 41 of the Constitution 
the IFE is an autonomous constitutional body with all the rights enshrined in Mexico’s 
Magna Carta. Four months later, however, the Court threw out the controversy in 
response to a challenge filed by the leader of the lower house of Congress 
(Reclamation Recourse 58/2007, 12 June 2007). After an intense two-day discussion, 
a slim majority of justices (six vs. five) reversed the initial ruling on the basis that 
constitutional article 105 does not mention the IFE and so the body lacks legal authority 
to present constitutional controversies.
Table 3.7 Supreme Court’s voting (Reclamation Recourse 58/2007: Congress vs.
IFE HAS NO LEGAL AUTHORITY TO 
PRESENT CC
IFE HAS LEGAL AUTHORITY TO 
PRESENT CC
Salvador Aguirre Anguiano Genaro G6ngora (presiding judge)
Mariano Azuela** Jos6 Ramdn Cossfo
Fernando Franco Jose de Jesus Gudiflo
Margarita Luna Ramos Olga Sanchez Cordero







61 Author interviews conducted in Mexico City, 13 February 2007.
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It should be noted that justice Margarita Luna Ramos was not present during the first 
day of discussions of the IFE case. The next day, she seemed a bit hesitant in her 
arguments against Gongora’s project, particularly because in the previous similar case 
(CNDH) she had voted in exactly the opposite way. A few of the interviewees I met in 
June 2007, who preferred to remain anonymous on this particular issue, said that Luna 
Ramos changed her vote at the last minute. Apparently, the main concern was that the 
defendant would not only be Congress, but also the executive, i.e. President Felipe 
Calderbn, who issued the 2007 budget. This had been one of the concerns of a 
number of IFE councillors who had voted against presenting the controversy in the first 
place.
Turning to the Court resolution, Luis Carlos Ugalde argued that it sets a precedent 
about the need for autonomous bodies to have a means of constitutional defence when 
their powers are invaded. Congressmen Obdulio Avila (PAN), Elias Cardenas 
(Convergencia) and Miguel Angel Jimenez (PANAL) all argued that the ruling 
confirmed that drafting the federal budget is the exclusive preserve of Congress, which 
therefore has the authority to determine allocations to autonomous bodies such as the 
IFE.62
Two relevant congressional initiatives were presented immediately after the Supreme 
Court announced its ruling. In the first, congressman Jose Manuel del Rio Virgen of 
Convergencia suggested that the IFE and the UNAM should be included among the 
autonomous bodies with legal authority to present constitutional controversies (Gaceta 
Parlamentaria, 15 February 2007). Congressman Jesus de Leon Tello of the PAN 
presented a similar proposal, this time to grant the IFE and its equivalent bodies in the 
states the power to present controversies (Gaceta Parlamentaria, 10 April 2007). 
Neither proposal has been adopted and so the need to clarify whether autonomous 
bodies have powers to file constitutional controversies remains pending on the judicial 
reform agenda.
Conclusions
In contrast to the traditional hierarchical relation between the federal and lower levels of 
government, new federalism policies have contributed to the decline of centralism and 
presidentialism by reinforcing municipal autonomy and state sovereignty. The process 
of vertical decentralisation has gradually led to a more genuine balance between the
62 Author interviews conducted in London on 18 October 2007.
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three branches of government, inserted into a broader climate of political change that 
started in the 1980s. The judiciary (since 1994) and the legislature (since 1997) are 
sharing a greater role in the governing process, demonstrating greater independence 
and a stronger sense of separation of powers.
In this chapter, I have argued that processes of institutional reform and increasing 
balance of powers have derived from gradual electoral opening and alternation of 
parties in power at all levels of government. The series of electoral reforms introduced 
since the 1970s has finally produced a more credible electoral framework. Moreover, 
political pluralism has brought with it the upgrading of traditionally weak institutions 
such as congress and the judiciary. Over the past decade, not only horizontal but also 
vertical separations of powers have been strengthened as the municipalities and the 
state governments are now playing a more active role in the institutionalisation 
process.
In terms of constitutional controversies, my analysis covering the 1995-2005 period 
shows how municipalities have increased their judicial activity since they were explicitly 
included among the entities with legal standing to request review by the Supreme Court 
of unconstitutional actions or the jurisdictional violation by another public entity. The 
Federal District also became increasingly active in using the law to challenge other 
government powers since it was added in 1994 to the list of actors who could use this 
legal mechanism. The municipalities increasingly challenged not only state authorities 
governed by opposing parties, but also the federal government. In the regional and 
political analyses, I have shown that 70 percent of the controversies were presented by 
opposition municipalities against state governments.
While it appears that since the 1994 reform there is a more visible role for the Supreme 
Court in political affairs, it is not necessarily a more respected one. Increased Court 
activism is not equivalent yet to greater political autonomy or better rule of law. The 
Supreme Court’s role in the actual institutionalisation process has become fundamental 
for the future of Mexico, as public policy is increasingly contested in the Court with less 
predictable outcomes. The democratisation process has indeed brought new and 
greater expectations of the Supreme Court’s role. However, it seems that the Court has 
become a type of escape valve in moments of political tension. Since 1995, the 
“apolitical” branch of government has been increasingly defining the way many most 
political processes work. The response of the Court to vital political issues may have 
important implications for its own credibility and legitimacy, not to mention the ongoing
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institutionalisation process in Mexico. The eleven judges who comprise the Supreme 
Court hold in their hands key decisions for the future of democratic consolidation in 
Mexico.
On the one hand, it could be argued that the increasing use of these legal mechanisms 
is healthy; a positive sign of the new democratic era where there is a true separation of 
powers and the Court is able to fulfill its role in resolving, as the final arbiter, disputes 
that emerge between the different levels and branches of government. On the other 
hand, this trend could lead to problems or even political paralysis when it comes to 
actual governance. True separation of powers requires more political agreements 
between the main political forces rather than the constant evasion of the responsibility 
of governing. The recurrent intervention of the Supreme Court in such diverse areas is 
a clear sign that what was intended to be a final recourse to resolve specific conflicts 
has become an easy option for many political actors. In the final analysis, a Court’s 
ruling does not replace the need for political agreements or for a build-up of capacity to 
govern by involving all political forces. Constitutional controversies were designed to 
clarify legal content, not to fill a political vacuum.
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CHAPTER 4
Party Politics, Fiscal Devolution and the Separation of Powers: 
Constitutional Controversies in Seven Case Study States
Higher levels of political competition, which were an essential part of the 
democratisation process and which became more in evidence after PAN victories in 
municipal and state elections started to be recognised after 1989, led to a new kind of 
conflict. This occurred when different levels of government came to be controlled by 
rival parties, creating jurisdictional conflicts. Later on, similar conflict arose when 
different factions of the same party controlled different levels of government (as we will 
see in the state of Tamaulipas later in this chapter.) This tended to happen more often 
when the democratisation process was further advanced and pluralism more 
established. This jurisdictional conflict created a demand for judicial arbitration that was 
not adequately met by the PRI-dominated and politicised Supreme Court prior to 1994. 
As we shall see in this chapter, the PAN and other actors started to complain that the 
Courts were biased against it and pressed actively for reform. However, the judicial 
reform of 1994 on the whole did succeed in creating a Supreme Court capable of 
making legitimate decisions on disputes between different levels of government. The 
result was to turn Mexico’s political system from very centralised into one in which the 
rights and duties of local, state and central governments became much more clearly 
defined. What this chapter does is trace this process as it affected politics in a number 
of Mexican states.
My main aim in this chapter is to explore the incipient separation of powers at the 
federal and subnational levels in seven case study states, and to analyse the new 
relationships between the branches and levels of government, as well as the more 
frequent use of legal mechanisms to defend their respective jurisdictions. As argued in 
Chapters 2 and 3, opposition parties first started to consolidate their positions at the 
municipal level and in the period 1989-2002 were able to win 17 out of 32 
governorships. From these positions of power, different municipalities increasingly 
used legal channels to confront state governments and even the federation on a 
number of issues. Similarly, in states governed by opposition parties, with more plural 
state congresses, the internal balance of powers was gradually modified as the various 
state government entities sought to defend their autonomy.
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In this context, I will explore the relationship between political competitiveness and the 
increasing use of legal recourses. Since constitutional controversies are the legal 
mechanism used to defend and protect the federal nature of the Mexican political 
system, it is the content of such legal claims presented by selected states that forms 
the core of my analysis. My selection of case study states is informed by the number of 
cases filed before the Supreme Court in the 1995-2005 period and by the relevance of 
the claims. The seven case study states are: the northern states of Baja California, 
Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas; Puebla and the Federal District in the central 
area of Mexico; and the large southern state of Oaxaca. These states have not only 
been governed by different political parties, but, since the 1980s, have all shown an 
increasing level of opposition representation at the local level. The case study states 
differ significantly in terms of population, size and number of municipalities, as well as 
level of cultural difference and indigenous representation, and so provide a 
representative sample of the national democratisation process.
In selecting the case studies I also considered that the northern region has had greater 
economic development than other areas of the country; the contrast is particularly 
sharp with Oaxaca, which is mainly rural with a large indigenous population. Table 4.1 
presents a summary of the main political and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
selected states. The modernisation process and the emergence of a stronger middle 
class enabled opposition parties to consolidate their presence at the local and state 
level and in the 1990s the PAN governed three of the six border states. A similar 
process has taken place in prosperous and industrial cities in most other states, where 
opposition parties have also started to accumulate victories since the 1980s. Several 
authors have argued that the urbanisation process coupled with higher levels of 
education and economic dynamism of this region have contributed to the gradual 
political opening in most of these northern states (Rodriguez and Ward, 1994: 33; 
Guillen Lopez, 1992: 153). The various elements considered in the selection of these 
states contribute to a more objective view of the relation between the transition at the 
subnational and national levels.
My main argument is that the growth of a strong regional opposition in these states— in 
most cases constructed around the PAN but in others involving the PRD in a multi­
party system structure— helps to explain the evolution of a more genuine separation of 
powers through legal activism against rival political parties ruling at higher levels of 
government. The case-study states are grouped according to the party structure they 
have developed over the years. First, I analyse a group of three northern states that
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have a bipartisan structure (PRI and PAN), but are governed by the PAN. In these 
states, the PAN gathered strength at the municipal level during the 1980s and later 
won the gubernatorial elections (Baja California, 1989; Chihuahua, 1992; and Nuevo 
Leon, 1997). These case studies show how the PAN used its strategic urban bases in 
these prosperous states to attack PRI state governments and even the federation, 
mainly over fiscal decentralisation and revenue-sharing.63 The cases demonstrate my 
argument that the opportunity for opposition parties to experience governing, even if 
only at the local level initially, has been crucial for the entire institutionalisation process 
in Mexico. As will be seen, municipalities and state governments with a longer tradition 
of opposition have been more legally active and more successful in defending their 
constitutional attributions through legal channels.
I then analyse three states—Tamaulipas, Puebla and Oaxaca—that are still governed 
by the PRI but have a multi-party structure. The state governments have been 
characterised since the 1990s by atypical /nfragovernmental relations with opposition 
parties. While in Tamaulipas most legal activism came from the two main opposition 
parties against the PRI state government, in Puebla confrontations were initiated by 
both the PRI state government against the PAN-controlled urban municipalities and 
vice versa. Oaxaca is particularly relevant since it is the only state to present blocks of 
legal recourses on the same issue: close to 300 controversies were filed by different 
municipalities against the indigenous reform bill approved by Congress in April 2001.
Finally, I will focus on the Federal District, not only because of its political and 
economic relevance, but because it became the first state to be governed by the PRD. 
Since then, three successive PRD heads of government in the capital have each 
demonstrated increased legal activism against the federation in a bid to re-establish the 
autonomy of the capital. In the wake of the substantial PRD victory in 1997, the first 
controversies against the federation demanded the proper distribution of federal funds. 
However, after the PRD lost its majority in the local legislature and the control of six 
political delegaciones (councils) to the PAN in the 2000 election, /Vrfragovernmental 
disputes have increased significantly, some initiated by opposition-dominated entities 
against the PRD state government itself. By studying the three different PRD 
administrations in the capital, I can analyse the changes in its /nfragovernmental 
relations, particularly in terms of a more active local legislature and delegaciones.
63 Since the 1980s, the six northern states bordering the United States represent 19 percent of the national 
GDP and have above national-average levels of education and basic public services (Alvarado 1992:22).
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Table 4.1 Political and socioeconomic data for the case-study states
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Towards a bipartisan structure: PAN’s gubernatorial victories
Baja California: the first Panista victory
Baja California is one of the most urban and modernised states in Mexico, and has the 
highest education levels. Almost 80 percent of the state’s population is concentrated in 
Mexicali and Tijuana, which have become major economic centres dominated by the 
maquiladora (assembly) industry.64 Baja California was one of the first states where the 
opposition won representation. The PAN began building its political organisation in the 
state in the 1953 elections in Baja California by “exploiting regionalist resentment of 
control from Mexico City...” (Malbry 1973: 54). The party challenged the 1959 
gubernatorial election results and called on the Supreme Court to intervene (Malbry, 
1973: 64). Although numerous cases of voter manipulation and ballot box theft had 
been reported, the plea was unsuccessful and protests escalated. The elected PRI 
governor, Braulio Maldonado, was eventually arrested on corruption charges.
The PAN benefited from splits within the traditional alliances among the political 
bureaucracy and the business elite (Guillen L6pez, 1992: 143) and went on to secure 
Baja California and other northern states as its main stronghold. Support from the 
business sector was particularly important to the PAN (Mizrahi, 1995: 82). In the 1968 
election, the PAN claimed it won the Tijuana and Mexicali municipalities and six state 
legislative seats. The federal government had to intervene and results were annulled, 
but new elections were never held (Malbry, 1973:79). PRI-PAN civic governing boards 
were installed in the disputed municipalities. The PAN continued to protest and 
presented appeals before the Supreme Court. In 1970 the PAN declared once again 
that it had been denied victory in these two municipalities. Curiously enough, it was 
these very municipalities that proved decisive in terms of legal contestation and the 
defence of local autonomy, as is discussed below.
Non-PRI parties started governing at the municipal level in 1983 (see Table 4.2). In 
1986, the PAN’s persistence in calling for fraudulent local elections to be annulled 
finally paid off when Ernesto Ruffo won the municipal presidency of Ensenada. 
According to Crespo (1995: 22), Ruffo’s resistance to the obstacles that PRI governor 
Xicotencatl Leyva tried to impose upon him translated into higher popularity, on which
64 Baja California was granted statehood in 1952 and was divided into four municipalities; the fifth, Playas 
de Rosarito, was created in 1995 (INEGI, 2001).
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Ruffo capitalised during the 1989 gubernatorial race.65 The non-PRI victory in Baja 
California—the first state to be governed by an opposition party—was an encouraging 
sign of the democratic opening of the political system (Guillen Lopez, 1995: 51).
Table 4.2 Municipal elections in Baja California (1983-2007)
Ensenada Mexicali Tijuana Tecate Rosarito
Population 370,730 764,602 1,210,820 77,795 63,420
(14.9%) (30.7%) (48.6%) (3.12%) (2.5%)
Mpal Election
1983 PST PRI PRI PRI
1986 PAN PRI PRI PRI
1989 PAN PRI PAN PRI
1992 PAN PRI PAN PAN
1995 PRI PAN PAN PRI
1998 PRI PAN PAN PRI *Mpal Council
2001 PAN PAN PAN PRI PAN
2004 PRI PRI PRI PRI PAN
2007 PAN PAN PAN PAN PRI
Source: Instituto Estatal Electoral, Baja California (IEEBC) http://www.ieebc.orq.mx
http://www.iepcbc.org.mx/archivos/elecciones/2007/municipes1.pdf 
* Although the PAN was the strongest opposition party in the mid 1940s, it was the Socialist Worker’s Party (PST) that 
first beat the PRI in Ensenada in 1983. Rodriguez and Ward (1994: 13) argue that the PST victory, together with the 
success of other small parties such as the Mexican Democratic Party (PDM) in Guanajuato, “appeared to have been 
orchestrated by the PRI in an effort to promote a semblance of democracy”.
The first PAN (1989-95) administration introduced crucial changes to the electoral 
institutions to make them more impartial, including an electoral reform that tightened 
election controls and a new citizen registry with photo identification cards for voting in 
future electoral processes.66 Ruffo also reformed the local justice system, paid more 
attention to human rights issues and delegated more responsibility and authority to the 
municipalities, particularly over education and housing development projects. A number 
of academics have studied Baja California and in particular the more confrontationist 
attitude of Ruffo as the first PAN governor (Guillen Lopez, 1995, 1994 and 1992; 
Rodriguez and Ward, 1994; Mizrahi, 1997; Espinoza Valle, 1999).
Shortly before Ruffo was sworn in as governor, two reforms were approved by the PRI- 
dominated state congress. The first reform guaranteed the continuation in office of the 
local judges recently proposed by the PRI governor; the second forced Ruffo's 
government to increase the portion allocated to the municipalities of federal funds 
received by the states (from 20 to 35 percent). The state government became the first 
to openly challenge the Ministry of Finance, demanding the increase in its share of
65 In 1989, the PAN also won nine of fifteen local districts and two of four municipalities. Tijuana became 
the only municipality to be governed by the PAN for five consecutive periods.
66 The national registry and the process for monitoring voter registration were based on the Baja California 
state credentialisation programme.
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federal allocations under the fiscal coordination law. Under the mechanism for 
distributing federal appropriations less was returned to the richer states than they 
contributed, which clearly penalised Baja California. Ruffo openly challenged fiscal 
centralism, under which 81 percent of each peso collected by the state was allocated to 
the central government, 16 percent to the states and only three to the municipalities. 
However, the state government lost the battle against the federation, and Ruffo 
decided not to refer the case to the Supreme Court. It was not until 1995 that the 
municipality of Tijuana did take the case to court.
After Ruffo complained to the Ministry of Finance, a public study was released showing 
that Baja California was in fact receiving 13.5 percent more in funding from the federal 
government than it contributed to the federal tax base (Espinoza Valle, 1999: 81). This 
led to a further cut in the state’s share of federal funding in 1992. Ruffo’s government 
was no doubt influenced in his decision not to pursue a legal challenge by the 
knowledge that the cost of a poor relationship with the federal government would be 
high, and that it would be difficult to defeat the federation while the Supreme Court was 
still dependent on the executive’s will. Some authors have argued that Francisco 
Barrio, who became governor of the state three years later, took stock of the results of 
Ruffo’s confrontationist attitude and chose to adopt a more cooperative strategy with 
the federation (Mizrahi, 1997).
According to Gonzalez Oropeza (2000: XXIV), the most important antecedent to the 
involvement of municipalities in constitutional controversies was the amparo suit 
(4521/90) presented by the receiver (Sindico) of Mexicali against the federation in 1990 
(see Chapter 2). In its resolution of this recourse on 7 November 1991, the Court 
established prior to the 1994 judicial reform that municipalities could make use of 
constitutional controversies. Contrary to what some authors have argued (Rodriguez 
and Ward, 1994: 102), PRI municipal presidents in Mexicali and Delicias were first to 
press the federation and the PAN state government in Chihuahua to respect municipal 
rights and responsibilities.
Tijuana was the first municipality to present a constitutional controversy (CC 6/95, 9 
June 1995) after the 1994 reform. The case was against the President, the lower 
chamber and other federal authorities and concerned the decree containing the 
federation’s budget for the 1995 fiscal year, in particular the final two paragraphs of 
Article 14, on allocations to states and municipalities. The municipality also called for 
the 1995 individual development agreement (Convenio de Desarrollo Social) between
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the governor and the federal executive to be invalidated. As in most of the fiscal 
disputes at the time, the Court ruled in favour of the federation (SCJN, February 1997).
This controversy was the first example of an entity from the lower levels of government 
calling for true democratic federalism as established by the Constitution. Although the 
Court ruled against it, the municipality set an important precedent by opposing the 
involvement of the Social Development Ministry in matters that, they argued, should be 
decided independently by the municipality in accordance to constitutional Article 115, 
Section IV. Both the Tijuana and the Mexicali cases reinforce the argument that 
opposition governors or municipal presidents had more liberty to challenge presidential 
power than their PRI counterparts.
During the 1990s, the trend towards bipartisanship became more evident. Since 1989, 
the PAN has won the governorship in three consecutive elections (1995, 2001 and 
2007) with more than 40 percent of the vote on each occasion.67 Successive PAN 
governments at the state and municipal levels, especially Tijuana and Mexicali, have 
had to deal with a divided congress and have adopted a less confrontational attitude 
towards the central government.
Two more controversies were presented after the 1998 elections, one by the state of 
Baja California (CC 8/99) and the other by the municipality of Tijuana (CC 11/99). The 
first claim, presented by the state governor against the President and Congress, 
questioned the federal authority to intervene in the selection of state public servants in 
a case involving the “illegitimate decision of a federal judge to remove a local judge” 
(SCJN, CC 8/99). The Court voted unanimously to dismiss the case. The second 
recourse, against the local congress and judiciary, suffered the same fate.
During the third PAN administration, the municipal president of Mexicali, Jaime Diaz 
(2001-04) challenged governor Elorduy, the President and other federal authorities 
over the Fiscal Coordination Law and its 1995 reform (CC 35/2002). This time the 
Court ruled in favour of the municipality, declaring that the challenge was well-founded 
in terms of the procedure to pay the municipality obligations related to the federal 
participations (SCJN, 4 April 2005).
67 In 1995, PAN candidate Hector Tercin (50.9%) defeated the PRI (42.3%) (CIDAC); he was replaced after 
his death by Alejandro Gonzalez, the local PAN leader, in October 1998. In 2001, Eugenio Elorduy (PAN- 
PVEM) won with 48% of the vote against 36% for the PRI candidate (IEEBC), in an election noted for high 
abstention rates and for returning a divided state legislature. The PAN won four municipalities. In 2007, the 
PAN's Jose Millan won with 50.4% of the vote.
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In 2004, controversies were presented by the state government (CC 69/2004) and the 
municipalities of Ensenada (72/2004), Mexicali (73/2004), Tijuana (74/2004) and 
Playas de Rosarito (75/2004) against the state legislature, related to an economic 
agreement approved in June 2004 which replaced the state’s chief treasurer (Contador 
Mayor de Hacienda). Two years later the Court ruled that all these recourses were 
unfounded, since the local legislature and the state’s chief treasurer had acted 
according to the law (SCJN, 3 February 2006: 139). Finallly, in 2005, two controversies 
were presented by the local electoral institute (9 and 30/2005) and two by the local 
judiciary (10 and 19/2005) against the Baja California legislature and executive. Both 
claims concerned modifications to the 2005 budget. The Supreme Court dismissed the 
cases brought by the electoral institute, but found the claims brought by the judiciary to 
be well-founded.
In August 2007, the PAN won its fourth consecutive gubernatorial election with Jose 
Osuna Millan defeating the PRI’s Jorge Hank Rhon, a former municipal president of 
Tijuana (2004-07). The election was notable for the opposing views of the local and 
federal electoral tribunals. The local tribunal ruled in June 2007 that Hank Rohn could 
not run for the governorship according to the “Ley Antichapulin” reform promoted by 
governor Elorduy in 2001 (Proceso, 29 June 2007), which forbids an elected public 
servant from resigning his post before the end of his constitutional period of office (local 
Article 42). Just one month after this ruling, the federal Electoral Tribunal confirmed 
Hank Rohn as the PRI gubernatorial candidate (SUP-JDC-695/2007).
The cases discussed demonstrate that Baja California has not only become a PAN 
stronghold, but has played a pioneering role in the use of legal channels to demand 
judicial recognition of lower levels of government. While initially it was the PAN in 
opposition that sought the Supreme Court’s intervention to annul allegedly fraudulent 
election results since the late 1950s, the range of actors and issues involved in more 
recent court actions has expanded as different bodies of government seek to defend 
their fiscal and political jurisdictions.
Chihuahua: the only PRI recovery
The PAN started to build its political presence in Chihuahua in the 1950s. Proximity to 
the United States and greater prosperity meant that border-states could be more
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independent of the federation.68 In 1954, the PAN’s Luis H. Alvarez exploited 
discontent with the PRI and regionalist animosity towards Mexico City in his campaign 
to win the governorship of the state. Although he lost the gubernatorial election, 
Alvarez became the PAN presidential candidate in 1958, when he adopted an 
aggressive attitude towards the PRI. The PAN was credited with 10 percent of the vote 
and six federal congressional seats (Malbry, 1973: 57). Alvarez refused to recognise 
the new government’s legitimacy and was jailed. His party furiously debated their future 
stance towards electoral fraud and piled pressure on the Electoral College to recognise 
more congressional victories. A number of PAN supporters died protesting irregularities 
during Lopez Mateos’ presidency (1958-64). However, in the 1970s the PAN softened 
its stance and focused on constructing an independent party in opposition.
The nationalisation of banks in 1982 proved crucial in winning support for the PAN in 
Chihuahua. The local Congress has been bipartisan since the 1983 elections when the 
PAN won five local districts, although only four were formally recognised after the 
results in the IV district of Ciudad Juarez were annulled, as they were again in that 
district in the 1985 federal elections. According to Aziz Nassif (1992: 80) the reason 
was simple, “if this district was controlled by the PAN, the PRI would not have had the 
required number of deputies to change the governor, as happened in 1985.” 
Paradoxically, more than a decade later, the 2001 elections in Ciudad Juarez were 
annulled twice by the local tribunal and it was not until 24 July 2002 that the federal 
electoral tribunal (TEPJF) stepped in to confirm the PAN’s victory.
At the municipal level, the PAN won eight important cities in 1983, including the 
maquila centres. During the 1983-86 period, Francisco Barrio and Luis Alvarez 
governed Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua, respectively. According to Rodriguez (1995: 
156), there is evidence of some financial manipulation by the state government in its 
conduct with the PAN municipalities, which forced them to develop alternative sources 
of income. “Both Alvarez and Barrio had to contend with a number of instances where 
the state government impeded or refused to grant autonomy over a variety of municipal 
functions” (Rodriguez 1995: 162). Ultimately, this translated into higher popularity for
68 Chihuahua is a large, mixed-economy border state with a total of 67 municipalities. Although it is at the 
top end of the GDP-per-capita spectrum, it also has a significant indigenous population in the Sierra 
Tarahumara. It has just over 3 million inhabitants, 62 percent of whom are concentrated in the two largest 
cities, Ciudad Judrez and Chihuahua, which are also two of the most important maquila cities in Mexico. 
Chihuahua has nine federal electoral districts, and a local Congress of 33 deputies elected in 22 local 
congressional districts and eleven proportional representation seats.
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Barrio, who was able to contest the 1986 and 1992 gubernatorial elections. Like Ruffo 
in Ensenada and Carlos Medina in Leon, Barrio experienced the constraints imposed 
by higher levels of authority.
Table 4.3 Municipal elections in Chihuahua (1980-2007)
Election PRI PAN PRD PT PPS PSUM Other
1980 65 1 1
1983 56 8 1 1 1




1995 54 11 1 1
PRIGOV 98
1998 48 17 2
2001 47 14 2 4
PRIGOV04
2004 41 21 1
2007 47 18 1 1
Source: CIDAC; Comite Estatal Electoral, Chihuahua (1995-2007)
In 1986, the PAN lost all the municipalities it had governed in the 1983-86 period. The 
PRI regime had to engage in fraud of enormous proportions to ensure the victory of its 
candidate, Fernando Baeza, over the PAN’s Francisco Barrio (Crespo 1995: 23). 
According to Molinar (1987: 29), the state’s voting list was biased in favour of the PRI. 
Barrio and a number of municipal candidates went on hunger strike to demand that the 
elections be annulled. Their campaign drew widespread attention and influenced 
opposition protests against electoral fraud in other states (Prud’homme 1999: 353). 
Federal congressmen from the PAN filed a complaint before the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights, thereby successfully “nationalising” these post-electoral 
conflicts and reinforcing PAN’s position as the “democratic party” (Loaeza 1999: 393- 
7). However, both the Electoral College and the Supreme Court deemed the evidence 
of fraud to be insufficient. This experience partly explains why, up until the mid-1990s, 
opposition parties preferred to pursue extra-legal negotiations instead of using legal 
procedures. Future electoral and judicial reforms did reinforce legal contestation by 
democratising the relevant electoral and judicial institutions.
Despite the air of disappointment surrounding Baeza’s inauguration, the PAN lost 
strength. In 1988 and 1989, the abstention rate reached 70 percent and the PRI won 
overwhelming local representation. Aziz Nassif (1992:87) argues that this was due to 
electoral fraud and to the way election campaigns were organised. Nevertheless, the 
business sector returned to the PAN in 1992 as they expected Barrio had better 
chances of winning the gubernatorial election. According to Prud’homme (1999: 354),
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negotiations between the candidates Barrio (PAN) and Jesus Macias (PRI) focused on 
the conditions of competition rather than electoral outcomes.




% 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Ciudad Juctrez 1,218,817 40% PAN PAN PAN PAN* PRI
PRI
Chihuahua 671,790 22% PRI PRI PRI PRI PAN PAN
Cuauhtemoc 124,378 4% PAN PRI PAN PRI
Delicias 116,426 3.8% PRI PRI PRI PRI
Midalgo del 
Parral









Source: INEGI (2001) Tabulados BAsicos Nacionales y por Entidad Federativa. Base de Datos y 
Tabulados de la Muestra Censal. X II Censo General de Poblaci6n y Vivienda, 2000, Mexico.
* The TEPJF annulled PAN’s victory in Ciudad Juarez (SUP-JRC-196/2001, 8 October 2001). On 10 October, a 
municipal council with a PRI majority took control temporarily. After extraordinary elections were held on 12 May 2002, 
the local tribunal annulled the PAN victory for the second time (7 July 2002), but the TEPJF overturned this decision.
In 1992 Chihuahua became the second state to be governed by the PAN, but this was 
shortlived since six years later became the first state to be recovered by the PRI. In the 
1995 election Governor Barrio lost the PAN majority in the state congress and the 
control of all large cities, except Juarez. The capital, Chihuahua, had always been 
governed by the PRI, except for the 1983-86 period, and the local PRI used it and 
other strongholds as bases for mounting legal challenges against the PAN government 
(1992-98). Among the legal challenges was the successful constitutional controversy 
presented by the municipality of Delicias in 1993 regarding its right to offer civil 
registration services (see Chapter 3). It was Chihuahua’s municipal president Patricio 
Martinez who recovered the governorship for the PRI in the 1998 election after winning 
one of the party’s first ever open primaries.69
Patricio Martinez had been very active in using legal channels to challenge the state 
government from his position as Chihuahua municipal president, presenting four 
controversies (CC18/95; 3/96; 28/96 and 53/96) against the local Tribunal, regarding 
taxes charged for a state government building that should have been exempt from 
paying them. In the end, the Court dismissed the case on the grounds that the dispute
69 More than 200,000 citizens participated in the state primary. Martinez was able to capitalise on this 
popular support, as well as disappointment in the incumbent’s performance at a time when the crime rate 
and drug-related violence were soaring. More than 100 young women had been murdered in Ciudad 
Ju£rez, with most cases still unsolved.
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did not represent a true invasion of powers; it was a conflict between parts and not 
levels of government (SCJN, 10 March 1997). The PRI-dominated local Congress also 
presented an unsuccessful legal recourse against governor Barrio, demanding that the 
Regulation for Social Development programmes be invalidated (CC 12/97). The 
municipality of Ciudad Juarez, governed by the PAN, presented a recourse against the 
local Congress, which was also dismissed (CC 17/97). These cases clearly show how 
controversies became a tool for lower levels of government to oppose rival parties 
through legal channels to create political pressure, even when jurisdictions between 
levels of government had not actually been invaded.
Once inaugurated as governor in 1998, Martinez maintained his legal activism even 
though the target of his challenges—the federal government—was from his same 
party. His stance was unusual among PRI state governors, who tended to be 
submissive in their relations with the federal executive. Martinez’s attitude was no 
doubt influenced by a generalised shift in the intergovernmental relations between 
states and the federation as more gubernatorial elections were closely contested or 
won by the opposition. The content of the controversies between the state and federal 
governments shows how in a more democratic context dynamics within the PRI started 
to change. Although I have argued throughout this thesis that the Court’s role became 
crucial in resolving differences between rival parties, the truth is that in an ideal 
democratic scenario, the Court would also have to resolve differences between 
branches and levels of government controlled by the same party.
The first recourse involving the state government of Chihuahua and the federation was 
presented by the Ministry of Finance. It was the second ever constitutional controversy 
to be presented by the federation for invasion of their jurisidiction (SCJN, 27 April 1999; 
see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the first such case, against the municipality of 
Guadalajara, Jalisco). The Ministry of Finance argued that the state had violated 
constitutional Article 131 by issuing a local decree (105/98) establishing a registration 
programme for the approximately 250,000 foreign cars (autos chocolate) circulating in 
Chihuahua (CC 7/99). The decree authorised the local executive to issue a formal 
certificate for all cars identified as foreign, for which it charged MXN 300-3,000, 
depending on the model. The Ministry of Finance argued that this was equivalent to a 
“local car registration/road tax” and violated the Constitution, which gives the federation 
the exclusive power to tax and regulate foreign products. In political terms, the decision 
contradicted the Ministry’s intention not to regulate foreign cars at all. In a meeting with 
Finance Minister Jose Angel Gurrla, Governor Martinez said the state government’s
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aim was not the registration per se, but to respond to an increasing public security 
concern (Proceso, No. 1177: 33). More than two years after the recourse had been 
presented, and after receiving several different reclamation recourses, the Supreme 
Court dismissed the case by eight votes to two; justices Castro and Gongora voted in 
favour of the project (SCJN, 15 May 2001).
A subsequent case involving the federal government and the state of Chihuahua was 
filed by Governor Patricio Martinez against the President, the Ministry of Finance and 
Congress. Martinez challenged the 1 percent discount on car registration tax which 
was applied against the Chihuahua state government (CC 27/1999). Although the 
Court eventually dismissed the case in February 2001, it did set an important 
precedent for future fiscal disputes in terms of the importance of using legal channels 
to challenge the federation.70
In 2001, the municipality of Juarez presented a recourse against the governor for failing 
to transfer responsibility for providing potable water and sewage services to the 
municipality (CC 362/2001). The municipality revived the issue in 2003 (CC 47/2003) 
and again in 2004, when two other municipalities joined in the challenge, as the Court 
declared legislative omission to provide adequate public water services according to 
the new municipal attributions defined in the 1999 reform to Article 115 (SCJN, CC 80, 
82 and 83/2004, 14 July 2005).71
The municipality of Juarez presented a further two recourses (CC 15 and 47/2004) in 
2004 against the local executive and legislature relating to the 2004 Municipal Income 
Law and to the General Fund of Participations and Municipal Support, respectively. 
The first of the claims was dismissed, but the Court ruled in favour of the second, 
declaring that the calendar and amount fixed by the Finance Ministry for each 
municipality under the General Fund were invalid. The municipality of Juarez had been 
making this same claim since 2003 (CC 26/2003). Another challenge brought by this 
same municipality was against Governor Patricio Martinez over an expropriation 
agreement (CC 28/2003); the case was dismissed in 2005.
The Chihuahua state legislature also readily pursued legal avenues to challenge the 
federation. The Supreme Court dismissed its first challenge (CC 18/2004), which was 




and Communications. Its second challenge (56/2004), concerning the installation of a 
motorway toll gate, was successful. The issue had already been the subject of a case 
brought by the state government against the federal executive (CC 23/2003), which the 
Court dismissed.
In 2005, the municipality of Ahumada presented a recourse against the local executive 
(CC 45/2005) over cuts in municipal funds (Liquidacidn y Aportaciones a Municipios). 
The Court ruled that the recourse was well-founded and that the Finance Secretary did 
not have the power to make these deductions.
From the cases studied, it is clear that Chihuahua represents an interesting case study 
for a number of reasons. As in Baja California, there is a bi-partisan PRI-PAN system 
with a divided congress, and legal recourses have been used on occasion against 
political rivals regardless of whether jurisdictions between levels of government have in 
fact been violated. It demonstrates how important the experience of governing is in 
terms of politicians making use of legal tools to defend jurisdictional disputes. It also 
represents a unique case in which a PRI state government legally confronted the 
federal government when it was still under PRI control. This reinforces the argument 
about the importance of the experience of governing since the governor involved in the 
case had previously made use of constitutional controversies when he was municipal 
president. But perhaps more importantly, it reflects a decree of democratisation of 
relationships within the PRI, and a relative increase in strength of state governors.
Nuevo Leon: the consolidation of the PAN
Nuevo Leon72 is another example of the development of a bipartisan system (PRI-PAN) 
in northern Mexico, a trend that was accentuated, according to Nuncio and Garza 
(1992: 188), by the open confrontation between the local business sector and the 
federal administration of Luis Echeverria (1970--76).73 The opposition started to gain 
ground at the local level in the 1960s, with PAN victories in the crucial municipality of 
San Pedro Garza Garcia, a Monterrey suburb. In the 1970 municipal elections, the 
PAN alleged massive electoral fraud and used its national convention to discuss
72 Another industrial and prosperous state, Nuevo Le6n comprises 51 municipalities. It has been divided 
into 11 federal electoral districts, and has 42 local deputies elected in 26 congressional districts and 16 
proportional representation seats. It has almost 4 million inhabitants, with more than a million living in the 
capital, Monterrey. More than 80 percent of the state’s population live in the seven municipalities that 
make up the conurbated area.
73 The death of business leader Eugenio Garza Sada in 1973 deepened the confrontation with the federal 
government. The economic power concentrated in the Comite Industrial de Nuevo Ledn, or the Grupo de 
los Diez, is such that the Monterrey Group has- historically negotiated directly with the federal government 
without the intermediation of regional authorities (Nuncio and Garza, 1992:191).
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whether to participate in future elections. Pablo Emilio Madero withdrew his candidacy 
for the 1976 presidential election and later ran for the municipality of Monterrey with a 
combative campaign opposing the central government. After his defeat, PAN 
supporters again alleged electoral fraud.
In the 1982 federal elections, the PAN topped the polls in Nuevo Leon, helped by the 
clear local links of its candidate, Madero, and by opposition to the nationalisation of 
banks. In the 1985 gubernatorial election, Fernando Canales ran a successful 
campaign supported by prominent local businessmen. Local actors again accused the 
victorious PRI of fraud. After 1985, the PRI state government reached a pragmatic 
governing agreement with Panista mayors (Nuncio and Garza, 1992: 192-193 & 211). 
A new local electoral law was approved and after 1988 the PAN was able to gradually 
gain political strength.










1) Monterrey 1,110,997 30% PRI PRI PRI PAN
2) Guadalupe 670,162 17.4% PRI PRI PRI PAN
3) San Nicolas de 
los Garza
496,878 13% PRI PRI PAN PAN
4) Apodaca 283,497 7.3% PRI PRI PRI PRI
5) General 
Escobedo
233,457 6% PRI PRI PRI PRI
6) Santa Catarina 227,026 5.9% PRI PAN PAN PAN
7) San Pedro Garza 
Garcia






Source: INEGI (2001) Tabulados B&sicos Nacionales y  por Entidad Federativa. Base de Datos y  
Tabulados de la Muestra Censal. X II Censo General de Poblacion y  Vivienda, 2000, Mexico. Ley de 
Desarrollo Urbano de Nuevo Le6n,1984. Electoral data: CIDAC/ Electoral Institute of Nuevo Le6n (2000), 
http://www.cee-nl.org.mx/mb_elecciones.htm
Towards the end of the 1980s the PAN was able to consolidate its strongholds in 
industrial and highly populated suburbs such as San Pedro Garza Garcia (1988), 
Santa Catarina (1988), San Nicolas de los Garza (1991) as well as the state capital, 
Monterrey (1994). The PRI’s Socrates Rizzo was elected governor in 1991 with 63 
percent of the vote. Given that the PAN won 33 percent of the state level vote and 
gained an unprecedented five municipalities, the PRI opted to “tolerate” the opposition 
facilitating the way to a tacit “gentleman’s agreement” (Bailey, 1995: 174). The attitude 
developed in these municipalities has been crucial for the federalisation process in 
fiscal and political terms, as well as in terms of increasing judicial activity.
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In 1989 the PAN municipal presidents were very vocal opponents of the 
recentralisation of the administration of value-added tax and of the change in revenue- 
sharing formula, which upgraded population size over economic production (Bailey, 
1995: 177). Upon being inaugurated into office in 1997 as the first PAN governor, 
Fernando Canales took up the mantle of fiscal protest, launching a campaign for higher 
federal funds for this prosperous state. He joined other state governors in demanding 
that the federation increase the percentage of federal participations to the states. He 
went as far as to suggest that the federal pact be abandoned altogether and a new 
fiscal coordination law be created (La Jornada, 24 September 1999).
In terms of constitutional controversies in this state, in just five years (1993-97) 
different PAN municipalities presented 13 recourses against the PRI state government. 
These municipalities were the most populated and economically active ones, governed 
by the PAN since the 1980s: Monterrey (six disputes), San Pedro Garza Garcia and 
San Nicolas de los Garza (three each) and Santa Catarina (one). The disputes mainly 
concerned fiscal and budgetary issues. Common to all of the municipalities was a bid 
to defend their autonomy to decide over their own regulations for public servants (CC 
2/93, 3/93, 4/95, 8/95 and 5/97), which the Court ruled against, stating that the 
legislature should decide all matters related to internal budgets and remunerations 
(SCJN, 19 September 1995). In controversy 5/97, the municipality of Monterrey 
opposed the state government’s distribution of the Solidarity Municipal Fund (CC 5/97, 
29 June 1998).74
In 1997, San Nicolas de los Garza presented a controversy against the federal and 
state governments related to the Fiscal Coordination Law (CC18/97). The Supreme 
Court partially found in its favour, invalidating the local agreements (SCJN, 4 June
2001). In 1995, Monterrey also challenged the state government in two controversies 
over the creation of intermediate authorities that restricted municipal autonomy (CC 
1/95 and 2/95), but the Court unanimously ruled that both cases were unfounded. 
Similarly, Monterrey opposed a specific legal code created under Decree 213 which 
issued the Organic Law of the Administrative Tribunal, but the Court dismissed this 
case (CC 16/95, 21 May 1996).
During the first half of Canales administration (1997-2000), 11 controversies were 
taken to the Court by different municipalities, eight of them by a single municipality, the
74 See <http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/juridica/engroses/cerrados/221/97000050.009.doc>
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PAN-controlled Guadalupe, in opposition to the local congress and specific 
administrative resolutions (CC 30-33/99, 3-6/99). The PRI-dominated municipality of 
General Escobedo successfully opposed decree 349 issued by the local congress on 
July 2000, which established new borders between it and Monterrey (CC 31/2000). 
Finally, the municipality of Garcia, governed by the coalition candidate Raul Aguirre, 
presented two recourses against the PAN governor challenging the illegal retention of 
municipal resources by the state government (CC 34/2000). This last case shows that 
fiscal disputes are not the sole preserve of the states and the federation, but also exist 
between municipalities and states, since allocations of the decentralisation fund are 
determined by the state governments and approved by the local congresses.
Following this period of intense legal activity, in 2003 the PAN lost the governorship by 
20 percentage points to PRI candidate Jose Natividad Gonzalez Paras. That same 
year, the municipality of Garza Garcia presented a recourse (CC32/2003) against the 
state legislature related to its failure to harmonise local legislation with aspects of the 
reforms to Article 115 relating to municipalities. The Court dismissed the case. A further 
four controversies were presented by different minor municipalities (CC 75-77 and 
79/2003) against the federal executive and other municipalities over a decree issued in 
2000 regulating an area designated as a national park. The final recourse was 
presented in 2004 by the municipality of Guadalupe related to topographical issues 
(CC 79/2004).
In sum, Nuevo Leon tops the list of states in terms of the number of constitutional 
controversies presented before the Supreme Court. Its legal activism was apparently 
unaffected by the change of state government (13 controversies were presented in 
1993-97 and 11 in 1998-2000). The PAN had its first opportunities to govern at the 
municipal level in the mid-1980s and gradually consolidated its strength before winning 
the governorship in 1997. Four urban and industrial municipalities were particularly 
active in legal terms in the context of new intergovernmental relations. The PAN 
municipalities fiercely defended their fiscal and jurisdictional attributions against the 
PRI state government, but with little success. The first PAN governor adopted a critical 
attitude towards the federation, demanding more public resources for the states and 
joining a cross-party group of governors seeking greater regional autonomy and a new 
federal pact. However, the PAN lost the governorship to the PRI in 2003 and once 
again in 2009 when the PRI’s Rodrigo Medina beat Fernando Elizondo in a closely 
contested election. Legal activity decreased markedly after 2003 compared with the 
period described above.
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PRI-governed states: a multi-party system structure
Tamaulipas
Tamaulipas is one of the remaining PRI strongholds and has never had a non-PRI 
government. In contrast to the cases discussed above, this northern state did not follow 
the traditional two-party system. Rather, a multi-party system developed with the PAN 
remaining strong in the industrial areas, and the PRD and to a lesser extent the PT 
consolidating their strength in other working class municipalities. Since the beginning of 
the 1980s, Reynosa, Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo have registered significant levels 
of support for the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), which had been 
created as an offshoot of the PRI to create the illusion of opposition (Alvarado, 1992: 
48). While since 1992 these industrial cities have remained under PRI control, Rio 
Bravo is the only border city to be governed by the PRD (1995-2001) and PT (2001- 
04).
Tamaulipas is divided into 43 municipalities. Some 42 percent of the state’s population 
and a significant portion of its maquila industry are concentrated in the three border 
cities: Reynosa, Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo. The state’s capital, Ciudad Victoria, is 
the municipality with the fifth largest population. The southern cities of Tampico and 
Ciudad Madero are active oil and electricity manufacturing centres. As Table 4.6 
shows, the main municipalities have always been governed by the PRI, except in 
1995-98 when the PAN won in Tampico and Matamoros and the PRD won in Ciudad 
Madero and Rio Bravo. During this period opposition municipalities increased their 
legal activity against the state government. Rio Bravo has been particularly active in 
legal terms, with a number of recourses presented against the state government by the 
different non-PRI parties that have governed this municipality since 1992.75
In terms of gubernatorial elections, it is worth noting that although the PRI still controls 
the state government, its support has gradually declined. Its candidate won 80 percent 
of the vote in 1986, against 66 percent in 1992 and 55 percent in 1998, when Tomas 
Yarrington became governor. In 1986 the main contender was the PARM candidate, 
while in 1992, the PAN-PRD coalition received 26 percent of the vote, bolstered by the 
many PRI supporters who had defected to the PRD after oil trade union leader Joaquin 
Hernandez Galicia “La Quina" was imprisoned. In 1998 the second-placed candidate 
(26.6 percent) was the PAN’s Gustavo Cardenas, the former mayor of Ciudad Victoria, 
followed by the PRD’s Joaquin Hernandez Correa (16 percent), son of La Quina and
75 The municipality of Rio Bravo was created on 10 January 1962 following Decree Number 53 approved 
by the state congress.
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former congressman for Ciudad Madero. More recently, the PRI seems to have 
reinforced its presence in Tamaulipas: in 2004 Eugenio Hernandez Flores won with 
57.6 percent of the vote against 31.5 percent for the PAN.






1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Reynosa 420,463 15.3 PARM PRI PRI PRI PRI PAN PRI
Matamoros 418,141 15.2 PARM PRI PAN PRI PRI PRI PRI
Nuevo
Laredo
310,915 11.3 PRI PRI PRI PRI PRI PRI PRI
Tampico 295,442 10.7 PRI PRI PAN PRI PAN PRI PRI
Cd Victoria 263,063 9.6 PRI PAN PRI PRI PRI PRI PRI
Cd Madero 182,325 6.7 PRI PRI PRD PRD PRD PRI PRI
Altamira 127,664 4.7 PRI PRI PFC
RN
PRI PRI PRI PRI
El Mante 112,602 4.1 PAN PRI PRI PRI PAN PRI PRI
Rio Bravo 104,229 3.8 PRI PAN PRD PRD PT PRI PRI
TOTAL 2,753,222 81.1
Source: INEGI (2001) Tabulados Bisicos Nacionales y  por Entidad Federativa. Base de Datos y 
Tabulados de la Muestra Censal. X II Censo General de Poblacidn y  Vivienda, 2000, Mexico.
Electoral information: CIDAC /  Electoral Institute of Tamaulipas 
http://www.cidac.org/es/modules.php?name=Encvclopedia&op=content&tid=28
The level of legal activism of Rio Bravo is especially relevant to my main argument that 
opposition parties from the lowest levels of government were the first to defend the 
Mexican federal arrangement through legal channels. In the 1992 elections, this 
municipality was won by the PAN and since then it has been governed by different 
parties, including the PRD (1995-2001), the PT (2001-04) and the PRI for two 
consecutive administrations (2004-07 and 2007-10). Juan Antonio Guajardo became 
the first opposition (PAN) municipal president in Rio Bravo and in the last year of his 
administration he presented two controversies.76 He used the first recourse to 
challenge local Article 152, regarding the political persecution of municipal 
representatives “who without reason were considered responsible for abusing their 
powers” (SCJN, CC 14/95, 8 September 1995). The Court dismissed the case on the 
grounds that it lacked legal foundation and that the constitutional controversy 
mechanism was not the ideal recourse for resolving the matter.
76 Following his first term as municipal president for the PAN (1992-95), Guajardo became a PRD federal 
congressman and then ran as a PRD candidate for the first minority Senate position in 1997. Although he 
won the election by a tight margin and occupied the Senate seat for three weeks, he was later asked to 
step down after the Electoral Tribunal ruled in favour of the PAN candidate, Maria del Carmen Bolado 
(TEPJF, SUP-REC 047/97 and 048/97). In 2001 Guajardo was once again elected as municipal president 
of Rio Bravo, but this time for the PT.
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The second recourse challenged Article 91 of the local constitution for violating the 
exclusive authority granted by the federal Constitution to municipalities to set public 
security and transit policies. Almost a year later, on 1 October 1996, the Court ruled 
unanimously in favour of Rio Bravo (CC19/95, 5 December 1995) and the 
gubernatorial nomination of public security delegates and police commanders was 
annulled.
Also in 1995, the PAN municipal government in Ciudad Victoria presented three 
controversies against the state government. The first challenged once again the 
income law on the grounds that it invaded municipal autonomy (CC 3/95, 25 May
1995). The second related to aspects of municipal revenues collected for the provision 
of services, such as licences for selling alcohol (SCJN, CC 5/95, 8 June 1995), while 
the third concerned the municipal jurisdiction to regulate police services (CC 7/95). The 
latter was presented on July 1995 in opposition to local judicial reforms empowering 
the Tamaulipas State Tribunal to decide not only on civil, but also on constitutional 
conflicts between different levels of government. The Court ruled unanimously in favour 
of the state government in all three cases.
In 1996, Bernardo G6mez (PRD) took over from Guajardo in Rio Bravo and continued 
his strategy of using legal mechanisms to strengthen the municipality’s financial 
autonomy. His first actions were to oppose the water law and to demand that the 
income law for this municipality relating to the 1996 fiscal year be declared invalid (CC 
1/96, 16 February 1996). Gomez then opposed new planning regulations affecting the 
Fund for Municipal Development (CC 4/96, 24 May 1996).77 In all three cases, the 
Supreme Court ruled in favour of the state government, declaring the respective laws 
to be valid (12 May 1998; 9 August 1999). The following year, in 1997, Gomez 
attemped to pursue the same three issues through the courts (CC 6/97, 7/97, 8/97, 4 
February 1997; CC11/97, 7 March 1997). He also opposed local Article 58 (section VI) 
related to the Organic Law of the Finance Ministry (Contaduria Mayor) and the order to 
audit the municipality. The Court dismissed the case four years later (SCJN, CC 24/97, 
January 2001). The recourses all aimed to restore municipal fiscal autonomy but were 
unsuccessful.
In 1998, the PRD administration in Rio Bravo presented three new controversies 
against the state government. The first was another challenge to the planning law and
77 A week later another PAN municipal president in Tampico filed a similar controversy (CC 5/96, 30 May
1996).
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the regulation for integrating the development councils under Ramo 33 (CC 7/98, 8 
March 1998) and was partially founded. The other two called for municipal autonomy to 
audit its own tax collection accounts (CC 15 and 16/98, 6 May 1998). Both were 
unsuccessful. Finally, the PRD-governed municipality of Ciudad Madero presented two 
politically motivated controversies in August 1998 regarding the decision by the Cabildo 
to suspend the Comptroller (Regidora) and to nominate an interim municipal president 
(CC 24 and 27/98). Both cases were dismissed for lack of legal foundation.
In 1999, two recourses were filed against the state governor, this time by the 
municipality of Reynosa (CC 19 and 20/99). Both claims referred to the arrest warrant 
issued against PRI municipal president Luis Gerardo Higareda for alleged corruption, 
falsification of official documents and abuse of power during his stint as Director of the 
Water Commission. Both recourses argued that the state governor could not suspend a 
municipal president, because under Article 152 of the local constitution the local 
congress has to authorise the arrest of certain public servants, including heads of state 
bodies. As it was a dispute between two PRI members, a number of local 
commentators argued that the charges against Higareda were part of a political 
struggle with governor Yarrington, who was “trying to punish Higareda for not 
supporting him in the gubernatorial race” {El Norte Tamaulipas, 19 August 1999).78 The 
Court dismissed the claims, which were clearly centred on political issues. Yarrington’s 
personal secretary, Humberto Valdez, replaced Higareda.
Up until 1999, only one of the 21 controversies presented by different opposition 
municipalities against the PRI state government was successful. The successful case 
was presented by the PAN administration in Rio Bravo, whereas most of the other 
controversies were presented by the PRD or in some cases the PRI and related to 
disputes that were clearly political in character, some connected to internal divisions 
within the ruling party. It should be highlighted, though, that the number of 
controversies has decreased significantly since 1999.
Only two recourses were presented in 2000-05. In 2001, the PRI-governed 
municipality of Nuevo Laredo (CC 325/2001) presented a case against President 
Vicente Fox and the federal Congress demanding control of border crossings, but the 
Court dismissed the case. Four years later, a recourse (CC 37/2005) was presented by
78 Indeed, the national Commission of Human Rights, issued a special recommendation (01/2000) to the 
Tamaulipas state governor and the local Congress for violating Luis Higareda’s human rights (10 April 
2000.http://www.cndh.orq.mx/Principal/document/boletines/abr2000/bol 038.htm). Higareda has tried to 
impeach governor Yarrington (http://gaceta.cddhcu.gob.mx/Gaceta/2000/abr/20000415.html#Demandas).
171
the PAN-controlled municipality of Reynosa against the state governor regarding the 
nomination of the head of the municipal water commission.
In sum, Tamaulipas is particularly relevant for studying constitutional controversies, 
even though it is underrepresented in the Mexican scholarly literature. Aside from being 
the state with the second highest number of controversies presented over the 1994-
1997 period (14), plus a further seven in 1998-2000, Tamaulipas’s electoral patterns 
are interesting, especially after the breakdown of the oil trade union at the beginning of 
the 1990s when internal divisions appeared within the PRI. Since then, the number of 
controversies has decreased significantly.
Although the PRI’s strength at the state government level is unquestionable, 
Tamaulipas is one of the few states in Mexico where three main parties have 
consolidated their political presence in diverse areas, including the most populated and 
economically active municipalities of Rio Bravo, Ciudad Madero, Ciudad Victoria and 
Tampico. From these positions of power, representatives from different parties have 
used legal recourses to confront the state government and even the federation. 
Political disputes between members of the same party that were taken to the Court in
1998 and 1999 show how the PRI has become internally divided.
Puebla
Puebla has always been governed by the PRI at the state level. This central state has 
a three-party regional structure with a strong PAN presence in urban areas and clear 
PRD strength among rural sectors. A polarised state bordering Mexico City, Puebla has 
a high number of poor, mainly rural municipalities, as well as industrial centres where 
the PAN has been particularly strong. Puebla has the second highest number of 
municipalities of the country (217) after Oaxaca and, like Oaxaca, its population is 
dispersed: Puebla has only four municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, 
which account for 35 percent of the state’s population of over 5 million inhabitants.
Although the PRI retains control of the state government, its support has declined more 
sharply than in Tamaulipas. In the 1992 gubernatorial elections, PRI candidate Manuel 
Bartlett won 70 percent of the vote against 17 percent for the PAN; in 1998 Melquiades 
Morales (PRI) won with 55 percent of the vote against 29 percent for the PAN and 11 
percent for the PRD; while in 2004, Mario Marin (PRI) won 51 percent of the vote 
against 37 percent for the PAN. At the municipal level, the five most populated
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municipalities were governed by the PAN in the 1995-98 period, as Table 4.7 shows. 
The PRI was able to recover the cities of Puebla and San Pedro Cholula in 1998, 
though lost Puebla to the PAN in 2001. In 2004 the PRI recovered Puebla city and 
three years later was able to consolidate its presence at the local level.





1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Puebla 1,346,916 26.5 PRI PAN PRI PAN PRI PRI
TehuacSn 226,258 4.4 PRI PAN PAN PRI PAN PRI
San Martin 
Texmelucan
121,071 2.4 PRI PAN PAN PRI PAN PAN





99,794 1.96 PRI PAN PRI PRI PRI PRI
Huachinango 83,537 1.6 PRI PRI PRI PAN PRI PRI
Tezuitian 81,156 1.6% PAN PRI PRI Conv PRI PRI
Izucar de 
Matamoros
70,739 1.4% PRI PRI PRI PRD PRI PRI









Source: INEGI (2001) Tabulados Bisicos Nacionales y  por Entidad Federativa. Base de Datos y  
Tabulados de la Muestra Censal. X II Censo General de Poblacidn y  Vivienda, 2000, Mexico.
Electoral information: CIDAC /  Electoral Institute of Puebla (2001)
In terms of constitutional controversies, the PAN-dominated urban municipalities 
adopted a confrontational attitude towards the PRI state government as soon as the 
1994 judicial reforms came into effect. In 1996 Puebla and other PAN municipalities 
opposed the creation of a system to operate water services (CC 51/96), though the 
Court ruled by seven votes to three against them.79
During Manuel Bartlett’s administration (1992-98), the state government and the PRI- 
dominated local congress extended their degree of political control over revenue- 
sharing among municipalities. Two controversies presented by Puebla and the other 
eleven municipalities governed by the PAN focused on the Ley para el Federalismo 
Hacendario known as “Bartlett’s Law” (CC 4/98 and 6/98). In the context of the 1998 
gubernatorial election, Bartlett created the law to alter the formula for distributing
79 After resolving several reclamation recourses, the three favourable votes, from justices Aguirre, Castro 
and Gbngora, were lost four years later, when they dismissed the municipal claim on the grounds that the 
initial ruling had been questioned extemporaneously (SCJN, 29 January 2001).
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federal funds to the 217 municipalities. Whereas allocations had been based on 
population, under Bartlett’s Law they would be based on poverty levels. Although on 
paper this is progressive— since larger municipalities have greater capacity for local 
revenue generation through taxes and so are less dependent on federal funds than the 
poorer areas— in reality there were clear political undertones in the context of closely 
contested 1998 elections. The PAN’s centres of control were the municipalities, 
including the capital, which stood to lose from the new arrangement. Moreover, Bartlett 
had his sights on the 2000 presidential election and wanted to position himself within 
the party and the general public.
The PAN claimed that the local congress had acted unconstitutionally in changing the 
formula for distributing fiscal resources to municipalities. Moreover, the municipalities 
argued, the “intermediate authorities” created by the new law to administer, distribute, 
carry out, exercise and audit the federal allocations (Comites de Planeacidn para el 
Desarrollo Municipal, Juntas Auxiliares and the Grupos Organizados), are prohibited 
according to Article 115, section I. Two years later, in February 2000, the Supreme 
Court decided that the “‘Bartlett Law’ did not affect the municipal jurisdiction in terms of 
federal allocations, because the local legislature is empowered to decide these issues” 
(SCJN, 2000: 219-20), but accepted that Planning Committees are intermediate 
authorities that interfere with municipal jurisdiction. The Court also ruled that federal 
authorities must supervise federal allocations, as it is not within state’s jurisdiction to 
use these resources freely (SCJN, 2000: 220).
The other dispute between PAN-controlled municipalities and the PRI state 
government focused on a state government urban development and modernisation 
programme known as Angelopolis. According to Ward and Rodriguez (1999: 94), 
although this programme was mainly focused on the city of Puebla, it was designed to 
decentralise administrative capacity to other municipalities throughout the state. 
Angelopolis and the planning agency responsible for it were created independently of 
the state planning commission (COPLADE), and so were not subject to the usual level 
of oversight by congress. This prompted several legal actions. In response, the local 
executive presented three controversies against the municipality of Puebla for posing 
obstacles to the project’s development (CC 20/97; 25/97; 28/97). On April 1998, the 
Court dismissed the state government’s claims unanimously (SCJN, 1998: 125-27).
Legal challenges to the indigenous law will be discussed in the section on Oaxaca, but 
it is worth noting that the first municipality to present a controversy against President
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Fox and the federal and state congresses was Molcaxac (SCJN, 12 July 2001). The 
municipality was supported by a human rights organisation and the outgoing PRD local 
government. The Court accepted the claim— along with hundreds of similar claims filed 
by other municipalities from different states— but it eventually dismissed all of the 
claims stating that it had no competence or any capability of jurisdictional control with 
regards to the Constituyente Permanente, the reforming body that approved the 
indigenous law (SCJN, 6 September 2002).
In sum, the balance of all the controversies presented by these state actors was mixed. 
The Court ruled in favour of the state government on the validity of Bartlett’s Law and 
the creation of a system to operate water services. However, it ruled in favour of the 
municipalities in terms of the creation of Planning Committees as intermediate 
authorities that were affecting their jurisdictions. The Court also dismissed the state 
government’s claims surrounding the Angelopolis project, as well as the recourses 
presented by municipalities in Puebla and other states against the indigenous law. 
What is notable about the case study has been the willingness of opposition-led 
municipalities—typically the PAN in important urban centres—to take advantage of the 
authority granted them by the 1994 reform to use constitutional recourses against 
higher levels of government.
Oaxaca
Historically, Oaxaca has been a PRI stronghold, with the PRI always governing at the 
state level and controlling the majority of the municipalities. However, there is 
significant PRD political representation in some rural and middle-sized municipalities, 
as well as an increasing support for the PAN in urban areas. By the beginning of the 
1990s the PRD became the second force in the state, controlling 16 municipalities, 
while in the 2001 election the PAN gained ground in crucial industrial municipalities 
such as Tuxtepec, Salina Cruz, Huajuapan and Miahuatlan. Oaxaca has a large 
indigenous population of close to one million people (INEGI, 2000), of a total population 
of 3.5 million. It is primarily rural and has the highest number of municipalities (570) in 
the country.
The state is divided into eight regions organised into 16 different indigenous groups. 
Since 1995 the indigenous population has been granted the right to elect most of its 
municipal authorities through a special system of uusos y costumbres" (customary and 
traditional practice), in a process simultaneous with the system of registered political
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parties. Previously, municipalities in Oaxaca and other states with significant 
indigenous populations could elect their local authorities under the system of 
customary practice, but candidates also had to be registered with a political party 
(Hernandez Navarro, 1999: 154). According to Bailon (1995: 207), the failure by PRI 
delegates to recognise community decisions contributed to the rise of the opposition to 
the official party.











1) Oaxaca de Juarez 256,130 7.4% PRI PAN PAN Convergencia
Democrdtica
2) San Juan Bautista 
Tuxtepec
133,913 3.9% PRI PAN PAN PAN
3) Juchit£n de Zaragoza 78,512 2.2% PRD PRD PRD PRI
4) Salina Cruz 76,452 2.2% PFCRN PRI PRD PAN
5) Santo Domingo 
Tehuantepec
53,229 1.5% PRI PRI PRI
6) Santa Cruz 
Xoxocotl£n
52,806 1.5% PRI PRI PRD
TOTAL 3,438,765 18.8%
Source: INEGI (2001) Tabulados B&sicos Nacionales y  por Entidad Federativa. Base de Datos y 
Tabulados de la Muestra Censal. X II Censo General de Poblacidn y Vivienda, 2000, Mexico.
Electoral information: CIDAC / Electoral Institute of Oaxaca
Since the 1995 elections, three quarters of the 570 municipalities have been elected 
through this communitarian method of direct democracy and support for the PRI has 
collapsed. While in 1989 the PRI won 535 municipalities, in 1995 412 municipalities 
elected their local authorities through local assemblies without the participation of 
political parties or a formal electoral organisation, and only 158 voted separately for 
parties. PRI losses were massive and included the state capital, which went to the 
PAN. The PRI has managed to retain its hold over the state governorship, but its grip is 
weakening: PRI candidate Diodoro Carrasco won 74 percent of the vote in 1992, 
compared with Jose Murat who won with only 48 percent of the vote in 1998, and PRI- 
PT-PVEM candidate Ulises Ruiz, with 47 percent against 43.2 percent for PAN-PRD- 
Convergencia candidate Gabino Cue.
Despite its loss of power, the PRI is still the first political force in the state in the context 
of a three-party regional system. The case of the capital, Oaxaca, is particularly 
interesting, since in the mid 1990s it became a PAN stronghold but was later won by 
Convergencia Democratica (CD). The poor relationship between the capital’s municipal 
president and the state governor is well-documented and explained in terms of Gabino
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Cue’s closeness to the previous governor, Diodoro Carrasco (Cronica, 28 July 2002). 
Moreover, the regidores (municipal councillors) elected in the capital were from the 
PAN and the PRI and after six months in office both filed a complaint before the state 
legislature against Cu6 for allegedly diverting public funds.
Table 4.9 Municipal elections in Oaxaca (1989-2001)
Election PRI PAN PRD Usos y Costum bres Others
1989 535 6 16 — 11
1992 537 4 16 — 13
1995 112 11 32 412 3
1998 112 9 30 418 1
7 Oct 2001 88 6 3 4*
Source: CIDAC; Institute Estatal Electoral, Oaxaca (1998). Out of the 418 municipalities that are elected 
through the traditional method, 63 have a one-year period; 24 a year and a half; one governs for a two- 
year period and the remaining 330 have a three-year period. ‘ Suprisingly, the small Convergencia por la 
Democracia party won the capital and other three municipalities.
During Carrasco’s administration (1992-98), two blocks of controversies were 
presented, each by 22 municipalities. The first block was taken to the Court in 1996 
and concerned the creation of the local Institute for Municipal Development, which, the 
municipalities claimed, affected the administrative autonomy granted to them under 
constitutional Article 115 (CC 6/96 to 27/96). Nine of the 22 participating municipalities 
were governed by the PAN, 11 were from the PRD and the remaining two were elected 
under customary law. In February 1997, the Court ruled unanimously in favour of the 
state government.
The second set of disputes reached the Court a month later, and once again was 
related to budgetary line Ramo 26. The 22 municipalities demanded that the full 
budgetary allocation be handed over to municipal authorities in line with stipulations 
contained in the Funds for Social Municipal Development. Of the 22 recourses (CC 
28/96 to 50/96), 13 were presented by municipalities governed by the PRD, one by the 
PRI and the remaining eight by municipal authorities elected by customary law. In 
August 1998, the Court declared unanimously that under local constitutional Article 27 
it is the local Court that is responsible for resolving conflicts with municipalities.
In 1998, the PRI state government challenged the municipality of Oaxaca (governed by 
the PAN) over municipal regulations for transit and public transport (CC 2/98). Nine 
months later, the Court ruled in favour of the state government (by 10 votes) and the 
regulation was declared invalid (SCJN, 20 October 1998). The municipality countered
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the ruling with a separate recourse filed in August 1999 (CC 24/99), but was 
unsuccessful (SCJN, 8 August 2000).
Regarding fiscal issues and the distribution of federal funds to municipalities, three 
consecutive controversies were taken to the Court in 1998 by the municipal authorities 
of Oaxaca, Asuncion Nochixtlan and San Juan Bautista Tuxtepec against the state 
government (CC 11,12 and 14/98). Almost three years later, the Court declared these 
claims to be invalid and affirmed the state government’s authority to determine fiscal 
distribution issues (SCJN, 6 February 2001). In a separate challenge, the state 
government opposed the creation by the PAN-governed municipality of Huajuapan de 
Leon of a local Commission of Human Rights (CC 14/2000). The Court ruled 
unanimously in favour of the local executive on the grounds that the local legislature 
has the exclusive authority to create decentralised bodies (SCJN, 15 February 2001).
A flood of constitutional controversies followed the approval of the indigenous bill by 
Congress in April 2001. Different municipalities presented 331 constitutional 
controversies, 3 unconstitutional actions and 351 claims before the Court (Pedro Nava, 
La Jornada, 7 March 2002: 17). More than 273 of the controversies were presented by 
municipal authorities in Oaxaca with the support of the local legislature and executive 
(Jose Murat, El Universal, 8 May 2002). Most of the controversies not only criticised the 
content of the constitutional reform, but also the approval procedure followed in many 
state legislatures, which, they argued, failed to comply with constitutional requirements 
contained in Article 135. The legal recourses also criticised the failure of the reform to 
consider international agreements signed by Mexico, including Treaty 169 of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) which stipulates that indigenous communities 
must be consulted on any legislative measure that affects their interests. Neither did 
the reform comply with the Acuerdos de San Andres signed by the federal government, 
the Commission for Peace and Reconciliation (Cocopa) and the rebel Zapatista Army 
of National Liberation (EZLN) in 1995. In addition, the Oaxaca state government 
claimed that the reform failed to consider the system of customary practice adopted in 
Oaxaca since 1995
In October 2001, the Supreme Court dismissed the first recourse by the Oaxaca state 
government since it had been presented before the indigenous law was published in 
the Diario Oficial (Reclamation recourse 209/2001 presented by the upper chamber 
against Oaxaca state government). The PRI governor had politicised this issue to the 
point of threatening to file a case before the Human Rights Interamerican Commission.
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Indeed, two weeks after the Court dismissed hundreds of claims against the indigenous 
law governor Murat and municipal representatives of indigenous communities 
presented a formal claim before the ILO criticising the violation of an international 
agreement and the local Constitution of Oaxaca (La Jornada, 21 September 2002).
This was undoubtedly a complicated case for the Supreme Court since there was no 
precedent in Mexico’s judicial history of a controversy opposing a constitutional reform 
which involved the entire reforming body (Constituyente Permanente), in this case both 
federal chambers of congress and all the state legislatures (Article 135).80 
Theoretically, the Court was expected to decide whether it had the power to revise acts 
of the Constituyente Permanente and, if so, to determine whether the approval 
procedure at the national and subnational level complied with constitutional 
stipulations. Similarly, the Court was expected to determine where international treaties 
fitted into the hierarchy of laws with respect to Mexican legislation. However, the Court 
dismissed the complaints filed against the indigenous rights law on the grounds that it 
does not have the jurisdiction to address such complaints and that the Constituyente 
Permanente is not susceptible to any jurisdictional control (jurisprudential theses 
39/2002-09-07 and 40/2002-09-07). Although three judges voted in favour of 
discussing the content of the controversy, the final eight-to-three ruling set an important 
precedent for future constitutional reforms, since any decisions approved by the federal 
congress and the majority vote in local congresses would not be subject to any 
modifications via constitutional controversies, regardless of the Supreme Court’s 
stance on the issue.
The ongoing conflict in Chiapas and pressure form many national and international 
organisations put the Court in a difficult position. The Court ruling was roundly 
denounced by national and international civil society organisations as a serious blow to 
the stalled peace process. Judge Diaz Romero defended the Court’s decision to 
abstain from discussing the approval process of the reform on the grounds that “if they 
had started a profound analysis of the issue, the Court would have been criticised of 
'judicial activism’ and the arrogance of believing that it is the only institution capable of 
determining ethical issues” (La Jornada, 7 September 2002). Several local groups, 
particularly from Oaxaca and Chiapas, continued to challenge the issue after the ruling.
80 The most similar case was the amparo suit presented by the former Mexico City mayor Manuel 
Camacho (1988-93) opposing the 1996 constitutional reform which barred former post-holders from 
running again. The Court ruled by the narrowest margin (six votes to five) to consider the amparo, though 
it eventually voted unanimously against it. The ruling did, however, establish important criteria for 
questioning constitutional reforms since it stated that it was possible to control the constitutionality of the 
reforming body, the Constituyente Permanente, through the amparo judgment (SCJN, 2000:188-90).
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Former President Fox was pressured into promising “to promote new political 
agreements in order to improve the indigenous reform" {El Universal, 25 September
2002), though his pledge was never fulfilled.
One final case of note relates to a Court ruling announced on 14 October 2009 over 
protests in Oaxaca from May 2006 to January 2007 that paralysed the state capital 
leaving at least a dozen people dead (Facultad de Investigation 1/2007, SCJN). The 
conflict began with a teachers’ strike but soon became a broader movement in demand 
of the resignation of Governor Ulises Ruiz for alleged electoral fraud. In a unanimous 
vote the Court absolved Vicente Fox’s government of any responsibility, but ruled that 
Ruiz’s administration had committed serious violations of individual guarantees and 
had blocked access to information. Although a similar ruling had prompted the 
resignation of the governor of Guerrero in 1996 over the massacre of 17 farm workers 
in Aguas Blancas, Ruiz did not resign. According to Supreme Court Justice Olga 
Sanchez Cordero, “[f]or us in the Court, the controversies are a thermometer of the 
governability and political stability of a state. Oaxaca is the state that registers the most 
controversies.81 As can be seen in Annex 1, most cases have been presented precisely 
during the administration of Ulisez Ruiz (2004-2010).
While this case study is notable for the precedent set in the case involving the 
indigenous law and Supreme Court’s curtailment of its authority to rule on 
controversies relating to decisions approved by the Constituyente Permanente, the 
implications of cases related to fiscal federalism are equally important. Bailon (1995: 
212) documents how one of the indicators of conflict with the PRI state government is 
its effort to adversely influence the level of resources assigned to certain municipalities. 
In particular, he analyses municipal appropriations and public investment in the 1985- 
92 period, and shows that while municipal assignations were unaffected by a change of 
municipal government, levels of public investment in opposition-controlled 
municipalities is influenced. By analysing public investment as the allocations received 
by the state government through the CUD (Convenio Unico de Desarrollo) to finance 
social infrastructure, Bailon (1995: 216) is able to conclude that opposition party power 
is directly related to the ability to negotiate and exert pressure: opposition municipalities 
received greater investment resources through mobilisation and pressure. After the 
1994 reforms, the legal route became ideal for many of these municipalities to exert
81 Author interview, conducted in Mexico City on 4 December 2009.
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pressure on the state government on a variety of issues, including on fiscal matters, as 
this section has shown.
Federal District: the first PRD victory at the state level
The Federal District (DF, known unofficially as Mexico City) has existed as a special 
political entity since 1928 and since 1970 has been divided into 16 delegaciones. The 
sprawling metropolitan area currently transcends more than one jurisdiction, 
comprising the 16 political delegations of Mexico City and no less than 27 
municipalities of the neighbouring Estado de Mexico (Ward, 1998: xiv). According to 
INEGI’s 2000 figures, the Federal District has over 8.5 million inhabitants, second only 
to Estado de Mexico in terms of its population (INEGI 2001). It is Mexico’s economic 
and political centre and, despite intense decentralisation efforts since the 1980s, it 
remains the largest manufacturing centre in the country both in terms of jobs and 
production (Jimenez, 2002).
Although the 1856-57 Constituyente granted the Federal District the character of a 
state with elected authorities, a decree issued in 1928 by President Alvaro Obregbn 
subordinated the government of the Federal District to the federal executive, which was 
given power over the executive and legislative functions of the capital city (art. 43). 
Since then, the Mexican political system has offered few institutional channels for 
political participation to residents in the capital. Up until 1997, instead of locally elected 
representatives running the City Hall, it was the President who appointed Mexico City’s 
Regente (mayor) and the 16 delegados.
As the Federal District grew, so too did the demands for its authorities to be closer to 
the capitalinos and more effective in responding to their needs and representing their 
interests. Since the mid-1980s, the political-administrative structure of the Federal 
District has undergone several transformations (Berruecos, 2002) that gradually 
expanded political rights for Mexico City’s residents, including their right to elect local 
authorities.82 The failure of the government to respond adequately to the earthquake
82 In 1977, the Federal District created a hierarchically ordered neighbourhood consultative structure on 
civic matters at the local and state levels (Juntas de Vecinos in the delegations and the Consultative 
Council in the Federal District). The Decree published on 10 August 1987 in the Diario Oficial created the 
Representative Assembly as a representative body with limited attributions. Two Assemblies were elected 
and functioned until 1994. Prior to the 1994 election, almost half a million inhabitants in the capital 
supported direct elections for local authorities in a plebiscite organised by members of the civil society on 
21 March 1993 (Berruecos, 2002). As a result of the Federal District’s Political Reform published on 25 
October 1993, the Assembly’s powers were expanded to the equivalent of a legislative body. One of the 
most relevant legislative functions given to this body was the power to approve the electoral law for the 
Federal District (Estatuto de Gobiemo), which was approved by the federal Congress in 1994. The 1993 
reform also created Citizens’ Councils which would report directly to the federal government.
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that devastated the capital in 1985 triggered the most intense social mobilisation in the 
city's history (Tavera-Fenollosa, 1999: 107) and ultimately prompted the 1986 reform, 
which set the basis for political participation in Mexico City.
The 1996 political reform finally established direct elections in the Federal District:
residents would be able to elect their own Jefe de Gobierno. The first elected 
government would be in power for only three years (1997-2000) while subsequent 
terms would last six years.83 According a decree issued on 22 August 1996, a
Legislative Assembly of the Federal District (ALDF) would be made up of elected
deputies (rather than representatives) from 1997. It was also agreed that delegados 
would become three-year elected positions from December 2000. According to Ward 
(1998: xv), new federalism has affected Mexico City in several ways: it led to the 
downsizing of the federal bureaucracy and encouraged outwards migration from 
Mexico City. However, because of the “special status” afforded to the Federal District, 
successive governments have been unable to successfully champion its fiscal 
autonomy— it does not receive federal funds on the same basis as other states and is 
not formally be part of the national fiscal programme.
The Federal District is an interesting case study— especially after Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas took office (1997-99)— not only because it was the first entity to be governed 
by the PRD, but because it shows how incipient internal democratisation unfolded at 
the local level as part of the overall transition process. Opposition parties have 
historically been strong in Mexico City, but they gathered real momentum after the 
1988 elections. From then on, the PRD strengthened its position within the Federal 
District and in 1997 not only won its first “governorship” (Jefe de Gobierno) but also 
secured an absolute majority in the local assembly (57.5 percent), winning 38 of the 40 
majority districts.84 Electoral participation was close to 70 percent. As can be seen in 
table 4.10, Cardenas won 48 percent of the vote, followed by the PRI's Alfredo del 
Mazo (26 percent) and the PAN's Carlos Castillo (16 percent). Cardenas stepped down
83 According to the new rules contained in the Constitution and the Statutes of Government of the Federal 
District, the First Legislative Assembly (1997-2000) approved the Electoral Code on 15 December 1998. 
This new code contains the details for the organisation of elections for the Assembly, the Head of 
Government and the Councils, on the basis of the Ley de Participacidn Ciudadana del Distrito Federal and 
the Cddigo Electoral del Distrito Federal. Given that the Federal District now has its own legislation and 
electoral authorities (as do the other 31 states), the 1997 local elections were the last to be organised by 
the IFE. Since the 2000 electoral process, the Electoral Institute of the Federal District (IEDF) has been in 
charge of organising local elections. The IEDF has a similar structure to the IFE, comprising a General 
Council of eight Councillors and a President, an Executive Secretary and five Executive Directors (IEDF, 
2000).
84 In 1997, the PRD secured 38 seats in the the Legislative Assembly, with 45 percent of the votes; the 
PRI won 12, with 24 percent; the PAN, 10, with 18 percent; and the remaining 13 percent was distributed 
between the PVEM (four seats), the PT (one seat) and the Cardenista Parties (one seat).
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after less than two years to campaign for the presidency in the 2000 general election. 
He was replaced in September 1999 by his Secretary of the Interior, Rosario Robles.
In the 2000 elections Andres Manuel L6pez Obrador became the third PRD mayor of 
Mexico City, narrowly defeating PAN candidate Santiago Creel. As opposed to 
Cardenas and Robles, Lopez Obrador faced a divided Assembly: the PRD had 19 
seats, against 17 for the PAN and 16 (proportional seats) for the PRI. The election for 
delegates was even closer, with the PAN and the PRD tied at 33 percent of the vote. 
The Electoral Tribunal had to resolve a number of complaints before confirming that the 
PAN had won seven and the PRD nine of the 16 delegations.85 As will be discussed, 
the delegations, particularly the ones governed by the PAN, have used legal 
mechanisms to oppose the PRD head of government.
Table 4.10 Percentage of votes won in the Federal District elections (1988-2006)
Election Loca Assembly Head of Government
PRI PAN PRD Others PRI PAN PRD Others Particip
1988 27.6 24.4 6.8 41.2
1991 45.6 19.6 12 22.5
1994 40.5 27 21.1 11.3
1997 23.6 18.5 44.8 13.2 25.6 15.5 48.1 10.5 67%
2000 22 35.2 31 12.3 22.8 33.4 34.5
2003 23.14 15.58 34.86 8.12 65.65%
2006 21.91 33.87 47.05 3.39 68.96%
Source: CIDAC, Instituto Electoral del Distrito Federal (2000) 
(http://www.asambleadf.gob.mx/princip/E-02_t.htm)
Intergovernmental relations with the federal government have not run smoothly for 
PRD governments in the capital since the party won power in the city in 1997. Some of 
the most problematic issues have related to the budget allocated to debt, federal 
spending cuts, the Fiscal Coordination Law and the withdrawal of revenue-sharing 
(participaciones) to the Federal District from 1999 onwards, as well as challenges over 
the Electoral Code. Five constitutional controversies were presented before the 
Supreme Court by the three centre-left state governments. Most of the controversies 
focused on fiscal issues— indeed all three PRD mayors have mounted legal challenges 
to demand a share of federal resources equal to that allocated to all other Mexican 
states.
The first controversy was presented by Cardenas against the federal Congress and 
other federal government entities including the Ministry of Finance (SHCP) opposing
85 See <http://www.iedf.org.mx/docs/electoral/EJD_RD.html>
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the presidential decree that reformed the Fiscal Coordination Law published in the 
Official Gazette on 31 December 1998 (SCJN CC 5/99, 8 March 1999). His specific 
challenge was against the presidential decision to exclude the Federal District from the 
resources given to strengthen the municipalities under budget line Ramo 33.86 
Cardenas’s successor, Rosario Robles, followed in his footsteps and presented a 
controversy against the federation (CC 11/2000) opposing the 2000 Annual Budget and 
the reform of Articles 36 and 37 of the Fiscal Coordination Law. Both claims were 
eventually dismissed for lacking legal foundation on 1 February 2001— Chief Justice 
Genaro Gongora was the only judge to defend the controversy.
Another area in which Robles used a legal recourse to challenge federal decisions was 
education. She demanded that Articles 1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16 of the General Education 
Law be ruled invalid (CC 32/2000), but her claim was dismissed (by eight votes) on 31 
May 2001. In a subsequent controversy between the federation and the Federal 
District, the Ministry of Education under the Zedillo administration argued that the 
federal government had exclusive authority to legislate over education. The process of 
decentralisation of education services had been completed in all states except for the 
Federal District. Nonetheless, Robles presented an Education Law that was approved 
by the PRD-dominated local Assembly on 8 June 2000. After more than a year of 
discussion, the Court ruled unanimously that the Legislative Assembly of the Federal 
District does indeed have constitutional powers to legislate on education (SCJN, 16 
November 2001). The eleven justices ruled that of the 188 articles contained in the 
Education Law of the Federal District, only 16 were unconstitutional while a further four 
violated certain constitutional precepts. In a divided vote, six justices ruled that Articles 
4 and 140 of the local law were constitutional which meant that pre-school services 
could be offered by the public education department.
During Lopez Obrador’s administration, a recurrent source of conflict was the 
presidential decree (Diario Oficial, 1 February 2001) on the daylight saving summer 
timetable. On 5 March 2001, the government of the Federal District presented a legal 
recourse (CC 5/2001) arguing that the federal congress is the only body constitutionally 
allowed to overrule the General System of Weights and Measures (Article 73) and 
therefore the presidential decree violated the principle of separation of powers 
contained in Article 49. L6pez Obrador went as far as to publish his own Decree on 26
86 The PRD government opposed the reform of Article 25, sections IV, 36, 37 and 38 containing 
information for local governments on resources corresponding to Ramo 33 (federal resources allocated to 
the states and municipalities as per the Fifth Chapter of the Fiscal Coordination Law, SHCP, 19 January 
1999)
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February 2001, suspending the presidential one and establishing that the Federal 
District would keep the normal timetable. The federal government countered with its 
own constitutional controversy on 30 March 2001 against the Governor of the Federal 
District, for attempting to regulate the summer timetable through an internal decree 
(SCJN, CC 8/2001). In the end, the Supreme Court ruled that both decrees were 
unconstitutional. The non-validity of the presidential decree had effect from 30 
September 2001, but only within the capital as this was the only actor that had opposed 
the decree. In its ruling, the Court argued that President Fox had misused his 
constitutional attributions as specified in Constitutional Article 89, Section I, by invading 
the congressional sphere (SCJN, Comunicado No. 444, 4 September 2001). Lopez 
Obrador applauded the ruling and expressed sympathy “for the emerging Court’s 
independence and a true separation of powers” {La Jornada, 7 September 2001: 5).
In late 2001, Lopez Obrador’s government presented another legal recourse against 
President Fox, this time for the decision to build a new terminal of Mexico City’s airport 
in Texcoco rather than in Tizayuca in the state of Hidalgo (SCJN, 3/2002). The 
presidential decision infuriated ejidatarios (communal landowners) in 13 small 
communities in the area Of Texcoco who were offered MXN 0.6 per square yard in 
compensation for their land. Most were situated in municipalities controlled by the PRD 
since 2000. Lopez Obrador argued that the federal government had failed to consult 
the local governments of the Federal District and the Estado de Mexico in a decision 
that would have a clear impact on the environmental and urban development of the 
metropolitan region. According to Article 115 of the federal constitution, planning 
policies for urban centres that belong to different states or municipalities have to be 
agreed among all the authorities involved. Lopez Obrador used this principle, together 
with another ten constitutional articles and six local laws, in his confrontation with Fox.
The height of the confrontation was a violent four-day protest in mid-July 2002 which 
ended with the ejidatarios releasing 19 hostages, some of them police officers, and the 
government promising to wait for the final resolution of the Supreme Court and even to 
reconsider the location and terms of the USD 2.3 billion construction. According to 
Sullivan (2002), “the airport battle turned into the latest cause for Mexico's combative 
collection of extreme leftists, anarchists and anti-globalisation activists, who went to 
Atenco in large numbers to protest alongside the farmers...Now they are focusing their 
efforts on the airport, taking on the government and powerful private interests who 
stand to benefit from the multibillion-dollar development in the surrounding area.” The 
truth is that the legal recourses used by the government of the Federal District, coupled
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with several amparo suits brought by peasants affected by the expropriation of their 
ejidos and controversies brought by municipalities of Texcoco, Acolman and Atenco 
(CC 1/2002, 2/02, 9/02), were able to stop, or at least prolong, the decision to build the 
new airport in a combative and extremely poor area.
Fox’s government announced on 1 August 2002 that the project would be cancelled 
and other alternatives would be sought. Although the decision was taken before the 
Court ruled on the legal recourses, there was a sense that the federal government 
stood to loose a lot more if the Court’s decision went against it. The well-regarded jurist 
Ignacio Burgoa even suggested that it was a "strategic decision, since President Fox 
knew that it was a judicial battle he had already lost, since his expropriation decree 
violated Article 115, section five” (La Jornada, 5 August 2002). The presidential 
decision was widely criticised by investors and the business sector who thought it 
showed weakness; the construction of the 11,000-acre airport was undoubtedly the 
largest public works project attempted during Fox's term in office and no one disputes 
that a new airport is necessary for Mexico City. Other commentators considered the 
decision fitting and in line with public opinion since Fox could not risk further casualties 
if stronger tactics were used to expropriate the ejido land. Again, this case is an 
example of how, in the context of increasing political pluralism and separation of 
powers, different actors are using legal routes to claim respect for specific jurisdictions 
or to politicise almost any dispute, generally among rival parties.
In terms of the new horizontal separation of powers within the Federal District, three of 
the seven PAN council leaders {jefes delegaciones) presented a constitutional 
controversy against Lopez Obrador’s government over an agreement affecting their 
public relations budget (SCJN, 1 April 2002). The agreement, published in February 
2002, established general guidelines in the areas of publicity, advertising, broadcasting 
and information, affecting all of the public entities within the Federal District (Gaceta 
Oficial, Number 17, 13 February 2002: 4). It referred to “austerity measures 
contemplated in the local Annual Budget” and established that “with the aim of 
obtaining better prices and conditions, the General Direction of Social Communication 
will concentrate and analyse the costs of services related to the areas 3601 
Advertising and institutional image expenses’ and 3602 ‘Broadcasting public services 
and information campaigns”’ (Gaceta Oficial, 2002: 5). The jefes delegacionales 
Guadalupe Morales from Delegacion Venustiano Carranza (CC 27/02), Jose Espina 
from Delegacion Benito Juarez (CC 28/02) and Francisco de Souza representing 
Delegacion Cuajimalpa (CC 29/02) argued that the measures announced by L6pez
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Obrador interfered with their jurisdictions. In their view, the new communication 
programme aims to “control, censor, restrict and manipulate the channels of 
communication between the political-administrative entities and the citizens who live 
within the territorial limits" {El Universal, Lagunas: 2 April 2002). More than a year later, 
all three claims were ruled founded as the Court highlighted the relevance of the 1996 
reform which granted the delegaciones the level of government bodies and thus the 
power to present controversies (SCJN, 4 November 2003), 
httD://www2.scin.aob.mx/iuridica/enaroses/cerrados/302/02000270.009.doc).
Other claims presented by the PAN delegaciones cover a wide variety of issues such 
as the use of partisan colours in official documents, the functioning of a secondary 
school in Colonia del Valle, and the centralisation of the administration of Chapultepec 
Park (CC 37/2000, 17 November 2000). The latter referred to document OM/2376/2000 
through which Robles’s government created the Unidad de Bosques Urbanos (Gaceta 
Oficial del DF, 23 September 1999)). The Court dismissed the case two years later 
(SCJN, 26 August 2002). Even though the claim was unfounded, the case is relevant 
since the ruling formally recognised the figure of delegado as an actor legally 
empowered to use constitutional controversies to defend the autonomy of a 
delegacion.
The local Assembly has also become an active participant in constitutional disputes. In 
2002 it filed a recourse against the local executive for not implementing the local third- 
party car insurance law (SCJN, CC 38/02). L6pez Obrador refused to implement the 
specific portion of the law that deals with fines for infractions, on the grounds that 
compulsory car insurance affects the population’s income to the benefit of insurance 
companies {Reforma, 9 July 2002). Forty local congressmen, mainly from the PAN and 
PRI, approved the decision to present a controversy against the Mexico City 
government. They were opposed by 13 PRD members and two abstentions {El 
Universal, 29 April 2002). Lopez Obrador claimed not to be surprised by this first legal 
claim presented by the Legislative Assembly against his government, since in his view 
this is the normal procedure for resolving differences between different powers in a 
democratic context. He said he would only enforce the compulsory car insurance if the 
Court instructed him to {Reforma, 14 May 2002). Once again, it was the failure to 
resolve differences through political negotiations that forced the local legislature to call 
on the Court to act as an external referee.
So far, the Court has ruled in favour of the Federal District in only one of the five 
controversies presented by different PRD governments. All of the fiscal disputes have
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been dismissed or decided in favour of the higher level of government. Given how 
short-lived the administrations of Cardenas (1997-99) and Robles (1999-2000) were, it 
was difficult for the Court to resolve the cases while the claimant was still in office. 
More recently, the Court dismissed an unconstitutional action presented by the federal 
Attorney General Rafael Macedo on 14 June 2002 against new local government 
regulations affecting the functioning of commercial establishments (Ley para el 
Funcionamiento de Establecimientos Mercantiles del Distrito Federal, approved by the 
local congress on 30 April 2002). In particular, the federal government opposed the 
new powers granted to the 16 delegaciones to shut down banks that do not guarantee 
complete security to their customers. The final vote was split: seven ministers 
supported the federal recourse arguing that the local legislative assembly was not 
empowered to legislate on security issues since this is an exclusive area of 
competence of the federal Congress. Because a minimum of eight votes is needed 
according to Article 105, the Court was not able to rule on the constitutionality of these 
reforms (SCJN, Al 12/02, 22 October 2002).
In terms of democratisation within the Federal District, although significant advances 
have been made, important issues are still being discussed in the capital and the 
federal Congress by a plurality of forces. The initiative for Political Reform of the 
Federal District was unanimously approved by the local Legislative Assembly in 
November 2001 and a month later was approved by a majority of votes in the lower 
chamber of congress. The initiative would empower the Legislative Assembly to issue 
laws and decrees, including the Income Law; to draft the Federal District’s budget; and 
to have the final say over the debt limits for annual governmental projects (Art 73, 
Fraction VIII, ALDF Initiative, November 2001). The initiative stalled in the Senate, 
however. Discussions were postponed on several occasions until the PRI Senators 
presented a counter-proposal in June 2002. One of the main objections to the initiative 
centres on the financial autonomy of the Federal District, an issue that was disputed by 
the three consecutive PRD governments via the controversies analysed in this section.
The implications of the reform initiative are wideranging and deep in terms of the 
Federal District’s fight for political autonomy. It would finally have the legal right to 
receive federal funds through the Fiscal Coordination Law, and could therefore become 
part of the Constituyente Permanente and participate formally in the National System of 
Fiscal Coordination, which includes funds allocated under the budgetary line Ramo 33. 
As I have argued, most of the legal disputes have referred to the need to include the 
Federal District in the distribution of two main federal funds: Municipal Strengthening
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(Fortamun) and Support for Social Infrastructure (FAIS). As presented in this section, it 
could be argued that political and legal pressure initiated by political pluralism is finally 
bringing to the fore issues that are crucial for the democratic consolidation process.
Conclusions
In this chapter, I have measured democratisation not only in terms of increased 
electoral competition but in terms of a greater separation of powers between levels and 
branches of government. A lack of political competitiveness and the highly centralised 
political system meant that the checks and balances contemplated in the Mexican 
federal system had largely lain dormant. However, as opposition parties started to win 
at the municipal and state levels, there was a gradual reactivation of the incipient 
system of separation of powers. With increased political, economic and even legal 
independence, municipalities began to adopt greater autonomy vis-a-vis the state 
government and the federation, and in some cases have openly begun to challenge 
their authority. The case studies analysed in this chapter show how municipalities and 
state governments are also playing a more active role in policy design and have 
become in some instances important counterweights to the executive.
Following the argument that opposition governments have been crucial in reinforcing 
an authentic federalism through the increasing use of the law, I chose to analyse in 
more detail seven states that experienced the first opposition governments at the 
municipal and state levels. The first three of the seven case study states (Baja 
California, Chihuahua and Nuevo Leon) have been governed by the PAN and are 
characterised by a bipartisan structure in which power has been shared mainly by the 
PAN and the PRI. Then I introduced three PRI-governed states that share a multi-party 
system structure at the municipal level. Particularly interesting was the case of the 
Federal District, the first to be won by the PRD and which also has a multi-party 
structure. In all these cases, I demonstrated how opposition governments have 
operated as effective counterweights to state governments and even to the federation.
In the case of the Federal District, I compared the first two governments that had an 
important majority at the local level, with the third PRD government (2000-2006) which 
faced a more divided state legislature and contains delegations that are governed by 
the opposition parties. The PRD governments have launched significant legal battles in 
defence of the autonomy of this entity. Their actions form part of a much longer
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process of democratisation within the capital. As I argued, the focus of conflicts has 
tended to be the need to strengthen the financial autonomy of the capital.
Since the 1994 reform, there does appear to have been a more visible role for the 
Supreme Court in political affairs thanks to a genuine recasting of intergovernmental 
relations and the reduction of dependence upon higher levels of authority. This has 
created new opportunities for democratisation and the emergence of true separation of 
powers. As opposed to the traditional hierarchical relation between the federal 
government and lower levels, new federalism policies facilitated the reduction of 
centralism and presidentialism by reinforcing municipal autonomy and state 
sovereignty. The process of vertical decentralisation has gradually promoted a more 
genuine balance between the three branches of government. The judiciary (since 
1994) and the legislative (since 1997) are sharing a greater role in the governing- 
process dynamics.
Yet, as was discussed in Chapter 3, the new role for the Supreme Court is not 
necessarily a more respected one. After the 1994 reform, the “apolitical” branch of 
government has been defining a number of important political processes, although as 
some of the cases above have outlined it is delineating its sphere of competence in a 
number of ways by rejecting politically-motivated legal challenges between rival parties, 
and by recusing itself from deciding on constitutional changes introduced by the federal 
and majority of local legislating bodies. The response of the Court to most political 
issues may have important implications for its own credibility and legitimacy, not to 
mention the ongoing institutionalisation process in Mexico.
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CHAPTER 5
Electoral Justice in Mexico: State Sovereignty and the Role of
Mexico’s Electoral Tribunal
“Demanding adherence to principles is, either, to accept the federal system with all its advantages and 
dangers, or to denounce it frankly and proclaim the empire of central government, granting it the power to 
correct the abuses that local authorities might commit’ Ignacio Vallarta (Gonzalez Oropeza, 2000: XXV)
The central claim of this thesis is that the empowerment of the judiciary has played a 
key part in institutionalising the democratisation process in Mexico. Much of the thesis 
has been taken up with issues to do with federalism and the resolution of constitutional 
controversies. However this chapter needs to deal with the electoral process directly. 
That is because reforming fraudulent or biased electoral practices is central to any 
credible role for the judiciary. One cannot institutionalise democracy or the rule of law 
in a democracy without public confidence in the electoral process. In the case of 
disputed elections and electoral legislation, the key arbitrating body is the Electoral 
Tribunal (TEPJF), whose role and operational behaviour is the main subject of this 
chapter.
The historic annulment of the 2000 gubernatorial elections in Tabasco set a 
fundamental precedent for electoral justice in Mexico and the role of the TEPJF in 
future federal, state and local elections. Successive constitutional reforms culminating 
with the 1996 “definitive” electoral reforms have consolidated a regime of electoral 
dispute adjudication at the federal level that gives political parties the right to appeal to 
federal authorities in state-level cases. The centralist position concentrated on the 
TEPJF and the Supreme Court of Justice in the electoral field contrasts with the trend 
under “new federalism”, which, as its architect, former President Ernesto Zedillo 
explained, was aimed at reducing excessive centralisation and presidentialism through 
the devolution of power from the federation to states and municipalities in several 
policy arenas.87
This thesis makes the claim that the effective supervision and arbitration of Mexico’s 
many election disputes, while in a certain sense centralising, was an essential part in 
the process of establishing a democracy with a significantly devolved process of 
governance. Even so, there have been criticisms made of the TEPJF to the effect that 
it has over-centralised the process of electoral arbitration and law enforcement. 
Whether or not this criticism is valid is considered again in the conclusion to this 
chapter.
87 Author interview with former President Ernesto Zedillo conducted in London in November 2001.
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Until recently, there were practically no mechanisms for reviewing the legality of local 
elections. Since parties could not legally oppose final outcomes, opposition parties 
became used to pressing for post-electoral concessions through negotiations that were 
clearly outside of any legal framework. Thus, on the one hand, the creation of the 
TEPJF was a fundamental step in the long process of electoral institutionalisation and 
has gradually become the main arena for dispute adjudication. On the other hand, 
there are also certain risks in giving this electoral institution the power to interpret legal 
criteria when ruling on subnational elections: the TEPJF is increasingly deciding a large 
number of political issues from the centre according to criteria that can be contested. 
Certain sectors have called for its powers to be limited so that in the future it can only 
rule over subnational elections based on well-defined criteria with respect for specific 
jurisdictional principles.
Throughout the discussion I refer to the concept of institutionalisation as it relates to the 
electoral courts. In doing so I follow Loaeza (2000: 104), who argues that the notions of 
liberalisation and democratisation are not useful for the Mexican case, as there was no 
need to reinstate individual (liberalisation) and civil (democratisation) rights but simply 
to expand them. In her analysis the concept of institutionalisation is more useful since it 
“captures the profound changes of electoral reforms” introduced during Mexico’s 
protracted transition.
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the evolution of electoral justice in 
Mexico, looking at the background to the TEPJF and the historical refusal of the 
judiciary to resolve electoral disputes. The incorporation of the TEPJF into the judiciary 
in 1996 was the result of an intense debate that existed throughout the past two 
centuries in Mexico over whether the Supreme Court should take part in electoral 
issues. Since then, the “apolitical” branch of government has been increasingly defining 
the way most political processes work. Enhanced competition and the pressure from 
parties to ensure more transparent elections resulted in improved administration of 
elections. However, it seems that the TEPJF is being consistently called to resolve 
matters that have no regional significance. In this context, it is crucial to assess 
opposition party compliance with electoral institutions; although electoral compliance 
has been studied by authors such as Eisenstadt (2004, 1999a; 1999b), the role of the 
TEPJF under new federalism is an important yet under-researched area.
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After analysing the 1996 reforms and the prerogatives of the new TEPJF, I will present 
an evaluation of this institution’s activities up to 2005. I reveal that there has been a 
significant increase in the number of cases challenging state court verdicts, which 
reflects a lack of confidence in electoral institutions at the subnational level. At the 
federal level, the electoral tribunals created under the PRI government have also been 
challenged in terms of their independence from the executive. Up until the 2006 
election, the opposition questioned the TEPJF’s impartiality as significant decisions still 
tended to favour the PRI regime. With alternation of power problems have persisted, 
with the PRI now also questioning the jurisdiction of the TEPJF. But rather than seek to 
identify whether there is continuing state bias, my focus in studying the recent conflicts 
in the Mexican south is to address a valid concern about the spheres of authority of 
federal institutions over subnational processes.
In the final section, I offer evidence from two crucial post-electoral conflicts, in Tabasco 
and Yucatan, which are typically identified as authoritarian enclaves (Eisenstadt, 2004; 
Lawson, 2000; Cornelius, Eisenstadt and Hindley, 1999). These case studies will help 
me explain the importance for the entire process of institutionalisation of the increasing 
use of judicial rather than political channels to resolve electoral disputes. The two 
examples also illustrate the ongoing difficulties involved in finding a legitimate balance 
between subnational autonomy and the need for impartial electoral institutions that can 
legally resolve these conflicts while operating with well-defined criteria. In fact, I show 
how after the events in the southeast, the TEPJF faced a crisis of credibility and its 
powers were finally restricted in terms of interpreting the constitutionality of electoral 
legislation.
I also look at several of the most recent rulings related to electoral matters and show 
how the Supreme Court has weakened significantly the TEPJF’s future role by 
asserting its supremacy as a constitutional court. The 1994 judicial reform explicitly 
prohibited the Supreme Court from determining the constitutionality of laws with 
respect to electoral matters. The 1996 electoral reform partially removed this limit by 
allowing electoral cases to be considered via the recently created unconstitutional 
actions. Since then, 11 unconstitutional actions have been presented before the 
Supreme Court, mainly challenging the system used to determine the distribution of 
seats. The Court first invalidated an electoral law in a September 1998 ruling on a case 
involving Quintana Roo. The final discussion of this Chapter centres on the TEPJF’s 
role in the “Amigos de Fox” and “Pemexgate” cases, and the crucial qualification of the
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closely contested 2006 presidential elections, which paved the way for the 2007 
electoral reform.
Antecedents to electoral justice in Mexico
Historically, there was a clear intention to refrain the Supreme Court from resolving 
political controversies. With the adoption of a presidential system in 1824, it was 
decided that the legislative power—the “political power par excellence”—  would be 
responsible for the make-up of Congress. Electoral Colleges were created as means to 
protect citizens’ political rights, while Article 113 granted the Supreme Court an 
incipient constitutional control of a political nature. After the short-lived 1836 Centralist 
Constitution, the debate about the Court’s role in the context of separation of powers 
gained currency. The 1847 Reform Act restored the federal system and created the 
amparo judgment, a means of constitutional control through the judicial system to 
protect individual constitutional rights at the federal level (Burgoa, 1986: 135). From 
then on, there was an increasing need to define whether the Court would resolve 
amparos that protected political and electoral rights.
At the end of the 19th century, the thesis of “incompetence of origin”, formulated under 
Chief Justice Jos§ Marfa Iglesias (1873-76), was established with the Amparo 
Morelos. However, as argued in Chapter 2, Iglesias’s position was reversed by Chief 
Justice Ignacio Vallarta (1878-82), who faced an increasing number of criticisms of the 
Court’s excessive interpretative power. Vallarta insisted on the need to depoliticise the 
Court and established that political issues were not individual rights and therefore 
should be excluded from the amparo protection at the federal level. Instead, the 
Electoral Colleges were strengthened as the proper channel for challenging the validity 
of political acts. Vallarta’s thesis of “non-intervention” by the judiciary in electoral 
conflicts delineated the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction for almost 150 years.
The 1917 Constituent Congress established the principle of “self-certification”, which 
prevailed until 1976. The principle ostensibly protected the judiciary from politicisation 
while resolving electoral conflicts but in reality served to maintain the PRI’s hegemonic 
regime since it gave the PRI-dominated Congress the power to oversee flawed 
elections. The 1917 Electoral Law gave citizens the right to ask the Congress to 
invalidate presidential elections and those of the lower house in any district. However, 
the lack of clear procedures prevented this right from being exercised. At the time, 
electoral organisational responsibility was highly decentralised at the municipal level.
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There were few restrictions on partisan activity and the registration of new candidates, 
which was reflected in the proliferation of and dominance of small regional parties.
Successive electoral reforms served to further reinforce the PRI’s position. The 
promulgation of the 1946 Federal Electoral Law (LEF) and the transformation of the 
Mexican Revolutionary Party (PRM) into the PRI, were crucial factors for the 
modernisation of the electoral system (Molinar, 1990: 24). The LEF centralised the 
organisation and supervision of federal elections in the executive, through the creation 
of the Federal Commission for Electoral Surveillance. It also extended to political 
parties the right to challenge federal electoral results, though it introduced requirements 
that made it more difficult for new parties to register (Molinar, 1991: 24). The federal 
and state-level congresses were given the authority to certify elections, while the Court 
was empowered to investigate voting irregularities. But it was the Electoral Colleges 
that determined the scope of electoral certification and these were dominated by the 
executive.
The 1946 law was clearly designed to create a national party system, without regional 
and local parties, where the President and the PRI had absolute predominance over 
the electoral competition. In order to register candidates, an organisation had to be a 
national party and demonstrate it had 30,000 members, with a minimum of 1,000 in 
each of at least two-thirds of the 31 states. This made it more difficult for new parties to 
register. While some flexibility was retained in 1946, which allowed 11 parties to 
register that year, by 1949 only three of them obtained their registration (PRI, PAN and 
PP). Subsequent reforms introduced in 1954 made it even more difficult to form 
political parties.
Political institutionalisation: towards an electoral jurisdiction
The PAN failed to present a presidential candidate in 1976 due to internal party 
problems, which seriously threatened the legitimacy of the political system. Faced with 
the prospect of running an election with no credible opponents on the one hand, and 
with the real threat of political violence from the left on the other, the government 
supported the 1977 reform which would incorporate external protest into the system, 
namely by offering a legal path to the left, without dismantling PRI hegemony (Loaeza,
1999).88 The process of political liberalisation hinged on the Federal Law on Political
88 Some earlier concessions to the opposition had been introduced with the 1963,1972 and 1973 electoral 
reforms, which were an attempt to reinvigorate the party system by guaranteeing marginal parties (PAN,
195
Organisations and Political Processes (LFOPPE), which was enacted in December 
1977. This reform marked the beginning of a process of political institutionalisation: it 
offered opportunities for opposition forces as it created a mixed representation system. 
From that point on, electoral opening proceeded gradually from above, stimulated by 
constant pressure from the opposition.
The main changes introduced by the LFOPPE were:
• A mixed representation system was created and Congress was increased to 
400 seats (300 to be elected by a simple majority of votes in single-member 
electoral districts (diputados uninominales) and 100 by proportional 
representation in party-list circumscriptions (diputados plurinominales, which 
were reserved for minority parties that won less than 60 single member 
electoral districts).
• Responsibility for party registration was moved from the Ministry of the Interior 
to the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC), which was also given the authority 
to oversee issues including public financing for parties, registration, approval of 
electoral coalitions and determining the electoral formula for proportional votes.
• Parties were made eligible for public financing and limited free access to mass 
media for election campaign spots.
In terms of the electoral justice system, the 1977 reform established the first appeal 
recourse against the Electoral College’s resolutions, although it was only available to 
political parties. Through the reform of constitutional Article 60, it was made clear that 
the Supreme Court would act as a legal tribunal and not as a political-electoral body, 
since its rulings would only have “declarative” character. It would be up to the Electoral 
Colleges to decide whether to accept the irregularities reported by the Court. The 
reform also introduced a system of administrative recourses aimed at regulating acts 
that took place prior to or on the day of the election. The number of electoral and post- 
electoral conflicts increased after the 1977 reform and the Court was recognised as the 
competent institution to resolve controversies in electoral matters. Although from 1977 
to 1986 it was the judiciary that certified congressional elections, the authority granted 
to it on electoral issues was very limited.
PPS and PARM) congressional representation at the national level through the so-called "diputados de 
partido" (party deputies). Nevertheless, none of these reforms transformed the existing parties into a 
credible opposition. The 1963 reform provided minority political parties winning more than 2.5 percent of 
the total national vote, a minimum number of deputies in Congress.
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According to Patino (1996: 72), the creation of the appeal recourse was aimed at giving 
greater objectivity to electoral results and at avoiding illegal interference by the judiciary 
in matters concerning the legislature. At this stage, a decision was taken not to involve 
the Supreme Court in political issues, since the emphasis of reform was to consolidate 
the judiciary as the legal branch of power. The Court’s involvement in certifying 
elections was deemed to be a clear violation of the principle of separation of powers. 
Yet the need for a legal resolution to electoral conflicts was clear. Support grew for a 
tribunal that would be independent of the judiciary but that could resolve electoral 
conflicts based on the law.
The Electoral Tribunal: institutionalisation from the periphery?
The economic crisis of the early 1980s altered the basic foundations of the regime’s 
legitimacy. President Miguel de la Madrid implemented a series of economic reforms 
that had political repercussions as opposition parties strengthened their presence at 
the local level. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 1984 reform of constitutional Article 115 
strengthened the municipalities’ economic and political independence by guaranteeing 
fixed revenues for public services (Rodriguez, 1997: 2). In the aftermath of the 1985 
earthquakes urban social protests peaked, together with post-electoral confrontations. 
Particularly significant were the protests organised by the 1985 gubernatorial PAN 
candidates in Nuevo Leon and Sonora against the outcome of their respective 
elections. The candidates presented complaints of electoral fraud.
A year later, Chihuahua became the centre of political tension after the opposition 
protested against electoral fraud in the 1986 state elections (Molinar, 1987). Several 
municipal candidates mobilised, while federal PAN congressmen with the support of 
some US congressmen demanded that the elections be annulled. The PAN, which in 
1986 had selected the confrontational hard-liner Luis H. Alvarez as party leader 
(Loaeza, 1999), even filed a complaint before the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights. However, the Electoral College and the Supreme Court considered that 
there was insufficient evidence of fraud.89 This experience partly explains why up until 
the mid-1990s opposition parties preferred to pursue extra-legal negotiations instead of 
using legal procedures.
89 In 1983 the PAN’s victoriesin the IV local district of Ciudad Juarez and eight municipalities were 
annulled. Two years later the PAN received confirmation that its victory in the same district had been 
annulled once again. As will be discussed, two consecutive PAN victories in Ciudad Juarez were annulled 
in 2001, which demonstrates that there has been a history of rulings against the PAN.
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It was against this background that the 1986 electoral reform was introduced, which 
expanded Congress to 500 members by adding an extra 100 proportional 
representation seats and limited the PRI to 350 members in the lower chamber. The 
Senate terms changed from concurrent with the presidential administration to semi­
concurrent, with half of the senators starting at midterm. Public subsidies to opposition 
parties were enhanced, as well as their media exposure and their participation in 
administering and supervising the electoral processes.
In terms of the electoral justice system, the most significant change introduced in 1986 
was the elimination of the appeal recourse. With the aim of avoiding judicial 
intervention, the 1987 Federal Electoral Code created the Contentious Electoral 
Tribunal (Tricoel) as an autonomous body of administrative character and independent 
of the judiciary. The Tricoel would decide appeal recourses in electoral matters and 
would have powers to invalidate the final outcome in any electoral district. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Tricoel only had administrative powers and its 
resolutions could be modified in an unchallengeable and definitive way by the Electoral 
College, which continued to be the final certifying body. The Tricoel comprised seven 
magistrates nominated by the parties and approved by congressional majority. 
However, critics argued that despite this “impartial” selection procedure, the 
magistrates’ performance during the 1988 elections was still compromised by Tricoel’s 
institutional dependence on the Electoral Colleges.90
After the controversy surrounding the 1988 election, political reform was rapidly 
accelerated under Salinas’s administration. Three different electoral reforms were 
introduced in less than five years. The 1990 reform created the Federal Electoral 
Tribunal (TFE) as an autonomous jurisdictional body whose resolutions would be 
definitive, unchallengeable and compulsory. The TFE was granted some judicial 
authority— it could resolve appeal and “nonconformity" recourses and could sanction 
parties that did not comply with its rulings— but the Electoral College could still override 
its resolutions with a two-thirds vote. The TFE judges would be nominated by the 
President, subject to congressional approval. In July 1990, the Federal Code of 
Institutions and Electoral Procedures (Cofipe) was approved. The reform also replaced 
the controversial Federal Electoral Commission, which was run directly by the Minister 
of the Interior, with autonomous entity, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), whose role 
would be to oversee federal elections. The IFE was given independent legal status and
90 Author interview with Arteaga, Mexico City, 20 May 2001.
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funding, and comprised representatives of the executive, legislature, political parties 
and the public. The legislation also enacted the “governability clause”, which 
guaranteed a majority of congressional seats to the party with the majority of votes in a 
congressional election (Alcocer, 1996), though capped the number of seats for any 
single party at 70 percent. The governablity clause was eliminated by the 1993 
reforms.
The 1993 reforms abolished the Electoral Colleges though the presidential certification 
process was not eliminated until 1996. The self-certification system was replaced and 
the authority transferred to the IFE, unless a controversy arose in which case the final 
resolution would correspond to the TFE. TFE appeals could be presented before 
appeal courts whose judges would be appointed by Congress from a list presented by 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The. 1993 reforms also created the Sa/a de 
Segunda Instancia (Second Instance Court) and extended the possible conditions for 
invalidating voting for congressional elections. This reform introduced the changes 
necessary for the TFE’s rulings to be binding and unchallengeable. Nevertheless, since 
these institutions emerged in the context of the PRI hegemonic system, their autonomy 
was severely questioned.
Zedillo’s administration and the 1996 reforms
The 1994 elections were widely hailed as marking a significant advance in the 
competitive character of the electoral system. But as soon as Ernesto Zedillo was 
inaugurated into office, the practice of conducting post-electoral negotiations outside 
the legal framework was resumed in the context of the 1994 gubernatorial elections in 
Tabasco.91 As discussed in Chapter 2, in a personal interview in November 2001 
Zedillo acknowledged that increased political pluralism leads to a greater need to 
resolve political disputes between rival parties. The rule of law would need to be 
strengthened to avoid continuous presidential interventions and the subsequent 
deterioration of the executive’s power. Meanwhile, the opposition insisted on the need 
for a truly independent electoral authority, and on 17 January 1995 an Acuerdo Politico 
Nacional was signed by the President and the four political parties that had legislative 
representation: PRI, PAN, PRD and the Workers’ Party (PT). After 18 months of
91 Eisenstadt (1999b) has argued that the poorly executed negotiation in Tabasco, in which Zedillo lost 
credibility with the local PRI and the PRD, could have contributed to Zedillo’s disdain for extra-legal 
negotiations.
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intense negotiations, an electoral reform was unanimously approved in July 1996, 
ahead of the 1997 mid-term elections.
The 1996 reform (Diario Oficial, 22 August 1996) gave IFE complete autonomy, 
whereas previously, the Interior Minister presided over the IFE General Council and
92organised the electoral process. It also put an end to a historic tradition that had 
hampered the Court’s ability to resolve electoral conflicts: the Electoral Tribunal 
(TEPJF) replaced the TFE and was integrated into the judiciary as the highest 
jurisdictional authority. Hence the “definitive” reforms determined that electoral 
differences should be resolved according to legal and non-political criteria. The main 
transformation under this reform was the extension of the TEPJF’s jurisdiction to 
include state and local elections. The states were also required to bring their own 
electoral laws into line with those at the federal level. According to Crespo (1996: 114- 
25), by 1996 all 31 states and the Federal District had Electoral Tribunals and in half of 
them Electoral College certification was replaced by judicial certification. One of the 
most important features of the 1996 reform was the introduction of direct elections for 
the authorities of the Federal District. This followed decades when the President 
appointed and removed the Regente of the City at will. The Federal District Assembly 
of Representatives created in 1987 has become the city’s Legislative Assembly (see 
Chapter 4). Other areas affected by the reforms include the representation of political 
parties in the legislature, political party financing, auditing guidelines for party financing, 
access to media, registration of national parties and electoral district boundaries.
Among the most important changes in terms of electoral justice are:
• Strengthening of the TEPJF’s structure by the creation of an Appeal Circuit (Sala
Superior) comprising seven judges and regional courts in five electoral areas
(Guadalajara, Monterrey, Distrito Federal, Xalapa and Toluca) with three judges 
each.
• Modification of the selection process for judges. The Court presents a list of
proposals to be ratified by a two-thirds Senate vote. Federal electoral judges are
given ten-year terms, while regional court judges serve eight-year terms.
92 Prior to the reforms, the Interior Ministry organised the electoral process, certified federal elections and 
handed the majority certificates to the representatives, to be ratified by the Colleges in both chambers. 
Presidential election results would be certified by Congress and there were no appeal recourses against 
their resolutions. Since 1996, there is one President Councillor, elected for a seven-year term by a two- 
thirds vote in Congress from a proposal made by the parliamentary groups. The 2007 reform reduced the 
Presidency to a six-year term with the possibility one re-election (Art 110, Cofipe 2008).
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• Modification of the presidential certification mechanism: the TEPJF is given
responsibility for computing the final results and declaring the validity of the
presidential election.
• Strengthening of the appeal recourses system for disputes over the constitutionality
and legality of electoral acts and resolutions.
• Ratification of the TEPJF’s jurisdiction to resolve definitively and irrefutably
complaints related to federal electoral issues, labour conflicts between IFE and its
public servants, and problems arising between the Court and its employees.
• Extension of the TEPJF’s responsibilities to include the definitive resolution of 
electoral constitutional revision rulings of the competent authorities to organise, 
certify and resolve complaints in subnational elections when violations of the 
Constitution have taken place, and the resolution of rulings for the protection of 
citizens’ political-electoral rights.
• Granting of exclusive powers to the Supreme Court to receive challenges about
unconstitutional acts. This is aimed primarily at potential contradictions arising
between a general regulation and the Constitution in electoral matters.
Under this new legal framework, but before secondary legislation Was in place, the 
judges of the TEPJF sent, a list of 76 candidates to the Senate for 22 new positions of 
the Appeal Circuit and regional courts. Court Judges Guillermo Ortiz Mayagoitia and 
Juventino Castro insisted that the list would ensure that the new electoral judges would 
be “judges, not politicians” (Proceso, 27 October 1996). In an “unusually fast process”, 
according to Senator Juan de Dios Castro (SCJN, 2005: 173), the Senate ratified the 
Court’s proposal on 31 December 1996 and named the seven judges who would 
comprise the Appeal Circuit until 2006.
Jos6 Luis de la Peza, the first President of the TEPJF, was responsible for conducting 
the 2000 presidential election, which is discussed below. He declined to run for re- 
election in September 2000 and Fernando Ojesto was elected in his place for the 
2000-04 period. During Ojesto’s presidency, the TEPJF annulled two gubernatorial 
elections in Tabasco (2000) and Colima (2003). As will be seen, Ojesto was severely 
criticised for statements made regarding the gubernatorial election in Tabasco and was 
forced to abstain in the case. He did, however, manage to conclude his presidency.
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Table 5.1 Electoral Tribunal judges 1996-2006
Jose Luis de la Peza 
Muftozcano 
replaced after his death 
in January 2005 by 
Jose Alejandro Luna 
Ramos 
(elected in 2005 for a 10- 
year period)
Born in Mexico City; initiated his 
judicial career in 1987.
Lawyer from Chiapas; initiated 
his judicial career in 1986.
President of the TEPJF 
(1996-2000)
De la Peza oversaw the 2000 
presidential election and 




Born in Mexico City; lawyer with 
doctoral studies; initiated his 
judicial career in 1987.
President of the TEPJF 
(2000-4)
Elected with one vote of 
difference.
Eloy Fuentes Cerda
Born in Coahuila; lawyer from 
UNAM; worked in the Federal 
District’s Tribunal Superior de 
Justicia.
President of the TEPJF 
(2004-5)
Elected in third round of a closed 
election; resigned on 28 Sep 
2005
Leonel Castillo Gonzalez
Born in Michoaccin; lawyer; 30- 
year judicial career; worked in 
the Supreme Court since 1975
President of the TEPJF 
(2005-6)
Elected by four votes in a public 
session.
Alfonsina Berta Navarro 
Hidalgo
Born in Jalisco; lawyer; first 
woman to become District 
Judge; initiated her judicial 
career in 1970.
Jos6 de Jesds Orozco 
Martinez
Born in Mexico City; lawyer, with 
masters from UCLA.
Mauro Miguel Reyes 
Zapata
Born in Puebla; lawyer; initiated 
his judicial career in 1975.
In 2004 Eloy Fuentes became the TEPJF’s president in a very closed election but he 
resigned before the 2006 presidential election to be replaced by Leonel Castillo. 
Several reasons were suggested for his resignation, including disagreements with the 
Supreme Court, his opposition to the election of 13 regional court judges and even 
corruption scandals {El Universal, La Jornada, October 2005). It was certainly the case 
that in its first decade the Electoral Tribunal faced challenges in terms of its legitimacy 
and future credibility. Its impartiality was severely questioned in the tightly run 2006 
election and its final resolution gave rise to doubts over the future interpretation of 
electoral annulment claims (Alanis, 24 October 2009). Another electoral reform was 
approved in 2007 to address some of these issues and the electoral institutions 
survived this critical moment.
Only three months after the 2006 election, the Supreme Court sent the Senate a list of 
18 candidates for the new Electoral Tribunal. On 31 October 2006 in a unanimous vote 
the Senate approved the first five new judges who currently comprise the TEPJF. After
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some debate, the sixth judge was confirmed as Jos6 Luna Ramos who would serve a 
full term rather than just the time remaining of his predecessor De la Peza’s term. Two 
weeks later the Senate elected the final judge, Pedro Esteban Penagos.
This new Electoral Tribunal elected Flavio Galvan as its fifth president in a closed 
meeting, rather than in a public session as had been done previously. Galvan resigned 
nine months later, ostensibly due to “health problems”, though at the time one of his 
advisors, Norma Aguilar, was facing corruption charges. Galvan stayed on as a judge 
but Mari Carmen Alanis replaced him as Court President. Several media reports 
criticised the decision since it was taken in a closed session (Cantu, Proceso, 5 August 
2007), but Alanis rejected any suspicions about her election since the “decision was 
unanimous."93
Table 5.2 Electoral Tribunal judges (2006-15)
Marla del Carmen Alanis President 
8 August 2007
Lawyer from UNAM with a Masters from 
the London School of Economics.
Flavio Galvan Rivera President 
6-Nov-2006 until 
6 August 2007
Lawyer from UNAM with Masters and 
PhD from UNAM. Judge since 1990.
Manuel Gonzalez 
Oropeza
Lawyer from, UNAM with Masters from 




Oaxaca-born lawyer from the 
Autonomous University of Oaxaca. 




Mexico-City born lawyer with PhD from 
Complutense University of Madrid.
Jos6 Alejandro Luna 
Ramos 
(elected in 2005)
Chiapas-born and -educated lawyer 
whose judicial career began in 1968.
Pedro Esteban Penagos 
L6pez
Chiapas-born lawyer with PhD from the 
Universidad Panamericana; judge since 
1987.
In sum, there was resistance to the incorporation of the TEPJF into the judiciary due to 
the historical tradition of not involving the judiciary power in political issues. As will be 
seen in this chapter in the specific case of the TEPJF, but has been analysed for the 
broader judiciary in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, the “apolitical” branch of government is 
playing a major role in defining the way most political conflicts are resolved. This is 
obviously good news in terms of the process of institutionalisation, but brings with it 
new challenges for the electoral institutions because the way in which they respond to
93 Author interview with Mari Carmen Alanis, 11 August 2007, Mexico City.
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political issues has implications for their own legitimacy and credibility. In the following 
section I present an overall evaluation of the TEPJF’s performance up to 2005, before 
discussing in more detail two crucial post-electoral conflicts that demonstrate the 
interplay of the actors’ interests in the context of political pluralism.
Evaluating the TEPJF
During the first TEPJF period, November 1996 to September 2000, the Court received 
a total of 11,096 complaints, of which 99 percent were resolved (11,001). Of this total, 
only 620 related to complaints against IFE rulings by political parties or associations, a 
marked decrease on the period before the electoral reform; 1,526 such recourses were 
presented in the 1994 elections. In contrast, the constitutional revision of the acts and 
resolutions of local authorities increased considerably after 1996. In less than four 
years, the Appeals Circuit received more than 1,000 complaints while more than 400 
electoral constitutional revision cases were presented in 2000 alone. These figures 
show how this type of recourse has gained in popularity, but they also reflect the lack of 
autonomy of electoral institutions at the subnational level. In 1997, of 220 cases 
challenging state court rulings, 36 altered state decisions and in the most significant
94cases local elections were annulled, as is analysed below.
Between November 1999 and September 2000 a total of 2,182 appeal recourses were 
presented, of which more than 75 percent (1,668 cases) corresponded to electoral 
opposition at the federal level. Only 514 challenged acts and resolutions of local 
authorities, and IFE labour issues. The most frequent complainant during this period 
was the PRI, which presented 190 recourses, followed by the PRD (122) and the PAN 
(93). Different coalitions presented 154 recourses and 1,448 were presented by 
individual citizens (TEPJF, 2000). More than 9,000 cases were presented to protect 
citizens’ political rights, related mainly to the electoral register and the issuing of voter 
identification cards.
94 Up until 1997, the TEPJF had annulled PRI victories in the municipalities of Tepetlaoxtoc, Estado de 
Mexico; Santa Catarina, San Luis; and Aconchi, Sonora. Other cases of constitutional revision reversed a 
PRI victory in Uriangato, Guanajuato and altered the city council composition in Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon. 
In terms of gubernatorial elections, the TEPJF ruled that some of the PRD’s complaints regarding 
Campeche’s Tribunal had been improperly resolved, but that these were not decisive for the outcome of 
the election.
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86 102 55 21,775
2008 3,326 296 265 1 5 62 4,067
2007 2,585 662 117 0 0 102 3,507
2006
*
2,441 534 97 495 52 37 3 ,7 4 5
2005 918 281 80 0 0 23 1,335
2004 1,001 551 77 0 3 36 1,702
2003 684 552 145 132 63 30 1,657
2002 1,184 239 55 0 0 22 1,518
2001 142 457 70 0 0 29 736
2000 1,453 529 60 112 44 26 2,275
1999 43 289 44 0 0 52 440
1998 109 285 24 0 0 56 487
1997 7,543 215 42 194 73 59 8,138
1996 5 6 9 0 90 3 36
TOT 35,241 5,739 1,744 1,020 342 592 51,418
Source: Electoral Tribunal Reports. Data confirmed on 22 December 2009 with the help of Gabriela P6rez 
Suarez and Jesus Gerardo Toache from the Electoral Tribunal.
The power to intervene in subnational elections was a significant achievement for the 
TEPJF. Yet while the 1996 reform has served to eliminate major post-electoral 
mobilisations given that the TEPJF is being used as a forum for dispute adjudication, 
not all actors have completely accepted the TEPJF’s jurisdiction or consider it to be 
absolutely impartial. Following problematic elections in Tabasco and Yucatan, the 
Supreme Court announced seven new jurisprudential theses confirming the TEPJF’s 
role as the ultimate body for resolving electoral disputes. In April 2001, following its 
intervention in the Yucatan elections, the Supreme Court confirmed that no local 
Congress has the power to annul TEPJF rulings (SCJN, 9 April 2001).
A number of jurists and political actors have expressed concern over the lack of 
specific regulations for resolving regional conflicts. The TEPJF’s rulings challenge state 
electoral institutions that might indeed be biased towards a state government, but that 
above all require more autonomy and professionalisation. Several actors have 
expressed a lack of confidence in local authorities and expect greater impartiality from 
the federal institution. Consecutive biased rulings by local authorities clearly render the 
process for the TEPJF more difficult, since they put the Court under pressure to concur 
with their rulings. This vicious cycle has reinforced the centralisation of power in the
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TEPJF. Moreover, the constitutional interpretation technique used by the TEPJF in 
Tabasco, discussed below, could give it authority to determine a considerable number 
of local electoral criteria, thereby involving it in political cases (Cosslo, 2001: 5). 
Indeed, only a year after reinforcing the TEPJF’s role, “the Supreme Court stepped in 
to clarify the position of the TEPJF by determining that the Supreme Court itself would 
have the final say in electoral matters. This consolidated the Supreme Court’s position 
as a Constitutional Tribunal, but may well have displaced some of the pressure on the 
TEPJF, leaving the Supreme Court to shoulder criticisms of undermining subnational 
authority or of playing politics in future election disputes” (SCJN, Contradiccibn de 
Tesis 2/2000, 23 May 2002).
Since the PRI lost the majority in Congress in the 2000 election, it has replaced the 
other opposition parties as the most frequent complainant, and has begun to express 
strong dissatisfaction with the TEPJF’s powers. In the PRI’s view, the TEPJF has 
exceeded its authority in subnational electoral processes. Particularly vociferous in 
their criticism were local PRI grandees Mario Villanueva in Quintana Roo, Roberto 
Madrazo in Tabasco and Victor Cervera in Yucatan, who have championed federalism 
and sovereignty. Although their views are undermined somewhat by the fact that they 
come from PRI fiefdoms where authoritarian control is exercised and federal 
intervention is considered a threat, the criticisms against the TEPJF’s partiality have 
resonated with observers at the national level and in academic circles.
According to Corrochano (2001), the TEPJF was not widely known or trusted during 
the 2000 elections. It faced a challenging moment in the run-up to the 2000 election 
when PAN candidate Vicente Fox challenged a TEPJF ruling rejecting his request to 
allow his photo to be used with the party's logo on the ballot (SUP-RAP-038-41-43/99). 
The ruling went against a previous agreement among IFE councillors that there was no 
constitutional prohibition against any candidate to use his photo. IFE electoral 
councillor Emilio Zebadua felt that the TEPJF ruling revealed a bias because the law 
does not forbid a party from including a photo of a candidate in its logo (Proceso, 16 
January 2000). Fox obeyed the ruling, but not before accusing the Electoral Court of 
“marranadas” (playing dirty). TEPJF President De la Peza denied the accusations of 
bias and argued that putting a photo of any candidate on a ballot paper was 
inappropriate since the party transcends the candidate.
This was not the only occasion in which the TEPJF was criticised for supposed bias 
towards the PRI regime. Zebadua and his fellow electoral councillor Jaime Cbrdenas
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accused the TEPJF of inconsistency in six rulings, including the TEPJF decision— in 
favour of the PRI—to dissolve a special commission created by the IFE to receive 
complaints of fraud during the 1997 elections.95
A similar source of contention was the TEPJF ruling against the PAN in a dispute over 
the majority in the 2000 Federal District legislature, a decision the party accepted but 
also strongly criticised. In a surprise ruling carried by five of the seven judges, the 
TEPJF revoked the “governability clause” which gave the party holding the largest 
minority of seats sufficient addition seats so that they would control an absolute 
majority in the legislature. The governability clause had been granted by the IFE and 
Federal District Tribunal to the Alliance for Change (the PAN-PVEM coalition in the 
2000 elections). The TEPJF reallocated 26 plurinominal (proportional representation) 
seats which gave the PRI 11 more deputies in the local assembly (IEDF, September
2000).
The President of the TEPJF was critical of both parties to the dispute, Fox and Mexico 
City Mayor Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador of the PRD. He pointed to a lack of judicial 
culture within political parties “that tend to remain mute while there is a convenient 
resolution but immediately disqualify the TEPJF if it affects its interests” {La Jornada, 
21 September 2000). In the same article he did, however, acknowledge that the TEPJF 
“has not achieved the credibility required and still has weaknesses.”
Vicente Fox’s victory in 2000 helped to raise expectations that the electoral institutions 
and the judiciary would play an impartial role in the process of democratic 
consolidation. In the first months of 2001, attention centred on elections in Tabasco 
and Yucatan, which are discussed in detail below. Another case to attract broad 
scrutiny was the PRI’s legal challenge in the 2000 gubernatorial election in Jalisco. The 
PAN had governed the state since 1995 and its candidate, Francisco Ramirez, won by 
a tight margin. The PRI accused the PAN state government of serious irregularities 
including printing more ballot papers than needed for the election, failing to properly 
protect electoral material, destroying the excess ballots and considerable errors in a 
number of polls. The PRI filed a constitutional review case before the TEPJF calling on 
it to annul the elections, having filed an unsuccessful recourse before the local tribunal 
opposing the votes cast in 1,792 polls (nonconformity judgment JIN-050/2000-I and 
reconsideration recourse REC-025/2001-S filed in November 2000). One month later,
95 Autor interview with Jaime Cardenas, former IFE Electoral Councillor, 13 July 2005, Mexico City.
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on 26 February 20001, the TEPJF issued its ruling annulling the votes received in 43 
polls, but confirming Jalisco’s Tribunal ruling overall, and therefore the PAN’s victory. 
This prompted outrage among PRI supporters. Senators from different parties criticised 
Judge Ojesto’s handling of the case, though at the same time attempted to disqualify 
the PRI allegations as “imprudent and inconvenient” (Senado de la Republica, Boletln 
de Prensa 48,18 July 2001).
Given the significance of events in Tabasco and Yucatan, I will analyse the TEPJF’s 
role in these cases in more detail, as well as the responses of the parties and local 
authorities involved. The cases not only help to explain the importance of increasing 
use of judicial rather than political channels for resolving electoral disputes, but also 
highlight the dilemma facing the TEPJF under new federalism and increasing political 
pluralism. They show how important it was for the TEPJF to clearly define its 
jurisdiction so that its impartiality would be recognised in future electoral processes. 
The Supreme Court’s clarification of its supremacy as a constitutional tribunal will 
eventually involve this institution in more electoral disputes when TEPJF decisions are 
contested on the grounds that constitutional interpretation is needed.
The historic annulment of the gubernatorial elections in Tabasco
The TEPJF’s decision to annul the October 2000 gubernatorial election in Tabasco on 
the grounds that irregularities had benefited the PRI, constituted a crucial precedent for 
the history of electoral justice in Mexico. It was the first time that a major election had 
been overturned and that the TEPJF had ruled against the final results of a 
gubernatorial election in any state. The unprecedented ruling deprived the struggling 
PRI of the only governorship it had won in the 18 months since losing the 2000 general 
election. It generated uncertainty in the state and posed an early challenge for 
President Fox’s administration since the ruling was announced only two days before 
the new governor was due to take office (SUP-JRC-487/2000, 29 December 2000).
The oil-rich state on the Gulf of Mexico has traditionally been a loyal PRI stronghold. 
Until the 1980s, the PRI had high voter support. The PRD became the strongest 
challenger, especially under the leadership of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, who ran 
as the centre-left coalition National Democratic Front (FDN) and PRD gubernatorial 
candidate in 1988 against the PRI’s Salvador Neme. Neme won by a landslide and 
L6pez Obrador alleged massive electoral fraud. In 1991, the PRD again felt it had been 
the victim of fraud in at least three municipalities and at the start of the following year
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Lopez Obrador led a protest march to Mexico City. The Salinas administration, which 
was in the middle of negotiations over the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
offered a political resolution, which represented a victory for Lopez Obrador.
The Tabasco gubernatorial election of 1994 was again the scene of controversy. Lopez 
Obrador ran for the second time as PRD candidate, against the son of a popular former 
PRI governor, Carlos Madrazo. Official results came out just days before Ernesto 
Zedillo’s inauguration: the PRI was confirmed to have won with 57 percent of the vote, 
against 39 percent for the PRD. Several political actors accused the PRI of extensive 
fraud and exorbitant levels of campaign spending. The case was prosecuted before the 
Supreme Court and a complaint documenting illegal campaign spending was filed 
before the federal Attorney General’s Office. The Court ruled that campaign spending 
was an internal state matter and so fell outside of its jurisdiction, but it did validate the 
Attorney General’s investigations, which confirmed that illegal campaign spending had 
taken place (CC 11/95 / CC 33/97). When Madrazo was found innocent in Tabasco, 
the federal government remained “respectful” of state decisions. The case failed to 
progress, even after when Santiago Creel launched impeachment proceedings against 
Madrazo in Congress in 1998 on the basis of an independent report in 1995 that 
ratified serious irregularities.
The PRD presented several nonconformity recourses before Tabasco’s Electoral 
Tribunal (TET) but most were rejected on technical grounds. Frustrated by the failure of 
their multiple legal challenges, the PRD organised another mass demonstration, which 
resulted in the first major crisis for Zedillo’s government. There were early indications 
that Madrazo would be sacrificed, but the local PRI rebelled. According to Eisenstadt 
(1999b: 270), “the fact that Zedillo was not the instrumental force in determining who 
would serve as governor of Tabasco could be [...] viewed as a successful application of 
‘new federalism’.” However, the more likely interpretation, he adds, is that Madrazo’s 
continuation in power demonstrated a failure of the federal government to uphold the 
rule of law.
Six years later, new gubernatorial elections in Tabasco attracted a similar degree of 
scepticism, even though this time Lopez Obrador would not be contending. The race 
was won by the PRI, but by a mere 8,000 votes. The opposition challenged the 
outcome and called on the TET to annul the elections. The PAN claimed that in most 
districts electoral documentation had been opened without any justification. The PRD 
denounced that irregularities were registered in 682 ballot boxes (SUP-JRC-487/2000,
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29 December 2000, p.3). The opposition’s claims were strengthened when some of the 
documentation relating to the election was discovered to have been destroyed. 
Although the TET recognised irregularities in some ballot boxes, the state electoral 
institution (IET) handed the confirmation of majority certificates to PRI candidate 
Manuel Andrade, at the same time as the TET ratified the PRI’s victory in October 
2000.
Table 5.4 Elections in Tabasco (1994-2001)
Candidates Parties Gov 
2001* 
(5 Aug)
Parties Gov 2000 
(15 Oct)
















































TOTAL 711,794 TOTAL 659,875 592,773 517,498
The PRD and the PAN strongly rejected this resolution and presented separate cases 
of constitutional revision before the TEPJF (SUP-JRC-487/2000 and SUP-JRC- 
489/2000). The impartiality of the TEPJF in the case was called into question when 
Judge Fernando Ojesto told a reporter that “to his knowledge, there have not been 
serious irregularities in Tabasco’s election” (Reforma, 28 October 2000). Ojesto based 
his remarks on the fact that external observers had not reported irregularities. The 
general secretary of the PAN, Jorge Ocejo, demanded that Ojesto step down as the 
TEPJF’s president (La Jornada, 29 October 2000) and subsequently both the PRI and 
the PRD presented impeachment procedures against Ojesto on the grounds of his lack 
of professionalism and impartiality (La Cronica, 17 July 2001; La Jornada, 14 
November 2000). Ojesto sent a letter to a national newspaper denying that he had 
made the statements (Reforma, 31 October 2000), but he was nonetheless forced to 
abstain from the final vote.
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One of Ojesto’s advisors argued that the situation reflected internal conflicts among 
electoral magistrates and the way the TEPJF was handling its administration and 
resources.96 Although he recognises that Ojesto’s declarations were inappropriate, he 
believes the response was disproportionate and clearly affected the institution’s image. 
In fact, some interviewees who asked to remain anonymous say that Ojesto was close 
to resigning but, due to the support of a couple of judges and his respect for the 
institution, he decided to remain in post though would not stand for a second period.
The TEPJF’s ruling was controversial: of the six judges remaining, four voted in favour 
and two against annulling the elections. Those in favour argued that irregularities had 
marred the balloting and that the majority certificates given to Andrade should be 
revoked. The annulment ruling was constructed using several precepts of the 
Constitution, the local laws and the Electoral Code, and concluded that an election can 
only be democratic if it satisfies certain principles. The ruling indicated that the electoral 
organisation had been inequitable, since the two local television channels gave 
excessive airtime to the PRI (86.9 percent against 13 percent for the opposition); and 
that 65 percent of the electoral documents had been opened without authorisation 
(SUP-JRC-487/2000, 29 December 2000). The TEPJF referred in its ruling to Article 86 
of the Ley General del Sistema de Medios de Impugnacidn en Materia Electoral 
(General Law of the System of Means of Challenging Electoral Issues), which allows a 
"general evaluation" of the entire electoral process as it relates to constitutional 
principles and international treaties that guarantee the freedom to vote. Although this 
criterion is not illegitimate, it affords the court a large degree of discretionary power 
when considering specific situations.
Indeed, the ruling in Tabasco set a crucial precedent for the history of electoral justice, 
because it established diverse criteria including the “abstract cause for annulment”, 
which has subsequently been used by the Court. For an abstract cause for annulment 
to exist, the Court must deem two of the following electoral principles to have been 
clearly violated: free, authentic and periodic elections; universal, free, secret and direct 
suffrage; equitable political party financing; organisation of elections by a public and 
autonomous body; certainty, legality, independence! impartiality and objectivity as the 
guiding principles of the election; equitable media access for political parties; and 
monitoring of the constitutionality and legality of electoral acts and resolutions. As will 
be seen, PRD candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, who lost the 2006 presidential
96 Author interview with Arturo Martin del Campo, Advisor to Electoral Magistrate Fernando Ojesto, 13 
August 2009, Mexico City.
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election, relied largely on the precedents set in this case, specifically the “abstract 
cause for annulment”, in his quest for a vote-by-vote recount and the possible 
annulment of the presidential election.
The TEPJF ordered the state legislature to name an interim governor who would call a 
new election within six months. The PRI’s immediate reaction was to criticise the 
TEPJF for bowing to political pressure. The party’s main argument—which echoed the 
findings of the local electoral court—was that the annulment procedure for 
gubernatorial elections does not exist in the local Constitution; only municipal and 
relative majority congressional results could be annulled. The PRI argued that with this 
ruling the TEPJF was acting against the state’s autonomy. The state Tribunal argued 
that Article 281 of the state’s electoral code does not consider the possibility of 
annulling gubernatorial elections, but only municipal and relative-majority congressional 
results. Moreover, it argued, it was odd that the TEPJF would annul the gubernatorial 
election while confirming the results at the municipal and congressional level, which 
were held the same day and could have involved the same irregularities. However, the 
TEPJF decided to interpret Articles 278 and 329 of the state electoral code (CEE) as 
though they were consistent with Article 116, section IV of the Constitution (Cosslo,
2001) which refers to the guiding electoral principles of certainty, impartiality, 
independence, legality and objectivity.
The government of Tabasco finally accepted the TEPJF’s ruling rather than break with 
constitutional order. The outgoing PRI-dominated state legislature approved an interim 
governor, Enrique Priego, but also introduced an amendment to the local constitutional 
to delay calling new elections. Just one day after the ruling, however, the legislature 
gave Priego 18 months in office, and not the six months that were established in the 
local Constitution and by the TEPJF.07 After these events, the debate centred on the 
fact that Priego had not resigned from his position as federal congressman, and so the 
new and almost evenly divided state legislature was given the right to name a new 
candidate, Ad6n Lopez, for interim governor. For a short time there were two rival 
appointed governors, supported by the different halves of the divided the legislature, 
until L6pez declined to be sworn in arguing that he preferred a negotiated solution.
At this point, both the PRD and the PRI presented different recourses before the 
Supreme Court. The PRD called for Priego to be impeached and presented an
97 By reforming the local Constitution, the period within which the interim governor had to call for new 
elections was suppressed. Before Madrazo’s administration ended, the president of the state electoral 
tribunal was also replaced. His position could have been crucial in the extreme case that powers in 
Tabasco were dissolved, because he would have become the interim governor.
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“unconstitutional action" to annul the reforms that had been approved by the state 
legislature. The PRI challenged the TEPJF and threatened to initiate impeachment 
procedures against the four judges who had annulled the elections. Among the PRI 
heavyweights involved in the debate was Senator Manuel Bartlett who said serious 
mistakes had been made during the LVI Legislature that created the TEPJF, as it left 
“judicial vacuums” that judges are now using arbitrarily against the rule of law.98 The 
new state legislature was inaugurated in the absence of opposition deputies. As PRI 
representatives ratified Priego as governor, there was fear that instability could break 
out again. On 10 January 2001, the PRI, PAN and PRD reached an agreement to hold 
“special” elections on 11 November, with the inauguration ceremony taking place on 
January 2002. The agreement included the renewal of the council and the state 
Tribunal.
Two months later, the Supreme Court resolved the PRD’s recourse against the local 
congress and former governor Madrazo. The Court ruled that the reform extending the 
period for calling the next election was valid, but ordered that a new date be set of no 
later than September. After a prolonged silence and only one day before the TEPJF’s 
deadline, the congress approved an election date of 5 August 2001. The situation 
seemed to be in order until governor Priego suddenly changed the inauguration date, 
with the backing of congress. This caused concern at the federal level, because it 
indicated that problems in Tabasco were not over.
The PRD retained Raul Ojeda as its gubernatorial candidate in the rerun of the 
election, but the PAN decided to select its own candidate rather than join forces with 
the PRD." The PRI benefited from the split within the opposition, winning by a margin 
of less than 5 percent (14,794 votes).100 The PRD (via its Alliance for Change) once 
again challenged the results, but the state tribunal rejected its nonconformity recourses 
on 30 August, and the TEPJF confirmed its ruling (SUP-JRC-201/2001, 8 October
98 Author interview, 7 February 2001, London.
99 Of the 200 local delegates, 108 voted to select their own candidate, 64 for an alliance and 5 abstained. 
This result was ratified by the national PAN Committee, mainly by Senator Juan Rodriguez Pratts, who did 
not support an alliance with the PRD. According to Granados Chapa, on 8 February Andrade revealed 
conversations with the ex PRI member Pratts to “act jointly in this process, with one or different 
candidates" {Reforma, 2 April 2001). With four votes in favour and one against, the state Tribunal 
cancelled the PVEM’s participation in the alliance, and the PRD only registered with the PT (29 May 2001).
100 Some sources suggested that the federal government was not keen to recognise another PRD 
governor in L6pez Obrador’s territory, especially after his combative attitude from the Federal District. An 
article in La Jornada criticised Andrade’s declaration: “It would be worrying to give Tabasco to L6pez 
Obrador...just imagine, having the capital and the most important oil-state (Astillero, 17 June 2001). The 
Ministry of the Interior denied suggestions that there was a pact between the executive and actors in 
Tabasco {Reforma, 2 August 2001).
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2001). This put a legal end to the post-electoral conflict. It could be suggested that not 
even with federal intervention was the PRD strong enough to defeat the local PRI 
forces.
In the context of “new federalism" it is crucial to acknowledge that there is tension 
between the drive to end discretionary federal intervention in state affairs, and the 
recognition that there is still a significant gap between federal and subnational 
institutionalisation. Mexico needs to abide by established legal procedures. Yet, the 
credibility of an electoral institution is not only dependent on compliance with its 
resolutions, but also on the impartiality and quality of its rulings, based on well-defined 
legal criteria agreed by the main political actors. In many ways, this case set an 
important precedent for the Supreme Court to impose a “lock" on future TEPJF 
decisions, a move that will not only increase the Supreme Court’s responsibilities but 
will involve it in more political cases.
The sovereignty of Yucatan
The southern state of Yucatan has long been a hotbed of resentment against the 
centralisation of power. A secessionist movement developed in the state in the 
nineteenth century, and after the revolution the state company Henequeros de 
Yucatan, the Socialist Party of the Southeast (PSS) and other local trade unions 
became the organisational pillars of hegemonic political control in Yucatan (Ramirez, 
1993: 83). This local structure of political competition was transformed in the 1950s 
when the federal government dismantled the PSS and integrated it with the PRI. After 
that Yucatan became one of many PRI strongholds, with a long history of strong 
political bosses.
Demands for federal intervention began in the 1950s when the PAN strengthened its
position in Yucatan. In 1958, PAN leaders claimed that the government had stolen the
local elections and protests in the capital Merida left three party supporters dead
(Mabry, 1973: 60). Acting under political pressure, the Electoral College recognised six
101PAN federal congressional victories, including the district of Merida, the state capital. 
Almost a decade later, in the 1967 municipal elections, PAN candidate Victor Correa 
won the capital. Correa, who became the first opposition gubernatorial candidate in
101 After Adolfo Christlieb’s presidency (1962-68), the PAN was modernised and secularised and adopted 
a policy of dialogue with the government. The 1963 reform opened some spaces for opposition 
representation in Congress with the adoption of the party deputy system. The Federal Electoral Law was 
also modified along the lines suggested by the PAN, mainly around the issue of electoral transparency. At 
the end of the 1970s, the PAN called for a deeper democratisation process involving proportional 
representation for all electoral bodies.
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1969, took advantage of a divided local PRI and criticised corruption abuses by 
previous governments (Poot, 1994: 185). According to Mabry (1973: 84) and Ramirez 
(1993: 84), there was abundant evidence to support the case that the PRI stole the 
1969 election. Immediately after the polls closed, the PRI candidate, Carlos Loret, 
announced his victory by a 90 percent margin. The PAN suffered an internal crisis as 
several regional committees demanded that the party’s national leaders reconsider 
participation in the 1970 election given the extent of the supposed fraud.
The PAN did not regain the state capital for another two decades, when the four main 
opposition parties formed an alliance. A new legal framework was used in the 1990 
elections, following changes to the federal electoral law, but post-electoral conflicts 
worsened as the local Congress, acting as Electoral College, annulled the results in 
four municipalities due to serious irregularities. According to Poot (1994: 204), the 
regional PRI resented the attitude imposed by the party’s central office; Governor 
Victor Manzanilla stated that the citizens of Yucatan were above the PRI. In the end 
PAN candidate Ana Rosa Payan, who had won the first federal district in Yucatan in 
1988, became the second opposition municipal president in the capital by a margin of 
less than 750 votes against the PRI. None of the PAN candidates won in the local 
congress, which gave rise to suspicions that negotiations had taken place with the 
federal government to only recognise the PAN victory in Merida (Garrido, 1990). The 
President forced Governor Manzanilla to resign in February 1991. He was replaced by 
Senator Dulce Marfa Sauri (Ramirez, 1993, p.85). Two years later, the 1993 local 
elections were also closely contested and followed by post-electoral conflicts. These 
disputes were resolved outside of legal channels with the main aim of preserving 
political equilibrium at the national level (Prud’homme, 1999: 357).
The PAN called once again for federal intervention to resolve severe irregularities in 
the 1995 gubernatorial election. The party accused Victor Cervera Pacheco—who was
acting as interim governor when he decided to run as the PRI candidate in 1995— of
102offering bribes and rigging the state’s electoral institutions.
A second serious dispute arose at the end of Cervera’s second term (1995-2001), this 
time over the nomination of the state electoral council members. In August 2000, the
102 Cervera acted as interim governor from 1984 to 1988 to conclude Graciliano Alpuche’s administration 
after his resignation. The PAN strongly criticised Zedillo’s government for “allowing" Cervera to run as the 
PRI candidate. Since then, Cervera was in the spotlight as he won the elections by more than 22,000 
votes against the PAN candidate Luis Correa; opposition parties reported several irregularities and insisted 
on federal intervention.
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PRI-controlled local congress reappointed the same council members to organise and 
monitor the gubernatorial election of 27 May 2001. The opposition strongly criticised 
the nomination procedure and presented a formal complaint before the TEPJF on the 
grounds that the reappointment had been done by simple majority (15 of 25 
congressmen) and not by the qualified four-fifths majority established in Article 86 of 
the local code. The TEPJF ruled that the appointments were invalid because not all of 
the nominated candidates had been considered. Two subsequent legislative 
manoeuvres were also ruled invalid (Electoral Tribunal, Boletines de Prensa No. 
62/2000, No. 66/2000, No. 67/2000, 15 November, 11 and 13 December 2000). At this 
point, the TEPJF dismissed the entire local council and selected a new panel from 
nominees proposed by different parties and civic organisations. Congress approved the 
selection, but the PRI majority suddenly refused to comply with the TEPJF ruling. 
Instead, the PRI supported the dissolved electoral council, whose members reinstalled 
themselves in office. Cervera kept a low profile in the conflict by deferring most issues 
to the legislative leaders that he controlled, though he did openly confront the TEPJF 
for violating state sovereignty.
In 2001, Cervera announced the publication of Decree 400, approved by the legislature 
(Diario Oficial, 5 January 2001), authorising the old council to use MXN 40 million to 
organise the elections. PRI leaders in Yucatan refused to recognise the new council. 
The head of the legislative commission on the matter, Myrna Hoyos of the PRI, stated 
that "the TEPJF was created to guarantee impartiality, but in Yucatan it has been 
openly partial in defending the interests of the PAN and the PRD...For us, this order is 
legally nonexistent" (Proceso, 17 December 2000). Up until March 2001, the two 
councils co-existed and neither was working to organise the election. To make matters 
worse, the PAN candidate, Patricio Patron, registered himself with the TEPJF’s council,
103while the PRI candidate, Orlando Paredes, did so before the old council.
In view of the ruling in Tabasco and the dispute in Yucatan, an important section of the 
PRI elite, including 17 state governors, openly opposed the TEPJF for violating state 
sovereignty. The governors took out an advertisement in several newspapers on 6 
January 2001 emphasising the need for an authentic federalism and criticising the 
TEPJF for using discretional rather than legal procedures in Tabasco and Yucatan.
103 Former mayor of M6rida, Patricio Patron, came second in the 2000 senate race, trailing the PRI by just 
one percentage point. The PRD National Council approved support for Patr6n. Paredes was nominated as 
the PRI candidate in a complicated session, where the move to present him as a "unity candidate" was 
rejected. He won by only 21 votes against Carlos Sobrino (author interview with Gaspar Quintal, 1 March 
2003).
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They proposed reforms to eliminate scope for discretion in electoral matters. The PRI 
presented Congress with an initiative to limit the TEPJF’s powers, calling the institution 
“an instrument of Fox’s government” (La Jornada, 18 February 2001). The PRI’s aim 
was to establish a clear prohibition of the TEPJF’s role in future local elections (Gaceta 
Parlamentaria, 15 February 2001).
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At the start of 2001, the PRD presented another revision judgment before the TEPJF to 
demand the use of public force. Three months of theoretical deadlock followed, with the 
TEPFJ wanting to hold off on determining whether this would be necessary and 
President Fox—who had said he would not intervene in state matters— urging local 
authorities to obey the ruling. Meanwhile local authorities reiterated their view that 
federal insistence that they recognise the council selected by the TEPJF constituted a 
serious violation to Yucatan’s sovereignty. According to jurists Burgoa and Raul 
Carrancci, the federal institution exceeded its authority by rejecting a council that has to 
be elected by the local congress (Burgoa, 2001). Moreover, since the PRD’s complaint 
did not indicate that any violation had taken place against the Constitution but rather 
against judicial aspects of the local law, the state congress was not obliged to accept 
the TEPJF’s ruling. In their opinion, the Tabasco ruling was valid— although it could be 
argued it was badly defended— but in the case of Yucatan it was completely invalid as 
it attacked “Yucatan’s democratic institutions” (Burgoa, 2001).
217
As the “new” deadline imposed by the TEPJF expired, the Attorney General’s office 
(PGR) began a formal investigation of the matter. The PGR summoned Cervera to 
explain why state authorities had disobeyed the final ruling. The TEPJF demanded that 
his administration hand over the facilities, economic resources and official 
documentation that would allow the elections to be organised. At the same time, local 
PAN congressmen presented an impeachment process against Cervera and 14 PRI 
legislators. After weeks of uncertainty, Cervera presented a bill to reform Yucatan’s 
Electoral Code (Diario de Yucatan, 9 March 2001). He proposed that both councils be 
merged i nto one 14-member “supercouncil” for this one occasion and that the elections 
be postponed by three weeks.104 The PRI congressional majority approved the council, 
but the opposition disapproved, calling the “supercouncil” unconstitutional. The TEPJF 
judges strongly criticised this reform, as it did not comply with their final resolution. 
Nevertheless, no federal position was taken and this resolution was temporarily 
abandoned until the Supreme Court issued its final ruling. While the Fox government 
was paralysed in its decision between stronger federal intervention or “respecting” state 
sovereignty, it was the “apolitical” branch of government that became involved once 
again in a crucial decision to put an end to post-electoral conflicts in this state.
On 7 April 2001, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that Cervera’s initiative was 
unconstitutional, and ratified the council appointed by the TEPJF (SCJN, Al 18, 19 and 
20/2001). The judges offered three main reasons for their decision: 1) the initiative 
created a council with 14 members, which could result in draws in important 
resolutions; 2) it was extemporaneous, because the “supercouncil” was created less 
than 90 days before the election; and 3) the “supercouncil” was approved by the votes 
of 15 local PRI congressmen, while the law requires at least 20. The Court ordered the 
rebellious local officials to accept the TEPJF’s terms for the election. Cervera said he 
would respect the Court’s decision, but he minimised it by adding that his government 
would analyse whether it contained more political than legal ingredients (Reforma, 10 
April 2001). According to Supreme Court Justice Olga Sanchez Cordero, the ruling in 
Yucatan was one of the most significant in any of the unconstitutional actions dealt with 
by the Court to date.105
104 Author interview with Gaspar Quintal, M6rida, Yucatan,. 1 March 2003.
105 Author interview with Justice Olga Sanchez Cordero, Mexico City, 4 December 2009.
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Despite the confusion, the gubernatorial elections took place rather peacefully on 27 
May.106 The victory of the opposition candidate was confirmed the same day of the 
election. With a difference of 52,940 votes (8 percent), Patron was declared the first 
PAN governor, ending the long PRI dominance in the state (See Table 5.6).107 PRI 
local members did not accept the official results and Paredes presented a complaint 
before the local Tribunal. The complaint was unsuccessful and so a similar complaint 
was later filed before a higher state court and the TEPJF.
Table 5.6 Gubernatorial election, Yucatan, 27 May 2001
Candidates Political parties Valid votes %
Patricio Patron Laviada PAN 
PRD, PT, PVEM
355,280 53.51%
Orlando Paredes Lara PRI 302,340 45.54%
Jose Eduardo Pacheco Duran PCD 4,207 0.63%
Erick Eduardo Rosado Puerto PAS 563 0.08%
Francisco Kantun Ek PAY 1,475 0.22%
663,865 100
Source: Consejo Electoral del Estado de Yucatan
The events in Yucatan led to serious instability in the region. As both cases have 
shown, there is indeed a dilemma in allowing a federal institution to intervene with 
broad criteria in subnational processes. As Eisenstadt (1999b: 288) has argued, “new 
federalism was supposed to end discretionary federal interventions in local affairs, not 
to end federal monitoring of state governors", especially with traditional governors that 
continue to take electoral matters into their own hands. I have tried to demonstrate that 
these local authorities have not challenged the TEPJF in isolation, as other actors were 
also concerned about the need to regulate the future role of this institution. In order for 
the institutionalisation process to continue, the law must be allowed to prevail. It is 
crucial therefore that the main actors recognise the judiciary’s impartiality and 
professionalism in dealing with sensitive political issues in order to keep complying with 
their decisions through proper legal mechanisms.
106 Author interviews with Paulino Canul, Gabriel Peniche and Gaspar Quintal in M6rida, Yucatan, 1 March 
2003.
107 It has been argued that the ‘PAN phenomenon’ in Yucatan, and especially in Merida, has to be 
understood also as reflecting public opinion (interviewees in Yucatan, 1 March 2003). Although according 
to Ramirez (1993: 85) work with the local PAN political base had been poor, the political programme was 
confused and there was a lack of charismatic leaders, the Diario de Yucat&n played an important role in 
strengthening the PAN. In his view, the newspaper was high quality and adopted a critical position against 
the PRI state government. Patrbn became the eleventh PAN candidate to win a governorship.
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Recent electoral rulings and the future role of the Supreme Court
Following its involvement in Tabasco and Yucatan, the TEPJF was involved in deciding 
a third important case, the 2001 municipal elections in Chihuahua. On two consecutive 
occasions, the local tribunal annulled the results in Ciudad Juarez, a municipality that 
had been governed by the PAN for three consecutive periods. On 8 October 2001, the 
TEPJF confirmed the first local tribunal’s ruling and annulled the PAN victory (SUP-JRC- 
196/2001). Two days later, a PRI-dominated municipal council took control of Ciudad 
Juarez temporarily, with responsibility for organising the extraordinary elections on 12 
May 2002. PRI candidate Roberto Barraza, who was supported by a coalition of 
parties, ran for the second time against the PAN’s Jose Delgado. More than 10,000 
PRI votes were annulled, giving victory to the PAN with 139,859 votes, against 
137,674. The annulment of these crucial votes infuriated PRI supporters who 
presented a second complaint before the TEPJF (Diario de Juarez, 15 May 2002).
On 7 July 2002, the local tribunal annulled the PAN’s victory for the second time. PAN 
members strongly criticised this decision arguing that it was partisan and had been 
orchestrated by Chihuahua’s PRI governor, Patricio Martinez (Calderon, 2002). PAN 
president Luis Felipe Bravo Mena even argued that “it is clear that Martinez’s 
government has not been able to guarantee the correct functioning of democratic 
institutions, nor the rule of law...The democratic future not only in this region but also in 
the country is worrying” {El Universal, 11 July 2002). What started as a legal problem 
ended with civil resistance movements, causing serious political instability in the region. 
A day before the final ruling was announced PAN secretary general Manuel Espino 
warned about the high risk of social rebellion in the state and referred to Martinez as an 
authoritarian governor (Diario de Juarez, 24 July 2002).
The PRI meanwhile accused the PAN of deliberately stirring up trouble to put pressure 
on the TEPJE to rule in its favour (Milenio, 24 July 2002).108 Once again the TEPJF had 
the last word; it overturned the decision of the local tribunal and ratified unanimously 
the PAN victory (24 July 2002). Delgado was inaugurated into office by a margin of just 
2,229 votes.
PRI members gave assurances that they would abide by this ruling, but nevertheless 
continued to argue that the situation of social unrest created by the PAN had influenced
108 Also author interview with Jesus Aguilar Bueno, PRI federal congressman (2003-06) from Chihuahua 
and from the SNTE (Teachers Union), 2 October 2003, Mexico City.
220
the federal institution. Barraza warned about the risk of judicial authorities giving in to 
pressures from the political parties:
The political risk is that Mexico's electoral system should lend itself to such 
frauds and give weight to political pressures and blackmailing ... those of us 
who do not agree with the actions of an authority figure could go and carry 
out our own lynch-mob version of justice or exercise violence in order to 
demand our rights, and then we would reach a point where the social 
stability of our country is at risk” (Reforma, 25 July 2002)
It was not only PRI members, but also political commentators who maintained that the 
TEPJF had ceded to political pressures (Fernandez, 25 July 2002; Cansino, 28 July
2002). In the final analysis, in spite of all of the improvements and money that has been 
spent on reinforcing the electoral system, in mid-2003 there was still a lack of trust in 
the impartiality of the TEPJF. Yet, most actors did abide by the institution’s rulings.
In October 2003, the TEPJF annulled the second PRI gubernatorial victory, this time in 
the state of Colima, on the grounds that the outgoing governor had intervened in the 
election of his successor. In a divided decision (four votes to three), the Tribunal 
anulled the PRI victory and requested that the local congress call an extraordinary 
election within a two-month period. Among the irregularities highlighted in judge 
Orozco’s ruling were statements made in the media by the outgoing governor against 
the PRD and PAN candidates, his failure to respect the state’s 25 day pre-election 
freeze on campaigning and his active participation in the PRI candidate’s closing 
campaign event.
Table 5.7 Elections annulled by the TEPJ F (1996-2005)
Year Municipality / State Type of election





































































Source: Created by the author using data available from the TEPJF
In 2004, the Electoral Tribunal refused to accede to the PRI’s request that it void the 
local election in the capital of Yucatan, Merida because the winning PAN nominee 
allegedly benefited from the expenditure of money from the Federal Disaster Fund. 
Also that year, the Tribunal reversed a state electoral court ruling that had voided a 
PAN victory by a mere 12-vote margin over the PRI candidate in the municipal election 
in Chochola, Yucatan.
In sum, these cases demonstrate the potential impact of electoral institutions and the 
judiciary on the fragile process of democratic consolidation. Despite significant 
advances in the TEPJF’s role, events in the southeast and in Ciudad Juarez cast a 
shadow over is reputation as an impartial electoral justice system that resists political 
pressures. Indeed if the TEPJF’s rulings— in theory definitive— are not recognised and 
followed, the institutional framework could be profoundly affected. In any case, there is 
considerable improvement since in the past disputes like these would have been 
resolved by presidential fiat.
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“Amigos de Fox” and “Pemexgate”
In this section I refer to a crucial feature of the TEPJF’s new role in the 
institutionalisation process: the regulation of political party and campaign financing. In 
August 2001, the TEPJF revoked an IFE resolution (CG79/2001) related to allegations 
by the PRI and the PRD that Vicente Fox’s coalition accepted illegal foreign 
contributions during the 2000 campaign (SUP-RAP- 050/2001, 7 May 2002). The 
allegation was first made on 22 June 2000 by Senator Enrique Jackson, who accused 
the Alliance for Change of receiving illegal resources from abroad for Fox’s campaign. 
By showing photocopies of cheques used in Mexico and the United States, as well as 
bank statements of the Belgian company Dehydratation Technologies, Jackson even 
suggested a possible link with money laundering. The next day, the PRI representative 
at the IFE, Jaime Vazquez, presented a formal complaint (Q-CFRPAP 19/00) against 
the PAN and the Alliance for Change for violations of the Cofipe (IFE, 23 June 2000). 
The PRD also presented various complaints against the Alliance for Change. A year 
later, the IFE Fiscal Commission dismissed the PRD and PRI claims (26 July 2001).
The TEPJF ruled that IFE should reopen the investigation. This caused tension with the 
federal government as Francisco Gil Diaz, then Finance Secretary, argued: “it is not 
clear for us how to deal with ‘banking secrecy’, although parties are willing to open their 
archives.”109 TEPJF judge Leonel Castillo argued that ’’banking secrecy” should not 
apply to the electoral institution’s examination of the budget assigned to political parties 
(Reforma, 8 May 2002), even though several of the “Friends of Fox” had won amparo 
suits to protect their “banking secrecy”. They included Lino Korrodi (702/2002), Carlota 
Robinson (972/2002) and Carlos Rojas (1066/2002). The IFE presented a series of 
recourses before the TEPJF criticising the amparos, but the electoral judges ruled 
unanimously that although IFE’s case was “partially founded” the Tribunal could not 
force district judges to revoke the amparos, nor could it declare the decisions invalid 
(TEPJF, 25 September 2002). In March 2003, Eduardo Fernandez, the ex president of 
the Banking and Securities Commission (CNBV), was detained by the Attorney 
General’s office, "for the possible violation of banking secrecy in relation to Lino 
Korrodi’s denunciations of 6 June 2002" (La Jornada, 5 March 2003).
Once again, criticisms were levied at the TEPJF that it was exceeding its constitutional 
attributions by ordering the IFE to reopen the case, particularly since there had been a 
violation of Article 17 which requires political parties claiming electoral results to 
present a previous written complaint. Juan de Dios Castro, judicial advisor to President
109 Author interview with Francisco Gil Diaz, 16 May 2002, London.
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Fox, argued that the TEPJF had invaded the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, though he 
did acknowledge that the IFE was constitutionally recognised (Art 41) to carry out the 
investigation (Reforma, 11 June 2002).
The other campaign financing case of note was Pemexgate, which involved an 
investigation launched by the federal government into the possible use of public 
resources from the state oil monopoly by the PRI for its 2000 campaign. The Pemex 
labour union was alleged to have illegally funnelled MXN 120 million (USD 13 million) 
to Franciscd Labastida’s campaign. Gil Diaz highlighted the significance of the IFE 
ruling that any person could access the financial statements of political parties from 17 
July 2002.110 This resolution was confirmed by the TEPJF on 19 June 2002, after the 
newspaper Reforma demanded access to the PRI’s file (Granados Chapa, 24 June
2002).
Although this represented a significant step forward in terms of transparency of party 
financing, the TEPJF had to resolve further recourses to force the CNBV to hand over 
bank records relating to the campaigns of the PAN and PRI in 2000; banking officials 
had refused to release these records, arguing that investigators had overstepped their 
authority by asking for too much information. On 14 March 2003, the IFE fined the PRI 
a historic MXN 1 trillion (USD 92 million) (Q-CFRPAP01/02 PRD VS PRI). The PRI 
filed a formal complaint against the resolution before the TEPJF (SUP-RAP-018/2003). 
Two months later the TEPJF confirmed the fine imposed, by four votes to three. The 
opponents of the ruling, TEPJF President Ojesto and judges Fuentes and Navarro, 
criticised the IFE Fiscal Commission, arguing that there was not enough evidence that 
MXN 500 million had reached the PRI. The PRI was vocal in criticising the divided 
Tribunal, the IFE and the interior minister, but eventually accepted the Tribunal’s ruling, 
no doubt to ease the political situation ahead of the July 2003 election (El Universal, 14 
May 2003).
While these two cases were attracting political attention, the Supreme Court took a 
decision that consolidated its role as a constitutional court: it ruled, in a case about the 
distribution of proportional representation seats that the TEPJF cannot interpret the 
constitutionality of the electoral legislation (23 May 2002).111 The ruling put an end to 
the uncertainties that had prevailed since the 1996 reform regarding which institution
110 Author interview with Francisco Gil Diaz, 16 May 2002, London.
111 Nine Court Ministers dismissed a 'thesis contradiction’ (2/2000) while revising the recourse SUP-JRC- 
209/99 and the unconstitutional action 6/98. This was a dispute between the different interpretations of the 
Court and the TEPJF.
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would have the final word in electoral matters. However, it also prompted criticisms 
about the politicisation of the Supreme Court. According to IFE electoral councillor Jose 
Barragan, “this move could affect the Court’s main role: its impartiality” {La Jornada, 19 
August 2002). In his view, the Court ruling “almost killed the TEPJF” even though 
constitutional Article 99, paragraph 5 clearly grants the Tribunal the power to decide on 
the unconstitutionality of a specific act or resolution related to electoral matters.
The ban on the TEPJF from ruling in cases related to the constitutionality of local and 
federal laws and regulations has clear implications for the future roles of both the 
Electoral Tribunal and the Supreme Court. It was clear that many actors preferred 
having the highest level of justice resolving electoral disputes, but this meant that the 
Supreme Court became more involved in a number of political and electoral issues as 
the TEPJF started to reject ruling on cases dealing with constitutional matters. On 19 
August 2002 the TEPJF refused to examine a recourse presented by the civil society 
grouping Cambio Ciudadano calling on it to review the validity of a part of the Cofipe. 
This was the first time in its six years of existence that the Electoral Tribunal was 
unable to rule on a specific case dealing with political rights due to the “lock” imposed 
by the Supreme Court in May 2002.
It was the Supreme Court that, as the highest level of the justice system, was going to 
have once again the last word on the amparo suits (discussed earlier) granted to the 
“Friends of Fox” by two federal judges. On 29 July 2002 the judges had suspended 
definitively the investigation of the financial contributions to the 2000 campaign, 
sparking outrage among different sectors, including IFE electoral councillors Jaime 
Cardenas and Jos§ Barragan, who criticised the judiciary “for not respecting the 
Constitution, as it clearly specifies in its Article 41, paragraph 4, that no amparo can be 
granted in electoral matters.”112 In a surprising move announced on 7 April 2003, the 
Friends of Fox decided to give IFE all of the information related to the 2000 campaign 
and confirmed they had contributed MXN 125 million to it (Miguel Angel Granados 
Chapa, ‘La eficacia del dinero’ in Reforma, 8 April 2003). Six months later, the General 
Council of the IFE resolved that the Alliance for Change had not only exceeded 
campaign spending limits, but had received donations that were never reported. The 
PAN was fined MXN 360 million, while the PVEM was fined MXN 184 million (IFE, 10 
October 2003).
112 Author interview with Jaime Cardenas, July 2005. La Jornada, 16 and 18 August 2002.
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2006 presidential election
According to ali interviewees who eventually worked in the Electoral Tribunal (Acuna; 
Perez-Suarez; Zuckerman, 13 August 2006), one of the most difficult moments for this 
institution was certifying the results of the closely contested 2006 presidential election. 
For the first time in Mexican history, the margin between the winner and runner up was 
little more than 250,000 votes. The IFE declared the preliminary winner to be PAN 
candidate Felipe Calderon with 15,000,284 votes. Immediately afterwards the 
candidate of the "For the Good of All" coalition, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador 
(14,756,350 votes), cried "fraud" and announced he would challenge the electoral 
results before the TEPJF.
Lopez Obrador's lawyers prepared an 826-page brief of alleged illegal actions taken 
before, during, and after the 2006 presidential election. In his quest for a vote-by-vote 
recount and the possible annulment of the election, Lopez Obrador relied largely on the 
precedents set in cases where the TEPJF had invoked the “abstract cause for 
annulment”, first set in the Tabasco ruling discussed above. His arguments against the 
election results centred on the fact that there was no PRD councilor on the IFE’s 
General Council; that President Fox, whom he derides as a “traitor to democracy,” 
violated the prohibition on participating in political campaigns by blatantly promoting 
Calderon’s candidacy while at the same time openly criticising the PRD candidate; that 
the IFE manipulated the preliminary results (Programa de Resultados Preliminares, 
PREP) to assist Calderon; and that errors had marred the results in 72,197 voting 
stations.
Table 5.8 2006 presidential election results (IFE-TEPJF)
Candidate IFE’s result TEPJF
Party / Coalition 5 September 2006
Felipe Calder6n 15,000,284 14,916, 927
PAN 35.89% 35.9%
Roberto Madrazo 9,301,441 9,237,000
PRI-PVEM 22.26% 22.2%





TOTAL VO TES 41,557,430
Source: TEPJF (2006) 'Aprueba Sala Superior del TEPJF, dictamen relativo al compute final de la 
eleccidn de Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,’ Boletin de Prensa No 081/2006, 5 September.
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In the end, the Electoral Tribunal did recount some 9 percent of all ballot boxes, 
annulling a total of 234,574 votes and rendering a final tally of 41,557,430 votes. The 
TEPJF subtracted 80,601 votes from Calderon’s total, 75,355 from Lopez Obrador’s 
total and 62,235 votes from Madrazo’s total, which gave victory to the PAN with only a 
233,831-vote margin.
L6pez Obrador warned that he would not respect TEPJF's judgment unless the body 
declared him the winner. Meanwhile, PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo, who finished a 
distant third, announced that he would support the TEPJF's verdict. The seven 
electoral court judges voted unanimously to confirm Calderon’s victory, though they did 
acknowledge certain irregularities in the electoral process, including the “inappropriate 
intervention” of President Vicente Fox (TEPJF, 5 September 2006). According to 
Eisenstadt and Poire (2006), while none of the vote annulment claims made by Lopez 
Obrador were backed by reliable evidence, he did raise valid questions about the 
credibility of the election.
The 2006 presidential electoral and legal outcomes reflect the type of democratisation 
that Mexico has experienced throughout the past decades: democratisation within 
institutions. Even though the election was extremely close, the results were challenged 
through political and legal channels, the electoral institutions were criticised and the 
losing party went as far as to form a “parallel government”, all parties did eventually 
abide by the resolutions of the electoral institutions. These institutions withstood an 
extremely difficult moment in the country’s political history and emerged as strong 
pillars of the Mexican political system. The next elections to be overseen by the IFE 
and TEPJF were the 2009 mid-term elections, which took place within the framework of 
electoral reforms approved in 2007, discussed briefly below.
2007 electoral reform
A comprehensive electoral reform was ushered in on 13 November 2007 as a reaction 
to the widely criticised 2006 presidential elections. The reform involved eight 
constitutional amendments, which were supported by all three major parties and 
passed fairly quickly without much debate in Congress.113 In January 2008 a new 
Cofipe entered into law and by July 2008 the Organic Law of the Judicial Power of the
113 The reform was approved in the lower chamber by 408 votes in favour, 33 against and nine 
abstentions, while in the Senate the vote was 110-11 in favour. The PVEM and Convergencia objected to 
some of the amendments because, in their view, they favoured the three main parties at the expense of 
smaller ones.
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Federation and the General Law on the System of Means of Challenging Electoral 
Issues were also reformed.
The 2007 electoral reform contained two key changes: a ban on individuals, 
candidates, political parties and other interest groups from buying political 
advertisements on radio and television, and the restructuring of the IFE. In terms of 
advertising, the following was introduced:
• IFE is given sole control over the administration of radio and television 
campaign advertisements;
• Each broadcaster has to give 48 minutes per day to the IFE, 30 percent of 
which is to be distributed equally among the parties with the remaining 70 
percent allocated in line with each party’s vote in the previous federal election;
• A constitutional prohibition of negative advertisements;
• Presidential campaigns are now limited to 90 days and mid-term elections to 60 
days.
In terms of the IFE, the reform called for the wholesale replacement of the electoral 
councillors, headed by Luis Carlos Ugalde. Indeed, although the 2007 electoral reform 
represented important advances in relevant topics for future democratic consolidation 
in Mexico, most interviewees coincided that the new law would erode IFE’s 
independence.
Overall, the main changes that had an effect on the electoral justice were:
• Annulment of elections
• Internal party democracy
• Validation of elections
• Judicial Career
• Supremacy of the Constitution over all other laws, in cases where there are 
contradictions between the laws
• Authority to exert jurisdiction over election disputes
Conclusions
The 1996 reforms reversed almost 150 years of Vallarta’s thesis of non-intervention by 
the judiciary in electoral conflicts. Up until then, local PRI elites were generally able to 
influence state electoral courts. The TEPJF has now been granted the power to review 
cases that have been resolved at the subnational level and opposition parties have 
started to follow legal procedures rather than accepting the concessions won in political 
negotiations, which maintained their aspirations of sharing power. Even though the 
cases studied in this chapter reveal a tendency to question the impartiality of the 
TEPJF, most actors are following the formal electoral complaint process and in the end 
are abiding by judicial rulings.
228
Over the past decade, the TEPJF has received hundreds of local and state appeals 
and for the first time reversed a PRI victory in the 2000 gubernatorial election in 
Tabasco. The TEPJF also reversed a number of municipal victories and thus finally put 
an end to extra-legal negotiations as a means of settling post-electoral conflicts by 
becoming the final instance venue for resolving such cases through the proper 
institutional channels. The historical intention that the judiciary should remain the 
“apolitical branch” of government has proved difficult to fulfil, however, as the Court is 
increasingly defining the way most political processes work. In Tabasco and Yucatan, 
the Supreme Court had to intervene to resolve local electoral conflicts. Moreover, in 
issuing rulings related to the financing of the 2000 presidential campaigns, the 
Supreme Court ended with the uncertainties that had prevailed since the 1996 reform 
regarding which institution would have the last word in electoral matters as it ratified its 
supremacy as a Constitutional Tribunal.
The 1996 reforms also forced the states to bring their own electoral laws into line with 
those at the federal level. Nevertheless, there are still evident gaps at the subnational 
level. In 2002 there were important disputes over local tribunal rulings, as the case of 
Ciudad Juarez clearly exemplified. Strong local electoral institutions are indeed 
essential for new federalism, as electoral differences emerge with increasing 
competitiveness. In this scenario, it is important to acknowledge that not all actors have 
completely accepted the TEPJF’s jurisdiction and absolute impartiality, and have 
repeatedly taken their cases to the Supreme Court. The post-electoral disputes in 
Yucatan and Tabasco fed concern about the lack of specific regulation to resolve post- 
electoral conflicts at the subnational level. If “new federalism” implies giving local and 
state governments the autonomy to govern themselves for the most part, it is crucial 
that specific jurisdictional principles accepted by the main political actors are respected, 
and that federal rulings are based on the law and not subject to political pressures.
After the events in the southeast, the TEPJF faced a crisis of credibility and its powers 
were finally limited in terms of interpreting the constitutionality of electoral legislation. 
On the one hand, it is positive that electoral processes no longer have to be just 
transparent, but also equitable. However, there is still a long way to go to 
professionalise public institutions, particularly at the subnational level. The judiciary has 
promoted professionalisation of the judicial career, but it remains to be seen what will 
come of the Court’s increasing involvement in electoral matters, particularly in terms of 
state and local elections. In the end, credible enforcement institutions are crucial for the
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development of a political system based on rule of law. The TEPJF will continue to play 
a fundamental role in the institutionalisation process, but undoubtedly it will be the 
Supreme Court that has the last word in an increasing number of electoral and non- 
electoral cases. This situation could introduce new problems for an institution that for 
most of the past century played a passive role. The positive aspect to highlight is that 
after the 2006 election concern has been focused not only on guaranteeing electoral 
transparency, but also on achieving an active horizontal and vertical separation of 
powers with political actors preferring to follow legal channels rather than the extra- 
legal negotiations characteristic of the authoritarian regime.
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CONCLUSIONS
Two analytical threads run through this thesis. One concerns federalisation as part of 
the process of democratic institutionalisation in Mexico. The other is about the 
increased separation of powers over the past few decades, specifically the enhanced 
independence and autonomy of the judiciary. It is where these threads entwine that my 
thesis has focused. As political parties gained ground at the local level, helped by a 
process of political negotiation that contributed to recurrent electoral reforms, they were 
able to use the Courts to leverage their demands for greater political and fiscal 
resources from an authoritarian and highly presidentialist federal government. This 
deepened the process of federalisation and it is this twin dynamic that I refer to as 
judicially-created federalism; the pivotal year for this process was 1994.
While no one doubts the profundity of the impact of Mexico’s 1994 judicial reform in 
terms of revitalising the judiciary, there are conflicting views about the motivations 
behind it and its relevance to broader political trends in the country. The architect of the 
reform, former President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), made clear in a personal 
interview in 2001 as I was beginning this project, that federalism of political decision­
making powers was the main driver of his reform. Although important— and certainly at 
the top of the agendas of international agencies involved in institutional design 
throughout Latin America at the time—the primary aim was not to underpin economic 
reforms or reduce public insecurity. Others, whom I interviewed, doubt Zedillo’s long­
sightedness: in retrospect, they contend, the reforms were the most important ever to 
have affected the judiciary and have had the effect of deepening federalism, but the 
latter may have been by accident rather than design.
The 1994 reforms introduced many changes aimed at strengthening the independence 
of the judiciary and expanding its competencies via the introduction or enhancement of 
judicial review mechanisms, namely amparos, constitutional controversies and 
constitutional acts. My thesis has focused on one of the modifications introduced by the 
1994 reform: the extension to the Federal District and the municipalities of the authority 
to file constitutional controversies against other branches and level of government 
before the Supreme Court. By telescoping in on this single aspect of the reform it 
becomes clear that the reforms have served to drive a federalism agenda from the 
bottom up. As Jacqueline Martinez, Supreme Court Director of Research, succinctly 
put it, whereas “the principal client of unconstitutional acts has been the Attorney
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General’s Office and business in the case of amparos”, the main clients of 
constitutional controversies have been municipalities.114
In terms of horizontal separation of powers, too, the Supreme Court is playing a crucial 
role as it gains confidence in its relatively newfound autonomy. Three historic rulings 
went against the President of the Republic; against Zedillo over the Fobaproa bank 
rescue and against former President Fox (2000-06) in cases involving electricity 
deregulation and a tax on a section of the soft-drinks industry. The Court was also 
called into disputes between the legislature and the executive over the budget. These 
were cases with deep repercussions for the country’s economic and political standing 
internationally.
Fiscal versus political federalism: which is in the driving seat?
Whereas a number of scholars argue that fiscal federalism is the key to driving the 
separation of horizontal and vertical powers, the evidence from my study of 
constitutional controversies supports arguments made by Riker (1964) that federalism 
of political power is the most important variable for defining the nature of a federal 
system. Although I would argue that it is difficult to disentangle the processes of fiscal 
and political devolution of power in the context of democratisation in Mexico in the 
1980s and 1990s, the latter substantiated the former.
My detailed study of constitutional controversies filed in seven case study states 
reveals that a large number of constitutional controversies involved disputes over the 
allocation of public (fiscal) resources. Most were filed by municipal governments 
against higher levels of government (the state or the federal government) and most 
were unsuccessful. There are some notable exceptions, however. The Supreme Court 
found in favour of the municipalities in the following cases: Soledad de Graciano 
Sanchez (CC 3/01), Tecamac (327/01), Mexicali (CC 35/02), Juarez (47/04), Ahumada 
(45/2005). In a few other controversies the Court partially found in favour of the 
municipalities but not over the central challenge, e.g. San Nicolas de los Garza 
(CC 18/97) Puebla (CC 4/98 and 6/98) and Zapopan (CC22/00).
There are a number of ways in which the treatment by the Supreme Court of fiscal 
cases is consistent with the treatment of conflicts involving other types of jurisdictional 
disputes between different levels and branches of government. Among the main
114 Author interview with Jacqueline Martinez, Mexico City, 24 November 2009.
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empirical findings from my analysis of the constitutional controversies filed in the period 
1995-2005 is that some 80 percent were between municipalities and state 
governments or local congresses, with fewer against the federal government. In most 
cases the Supreme Court did not issue a ruling, whether because the cases were 
considered not well founded, because the complainant withdrew or for technical 
reasons.
During the period under review it took an average of 400 days to resolve each 
controversy (see Annex 1, which includes the dates when each controversy was 
presented and resolved). Up until 1998 only 6 percent of constitutional controversies 
were successful, but since 2001 the Supreme Court has ruled in favour of the claimant 
in an increasing number. In only a very few cases did the lower level of government 
prevail against a higher level of government (typically municipality vs. state or, less 
commonly the federal government). It is notable that the founded cases tend to be over 
territorial conflicts, the responsibility of public servants or planning issues. The Court 
found in favour of the complainant in very few cases of real significance. This might be 
in part because controversies presented by federal powers or by governors tend to 
attract media attention and are treated differently by the Court, with more care taken 
over the ruling.
In terms of the political parties involved in the constitutional controversies in the sample 
states, the majority were filed between government bodies controlled by different 
political parties, but the Supreme Court dismissed many of them on the grounds that 
they were politically motivated. Of those cases that the Supreme Court decided to hear, 
I could not identify any bias towards a particular party or any increased probability that 
the case would be successful when the complainant and defendant were from the 
same or different political parties. A large number of controversies over the period in 
question were filed by the opposition to PRI state and national governments. The 
centre-right PAN—the first opposition party to experience the responsibility of local and 
state government— has been particularly active in taking legal action to defend political 
and jurisdictional disputes.
A high number were presented by northern states (Nuevo Leon, Sonora, Tamulipas, 
Chihuahua and Baja California), most commonly by opposition-governed municipalities 
against the state and federal government in diverse areas. According to Justice 
Sanchez Cordero, constitutional controversies are “for us [in the Court], a thermometer
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of the governability that exists in each state.”115 As can be seen in table 3.5, Oaxaca is 
the state where the highest number of controversies has been presented in the period 
in question, even without considering the more than 300 controversies that were filed 
against the indigenous reform (these are included in Annex 1). One case that drew 
particular attention from the media and specialist commentators was that involving the 
repression of teacher protests and political and social unrest in May 2006-January 
2007 and July 2008. After two days of deliberations, on 14 October 2009 the Court 
made public its ruling that Oaxaca state governor Ulises Ruiz Ortiz is culpable for the 
human rights violations that occurred.
My conclusion that the Supreme Court rulings over constitutional controversies and 
fiscal challenges in particular have tended to favour the higher authorities and that the 
political affiliation of the parties involved does not appear to affect the outcome of the 
case, runs counter to Magaloni and Sanchez’s (2006: 6) thesis that Justices appointed 
to the new Supreme Court in 1995 are closer in the policy space to the PRI than to the 
“opposition parties”. While I agree that the 1995 election was carried out by a Senate 
with a significant PRI majority, by 2004 three new Supreme Court Justices had been 
proposed by President Vicente Fox and ratified by a PRI-dominated Senate (Jose 
Ram6n Cossio, November 2003; Margarita Luna Ramos, February 2004 and Sergio 
Vails, October 2004). Moreover, in 2006, when President Felipe Calderon had just 
assumed office, another new justice was elected (Fernando Franco, 13 December 
2006). By the end of 2009 two more justices were proposed by President Felipe 
Calderon and ratified by the Senate without too much trouble, which means six of the 
eleven justices will have been proposed by PAN presidents. If it is true that the Court 
has a preference to rule in favour of its appointer, the Court would have shown a 
different trend in its resolutions since 2004.
I argue that it is not only political fragmentation that has given the Court the confidence 
to fulfil its role as Mexico’s arbiter on constitutional matters. It has actively sought to 
build political support through strategies to build credibility among opposition parties 
rather than the population at large. More recently, in an effort to appeal to the general 
public, the Court has increased its levels of transparency by televising its sessions and 
publishing hearings and case notes on the Internet, especially in controversial cases.
115 Author interview with Justice Sanchez Cordero, 24 November 2009, Mexico City.
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Although my analysis of constitutional controversies does not look at the decisions of 
individual judges, my original database did include this information. I also cite a recent 
study that shows that the proportion of divided Supreme Court rulings has increased 
since 2000 and more significantly since 2005. This trend could be explained due to the 
changing composition of the Court, as well its greater transparency.. The public nature 
of hearings means that justices cannot hide the direction of their vote and the 
argumentation behind it, especially in controversial cases that attract media attention.
Horizontal separation of powers: the oxygen of fragmentation
A number of the constitutional controversies I analyse involve competing branches at 
the same level of power, most significantly the federal legislature and executive. In 
2001, for the first time, the Supreme Court had to rule on a dispute between both 
chambers of Congress and the federal executive over a highly emotive issue for the 
Mexican public: the electric energy sector. President Fox had issued a decree 
reforming the regulatory framework of the electricity sector in order to allow a higher 
percentage of privately generated electricity to be sold by the Federal Electricity 
Commission. According to the Constitution, the energy sector falls under the exclusive 
competence of the Mexican state. The case was highly controversial and pitted Fox’s 
pro-business stance against the PRI legacy of economic nationalism. The Supreme 
Court eventually found in favour of the legislature. The case positioned the Court as an 
effective veto player in the system of government and as a key arbiter of federalism. 
The case saw the Court fulfil its remit as the interpreter of the constitution and the 
protector of the jurisdictional boundaries between each branch and level of 
government.
That the Court was able to play this role effectively was, I argue, directly related to the 
division of power and alternation of power in office. The Mexican Court has gained 
independence as power has become more fragmented among political parties. Since 
1997, when the PRI lost its majority in the lower chamber, Congress has become much 
more active in legally defending its constitutional powers. Fox’s government was 
divided— he did not have a majority in Congress and the Senate was still dominated by 
the PRI—which limited any political pressure on the Court to abstain or rule in a 
particular direction.
New actors are currently seeking the Court’s intervention in matters concerning 
jurisdictional disputes, which is a marker of the increased confidence vested in the
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judiciary. As discussed in Chapter 3, the IFE and the CNDH are two such agencies that 
have filed constitutional controversies before the Court. The Court determined in both 
cases that the autonomous bodies do not have the authority to use constitutional 
controversies. However, at least two congressional initiatives have since been 
presented seeking congressional debate over the issue of the legal authority of 
autonomous bodies, which could also include the Banco de Mexico and universities 
and other higher education institutions that the law considers autonomous.
The Supreme Court: redrawing the boundaries of its own jurisdiction
The comparative material on the independence of the judiciaries in Argentina, Brazil 
and Venezuela (see Chapter 1) sheds light on the relative success of the process of 
judicial reform in Mexico. In all four Latin American countries there are more active 
Supreme Courts as a result of reforms introduced since the early 1990s, but in 
comparison with Argentina and Venezuela, Mexico’s Court has achieved greater 
autonomy, transparency and public support. Compared with Brazil’s, Mexico’s Court is 
less isolated from the other institutions of government and civil society and is more 
accountable, although both have been the subject of criticism due to the high salaries 
paid to judges. As opposed to other countries, each year the Mexican Court has to 
negotiate its budget since it is not pegged to GDP or the national budget, and has to 
present spending plans for congressional revision. For a number of years Brazil’s 
judiciary has refused to countenance reforms, whereas in Mexico the judiciary was the 
focus of profound reforms in 1994, in 1999 when the judicial council was revamped, 
and again in 2008 under President Calderon.
Argentina and Venezuela suffered serious institutional crises in 2000 and 1999, 
respectively, which affected their Courts. In sum, it is possible to conclude that in 
Mexico the judicial reform process has been relatively successful since a strengthened 
judiciary now forms part of and has helped to consolidate a more democratic system 
with stable institutions. The presidential election in 2006 provided an important test not 
only of the country’s institutions, but of the political actors who complied with the 
resolutions of the IFE, the Electoral Tribunal and the Supreme Court.
As in other Latin American Countries, Mexico’s newly revitalised Supreme Court has 
become involved in an increasing number of controversial cases of national and 
international relevance. This carries risks for the Court in terms of its own credibility,
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but as cases I analyse show, the Court has been careful to delineate the scope of its 
jurisdiction.
In the first place, my analysis of constitutional controversies filed in seven case study 
states (Chapter 5) indicates that the Court has consistently rejected politically- 
motivated cases between rival parties, typically involving opposition-led municipalities 
against state governments.
One case of particular note is the legal challenge— or rather more than 300 individual 
legal challenges— against the indigenous rights law. The Supreme Court eventually 
decided in a divided (8-to-3) ruling that it does not have jurisdictional control over 
constitutional changes introduced by the Constituyente Permante (the federal and a 
majority of state legislatures). During the hearing the Court came under intense 
scrutiny and its resolution was criticised by a number of national and international civil 
society organisations who said it would set back the stalled peace process in Chiapas. 
The case set a precedent for the Court’s engagement in future constitutional reforms.
The Mexico City airport was another controversial case that was in the national and 
international public gaze. The Supreme Court was absolved from having to rule on the 
matter by Fox’s U-turn over the decision to expropriate land on a potential airport site, 
but is widely thought to have contributed to the reversal since Fox might have had 
more to lose if the Court had ruled against him.
But whereas in the case of the indigenous rights bill the Court was criticised for its 
conservatism, it came under fire for opposite reasons when it intervened in contested 
elections in Tabasco (2000) and Yucatan (2001). The Tabasco ruling is especially 
interesting since the Court had decided not to intervene in the previous gubernatorial 
elections which were widely held to be fraudulent—that it did so in 2000 is a marker of 
its increased strength. The Court also intervened in a case related to the financing of 
the 2000 presidential campaigns, and thereby not only expanded its jurisdiction to 
areas that the recently created federal electoral tribunal was overseeing, but 
consolidated its position as a constitutional court. In doing so it ended a tradition of 
isolating the judiciary from electoral politics in Mexico.
Conclusions can be drawn from all of the above with reference to the definition of 
judicial independence as hinging on the “authority” of the Court. Richardson (2007) 
argues that the judiciary can promote its “authority” and consequently its independence
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through (i) the making of law, (ii) promoting and maintaining public confidence, (iii) 
providing accurate information about the workings of the courts and responding to 
criticism and (iv) participating in administrative law. The cases I analyse show that 
Mexico’s Supreme Court is actively engaged in all four areas.
Fifteen years of judicial reform
While 1994 is the watershed year when it comes to judicial reform in Mexico, efforts to 
improve the judicial system did not stop there. As mentioned above, subsequent 
reforms were introduced in 1999 and a new raft of amendments has been tabled by the 
current president. The more recent reforms take place against a backdrop of the 
consolidation of democracy in Mexico. The Supreme Court became more proactive as 
political pluralism increased and especially after alternation of power in 2000. The 
empirical analysis of the constitutional controversies shows that the type of disputes 
presented before the Court has also changed as the opposition parties increasingly 
gained control of municipal and state governments. Theoretically, supreme courts 
engage in policymaking with fragmentation of power; this has proven to be the case in 
Mexico.
Between 1994 and 2000, the Supreme Court resolved an average of 27 constitutional 
controversies per year, while from 2005 to 2009 the average has increased to 87 per 
year. This compares with only 55 constitutional controversies were presented before 
the Supreme Court (or less than one per year) presented during the eight decades 
prior to the 1994 reform (1917-1994). Although unconstitutional actions are not the 
subject of this thesis, it is worth noting also that in the 15 years since the 1994 judicial 
reform, the Court has received 707 actions, almost half of which (44 percent) were in 
connection with electoral issues.
In terms of the Electoral Tribunal, it is important to note that in 2009 more cases were 
filed before it (21,773) than in the entire preceding decade (a total of 20,982 recourses 
were filed in 1999-2008). The experiences of 2009 have finally put an end to the notion 
that the Tribunal is geared towards resolving federal electoral conflicts. Indeed more 
than eight of every ten complaints received were related to local elections (a total of 
18,964, or 87 percent), even though federal elections also took place in 2009. During 
the period November 2008 to late 2009, 34 jurisprudence texts and 47 theses were 
approved by the Tribunal.
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The number of cases being presented before the Tribunal is evidence of the growing 
importance of the judiciary in the processes of federalism, increased separation of 
powers and electoral institutionalisation in Mexico. But it also reflects a growing culture 
of legality among political actors and citizens: two out of every three recourses filed 
before the Tribunal were presented by individual citizens in inter-party disputes. As the 
Tribunal’s 2009 report concludes, “Electoral justice has ceased to be the exclusive 
terrain for resolving disputes among parties and electoral authorities and has crossed 
over to the protection of political-electoral rights. We register parallels with increasingly 
active party support. In 2009, 1,391 supporters of all parties requested the intervention 
of electoral justice to resolve controversies related to the decisions of their political 
institutions” (TEPJF, 2009).
The year 2009 was particularly relevant for the Tribunal since it was the first time when 
federal and local elections were scrutinised under new rules introduced via the 
Constitution in 2007 and secondary legislation in 2008. The changes affected areas 
such as campaign spots, the promotion of officials and the publicising of the work of the 
legislature. Under the new rules the federal and local electoral calendars were merged.
Thus, since 1995, the “apolitical” branch of government has been increasingly defining 
the way many political processes work. It is being called on to resolve all kinds of 
disputes that emerge between the different levels and branches of government. This is 
problematic since a true separation of powers requires political agreements between 
the main political forces rather than the delegation of them to a third party. The 
recurrent intervention of the Supreme Court in diverse policy areas indicates that what 
was intended to be a final recourse to resolve specific conflicts related to constitutional 
matters has become the easy option for many political actors. This has implications for 
the credibility of the Supreme Court— a situation that might be compounded in the 
future by the Court’s new responsibilities in electoral matters. In other words, while it 
appears that since the 1994 reform there has been a more visible role for the Supreme 
Court in political affairs, it is not necessarily a more respected one! Increased Court 
activism is not equivalent yet to greater political autonomy or better rule of law. The 
Supreme Court’s role in the actual institutionalisation process has become fundamental 
for the future of Mexico, as public policy is increasingly contested in the Court with less 
predictable outcomes.
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Implications for theory and further research
As one of Latin America’s few federal systems, Mexico offers an ideal laboratory for the 
study of the political conditions that facilitate or hinder judicial reform efforts. By looking 
at judicial reform from a political science perspective, my study makes clear that the 
judiciary should not be underestimated in studies of presidentialism, not only for the 
role it plays as a check on presidential power, but for the leverage it provides other tiers 
of government to assert claims on the central executive authority.
There are a number of important ways in which my study could be deepened. First, one 
side-effect of the long period of gestation of this thesis is that much of the empirical 
material could be updated. My cut-off year is 2005, which leaves four more years of 
constitutional controversies to be analysed. The study of these would be facilitated by 
the new Supreme Court database of all controversies filed before the Court.
The analysis of the last four years of controversies would also allow me to look into 
new areas, in particular whether the Court’s new composition is affecting its 
performance. The retirement from the bench of Justices Mariano Azuela and Genaro 
Gongora is especially significant since both are former Chief Justices who have been 
pivotal and represent opposite sides of the political-judicial spectrum (right-leaning and 
judicially conservative versus left-leaning and judicially activist). A second new issue 
would be the impact of the 2008 reforms introduced by President Calderon. While 
many of the reforms are concerned with criminal law and are therefore beyond the 
scope of my study, they include measure to increase transparency and expediency of 
the Court. The latter point it particularly relevant since a criticism levied at the 
constitutional controversy mechanism is that it is too slow to be effective, with cases 
taking more than a year to resolve.
Second, I have focused on the federal Supreme Court, though referred in a number of 
places to local justice systems, generally when the Court has been approached to 
overturn a ruling of the state court. A subnational comparative analysis of judicial 
reform efforts within Mexico would complete the picture of judicial federalism as it is 
being experienced at the municipal, state and federal levels.
The study of the judiciary from the political science perspective has resulted in an 
intriguing and fascinating task. Much remains to be done and the combination of law 
and politics could become an interesting approach for other political scientists. I have
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emphasised the importance of studying the Mexican case not only because of the 
nature of its gradual democratic transition, but more importantly for the virtues of this 
type of change for the Mexican political system as a whole and its institutions. It has 
allowed increasing political inclusiveness without causing serious ruptures of the 
institutional order. Now that we are well into the 21st century, it is possible to confirm 
that the post-revolutionary political order in Mexico not only did not collapse as it gave 
way to democracy, but a gradual political change took place, the product of a 
combination of pressure, negotiation and agreements among different political actors. 
This strengthened the institutional framework, including the Supreme Court of Justice 
and the Electoral Tribunal. Mexico is not necessarily a success story, but the 
characteristics of its process of democratic consolidation are certainly unique in the 
context of Latin America.
241
INTERVIEWS
Abundis, Francisco, Director of Parametria. Investigation estrategica. Analisis de 
opinion y mercado, 16 July 2005, Mexico City.
Acuna Llamas, Francisco Javier, Director General of the Department of Information, 
Documentation and Transparency of the Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPJF), 22 
January 2008, Mexico City.
Aguilar Bueno, Jesus, PRI federal congressman (2003-06) from IX District in Hidalgo 
del Parral, Chihuahua and member of the SNTE (Teachers Union), 2 October 2003, 
Mexico City
Alanls, Marla del Carmen, Chief Magistrate of the TEPJF, 11 August 2007, Mexico City
Albo, Andres, Electoral Councillor, Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), 18 September 
2006, Mexico City
Agraz Rojas, Fernando, Advisor of the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court, 26 April 
2008, Mexico City.
Amerena, Eduardo, criminal lawyer, Cardenas-Amerena law firm, 26 March 2008, 
Mexico City.
Andrade, Virgilio, Electoral Councillor, IFE, 8 December 2003 and 13 February 2007, 
Mexico City.
Ansolabehere, Karina, researcher and lecturer in legal culture at FLACSO-MSxico, 8 
October 2008, Mexico City
Arteaga, Elisur, constitutional lawyer, professor of constitutional theory at the 
Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana and of federalism at the Universidad Autonoma 
del Estado de M&xico, 20 May 2001, Mexico City
Avila, Obdulio, PAN congressman (2006-09), 18 October 2007, London, UK 
Bartlett, Manuel, PRI Senator, 7 February 2001, London, UK.
Camargo, Edgar, Economist for Latin America, Merrill Lynch, 1 September 2000 and 
16 September 2008, Mexico City.
Campos Straffon, Edgar Donnovan, Deputy Director of Jurisdictional Statistics of the 
Supreme Court, 24 November 2009, Mexico City.
Cardenas, Efrain, criminal lawyer, Cardenas-Amerena law firm, 26 March 2008, 
Mexico City.
Cardenas, Elias, congressman and representative at the IFE of the political party 
Convergencia (2006-09), 18 October 2007, London, UK.
Cardenas, Cuauhtemoc, Founder of the PRD, First Elected Mayor of the Federal 
District (1997-2000), 7 March 2002, London.
242
Ccirdenas, Jaime, Electoral Councillor, IFE, 13 July 2005, Mexico City.
Chackelevicius Formica, Marla Jimena, Argentinean lawyer, Rosario, Argentina, 24 
March 2007.
Cordero, Ernesto, Treasury Minister (SHCP), 23 December 2009, Mexico City.
Cordero Ernesto, Social Development Minister, 26 February 2009, Mexico City.
Cordero Ernesto, Deputy Treasury Minister for Expenditure (SHCP), 24 May 2007, 
Mexico City.
Cordero, Ernesto, President of the Foundation Manuel Estrada Iturbide (PAN), 14 May 
2001, Mexico City.
Canul, Paulino, PRI federal congressional candidate for the V District in Ticul, Yucatan, 
1 March 2003, Merida, Mexico
Concha, Hugo, Executive Secretary, Institute for Juridical Research, UNAM, 18 
October 2003, Mexico City.
Cuevas, Francisco, President of the Federal Tribunal of Justice for Fiscal and 
Administrative Matters, 4 December 2009, Mexico City.
Dur&n Miranda, Jos6 Angel, lawyer at the Department of Jurisdictional Statistics of the 
Supreme Court, 24 November 2009, Mexico City.
Garcia Villegas, Paula, assistant (Secretaria de Estudio y Cuenta) to Justice Margarita 
Luna Ramos, 24 November 2009, Mexico City.
Gil Diaz, Francisco, Minister of Treasury (SHCP), 16 May 2002, London, UK.
Gomez Alcantar, Marco Antonio, Electoral Councillor, IFE, 13 February 2007, Mexico 
City.
Gonsen, Marco, Advisor in the Supreme Court of Justice, 23 October 2002, Mexico 
City
Guerrero, Omar, partner at the Barrera, Siqueiros y Torres Landa Abogados, S.C. law 
firm, 13 March 2006, Mexico City
Jimenez, Miguel Angel, congressman for the New Alliance Party (PANAL) (2006-09), 
18 October 2007, London, UK
Lopez, Lourdes, Electoral Councillor, IFE, 13 February 2007, Mexico City.
Martin del Campo, Arturo, advisor to Electoral Magistrate Fernando Ojesto, 13 August 
2009, Mexico City.
Martinez, Jacqueline, Director of Jurisdictional Statistics of the Supreme Court, 24 
November 2009, Mexico City.
Moctezuma Barragan, Esteban, former Minister of the Interior, 19 November 2001, 
London, UK.
243
Morales, Rodrigo, Electoral Councillor, IFE, 13 February 2007, Mexico City.
Olivares, Gonzalo, advisor to Electoral Councillor Jacqueline Peschard, IFE, 22 April 
2001, Mexico City.
Peniche, Gabriel, local representative of the National Union of Teachers (Sindicato 
Nacional de Trabajadores de la Education, SNTE) in Yucatan, 1 March 2003, Merida, 
Mexico.
Perez Suarez, Gabriela, Advisor to the Chief Magistrate of the Electoral Tribunal, 
TEPJF, 26 March 2009, Mexico City.
Poire, Alejandro, Deputy Secretary of the Interior, 23 December 2009, Mexico City
Quintal Parra, Gaspar, former Minister of the Interior (Oficial Mayor) in Yucatan, 1 
March 2003, Merida, Mexico.
Rodriguez Mondragdn, Reyes, Director of Statistics, Supreme Court of Justice, 11 
November 2007, Mexico City
Scinchez Cordero, Olga, Supreme Court Justice, 4 December 2009, Mexico City.
Sylveira, Vanessa, Deputy Director of Jurisdictional Statistics of the Supreme Court, 24 
November 2009, Mexico City
Torres, Flavio, Technical Director of the Asociacion de Bancos de Mexico, Mexico City, 
18 December 2008
Trejo Gonzalez, Martha, Deputy Director of Jurisdictional Statistics of the Supreme 
Court, 24 November 2009, Mexico City.
Zedillo, Ernesto, former President of Mexico and Visiting Fellow at the Centre for 
Global Governance, London School of Economics, 23 November 2001




Aguayo, Sergio (1995) 'A Mexican Milestone’ in Journal of Democracy. Vol. 6, Num 2, 
April 1995, International Forum for Democratic Studies at the National Endowment for 
Democracy: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Washington, D.C. pp. 157-167.
Aguero, Felipe and Jeffrey Stark (1999) Fault Lines of Democracy in Post-Transition 
Latin America. Lynne Rienner Pub. Boulder, Colorado.
Ai Camp. Roderic (1998) “Province Versus the Center: Democratizing Mexico’s 
Political Culture” in Philip Kelly (ed.) Assessing Democracy in Latin America. Westview 
Press, Boulder, Colorado, pp. 76-92.
Alfonsin, Raul (1993) “The Function of the Judicial Power During the Transition" in 
Stotzky, Irwin (ed.) Transition to Democracy in Latin America. Boulder, Westview 
Press, p.41-54.
Alonso, Jorge and Jaime Tamayo (1994) Elecciones con alternativas: algunas 
experiencias en la Republica Mexicana. Ciudad de Mexico: La Jornada Ediciones y 
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico).
Alvarez, Angel E. (1998) “Venezuelan Local and National Elections (1958-1995) in 
Dietz A. Henry and Gil Shidlo (eds.) Urban Elections in Democratic Latin America. 
Scholarly Resources Inc, USA, p.243-278
Ansolabehere, Karina (2007), La politica desde la iusticia: Cortes Supremas. Gobierno 
v Democracia en Argentina v Mexico. Ciudad de Mexico: Facultad Latinoamericana de 
Ciencias Sociales, (FLACSO) Mexico y Distribuciones Fontamara.
Arantes, Rogerio Bastos ; KERCHE. Fabio . Judicterio e Democracia no Brasil. Novos 
Estudos. CEBRAP: Centro Brasileiro de Analise e Planejamento, Sao Paulo, v. 54, p. 
27-41,1999.
Arteaga Nava, Elisur (2000) Tratado de Derecho Constitucional. Biblioteca de Derecho 
Constitucional, Vol. I, II, III and IV Ciudad de Mexico: Oxford University Press
Aziz Nassif, Alberto (1992) Chihuahua: De la Euforia a la Indiferencia in Guillen Lopez, 
Tonatiuh (coordinador), Frontera norte: una decada de politica electoral. Mexico: 
Colegio de la Frontera Norte, (COLEF) Colegio de Mexico, pp.69-95.
Bailon, Moises Jaime (1995) “Municipios, Opposition Mayorships, and Public 
Expenditure in Oaxaca” in Victoria Rodriguez and Peter Ward, Opposition Government 
in Mexico. New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, pp. 205-219.
Baker, Richard D. (1971) Judicial Review in Mexico. A Study of the Amparo Suit. 
Austin, University of Texas Press.
Barros, Robert (2002) Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 
1980 Constitution. New York: Cambridge University Press.
245
Becerril, Andrea (2009) “lmpondr£n PRI y PAN a los 2 futuros ministros de la Corte, 
prev6n Senadores” in La Jornada. 29 de noviembre 2009
Bednar, Jenna, William Eskridge and John Ferejohn (2001) “A Political Theory of 
Federalism”, in John Ferejohn, Jack N. Rakove and Jonathan Riley, Constitutional 
Culture and Democratic Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. United 
Kingdom.
Berruecos, Susana (2004) “La Suprema Corte de Justicia en el Contexto de un Nuevo 
Federalismo” in El Poder Judicial en la Transition y Consolidation Democratica en 
Mexico, Trabajos Ganadores del Octavo Certamen Nacional de Ensayo, Francisco I. 
Madero 2003, Instituto Federal Electoral, pp. 77-109.
— .(2003) “Electoral Justice in Mexico: The Role of the Electoral Tribunal under New 
Federalism” Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 35, pp. 801-825. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. United Kingdom.
— .(2003) “El nuevo papel del Poder Judicial en Mexico: la Corte Suprema bajo un 
nuevo federalismo” in Londono Toro, Beatriz Estado de Crisis o Crisis del Estado, 
Coleccidn Textos de Jurisprudencia, Centro Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 
Colombia, pp. 77-113.
— .(2002) Procesos Electorates v Participation Ciudadana en el Distrito Federal. Prize 
winning essay in the Second Annual Essay Competition, Instituto Electoral del Distrito 
Federal (IEDF), 31 August.
Biles, Robert E. (1976) “The Position of the Judiciary in the Political Systems of 
Argentina and Mexico” in Lawyer of the Americas. American Society of International 
Law, Washington, D.C. 8 (1976): 287-318.
Bill Chavez, Rebecca (2004) The Rule of Law in Nascent Democracies: Judicial 
Politics in Argentina. Stanford University Press.
Bill Chavez, Rebecca, John Ferejohn, and Barry Weingast. (2003) “A Theory of the 
Politically Independent Judiciary”, Paper presented at APSA: American Political 
Science Association. Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, Aug. 27, 2003
Blaikie, Norman (2001) Designing Social Research. The Logic of Anticipation. Polity 
Press, Great Britain.
Borges, Nilsono (2002) “O TSE e o resumo da opera” in Coiuntura Politica. April 2002, 
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Minas Gerais, Brasil.
Brinks, Daniel (2005) “Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina: the 
Beginning of a New Millennium?” in Texas International Law Journal. Vol. 40, Number 
3, Spring 2005, pp.595-622. Austin: University of Texas
Bruhn, Kathleen (1997) Taking on Goliath: the emergence of a new left party and the 
struggle for democracy in Mexico. University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press.
Buchanan, James (2001) “Judicial Reform in the Americas”, The Canadian Foundation 
for the Americas (FOCAL) Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, November: pp. 1-12
246
Burgoa, Ignacio (1986) El Juicio de Amparo. Mexico D.F.: Editorial Porrua
Burton, Michael, R. Gunther and John Higley (1992) "Introduction: Elite
Transformations and Democratic Regimes" in John Higley and Richard Gunther (Eds), 
Elites and Democratic Consolidation: Latin America and Southern Europe. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Buscaglia, Eduardo and Maria Dakolias (1996) Judicial Reform in Latin American 
Court: The Experience in Argentina and Ecuador. The World Bank, Washington D.C. 
Buscaglia, Eduardo, Maria Dakolias and William Ratliff (1995) Judicial Reform in Latin 
America. Stanford University, Hoover Institution.
Cabrera Acevedo, Lucio (1968) El Poder Judicial Federal Mexicano v el Constituvente 
de 1917. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico.
— (1997) La Suprema Corte de Justicia en el Siglo XIX. Vol. II. Ciudad de Mexico: 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Federation.
— (1997), La Suprema Corte de Justicia durante el Gobierno del Presidente Plutarco 
Ellas Calles (1924-1928). Ciudad de Mexico Suprema Corte de Justicia de la 
Federacion
— (1998) El Poder Judicial Federal Mexicano v el Constituvente de 1917. Mexico City: 
Universidad Nacional Autbnoma de Mexico.
— (1999) La Suprema Corte de Justicia durante el Gobierno del Presidente Lazaro 
Cardenas (1935-1940). Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Federacion, Mexico.
— (2000) La Suprema Corte de Justicia durante el Gobierno del General Avila 
Camacho (1940-1946). Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Federacibn, Mbxico. Pp.20-25
— (2002) El Constituvente de 1917 v el Poder Judicial de la Federacion. Una vision del 
Sialo XX. Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nation, Mbxico.
— (2005) Poder Judicial de la Federacibn, La Suprema Corte de Justicia durante el 
Gobierno del Presidente Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1995-2000). Poder Judicial 
de la Federacion, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Federacion, Mexico.
— (2005) La Suprema Corte de Justicia durante el gobierno del Presidente Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari (1989-1994). Poder Judicial de la Federacion, Suprema Corte de 
Justicia de la Federacion, Mexico.
— (2005) “30. Controversia constitucional planteada por el ayuntamiento de ciudad 
Delicias, Chihuahua, contra el gobernador y secretario de gobierno del mismo estado, 
y la sentencia sobre el caso de la Suprema Corte en 1994” in La Suprema Corte de 
Justicia durante el gobierno del Presidente Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1989-1994). 
Poder Judicial de la Federacion, Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Federacion, Mexico, 
pp. 159-185.
— (2005) “31. Comentario a la sentencia de 30 de agosto de 1994 en la controversia 
constitucional 1/93” in La Suprema Corte de Justicia durante el gobierno del 
Presidente Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1989-1994). Poder Judicial de la Federacion, 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Federacion, Mexico, pp. 183-185.
247
— (2006) La Suprema Corte de Justicia durante el gobierno del Presidente Vicente 
Fox Quesada (2001-2006). Poder Judicial de la Federacion, Suprema Corte de Justicia 
de la Federacion, Mexico.
Calvert, Peter A. (1998) “Urban Electoral Politics in Argentina” in Dietz A. Henry and 
Shidlo (eds.) Urban Elections in Democratic Latin America. Scholarly Resources Inc, 
USA.
Cameron, Charles M. (2002) “Judicial Independence: How can you sell it when you see 
it? In Stephen B. Burbank and Barry Friedman (eds.) Judicial Independence at the 
Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Canache, Damarys and Michael R. Kulisheck (eds.) (1998) Reinventing Legitimacy. 
Democracy and Political Change in Venezuela. Greenwood Press.
Carbonell, Miguel (2000) Poder judicial v la transicibn a la democracia: la reforma de 
1999. Boletln Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, Revista Juridica, Num. 97, Ciudad de 
Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico.
— (2003) El nuevo paoel del poder judicial v la transicibn a la democracia en Mexico. 
Instituto de Investigaciones Jurldicas de la Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico 
(llJ-Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico), Mexico.
Cbrdenas Gracia, Jaime (1995) “Comentarios sobre la Controversia Constitucional” in 
Revista Juridica. Boletln Mexicano de Derecho Comparado. No. 85, Mexico City: 
Instituto de Investigaciones Jurldicas de la Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico 
(llJ-Universidad Nacional Autbnoma de Mbxico), Mbxico.
— (1996) “El Municipio en las Controversias Constitucionales” in Pemex Lex. Revista 
Juridica de Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) No. 101-102, Noviembre, pp. 34- 43. 
Ciudad de Mbxico: PEMEX
— (2000), Una Constitution para la Democracia. Proouestas para un nuevo orden 
constitucional. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurldicas de la Universidad Nacional 
Autonoma de Mbxico (llJ-Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mbxico), Mbxico.
Carmagnani, Marcello (coord.) (1993) Federalismos Latinoamericanos: Mbxico. Brasil 
v Argentina. Ciudad de Mbxico: El Colegio de Mbxico. (COLMEX)
Carpizo, Jorge (1987) El Presidencialismo Mexicano. Seventh Edition, Siglo XXI 
Editores, Mbxico.
Carpizo, Jorge (1995) “Reformas constitucionales al Poder Judicial de la Federacion y 
a la jurisdiccion Constitucional del 31 de diciembre de 1994” in Boletln Mexicano de 
Derecho Comparado. No. 83, pp.807-842, Ciudad de Mbxico: Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jurldicas de la Universidad Nacional Autbnoma de Mbxico (IIJ- 
Universidad Nacional Autbnoma de Mbxico), Mbxico.
— (2004) El Presidencialismo Mexicano. Siglo XXI Editores, Mbxico.
Carranco Zuniga, Joel (2000) Poder Judicial. Miguel Angel Porrua, Mbxico.
Carrera Damas, German (1988) La necesaria reforma democratica del estado. 
Grijalbo, Venezuela.
248
Casar, Marfa Amparo. 2002. “Executive-Legislative Relations: The Case of Mexico 
(1946-1997)”, in Benito Nacif and Scott Morgenstern (eds.), Legislative Politics in Latin 
America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cavarozzi, Marcelo (1992) “Beyond Transitions to democracy in Latin America” in 
Journal of Latin American Studies. 24. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— (2001) “Transitions: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay” in Garretdn, Manuel Antonio 
and Edward Newman (2001) Democracy in Latin America: (Re) Constructing Political 
Society. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp.45-65.
Chavez, Hugo (1999) “Justice Reform, Social Peace and Democracy” in Andres Rigo 
and Waleed Haider (Eds) Judicial Challenges in the New Millenium. Proceedings of the 
Second Ibero-American of Supreme Courts and Tribunals of Justice. World Bank 
Technical Paper No. 450, pp. 13-15.
Collier, David and Steven Levitsky (2000) “Democracy with adjectives: Conceptual 
Innovation in Comparative Research,” in World Politics 49, No. 3 (April): 430-51., 
Chicago Working Papers.
Concha, Hugo Alejandro y Jose Antonio Caballero (2001) Diaonostico sobre la 
Administration de Justicia en las entidades Federativas. Un estudio institucional sobre 
la iusticia local en Mexico. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurfdicas, Universidad Nacional 
Autonoma de Mexico.
Coppedge, Michael (1996) “Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of Patriarchy" in Jorge 
Dominguez and A. Lowenthal (Eds) Constructing Democratic Governance. Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the 1990s. Baltimore The John Hopkins University Press
— (2003) “Venezuela: Popular Sovereignty versus Liberal Democracy” in Jorge I. 
Dominguez and Michael Shifter, eds. Constructing Democratic Governance, Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins University, pp. 165-192.
— (2005) “Explaining Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela Through Nested 
Inference" in Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring (Eds).The Third Wave of 
Democratization in Latin America. Cambridge University Press
Cornelius Wayne A. (2000) “Blind Spots in Democratization: Sub-national Politics as a 
Constraint on Mexico’s Transition” in Democratization. Vol. 7, No. 3, autumn. London 
and New York: Routledge, pp. 117-132.
Cornelius, Wayne A. and David Shirk (1999) ‘Subnational Politics and Democratization: 
Tensions between Center and Periphery in the Mexican Political System’ in Cornelius 
(et al.) Subnational Politics and Democratization in Mexico La Jolla: Center for U.S. - 
Mexican Studies, University of California
— (2007) Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico. Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press.
Corona Armenta, Gabriel (coordinador) (2007) Los Poderes Federates en la 
Consolidation Democr£tica de Mexico. Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico.
Coronil, Fernando (1997) The Magical State: nature, money and modernity in 
Venezuela. University of Chicago Press.
249
Correa Sutil, Jorge (1993) The Judiciary and the Political System in Chile: The 
Dilemmas of Judicial Independence During the Transition to Democracy’ in Stozky, 
Irwin (Ed) Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Judiciary. 
Westview Press, pp. 89-106.
Corrochano, David (2001) “Identidad Institucional: El Tribunal Electoral ante las 
elecciones presidenciales de 2000” in Economia. Sociedad v Territorio. El Colegio 
Mexiquense, Toluca, Mexico: vol. Ill, no. 9, pp. 127-151
Couso, Javier (2008) in “Consolidacion democratica y poder judicial. Los riesgos de la 
judicializacion de la politica” in Tribunales Constitucionales v Democracia. Suprema 
Corte de Justicia de la Nacion, Mexico, pp. 429-457..
Cossfo Diaz, Jose Ramon (1995b) "Comentario al articulo 105 de la Constitucion" in 
Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos Comentada. Tomo. II. 7th ed., 
Mexico D.F.: Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, Editorial Porrua-Universidad 
Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico.
— (1998) ‘Cuestiones Constitucionales. Yucatan: Los Dilemas de la Justicia Electoral’ 
in Ciudad de Mexico: Editorial Este Pals. Mexico City. (October 1998), pp. 14-18.
— (2000a). “Comentario al Articulo 105 Constitucional”, in Miguel Carbonell (ed), 
Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Comentada v Condordada. 
Mexico City: Porrua/UNAM
— (2000b) “Cuestiones Constitucionales / La indebida ampliation competencial de la 
Suprema Corte” in Ciudad de Mexico: Editorial Este Pais.. (Mexico City).
— (2001a) ‘Cuestiones Constitucionales. El caso Tabasco: ^Democracia vs Estado de 
Derecho?’ in Ciudad de Mexico: Editorial Este Pais.. No. 119, (February 2001), pp. 38- 
41.Ciudad de Mexico: Editorial Ciudad de Mexico y Editorial Este Pais.
— (2001b). “La Suprema Corte y la teoria constitucional”, Politica v Gobierno. Division 
de Estudios Politicos del Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas (Centro de 
Investigacion y Docencia Economicas). Vol. VIII, Num. 1 Mexico, Primer Semestre de 
2001.:pp.61-115.
— (2007) Tribunales Constitucionales y Consolidacion de la Democracia, SCJN: 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion, Mexico.
Cosio Villegas, Daniel (1975) La sucesion presidencial. Ciudad de Mexico Joaquin. 
Mortiz.
Crespo, Jose Antonio (1995a) “Governments of the Opposition: The Official Response” 
in Victoria Rodriguez and Peter Ward, Opposition Government in Mexico. New Mexico: 
University of New Mexico Press, pp. 17-32.
— (1996) Votar en los estados: an£lisis comparado de las leaislaciones electorales 
estatales en Mexico. Ciudad de Mexico: Miguel Angel Porrua
D’Alva Kinzo, Maria (2001) “Transitions: Brazil” in Garreton, Manuel Antonio and 
Edward Newman (2001) Democracy in Latin America. (Re) Constructing Political 
Society. Tokyo: United Nations University Press
250
IDahl, Robert (1971) Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press.
—  (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Dakolias Maria and Javier Said (1999) “Judicial Reform. A process of Change Through 
Pilot Courts”, Legal And Judicial Reform Unit. Legal Department. The World Bank, No. 
20176.
De la Peza, Jose Luis (1999) ‘Poder Judicial y cuestiones comiciales: la evolucion de 
la justicia electoral en el Mexico contemporaneo” in Dialogo v Debate de Cultura 
Politica. La Reforma al Poder Judicial. Year 2, No. 7, pp. 221-255.
Diamond, Larry (1999) Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press
Diamond, Larry, Juan Linz and Seymour Lipset (1989), Democracy in Developing 
Countries: Latin America. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (eds.) (1997) 
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. Themes and Perspectives. Baltimore and 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Domingo Villegas, Pilar (1995) Rule of Law and Judicial Systems in the Context of 
Democratisation and Economic Liberalisation: A Framework for Comparison and 
Analysis in Latin America. Mexico: Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Econbmicas, 
Documentos de Trabaio (Working Paper) No. SDTEP 25: Division de Estudios 
Politicos
—  (1999) “Judicial Independence and Judicial Reform in Latin America” in Schedler, 
Andreas, Larry Diamond and Mark F Plattner (Eds) The Self-Restraining State: Power 
and Accountability in New Democracies. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 151- 
175.
— (2000) “Judicial Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court in Mbxico” in 
Journal of Latin American Studies. 32, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
705-735.
— (2005) “Judicialisation of Politics: The Changing Political Role of the Judiciary in 
Mexico” in Judicialisation in Latin America. Rachel Sieder, Schjolden and Alan Angell 
(eds.) New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Domingo, Pilar and Scott Morgenstern (1997) The Success of Presidentialism: 
Breaking Dridlock. Gridlock o Dreadlock??? in Presidential Regimes. Mexico: Centro 
de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas, Documentos de Trabaio (Working Paper) 
No. 73.
Domingo, Pilar and Rachel Sieder ed. (2001) Rule of Law in Latin America: The 
International Promotion of Judicial Reform. London: Institute of Latin American Studies
Dominguez, Jorge (2003) “Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America. 
Taking Stock of the 1990s" in Dominguez, Jorge and Michael Shifter (eds.) 
Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America. Second Edition. Baltimore: 
John Hopkins
251
Donald. J., Mabry, and (1973) Mexico's Accion Nacional: a Catholic alternative to 
revolution. New York: Syracuse University Press.
Drewry, Gavin (2000) “Political Institutions: Legal Perspectives” in Goodin, Robert and 
Hans-Dieter Kilngemann (Eds), A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 191-204.
Edmonds Ellas, Emily (1998) “The Implications of Electoral Competition for Fiscal 
Decentralization and Subnational Autonomy in Mexico.” Prepared for delivery at the 
1998 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association. Chicago, Illinois, 24-26  
September 1998.
Eisenstadt, Todd (1999a), ‘Off the Streets and into the Courtrooms: Resolving Post 
electoral Conflicts in Mexico’ in The Self Restraining State: Power and Accountability in 
New Democracies. Schedler (et al.) Boulder, Colorado
— (1999b) “Electoral Federalism or Abdication of Presidential Authority? Gubernatorial 
Elections in Tabasco, in Wayne Cornelius (et al.) in Subnational Politics and 
Democratization in Mexico. La Jolla, California: Center for U.S. - Mexican Studies, 
University of California
— (2004) Courting Democracy in Mexico. Party Strategies and Electoral Institutions. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Eisenstadt, Todd and Jane Hindley (1995) Subnational Politics and Democratization in 
Mexico. La Jolla: Center for US-Mexican Studies, pp. 107-132.
Eisenstadt, Todd and Alejandro Poire (2006) “Explaining the Credibility Gap in 
Mexico’s 2006 Presidential Election, Despite Strong (Albeit Perfectible) Electoral 
Institutions” Working Paper No. 4 Center for Democracy and Election Management. 
School of Public Affairs. American University. November 2006
Elazar, Daniel (1987) Exploring Federalism. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
— (1997) “Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems”. International Political Science 
Review/ Revue intemationale de science politique. Jul 1997; vol. 18: pp. 237 - 251.
— (1998). Constitutionalizing Globalization. The Postmodern Revival of Confederal 
Arrangements. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publ. Inc.
Ellner, Steve (2001) “The Radical Potential of Chavismo in Venezuela. The First Year 
and a Half in Power” in Latin American Perspectives. Issue 120, Vol. 28, No. 5, 
September 2001, pp. 5-32.
Epstein, Lee and Jack Knight (1996) “On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy", Law & 
Society Review, vol. 30, no. 1.
Epstein, Lee, Jack Knight and Olga Shvetsova (2001) “The Role of Constitutional 
Courts in the Establishment of Democratic Systems of Government”. Law & Society 
Review, vol. 35, no. 1.
Faro de Castro, Marcus (1997) “The Courts, Law and Democracy in Brazil", 
International Social Science Journal. Oxford, n° 152, June 1997, Blackwell Publishers I 
UNESCO, pp. 241-252.
252
Faundez, Julio (ed.) (1997) Good Government and Law: Legal and Institutional Reform 
in Developing Countries. London: Macmillan Press: New York, NY: St Martin’s Press in 
association with the British Council.
Ferejohn, John (1999) “Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial 
Independence”. Southern California Law Review. The Law School, University of 
Southern California, Los Angeles, California, Vol., 62, No. 1: (Jan-Mar): 353-384
— (2002) “Judicialising Politics, Politicising Law” in Law and Contemporary Problems, 
Vol. 65, No. 3, (Jul-Sep), The Law of Politics. Duke University School of Law, pp. 41- 
68.
Ferejohn, John, and Barry Weingast. (1992) “A Positive Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation”, International Review of Law and Economics, no. 12. Elsevier. 
Amsterdam
Finkel, Jodi (1999) "Judicial Reform in Latin America: Market Economies, Self- 
Interested Politicians, and Judicial Independence," Presented at the American Political 
Science Association Conference. Atlanta (September 2-5, 1999).
— (2003). “Supreme Court Decisions on Electoral Rules After Mexico’s 1994 
Constitutional Reform: An Empowered Court”, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 
35, pp. 777-799. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. United Kingdom.
Fino Susan P (1987), The Role of State Supreme Courts in the New Judicial
Federalism. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
Fiss, Owen (1994) “The right degree of independence" in Stotzky, Irwin (ed.) 
Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the judiciary. Boulder, Colorado, 
Westview Press.
Fix-Fierro, Hector. (1998). “Judicial Reform and the Supreme Court of Mexico: the 
Trajectory of Three Years”, United States-Mexico Law Journal. University of New 
Mexico, Albuquerque, vol. 6, Spring.
— (2000) ‘Poder Judicial’ in Marla del Refugio Gonzalez (et al.) Transiciones v Disenos 
Institucionales. Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. Ciudad de Mexico: Instituto 
de Investigaciones Jurldicas, Universidad Nacional Autdnoma de Mexico: pp. 162-217.
Fix-Zamudio, Hector (1988) “El ejecutivo federal y el poder judicial”, in El sistema 
presidencial mexicano: alounas reflexiones. Mexico, Universidad Nacional Autonoma 
de Mexico.
— (1999). Ensavos sobre el derecho de amparo. Ciudad de Mexico: Editorial 
Porrua/Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico.
Fix-Zamudio, Hector and Jose Ramon Cosslo Diaz (2004) El Poder Judicial en el 
ordenamiento mexicano. Ciudad de Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica.
Flick, Uwe (2002) An Introduction to Qualitative Research. Second edition. Sage 
Publications, London, UK.
253
Friedman, Barry (2000) “The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: 
Law’s Politics”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 148, no. 4, April.
Fix-Zamudio Hector and Hector Fix-Fierro (1996) “El Consejo de la Judicatura”. 
Cuadernos para la Reforma de la Justicia 3, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de 
Mexico. Ciudad de Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurldicas, Mexico
Friedman, Barry (2001) “The History of the Counter majoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: 
The Lesson of Lochner”. New York University Law Review, vol 76, Spring
Friedrich, C.F. (1994) Pressuring the Center: Opposition Governments and Federalism 
in Mexico. Numero 71.Mexico: Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas, 
Documentos de Trabajo No.71. Division de Estudios Politicos.
Friedrich, Carl J. (1966), "Federalism and Opposition" in Government and Opposition. 
an International Journal of Comparative Politics. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. Vol. I, No. 
1: pp.286-296
Galeana, Patricia (Ed.) (2003) Mexico v sus Constituciones. Ciudad de Mexico: Fondo 
de Cultura Economica
Garcia Ramirez, Sergio (1996) Poder Judicial v Ministerio Publico. Universidad 
Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurldicas Ciudad de 
Mexico: Porrua, Mexico.
Garcia Villegas Sanchez Cordero, Paula M. (2007) Cuestiones de Constitucionalidad. 
Los Tribunales Coleqiados de Circuito como Tribunales Constitucionales. Editorial 
Porrua, Mexico.
Garcladiego, Javier (2003) “Marco historico: Mexico a traves de este siglo: Su 
evolucion politica” en Galeana, Patricia (compiladora) Mexico v sus Constituciones. 
Ciudad de Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica pp. 314-335.
Garoupa, Nuno. and Ginsburg, Tom (2008a) “The Comparative Law and Economics of 
Judicial Councils” in Berkeley Journal of International Law Illinois Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. LE08-036.
— (2008b) Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence In: 
The American Journal of Comparative Law. Vol. 57 Issue 1 / Winter 2009: 103-134
Garrido, Luis Javier (1989) “The Crisis of Presidencialismo” in Cornelius, Wayne, 
Judith Gentleman and Peter Smith (Eds) Mexico’s Alternative Political Futures. La Jolla 
California: University of California at San Diego, Cal: UCSD. Center for US-Mexican 
Studies, pp. 422-26
— (1990) ‘La negociacion’ in Diario de Yucatan. 7 December 1990, pp.2 and 3.
Gibson, Edward L. and Tulia Falleti “Unity by the Stick: Regional Conflict and the 
Origins of Argentine Federalism" (2003) in Federalism: Latin America in Comparative 
Perspective. Baltimore; The Johns Hopkins University Press
254
Gibson, James L. and Gregory A. Caldeira. (1995). “The Legitimacy of Transnational 
Legal Institutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice”, American 
Journal of Political Science. John Wiley and Sons, Inc vol., 39 (#2, May): 459-489.
Gibson, James L., Gregory A. Caldeira, and Vanessa A. Baird. (1998) "On the 
Legitimacy of High Courts." in American Political Science Review. Department of 
Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles, 92, No 2, June 1998:343-358.
Giugale, Marcelo M., Olivier Lafourcade, and Vinh Nguyen, (2001) Mexico. A 
Comprehensive Development agenda for the New Era. Washington, D.C.: The World 
Bank
Gloppen, Siri, Roberto Gargarella and Elin Skaar (2004) Democratization and the 
Judiciary: the accountability function of courts in new democracies. London, Portland: 
Frank Cass Pub.
Goldman, Sheldon (1968) The Federal Judicial System: Readings in Process and 
Behavior (with Thomas P. Jahnige) (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Austin, Texas. 1968)
Gomez-Palacio, Ignacio (1999) “Reforma Judicial: El criterio de importancia y 
trascendencia y su antecedente, el Writ of Certiorari,” in Revista del Instituto de la 
Judicatura Federal. Mexico City.
Gonzalez Casanova, Pablo (1965) La democracia en Mexico. Ciudad de Mexico: 
Ediciones Era.
— Gonzalez Casanova (1970) Democracy in Mexico. Second edition, Ciudad de 
Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico.
Gonzalez Compebn, Miguel and Bauer Peter (2002) Jurisdiccibn v democracia. Los 
nuevos rumbos del Poder Judicial en Mexico. Ciudad de Mexico: Centro de 
Investigacion para el Desarrollo, A.C: Center of Research for Development), Cal y 
Arena, Mexico.
Gonzalez Oropeza, Manuel (1987) La intervention federal en la desaparicion de 
poderes. 2a ed, Ciudad de Mbxico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico.
— (1989) “Presidencialismo y federalismo” in Boletln Mexicano de Derecho 
Comparado. No. 66, Ciudad de Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurldicas de la 
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, pp.899-911.
— (1993) Las Controversias entre la Constitucion v la Politica. Universidad Nacional 
Autonoma de Mexico-Corte de Constitucionalidad y Procurador de Derechos Humanos 
de Guatemala (Cuadernos Constitucionales Mexico-Centroambrica 6), Ciudad de 
Mexico.
— (2000) “Prologo” in Jose de Jesus Gudino Pelayo (2000), Controversia sobre 
Controversia. Ciudad de Mexico: Editorial Porrua
Gonzalez-Casanova, Pablo (Ed) (1985) Las Elecciones en Mexico: evolution v 
perspectivas. Ciudad de Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores.
Gosman, Eleonora (2003) “Brasil: el nuevo presidente de la Corte Suprema critica a 
Lula, in El Clarin. Buenos Aires, Argentina, 7 June
255
Gudino Pelayo Jose de Jesus (2000), Controversia sobre Controversia. Ciudad de 
Mexico: Editorial Porrua.
—  (2001) “La Reforma Judicial Federal y el Estado de Derecho”, in Seminario La 
reforma legal v asuntos de Justicia en Mexico v Latinoamerica. American Bar 
Association. 11 October 2001, Nuevo Leon, Mexico.
Guillen Lopez, Tonatiuh (1992) “Baja California: “Una Decada de Cambio Politico” in 
Guillen Lopez, Tonatiuh" (coordinador) Frontera norte: una decada de politica 
electoral. Tiiuana: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, pp. 139-85.
—  (1994) “Baja California: Las Elecciones de 1992 y la Transition Democratica” in 
Jorge Alonso and Jaime Tamayo, Elecciones con alternativas: alqunas experiencias en 
la Republica Mexicana. Ciudad Mexico City: La Jornada Ediciones, Universidad 
nacional Autonoma de Mexico, pp.25-40.
- r  (1995) “The 1992 “Elections and the Democratic Transition in Baja California” in 
Victoria Rodriguez and Peter Ward, Opposition Government in Mexico. New Mexico: 
University of New Mexico Press, pp.51-64.
Gujarati, Damodar (2003) Basic Econometrics. New York: McGraw Hill.
Gutierrez, Alejandro (1999) “El Negocio en Chihuahua”. Proceso (Mexico City) No. 
1177, 24 May, p. 33
Guzman-V&zquez, (2007) Antonio Benito Juarez. Benemerito. Investigacion. Selection 
de Textos. Ciudad de Mexico: Iconografia Convergencia.
Helmke, Gretchen (2002) “The Logic of Strategic Defection: Judicial Decision-Making 
in Argentina under Dictatorship and Democracy,” in American Political Science Review 
96(2): 291-30.
Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay and James Madison, Edited by Robert Scigliano (2001) 
The Federalist. A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. New York: The 
Modern Library. The Random House Publishing Group Random House, Inc. Broadway, 
New York NY
Hammergren, Linn Ann (1983) Development and the politics of administrative reform: 
lessons from Latin America. Boulder: Westview Press.
— (1998) The Politics of Justice and Justice Reform in Latin America: The Peruvian 
Case in Comparative Perspective. Boulder: Westview Press.
— (2001) “Legal and Judicial Institutions” in Marcelo Giugale, Oliver Lafourcade and 
Vinh Nguyen (eds) Mexico-A Comprehensive Development Agenda for the New Era. 
Washington, D.C.: World Bank, pp. 733-748.
-— (2002) “Do Judicial Councils further judicial reform? Lessons from Latin America” 
Working papers. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Rule of Law Series. 
Democracy and Rule of Law Project. Number 28, June.
— (2007) Envisioning Reform. Improving Judicial Performance in Latin America. 
Pennsylvania: Penn State Press.
256
Holland, Kennet M (ed.) (1991) Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspective. London: 
IMacmillan.
Human Rights Watch (2004) Rigging the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence under 
Siege in Venezuela. 16 June 2004.
laryczower, Matias, Pablo Spiller, and Mariano Tomassi. (2002). “Judicial Decision- 
Making in Unstable Environments,” in American Journal of Political Science, vol. 46, 
no. 4, October, pp. 699-716.
Inclan Oseguera, Silvia (2006) 'Will judicial independence take hold in Mexico?: 
Lessons from the region" Prepared for delivery at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association. Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, 
Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, August 30th-September 3, 2006.
—  (2007) “De las implicaciones de la reforma judicial mexicana de 1994 y del ^como 
estimarlas?” in Corona Armenta, Gabriel (ed) Los Poderes Federates en la 
Consolidacion Democratica de Mexico. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autbnoma 
de Mexico.
Irons, Peter (2000) A People's History of the Supreme Court. The men and women 
whose cases and decisions have shaped our Constitution. Penguin Books.
Jimenez, Miguel (2005) “Global Change and Local Economic Restructuring: The Case 
of Mexico City.” PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, Geography Department. 
London
Jorgen Elklit and Andrew Reynolds, (2000) “The Impact of Election Administration on 
the Legitimacy of Emerging Democracies: A New Research Agenda", Working paper 
281 Kellogg Institute. Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute of International Studies
Karl, Terry and Philippe Schmitter (1991) “Modes of Transition in Latin America, 
Southern and Eastern Europe” in International Social Science Journal 128: 269-84.
Karl, Terry. (1990). “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America" in Comparative 
Politics 23:1-21
Kaufmann, Daniel and Art Kraay (2002) ‘Growth without Governance’. World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 2928 July 2002, Washington DC: The World Bank
Kelman, Steven (1987) Making Public Policy. A Hopeful View of American 
Government. New York: Basic Books Inc., Publishers.
King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg (2000) "Making the Most of Statistical 
Analysis: Improving Interpretation and Presentation”, American Journal of Political 
Science, vol. 44, no. 2.
Kinzo Maria D'Alva G (1993) (Editor): Brazil: Challenges of the 1990s. London: Institute 
of Latin American Studies and British Academic Press and New York: Macmillan
Kitschelt, H, “Comparative Historical Research and Rational Choice Theory: The Case 
of Transitions to Democracy”, Theory and Society. 22 (June 1993): 413-27.
Koerner, Andrei (1999) O Debate sobre a Reforma Judiciaria in Novos Estudos 
CEBRAP: Centro Brasileiro de Analise e Planeiamento. NO. 54, July, p. 5-26.
257
Kornblith, Miriam (1997) "Legitimacy and the Reform Agenda in Venezuela" in 
Canache, Damarys and Michael R. Kulisheck (eds.) (1998) Reinventing Legitimacy. 
Democracy and Political Change in Venezuela. Greenwood Press, p.3-20.
Krauze, Enrique (2006) Conferencia Magistral, Curso Interamericano de Elecciones y 
Democracia, 24 April 2006.
Kritz J. Neil (Ed) (1995) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with 
Former Regimes, vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press.
Kutler, Stanley I (1968) Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press.
Lamounier, Bolivar (1994), “Brazil: Toward Parliamentarism?” in Juan J. Linz and 
Arturo Valenzuela (Eds), The Failure of Presidential Democracy. .Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press p. 253-293
— (1996) “Brazil: the hyperactive Paralysis Syndrome” in Jorge Dominguez and A. 
Lowenthal (Eds) Constructing Democratic Governance. Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the 1990s. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, p. 166-187.
Larkins, Christopher M. (1996a) “Judicial Independence and Democratization: A 
Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis, in the American Journal of Comparative Law. 44: 
605-626.
— (1996b). Judicial Independence and Democratization: Power and Accountability in 
New Democracies. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
— (1998) “The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina”, in Comparative 
Politics. Vol. 3, n° 4, Julio 1998.
Lassalle, Ferdinand (1997) ;.Que es una constitucion?. Mexico: Ediciones Coyoacan.
Lawson, Chappel (2000) “Democratization and Authoritarian Enclaves in Mexico” in 
Mexican Studies.(Estudios Mexicanos). Vol. No 16 (2), Summer 2000, University of 
California Press, pp.267-287
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (1996) “Halfway to Reform: The World Bank and 
the Venezuelan Justice System.” Joint report by the Lawyers Committee for Human 
Rights and the Venezuelan Program for Human Rights Education and Action. 
Available: www.lchr.org/pubs/halfwav.htm
Levine, D.H. (2002) “The Decline and Fall of Democracy in Venezuela: Ten Theses” in 
Bulletin of Latin American Research. April 2002, vol. 21, no. 2, (22)
Blackwell Publishers Ltd, Oxford, UK and Boston, USA , pp. 248-269.
Lijphart, Arend. (1977), Democracy in Plural Societies: a Comparative Exploration. 
New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
— (1984), Democracies: Patterns of Maioritarian and Consensus Government in 
Twentv-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.
258
—  (1992) Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
—  (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press
Linz, Juan J. (1990) "The Perils of Presidentialism", in Journal of Democracy Vol. 1 no 
2 (Winter 1990): 51-69.
Linz, Juan and Armando de Miguel (1966) “Within Nation Differences and 
Comparisons: the Eight Spains” in R Merritt and S. Rokkan (Eds), Comparing Nations: 
The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross- National Research. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, pp 267-319.
Linz, Juan and Seymour Lipset (1989), Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin 
America. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Linz, Juan and Arturo Valenzuela (1994) The Failure of Presidential Democracy. 
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan (1996) Problems of Democratic Transitions and 
Consolidation. Southern Europe. South America and Post-Communist Europe. 
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
— (1997) “Toward Consolidated Democracies” in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, 
Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (eds.) Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies. 
Themes and Perspectives. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, pp. 14-39.
Loaeza, Soledad (1996) Federalismo v Congreso en el Cambio Politico de Mexico. 
Ciudad de Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica
— (1999a) El Partido Accion Nacional: la laroa marcha. 1939-1994. Qposicion Leal v 
Partido de Protesta. Ciudad de Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica.
— (1999b) “La crisis electoral del 6 de julio de 1988” In: Revista Mexicana de 
Sociologia. Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de 
Mexico, Vol. 61, Num. 3, julio-septiembre, pp. 163-182
— (2000) “Uncertainty in Mexico’s Protracted Transition: The National Action Party and 
its Aversion to Risk" in Democratization. Vol. 7, No 3, autumn 2000, pp.93-116.
Lopez Ayllon Sergio and Hector Fix Fierro (2000) Tan Cerca. Tan Leios! Estado de 
Derecho v Cambio Juridico en Mexico (1970-1999). Universidad Nacional Autonoma 
de M&xico, Mexico
— (2003) Tan Cerca, Tan Lejos!"Estado de Derecho y Cambio Juridico en Mexico 
(1970-2000)” en Fix-Fierro, Hector, Lawrence Friedman y Rogelio Perez Perdomo, 
Cultures iuridicas latinas de Europa v America en tiempos de Globalization. Mexico 
D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico.
Lujambio, Alonso (1995), “De la hegemonfa a las alternativas. Disenos institucionales y 
el futuro de los partidos politicos en Mexico” in Politica v Gobierno. II, Centro de 
Investigacion y Docencia Economicas, Mexico.
259
— (1996), Federalismo v Conqreso en el cambio politico de Mexico, Instituto de 
Investigaciones Jundicas, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico.
— (2000) El Poder Compartido: Un ensavo sobre la Democratization Mexicana. 
Ciudad de Mexico: Editorial Oceano.
Magaloni, Beatriz (2003) “Authoritarianism, Democracy and the Supreme Court: 
Horizontal Exchange and the Rule of Law in Mexico” In Mainwaring, Scott and 
Christopher Welna (Eds) Democratic accountability in Latin America. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 266-306.
Magaloni, Beatriz and Arianna Sanchez. (2001). “Empowering Courts as Constitutional 
Veto Players: Presidential Delegation and the New Mexican Supreme Court”, paper 
presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 
Washington D.C.
— (2006) “An Authoritarian Enclave? The Supreme Court in Mexico’s emerging 
democracy. Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association. Philadelphia, PA (2 September 2006).
Mainwaring, Scott (1989) “Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation”: 
Theoretical and Comparative Issues. Working Paper 130, Kelloa Institute. University of 
Notre Dame.
— (1997), “Multipartism, Robust Federalism and Presidentialism in Brazil” in 
Mainwaring Scott and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Presidentialism and democracy in 
Latin America. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 55-109. 
Mainwaring Scott, Guillermo O’Donnell and J.S. Valenzuela. (1992). Issues in 
Democratic Consolidation: the New South American Democracies in Comparative 
Perspective. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press and Kellogg Institute.
Mainwaring, Scott and Donald Share (1986), “Transitions Through Transactions: 
Democratization in Brazil and Spain” in Selcher, Wayne (ed.), Political Liberalization in 
Brazil. Boulder: Westview Press.
Mainwaring, Scott and Christopher Welna (Eds) (2003) Democratic accountability in 
Latin America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Malbry, Donald J (1973) Mexico’s Action Nacional: A Catholic Alternative to 
Revolution. Nueva York: Syracuse University Press.
Manin, Bernard. (1997). “Checks, balances and boundaries: the separation of powers 
in the constitutional debate of 1787”, in Biancamaria Fontana (ed.), The Invention of 
the Modern Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Maravall, Jose Maria and Adam Przeworski (2003a) Democracy and the Rule of Law 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press .
Maravall, Jose Maria and Adam Przeworski. (2003a). “Introduction” in Adam 
Przeworski and Jose Marfa Maravall (Eds.), Democracy and the Rule of Law. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
260
Martinez Neira, Nestor Humberto (1996) Judicial Councils in Latin America. 
Annotations on Judicial Self-government. Washington D.C: Inter-American
Development Bank.
Martz, John and David Myers, (Eds). (1985) Venezuela. The Democratic experience. 
Santa Barbara :Greenwood Publishing Group.
McAdams, A. James (ed.) (1997) Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New 
Democracies. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Medina Torres, Luis Eduardo (2006) “La Justicia Electoral Mexicana y la Anulacion de 
los Comicios, 1996-2005, Justice in Mexico” Working Paper Series, Issue Number 4.
Mendez, Juan E., Guillermo O'Donnell, and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro (Eds) (1998), The 
(Un) Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America. Notre Dame; University of 
Notre Dame Press.
Middlebrook, Kevin J. (1986a) “Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: The 
Case of Mexico” in O’Donnell, Guillermo. Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence 
Whitehead Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
— (1986b) Political Liberalization in an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Mexico’ in 
O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (eds.) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democratic Regimes Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press pp. 123-45,.
— (Ed.) (2001) Party Politics and the Struggle for Democracy in Mexico: National and 
State-level Analyses of the Partido Accidn Nacional. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican 
Studies.
Miller, Jonathan (2002) “Control Judicial de Constitucionalidad y Estabilidad 
Constitucional: Sociologia del Modelo Estadounidense y su Colapso en Argentina” in 
Boletm del Instituto Internacional de Gobernabilidad: Proqrama de las Naciones 
Unidas para el Desarrollo No 107, 13 Agosto
Mizrahi, Yemile (1994), “Pressuring the Center: Opposition Governments and 
Federalism in Mexico”. Centro de Investigacion v Docencia Economicas. Division de 
Estudios Politicos. Documento de Trabajo No. 71.
— (1995) “Entrepreneurs in the Opposition: Modes of Political Participation in 
Chihuahua" in Victoria Rodriguez and Peter Ward, Opposition Government in Mexico. 
New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, pp. 81-96
Moctezuma-Barragcin Javier (1994), Jos6 Marla lolesias v la Justicia Electoral. Ciudad 
de Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico.
Molinar Horcaditas, Juan (1987) “Regreso a Chihuahua" in Nexos. Number 11, March 
1987. Ciudad de Mexico: Grupo Nexos.
(1991) El tiempo de la leoitimidad. Elecciones. Autoritarismo v Democracia en 
Mexico. Mexico City: Editorial Cal y Arena.
261
— (1996). “Changing the Balance of Power in a Hegemonic Party System: The Case of 
Mexico”, in Arend Lijphart and Carlos Weismann (eds.), Institutional Design in New 
Democracies. Boulder: Westview Press.
Montesquieu. 1977 [1748], The Spirit of the Laws (A Compendium Of The First English 
Edition. Edited With An Introduction By David Wallace Carrithers). London: University 
of California Press.
Moore, Barrington (1967) Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and 
Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. London: Allen Lane, the Penguin Press.
Morales Q. Waltraud and Corinne B Young (1999) “Mexico: Revolution in the 
Revolution?” in Rimanelli, Marco (Ed) Comparative Democratization and Peaceful 
Change in Single-Party Dominant Countries. New York: St. Martin Press p.291-308.
Morris, Stephen (1995), Political Reformism in Mexico: an Overview of Contemporary 
Mexican Politics. Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers.
Mustapic, Ana Maria (2002) “Oscillating Relations: President and Congress in 
Argentina” in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, Legislative Politics in Latin America. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.23-47.
Nacif, Benito (2002). “Understanding Party Discipline in the Mexican Chamber of 
Deputies: The Centralized Party Model”, in Benito Nacif and Scott Morgenstern (eds.), 
Legislative Politics in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Navia, Patricio, and Julio Rios-Figueroa (2005) “The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic 
of Latin America”, Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 38, No. 2, 189-217
Nazareno, Julio (1999) “Citizen Participation in Judicial Processes” in Andres Rigo and 
Waleed Haider (Eds) Judicial Challenges in the New Millennium. Proceedings of the 
Second Ibero-American of Supreme Courts and Tribunals of Justice. World Bank 
Technical Paper No. 450, pp. 39- 42.
Nino, Carlos (1993) “On the Exercise of Judicial Review in Argentina” in Stotzky, Irwin 
(ed.) Transition to Democracy in Latin America. Boulder, Westview Press.
North, Douglass Cecil (1990) Institutions. Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
— (1995) “The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development” in J. Harris, 
J. Hunter and Lewis Colin (Eds) The New Institutional Economics and Third World 
Development. London, Routledge, pp. 17-27
Nuncio, Abraham and Luis Lauro Garza (1992) “Nuevo Leon: Reforma Politica y Poder 
Desigual 1980-1990” in Tonatiuh Guillen Lopez, (Ed). Frontera norte: una decada de 
politica electoral. Tijuana: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, pp. 187-235.
O'Donnell, Guillermo A. (1994) ‘Delegative Democracy.’ In Journal of Democracy. 
Volume 5, Number 1: 55-69.
262
— (1996). ‘Illusions About Consolidation.’ In Journal of Democracy. Volume 7, Number 
2: 34-51.
— (1998a) “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 9: 
112-126.
— (1998b) “Polyarchies and the (un)rule of law in Latin America”, In: Juan Mendez, 
Guillermo O'Donnell, and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, eds., The Rule of Law and the 
Underprivileged in Latin America. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
— (2000) “The Judiciary and the Rule of law” in Journal of Democracy 11 (1) (January): 
pp 25-31
O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (1986) 
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democracies (Volume 4) Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
Orozco, Jose de Jesus (2009) “Evolution of the Mexican electoral system”, in Mundo 
Electoral. Electoral World. Year 2, No. 5.
Ortiz Pinchetti, Francisco (2004) “Sesion extraordinaria de los ministros, nueve dlas 
despues de las elecciones. Se enfrenta Barrio a un fallo ‘politizado’ de la Suprema 
Corte: ’No lo acatare’, dice el gobernador” Proceso 11 de Septiembre Ciudad de 
Mexico: Editorial Proceso.
Ortuno Burgoa, Roberto Ignacio (2008) Ignacio Buraoa Orihuela El Maestro Vive. 
Editorial Porrua, Mexico.
Pacelle, Richard L. Jr. (2002) The Role of the Supreme Court in American Politics. The 
Least Dangerous Branch?. Westview Press, Athens and London.
Partido Accidn Nacional (1995) The Democratic Plea of PAN in Yucatan. Ciudad de 
Mexico: PAN
Pasquino, Pasquale (2001). “One and Three: Separation of Powers and the 
Independence of the Judiciary in the Italian Constitution”, in John A. Ferejohn, Jack N. 
Rakove, and Jonathan Riley. Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Pp ?
Patino Camarena, Javier (1996), Derecho Electoral Mexicano. Ciudad de Mexico: 
Editorial Constitucionalista.
Pempel, T.J., (1996) Uncommon Democracies. The One-Partv Dominant Regimes. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Philip, George (1999) ’’Democracy and State Bias in Latin America: some lessons from 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela," Democratization Vol. 6 no. 4. (Winter 1999).
— (2002) “The Presidency, the Parties and Democratization in Mexico," 
Democratization Vol. 9 no 3 (autumn 2002).
— (2003) Democracy in Latin America: Surviving Conflict and Crisis?. Cambridge: 
Polity.
263
Poitras, Guy (1998) “Mexico’s Problematic Transition to Democracy” in Philip Kelly 
(ed.) Assessing Democracy in Latin America. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 63-75.
Poot, Efrain Eric (1994) “Por Segunda Ocasion Merida se Tino de Azul (el Triunfo de 
Accion Nacional en Noviembre de 1990)” in Jorge Alonso and Jaime Tamayo (coord) 
Elecciones con alternativas. Alaunas Experiencias en la Republica Mexicana. Ciudad 
de Mexico: Jornada Ediciones y Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en 
Humanidades, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico.
Posner, Richard (1986) Economic Analysis and Law. Boston: Brown Little.
Presidencia de la Republica (2009). Discurso del Presidente Felipe Calderon Hinojosa 
Calderon durante el evento Tres Anos de Gobierno. 29 November 2009, Ciudad de 
Mexico: Presidencia de la Republica.
Prillaman, William C. (2000) The Judiciary and Democratic Decay in Latin America. 
Declining Confidence in the Rule of Law. London: Praeger.
Prud’homme, Jean-Francois (1999) ‘State Electoral Conflicts and National Interparty 
Relations in Mexico’, in Wayne Cornelius (et al.) Subnational Politics and 
Democratization in Mexico Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers pp. 343-360.
Przewoski, Adam (1991), Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms 
in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Przewoski, Adam (1995) Sustainable Democracy. New York, Cambridge University 
Press.
— (2002). “Foreword” in Robert Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship. Pinochet, 
the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rakove and Jonathan Riley (2001), Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ramirez Luis Alfonso (1993) Sociedad v Poblacion Urbana en Yucatan 1950-1989. 
Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico.
Remes, Alain de (2000) Base de Datos Electoral a Nivel Municipal 1980-1999. 
Actualization del propio autor en 2000 de acuerdo a los datos prooorcionados por los 
institutos electorales estatales. Ciudad de Mexico: Centro de Investigacion y Docencia 
Economicas.
Rey Juan Carlos (1997) "Corruption and Political Illegitimacy in Venezuelan 
Democracy" in Canache, Damarys and Michael R. Kulisheck (eds.) (1998) Reinventing 
Legitimacy. Democracy and Political Change in Venezuela. Greenwood Press, p .IIS - 
135.
Richardson, Kristy (2007) “A definition of judicial Independence” in The University of 
New England Law Journal, vol. 4, Num.1.
Riggs, Fred W  (1975) “Federalism” in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds.) Handbook of 
Political Science. 5: Governmental Institutions and Processes. 93-172. Reading, Mass: 
Addison-Wesley.
— (1988) "The Survival of Presidentialism in America: Para-constitutional practices” in 
International Political Science Review. Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 247-278.
264
Riker, William H. (1962) The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, Yale University 
Press.
— (1964) Federalism: Origin. Operation. Significance. Boston: Little Brown.
— (1975) “Federalism” in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds.) Handbook of Political 
Science. 5: Governmental Institutions and Processes. Reading, Mass: Addison- 
Wesley, pp. 93-172.
Rimanelli, Marco (Ed) (1999) Comparative Democratization and Peaceful Change in 
Single-Party Dominant Countries. St. Martin Press, New York.
Rios Figueroa, Julio (2004) “El surgimiento de un poder judicial efectivo en Mexico: 
gobierno dividido y toma de decisiones en la Suprema Corte de Justicia 1994-2002”, in 
Ensavos. El Poder Judicial en la transicidn v consolidacidn democratica en Mexico. 
Octavo Certamen Nacional de Ensayo Francisco I. Madero, Ciudad de Mexico: 
Instituto Federal Electoral.
— (2007) “Fragmentation of Power and the Emergence of an Effective Judiciary in 
Mexico, 1994-2002”, in Latin American Politics & Society. Volume 49, Number 1, 
Spring 2007, pp. 31-57.
Rlos-Figueroa, Julio and Mathew M. Taylor (2006) “International Determinants of the 
Judicialisation of Policy in Brazil and Mexico” in Journal of Latin American Studies. 
38:4:739-766. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. United Kingdom.
Rodriguez, Victoria (1997) Descentralization in Mexico. From Reforma Municipal to 
Solidaridad to Nuevo Federalismo. Boulder: Westview Press.
— (1998a) “Opening the Electoral Space in Mexico: The Rise of the Opposition at the 
State and Local Levels” in Dietz A. Henry and Shidlo (eds.) Urban Elections in 
Democratic Latin America. San Diego: Scholarly Resources Inc.pp. 163-197.
— (1998b) Recasting Federalism in Mexico in Publius: The Journal of Federalism. 28 
(1): 235-254.
Rodriguez, Victoria and Peter Ward (1994) Poilitical Change in Baia California. 
Democracy in the making? La Jolla: Center for US-Mexican Studies.
— (1995) Opposition Government in Mexico. New Mexico: University of New Mexico 
Press.
Rosenberg, Gerald N. (1992). “Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political 
Power”, The Review of Politics, vol. 54, Summer.
Rubio, Luis, Beatriz Magaloni and Edna Jaime (Coord.) (1994) A la Puerta de la Lev: El 
Estado de Derecho en Mexico. Ciudad de Mexico: Centro de Investigacion para el 
Desarrollo, A.C. (CIDAC): Center of Research for Development.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens (1991) 
Capitalist development and democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Ryden, David K. ed. (2000) The US Supreme Court and the Electoral Processes. 
Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
265
Sadek, Maria Tereza (1995) “Institutional Fragility and Judicial Problems in Brazil” in 
D’Alva Kinzo Maria and Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Growth and Development in Brazil: 
Cardoso’s Real Challenge. London: The Institute of Latin American Studies, pp. 159- 
170
Samuels, David (2002a) “Progressive Ambition, Federalism, and Pork-Barreling in 
Brazil” in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, Legislative Politics in Latin America. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 315-340.
— (2002b) “Fiscal Straightjacket: The Political Economy of Macroeconomic Reform in 
Brazil 1995-2002”, 
http://www.polisci.umn.edu/facultv/dsamuels/Fiscal%20Straightiacket.pdf
Sanchez Cordero, Olga (2001) “El Poder Judicial de la Federation” in Ciudad de 
Mexico: Editorial Este Pals.. April, Mexico, D.F.
Sartori, Giovanni (1966),"Opposition and Control Problems in Prospects" in 
Government and Opposition. Vol. I, No. 1.
Schedler, Andreas, (1998) “What is Democratic Consolidation?” in Journal of 
Democracy. Volume 9, Number 2, April 1998, pp. 91-107.
Schedler, Andreas, Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (1999) The Self-Restraining 
State. Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
London.
Schmitter, Philippe (1995), “Democracy’s Future: More Liberal, Preliberal or 
Postliberal”, Journal of Democracy 6. no. 1: 15-22.
Schwarz, C (1975) “Judges under the Shadow: Judicial Independence in the United 
States and Mexico” in Karst, Kenneth and Keith Rossen Law and Development in Latin 
America. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Seider, Rachel, Line Schjolden, and Alan Angell, (Eds) (2005) The Judicialization of 
Politics in Latin America. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Serie C, Estudios Historicos, 
Num. 24, Mexico
Shapiro Martin (2002) “Political Jurisprudence” in Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet. On 
Law. Politics and Judicialization. Oxford University Press, pp. 19-54.
— (1988) Who Guards the Guardians? Judicial Control of Administration, The 
University of Georgia Press, Athens and London.
Shidlo, Gil (1998) “Local Urban Elections in Democratic Brazil” in Dietz A. Henry and 
Shidlo (eds.) Urban Elections in Democratic Latin America. Scholarly Resources Inc, 
USA, p. 63-90.
Shirk, David (1999) “New Federalism in Mexico. Implications for Baja California and the 
Cross-Border Region,” Briefing paper. University of California. San Diego. July 1999.
Skaar, Elin (2003) Un Analisis de las Reformas Judiciales en Argentina. Chile v 
Uruguay. America Latina Hov. 34, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, pp. 147-186.
Skidmore, Thomas (1988) The Politics of military Rule in Brazil. 1964-85. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
266
Soberanes Fernandez, Jose Luis (1992) El Poder Judicial Federal en el Sialo XIX 
(Notas para su estudio). Instituto de investigaciones Juridicas, Universidad Nacional 
Autonoma de Mexico.
Sosa, Cecilia (1999a) “Autonomy and Budgetary Independence and Education in 
Ibero-America” in Andres Rigo and Waleed Haider (Eds) Judicial Challenges in the 
New Millennium. Proceedings of the Second Ibero-American of Supreme Courts and 
Tribunals of Justice. World Bank Technical Paper No. 450, pp. 25- 34.
— (1999b) “Reform Challenges in Ibero-America” in Andres Rigo and Waleed Haider 
(Eds) Judicial Challenges in the New Millennium. Proceedings of the Second Ibero- 
American of Supreme Courts and Tribunals of Justice. World Bank Technical Paper 
No. 450, pp. 15-17.
— (1997) Constitutional Engineering in Brazil. The Politics of Federalism and 
Decentralization. Macmillan Press, New York.
Spiller, Pablo and Rafael Gely. (1990) “A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court 
Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases”, Journal 
of Law. Economics and Organization, vol. 6, no. 2.
Staton, Jeffrey (2002a). “Judicial Decision-Making and Public Authority Compliance: 
The Role of Public Support in the Mexican Separation of Powers System”, PhD 
Dissertation, Washington University, St. Louis.
— (2004) "When Judges go Public: The selective promotion of case results on the 
Mexican Supreme Court”. The Florida State university, Typescript. February 24, 2004.
— (forthcoming 2010) Judicial Power and Strategic Communication in Mexico. New 
York: Cambridge University Press
Staton Jeffrey and Julio Rios Figueroa (2007) “Lobbying for Judicial Reform: The Role 
of the Mexican Supreme Court in Institutional Selection” in Cornelius, Wayne and 
David A. Shirk, Reforming the Administration of Justice in Mexico. South Bend: Notre 
Dame University.
— (2008) “Unpacking the Rule of Law: A Review of Judicial Independence Measures in 
Political Concepts. Committee on Concepts and Methods. Working Paper Series, 21, 
September 2008.
Staton, Jeffrey and Mark Strahan. (2002b). “The Emergence of an Effective 
Constitutional Court”. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association.
Stepan, Alfred (1999) “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model” in Journal 
of Democracy. 10.4, pp. 19-34.
— (2001) “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, (Multi) Nationalism, and 
Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism”. In Arguing Comparative Politics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Stepan, Alfred and Cindy Skach (1993) “Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic 
Consolidation: Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism”. World Politics, Vo. 46, pp. 1- 
22 .
267
Stephen D. Morris (1995), Political reformism in Mexico: an overview of contemporary 
Mexican politics. Boulder, Colorado.
Stotzky, Irvin (Ed) (1993) Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the 
Judiciary. Boulder, Westview Press.
Stotzky, Irwin and Carlos S Nino (1993) The Difficulties of the Transition Process,’ in 
Stotzky, Irvin (1993), Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the 
Judiciary. Boulder, Westview Press.
Sullivan, Keith (2002) “Mexican Airport Protesters Release Hostages” in The 
Washington Post (Washington. D.C.), 16 July, p. A12.
Surrency, Erwin C. (1987) History of the Federal Courts. New York: Oceana 
Publications, Inc.
Tarr, G. Alan and Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter (1988) State Supreme Courts in State and 
Nation. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Tate, C. Neal (2007) “The literature of Comparative Judicial Politics: A 118 year survey” 
(Version of December 13, 2007), Prepared for presentation on the panel "Epistemology 
and Methodology in the Field of Comparative Judicial Studies" of Research Committee 
09 Comparative Judicial Studies, at the 20th World Congress of the International 
Political Science Association, Fukuoka, Japan, July 10, 2006.
Tate, C. Neal and Torbjorn Vallinder, editors (1995) The Global Expansion of Judicial 
Power. New York: New York University Press.
Tavera-Fenollosa, Ligia (1999) “The Movimiento de Damnificados: Democratic 
Transformation of Citizenry and Government in Mexico City” in Cornelius, Wayne, Todd
Taylor, Michael C. (1997). “Why No Rule of Law in Mexico? Explaining the Weakness 
of Mexico’s Judicial Branch”, New Mexico Law Review, vol. 27, no. 1, Winter.The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 351- 381.
Tocqueville, Alexis de (..... ) (1966) Democracy in America. New York: Harper and
Row.
Torres Espinosa, Eduardo (2007) “El Poder Judicial en Mexico y la nueva correlation 
de fuerzas entre los poderes publicos 1994-2003” en Gabriel Corona Armenta, Los 
Poderes Federales en la Consolidacion Democratica de Mexico. Instituto de 
Investigaciones Sociales, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, Mexico
Ungar, Mark (2002) Elusive Reform: Democracy and the Rule of Law in Latin America. 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO.
Valenzuela, Arturo (1989) “Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Democratic 
Regime” in Larry Diamond, Linz and Lipset (Eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: 
Latin America. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
Vanberg, Georg (2000) “Establishing Judicial Independence in West Germany. The 
impact of Opinion Leadership and the Separation of Powers”, Comparative Politics, vol. 
32, no. 3.
268
Vega Hernandez, Rodolfo (2003) La independencia del Poder Judicial. Ciudad de 
Mexico Coleccion FUNDAP. Derecho, Administration y Politica.
Velloso, Carlos (1999) “Judicial Management Information Systems” in Andres Rigo and 
Waleed Haider (Eds) Judicial Challenges in the New Millennium. Proceedings of the 
Second Ibero-American of Supreme Courts and Tribunals of Justice. World Bank 
Technical Paper No. 450, pp. 35- 36.
Voigt, Melvin John (1961) Change in Latin America: The Mexican and Cuban 
Revolutions. Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press
Von Mettenheim, Kurt (1997) “Brazilian Presidentialism: Shifting Comparative 
Perspectives from Europe to the Americas, in Von Mettenheim, Kurt (1997) 
Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics. Comparing Regional and National 
Contexts. The John Hopkins University Press, pp. 136-158.
Walker, Christopher Jay (2006) "Toward Democratic Consolidation? The Argentine 
Supreme Court, Judicial Independence, and the Rule of Law", Florida Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 18, pp. 745-806.
— (2007) "Judicial Reform in Latin America: is Judicial Independence Enough to (Re-) 
Build the Rule of Law in Argentina?” Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the 
Americas. September 2007
Ward, Peter (1998) Mexico City, Revised Second Edition. Chichester, Sussex: John 
Wiley & Sons (World Cities Series)
Ward, Peter and Elizabeth Durden (2002) “Government and Democracy in Mexico’s 
Federal District, 1997-2001: Cardenas, the PRD and the Curate’s Egg” in Bulletin of 
Latin American Research. Volume 21, Number 1: 1 -39.
Ward, Peter and Victoria Rodriguez (1999), “New Federalism and State Government in 
Mexico,” US-Mexican Policy Studies Program, Policy Report No. 9, the University of 
Texas at Austin, Texas.
Weldon, Jeffrey (1997), The Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico” in 
Mainwaring Scott and M Shugart (1997), Presidentialism and democracy in Latin 
America. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 225-258.
Wesson, Robert and David Fleischer (1983) Brazil in Transition. New York, Praeger 
Publishers.
Wheare, K.C. (1946), Federal Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Whitehead Laurence (1994) ‘Prospects for a Transition from Authoritarian Rule in 
Mexico’ In: Maria Lorena Cook (et al.) The Politics of Economic Restructuring: State- 
Societv Relations and Regime Change in Mexico. San Diego
— (Ed) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain 
Democratic Regimes. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, pp. 123-147.
— (2002) “Reforms: Mexico and Colombia” in Garreton, Manuel Antonio and Edward 
Newman (2001) Democracy in Latin America. (Re) Constructing Political Society. 
United Nations University Press, pp.66-98
269
Whitehead, Laurence (2002) Democratization. Theory and Practice. Oxford University 
Press.
Wildavsky, Aaron (1961) “Party Discipline Under Federalism” in Social Research. 
XXVIII.
Wynia, Gary (1995) "Argentina’s New Democracy: Presidential Power and Legislative 
Limits” in David Close (Ed) Legislatures and the New Democracies in Latin America, 
p.71-87.
Yamin, Alicia Eli, and Ma. Pilar Noriega. 1999. “The Absence of the Rule of Law in 
Mexico: Diagnosis and Implications for a Mexican Transition to Democracy”, Lovola of 
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal, vol. 21, no. 3, July.
Yemile Mizrahi, (2001) Making Mexican federalism work: a year after the election of 
Vicente Fox” in Federations. Vol. 2, No. 1 (November 2001).
— (1997) “Pressuring the Center: Opposition Governments and Federalism in Mexico.” 
No 71, CIDE, Mexico.
Zedillo, Ernesto (1994) “El Marco del Nuevo Federalismo,” in Gaceta Mexicana de 
Administracidn POblica Estatal v Municipal. Speech given in Sonora, 19 December
1994.
Zovatto, Daniel G. 2001. “Valores, percepciones y actitudes hacia la democracia. Una 




Centro de Investigacion para el Desarrollo, A.C.: Center of Research for Development 
(CIDAC). Data on composition of state congresses.
Consulta Mitofsky (htto://www.mitofskv.com.mx/)
Consulta Mitofsky, Confianza en las Instituciones. Encuesta Nacional en Viviendas, 31 
October 2008. http://72.52.156.225/Estudio.aspx?Estudio=confianza-instituciones
Instituto Federal Electoral, (IFE). Data on state and federal elections, www.ife.orq.mx
IFE (1995) 1994 tu eleccion. Memoria del Proceso Electoral Federal.
Local Electoral Institutes:
Instituto Electoral de Baja California http://ieebc.org.mx/
Instituto Electoral de Chihuhua, www.ieechihuahua.org.mx/
Instituto Electoral del Distrito Federal, www.iedf.org.mx.
Instituto Electoral de Nuevo Leon, http://www.cee-nl.org.mx/
Instituto Electoral de Oaxaca, www.iee-oax.org.mx 
Instituto Electoral de Puebla, http://www.ieepuebla.org.mx 
Instituto Electoral de Tabasco,
http://www.iepct.org.mx/result_electorales.php?seccion=5 
Instituto Electoral de Tamaulipas, http:www.ietam.org.mx/
Instituto Electoral de Yucatan, www.ipepac.org.mx
Government of Quintana Roo, Historia de Quintana Roo, www.quintanaroo.qob.mx. 
Parametria, June 2005. (www.parametria.com.mxJ)
Reforma, Poll, 18 December 2004
OFFICIAL DATA 
CONGRESS
Boletln de Prensa 1528, Camara de Diputados, 15 December 2002.
Boletln de Prensa 48, Senado de la Republica, 18 July 2001.
Camara de Diputados, LVII Legislatura (2000) Informe de Actividades de la LVII 
Legislatura. Septiembre de 1997-Agosto de 2000, Information Legislativa, Abril 
2000.
Dictamen del Senado, Judicial Reform, 16 December 1994
Fundacion Miguel Estrada Iturbide (2001) Prontuario Estadistico. Segundo Periodo 
Ordinario de Sesiones del Primer Ano de Ejercicio de la LVII I Legislatura. 
Coordinacion de informatica. Information Legislativa, Marzo-Abril 2001.
Gaceta Parlamentaria, several issues (http://gaceta.cddhcu.qob.mx)
Gaceta Parlamentaria del Senado, No. 68, Year 2009,10 December 2009.
Gaceta Parlamentaria del Senado, No. 35, Year 2004,19 February 2004.
Gaceta Parlamentaria del Senado, Asuntos pendientes de la sesion vespertina del 
Jueves 27 de Noviembre 2003, Eleccion por cedula de los candidatos propuestos en la 
segunda terna, a ministros de la SCJN, 27 November 2003.
http://www.senado.gob.mx/content/sp/sp/content/gaceta/content/ordinaria/59/content/2
7/index.html
Iniciativa con proyecto de decreto que reforma los Artlculos 94, 100, 103, 105, 107 y
112 de la Constitucibn Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos y expide la Ley de
Amparo, 22 March 2004
http://www.senado.gob.mx/content/sp/com/content/decreto_amparo.pdf 
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Cbrdova Vianello, Lorenzo (2008) La (e)lecci6n presidencial 2006. Los retos del 
Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federacibn, TEPJF, Mexico.
TEPJF (2006) ‘Aprueba Sala Superior del TEPJF, dictamen relativo al cbmputo final de 
la eleccion de Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,’ Boletln de Prensa No 
081/2006, 5 September.
LAWS
Codigo Federal de Instituciones y Procedimientos Electorales (COFIPE) 
(http://www.diputados.aob.mx/LevesBiblio/pdf/COFIPE.pdf)
Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
Organic Law of the Judicial Power of the Federation
Ley General del Sistema de Medios de Impugnacion en Materia Electoral (General 
Law on the System of Means of Challenging Electoral Issues)
Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacion para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2000 
Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacion para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2001 
Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacibn para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2002 
Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacion para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2003 
Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacion para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2004 
Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacion para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2005 
Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacibn para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2006 
Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacibn para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2007 
Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacibn para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2008 
Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacibn para el Ejercicio Fiscal 2009
Ley de Amparo (http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/20.pdf)
272
Ley Federal de Presupuesto y Responsabilidad Hacendaria
(http://www.djputados.qob. mx/LevesBiblio/pdf/LFPRH. pdf)
Ley de Presupuesto, Contabilidad y Gasto Publico Federal (abrogada 30 March 2006)
Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Informacibn 
(http://www.ifai.org.mx/transparencia/LFTAIPG.pdf)
SUPREME COURT
Alex, Portal de Estadistica Judicial, Suprema Corte de Justicia, Controversias 
Constitucionales (http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/alex/).
CD, Jurisprudencia y Criterios Relevantes en Materia de Controversias 
Constitucionales, SCJN, Mexico 2009.
CD, Relevant Decisions of the Mexican Supreme Court 2003-2006, SCJN, Mexico 
2007.
Comunicado de Prensa 503, 6 February 2002.
Decree that reforms constitutional articles: 76, section VIII, 89 section XVIII, Arts 94 to 
101, Art 103 to 107, Art 110 and 111, Diario Oficial de la Federacion, 30 December
1994,
Decree that reforms the 1988 Organic Law of the Judiciary of the Federation (Ley 
OrgSnica del Poder Judicial de la Federacidn), Diario Oficial de la Federacibn, 26 May
1995.
Libro Blanco de la Reforma Judicial. Una Agenda para la Justicia en Mexico (2006), 
Supreme Court of Justice.
http://www.scjn.gob.mx/RecJur/ReformaJudicial1/LibroBlancoReformaJudicial/Pagin
as/TextoLibroBlanco.aspx
SCJN. Mexican Supreme Court of Justice. (..... ) Summary of the Plenary Sessions,
electronic source: www.scin.qob.mx
Supreme Court of Justice Data Bases.Actividad Jurisdiccional/Consulta de 
Expedientes/Textos de Engrose (http://www2.scin.qob.mx/expedientes/)
Memoria. Visibn de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacion a 180 anos de su 
instalacion (2005) Poder Judicial de la Federacibn, SCJN, Mexico.
Reglamento de la SCJN y del Consejo de la Judicatura Federal para la aplicacion de la 
Ley Federal de transparencia y Acceso a la informacion, 2 April 2004
Relevant Decisions of the Mexican Supreme Court (2006) Poder Judicial de la 
Federacibn, SCJN, Mexico.
SCJN: Mexican Supreme Court of Justice (2001) Contenido de la Version Taouiqrafica 
de la Sesion Publica Extraordinaria del Pleno de la SCJN. celebrada el sabado 7 de 
abril de 2001. Acciones de inconstitucionalidad 18, 19 and 20/2001. Ciudad de Mexico: 
Suprema Corte de Justicia.
Tribunales Constitucionales y Democracia, Mexico, 2008
273
PRESIDENCY
Office of the Presidency, Con la Reforma Politica propuesta, “si es posible cerrar la 
brecha entre politica y ciudadanla”, afirma FCH, 15 December 2009. 
http://www.presidencia.qob.mx/prensa/presidencia/?contenido=51465
Office of the Presidency, 29 November 2009
Office of the Presidency, 1994, 5 December 2002
Office of the Presidency, Political Reform and Electoral Processes in Mexico, 2000.
Presidencia de la Republica. Unidad de la Cronica Presidencial, Las Razones v las 
Obras. Gobierno de Miguel de la Madrid, 1a edicion, 6 tomos, Mexico, Fondo de 
Cultura Economica, 1988
President’s Ernesto Zedillo First State of the Nation Report, September 1st, 1995 
President’s Ernesto Zedillo Second State of the Nation Report, September 1st, 1996 
President’s Ernesto Zedillo Third State of the Nation Report, September 1st, 1997 
President’s Ernesto Zedillo Fourth State of the Nation Report, September 1st, 1998 
President’s Ernesto Zedillo Fifth State of the Nation Report, September 1st, 1999
274
NEWSPAPERS AND SPECIALIST MAGAZINES 
DIARIO DE YUCATAN
Garrido, Luis Javier ‘La negotiation’ in Diario de Yucatan. 7 December 1990, pp.2 and 
3.
DIARIO DE JUAREZ
DIARIO TABASCO HOY (Tabasco daily 1999-2001)
CRONICA (Mexico City daily) 1998-2003
Gonzalez, Alfredo 'Querfan enviar al Ejercito a Yucatan’. Interview with Fernando 
Ojesto Martinez, (17 July 2001).
Cecilia de Los Angeles, ‘Exige el PRI la renuncia del magistrado Fernando Ojesto’ 
Interview with Felipe Soils Acero, PRI Secretary of Elections, (18 July 2001).
“Ma. Del Carmen Alanls rechaza sospechas por su nombramiento; “fue decision 
unanime”, 8 August 2007.
EL NORTE TAMAULIPAS (Tamaulipas daily, 1998-2003)
(http://www.gerardohigareda.org/publicac4.htm)
ESTE PAIS (Mexico City, monthly 2000-2009)
Cosslo, Jose Ramon ‘Cuestiones Constitucionales. El caso Tabasco: ^Democracia vs 
Estado de Derecho?’ in Este Pals. No. 119, (February 2001), pp. 38-41.Ciudad de 
Mexico: Editorial Ciudad de Mexico: Editorial Este Pals.
EXCELSIOR (Mexico City, daily 1995-2009)
Mondragon, Veronica “Poder Judicial defiende gasto ante los diputados” in Excelsior. 6 
November 2009.
EL UNIVERSAL (Mexico City, daily 1993-2009)
Bravo Mena, Luis Felipe “Ciudad Judirez, vlctima de la dictadura del gobernador 
Martinez’, in El Universal. 11 July 2002.
Burgoa, Ignacio, El Universal, 12 December 1994: 1.
Burgoa, Ignacio, El Universal, 20 January 1995:10
Concanaco, El Universal, 8 December 1994: 1
Lizardi, Juan “Aqui entre nos”, El Universal. 22 October 2002.
Sanchez, Hector, El Universal, 26 January 1995
Salgado, Felix, El Universal, 26 January 1995
LA JORNADA (Mexico City, daily 1993-2009)
Aranda, Jesus in an interview with Jose Luis de la Peza, ‘De la Peza: el TEPJF aun no
logra la credibilidad necesaria” (21 September 2000)
Aranda, Jesus ‘Las ternas de candidatos a magistrados electorates se integraron bajo 
presibn’, 23 October 2006.
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2006/10/23/index.php?section=politica&article=008n1pol
Berruecos, Susana ‘Los costos del pacto de Yucatbn. Superconsejo o superviolacion 
de la ley” Masiosare, (8 April 2001), p. 12
---------------------------  ‘Un contrapeso bajo fuego. El Tribunal y la Justicia Electoral’
Masiosare, (14 January 2001), p. 12-14
Becerril, Andrea, La Jornada, 29 November 2009
Calderon, Felipe, La Jornada, 6 December 1994.
Garcia Ramirez, 15 December 1994: 11
Gonzblez Luna, 22 December 1994: 18
Interview with Ignacio Burgoa, 5 August 2002
Mendez and Aranda, La Jornada, 2 December 2009
Rivera, Miguel Angel, 13 December 1994: 4
NEXOS (Mexico City, monthly 1986-2009)
Molinar Juan (1987) “Regreso a Chihuahua” in Nexos. Number 11, March 1987. 
Ciudad de Mbxico: Grupo Nexos
MILENIO (Mexico City, daily 2001-2009)
Miguel Sarrb (Milenio, 2002),
Fernandez Menendez,Jorge “La legalidad solo a medias”, 25 July 2002.
PROCESO (Mexico City weekly 1988-2009)
Cantu, Jesus “TEPJF: La opacidad,” Proceso (Mexico City) No. 1606, 5 August 2007,
Delgado, Alvaro “Asegura el PAN: El TEPJF pararb a Hank Rhon,” Proceso (Mexico 
City) No. 29 June, 2007
Caballero, Alejandro “La institucionalidad electoral, en riesgo”, No. 1345, (12 August 
2002)
Agustin Ambriz and Delgado, ‘El Tribunal Electoral, en el banquillo’ (16 January 2000)
276
Ambriz, Agustin El Poder Judicial va a la deriva: Cossfo Diaz. A cuatro anos de las 
reformas del presidente Zedillo, la Suprema Corte pide nuevas modificaciones.1998. 
Ambriz, Agustin (1996) ‘Los nuevos magistrados electorales seran jueces, no politicos: 
Ortiz Mayagoitia y Castro y Castro’ (27 October 1996)
Ambriz, Agustin (1995) Hav proclividad a la sumision v la dependencia. dice. Los 
Ministros de la Corte deberan resistir la tentacion de ser bufones del Eiecutivo: Azuela. 
Proceso (Mexico City).
Ambriz, Agustin (1995) PRI v PAN eliaieron a los Ministros de la Suprema Corte 
Proceso (Mexico City).
Ambriz, Agustin Ministros de la Suprema Corte esperan mbs reformas que corriian 
intromisiones. duplicidades v deseauilibrios entre los tres poderes Proceso (Mexico 
City).
Ambriz, Agustin No hav auien vele por las oarantlas constitucionales. Por neqliaencia 
del Eiecutivo no se ha inteorado la nueva Suprema Corte de Justicia:
Cabildo, Miguel La Suprema Corte de Justicia volvio a inclinar la cabeza. Los 25 
ministros que serein jubilados, sus historias, sus cameras, sus nombramientos” 
Proceso (Mexico City)
Jarquez Antonio ‘El Presidente del Tribunal Electoral refuta los ‘ataques infundados’ 
del PRD’ (20 December 1998)
Santana, Rosa Palacios and Morita (, ‘La intervencibn del TEPJF en Yucatan puede 
romper el pacto federal: PRI’ (17 December 2000)
REFORMA
Calderon Hinojosa, Felipe (1999) ‘Nuevamente la Barbarie’, 11 July 2002.
Court judge Genaro Gongora Reforma, 19 November 2009: 8
Granados Chapa, Miguel Angel, Plaza Publica, ‘La eficacia del dinero’, 8 April 2003.
---------------------------------‘TRIFE por la transparencia’, 24 June 2002.
---------------------------------‘Tabasco y algo mas’, 5 August 2001.
---------------------------------Tabasco: la hora del PAN’, 9 July 2001
---------------------------------‘Yucatan en Trance, 18 June 2001
---------------------------------‘Tabasco’, 2 April 2001
--------------------------------- ‘Desaparicibn de Poderes’, 3 January 1995
Moreno, Alejandro, “En Crisis de Imagen”, Enfoque-Reforma, 10 November 2002. 
“Perciben Corte politizada”, Reforma Newspaper, 27 November 2003. 
MolinarHorcasitas, Juan, “Reforma Judicial”, 12 December 1994.
THE ECONOMIST (London weekly, 1998-2009)
The Dinosaurs Soffocate. Mexican Politics’, June 2001, p.62
277
“Chavez and the Judges. The Supreme Court discovers its independence. Politics in 
Venezuela”. 17 August 2002, p. 44
“Brazil’s judiciary. Not-so swift justice”, 25 March 2004.
THE WASHINGTON POST (Washington daily, 2001-2009)
Sullivan, Keith (2002) “ Mexican Airport Protesters Release Hostages”, p. A12.
VOZ Y VOTO (Mexico City monthly 2005-2009)
Burgoa, Ignacio (2001) ‘Sentencia Antiyucateca’ in Voz v Voto. No. 96, Feb, Ciudad de 
Mexico Nuevo Horizonte Editores p.50-55.
278
ANNEX I
Case-by-case detailed analysis of constitutional controversies,
1995-2005
NUM CLAIMANT DEFENDANT RULING
2/93 MUN
San Pedro Garza 
Garcia, NL
PAN STATE














Governor, Congress TAMPS 
‘Municipal autonomy: income and 







San Luis Potosi, SLP
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress SLP 






















Governor, Congress NL 










Governor, Congress TAMPS 








San Nicolas de 
Los Garza, NL
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress NL 











Governor, Congress TAMPS 
‘Allocation of resources 











‘Allocation of public resources: 










Governor, Congress TAMPS 











Governor, Congress NL 







San Pedro Garza 
Garcia, NL
PAN STATE LEG 
Congress NL









Governor, Congress NL 







Governor, State Congress 
President and local 
Attorney, TAB
PRI FEDERATION
President; Attorney General (PGR) 






San Luis Rio 
Colorado, SON
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress SON 







San Nicolas de 
Los Garza, NL
PAN STATE










Governor, Congress TAMPS 






























Congress and Governor, MOR 








Supreme Tribunal of Justice CHIH




























President, Lower Chamber 
Governor, Congress YUC 









PRI LOCAL JUDICIARY Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice CHIH
‘Responsibility of public servants: 







PRD LOCAL LEGISLATURE 
Congress TAMPS








Governor, Congress TAMPS 











Governor, Congress OAX 
‘ Functioning of institutions: 







7/96 San Miguel Ahuehuetitlan PAN Same
8/96 San Juan Ihualtepec PAN Same
9/96 Barrio de la Soledad PAN Same
10/96 San Antonio Castillo 
Velasco
PRD Same
11/96 Santo Domingo Ingenio PAN Same
12/96 Villa de Zaachila PRD Same
13/96 Villa de Etla PRD Same
14/96 San Pedro Pochutla PRD Same
15/96 Oaxaca de Juarez PAN Same
16/96 San Pablo Hixtepec PAN Same
17/96 San Juan Bautista 
Tuxtepec
PAN Same
18/96 Huajuapan de Leon PAN Same
19/96 Comitanallo Tehuantepec PRD Same
20/96 Santa Maria Petapa 
Juchiten
PRD Same
21/96 San Jacinto Amilpas PRD Same
22/96 Magdalena Tequisistlan PRD Same
23/96 Loma Bonita PRD Same
24/96 Juchitan de Zaragoza PRD Same
25/96 Santiago Pinotepa 
Nacional
PRD Same
26/96 Matias Romero PAN Same





PRI LOCAL JUDICIARY: Supreme 
















30/96 San Pedro Pochutla PRD Same DISMISS
29/08/96
05/10/98
31/96 San Sebastian Ixcapa PRD Same
32/96 Villa de Etla PRD Same
33/96 San Fco. del Mar PRD Same
34/96 San J. Cacahuatepec PRD Same
35/96 Santiago Jamiltepec PRD* Same
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36/96 Santa Ma. Jalapa de 
Marquez
PRD Same
37/96 Santiago Miltepec PRD Same
38/96 Juchitan de Zaragoza PRD Same
39/96 Mazatlan Villa de Flores * Same
40/96 Santo Domingo Zanatepec PRD Same
41/96 Ayotzintepec PRD Same
42/96 Guevea de Humboldt * Same
43/96 San Jeronimo 
Tlacochahuaya
* Same
44/96 San Pedro Comitancillo PRD Same
45/96 San Miguel Sola de Vega PRD Same
46/96 San Jacinto Tlacotepec * Same
47/96 El Espinal PRD Same
48/96 San Antonio Castillo 
Velasco
PRD Same
49/96 Santo Domingo Tonala PRD Same











53/96 Marfa Eugenia Guevara LOCAL JUDICIARY 






Aguililla and 49 Sindicos of 
other municipalities, MICH
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress MICH 


























Slndico from Tuxtla 
Gutierrez, CHIS
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress CHIS 






Slndico from Tuxtla 
Gutierrez, CHIS
PAN FEDERATION 
President, lower chamber 









“ Appointment of public servants 




















Governor, Congress NL 










Governor, Congress TAMPS 










Governor, Congress TAMPS 











Governor, Congress TAMPS 




















Governor, Congress NL 

















12/97 LOCAL LEGISLATURE 
Congress CHIH PRI AM
STATE
Governor, CHIH







Different municipalities in Yucatan, 
YUC






Tlalnepantla de Baz, 
EDOMEX
PAN STATE

















16/97 MUN - Slndico 
San Luis Rio 
Colorado, SON
PRI FEDERATION/STATE 
Governor, Congress SON 
President


















San Nicolas de los Garza, 
NL
PAN FEDERATION
President; Federal Congress 
Ministries of Finance and Interior. 
Governor, State Congress









19/97 STATE JUDICIARY 























Governor, local Attorney AGS 
‘Municipal autonomy: not complying 





Asoc Residentes San Jose
Insurgentes
FEDERATION
President, Jefe de Gobiemo DF 
















Congress, Contadurla TAMPS 














































Governor, Congress PUE 









Governor, Congress EDOMEX 
‘Responsibility: revocation of 

















Valle de Bravo, EDOMEX
PRI STATE
Governor, Congress EDOMEX 







33/97 STATE LEGISLATURE 
Congress TAB PRI AM
FEDERATION 
Lower Chamber






34/97 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
PJ de GTO
STATE
State Congress GTO 



















PRI LOCAL LEGISLATURE 
State Congress COL 














Local Attorney, OAX PRI
MUN
Oaxaca de Juarez, OAX 
‘ Invasion of spheres of competence: 













Puebla, PUE and others
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress PUE 







5/98 MUN -  Regidores 
Acapulco de Juarez GRO
PRD LOCAL LEGISLATURE 
Congress GRO 











Governor, Congress PUE 




















PRD STATE. Local Ministry of Urban 
Development EDOMEX 









PAN LOCAL LEGISLATURE 
LVII Congreso SLP 

















Oaxaca de Juarez, OAX
PAN FEDERATION/STATE
Ministry of Social Development;
Governor OAX

























Governor, Congress, Local Attorney 
TAMPS









PRD STATE /Governor, Congress, Local 
Attorney TAMPS







17/98 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Judicial Council GTO
STATE





18/98 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Judicial Council MOR
STATE



























Federal General Attorney 








PRI LOCAL JUDICIARY 








San Pedro Cholula, PUE 
•Municipal autonomy: provision of 






PRD LOCAL LEGISLATURE 
Congress TAMPS







Governor, Congress VER 



















PRD LOCAL LEGISLATURE 
Congress TAMPS















San Pedro Cholula, PUE
PAN STATE
Governor, PUE
‘Alllocation of public resources: 





















3/99 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice GTO
FEDERATION 
President, Lower Chamber 








Governor, Congress EDOMEX 








5/99 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government
PRD FEDERATION
President, Senate, Lower Chamber 
Allocation of Public Resources: 



















‘Allocation of public resources: use 







Governor, Local Attorney, 
BC
PAN FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
Collegiate Tribunal 







Governor, Congress HGO 









PRD LOCAL LEGISLATURE 
Congress VER






PAN STATE JUDICIARY/ CONGRESS 
Administrative Tribunal, Congress BC 







PRD STATE LEGISLATURE 
Congress, SON
‘Responsibility: revocation of 






PRI FEDERAL CONGRESS 
Federal Lower Chamber 
‘Allocation of public resources, 


















President, Lower Chamber, Senate 
Junta Local de Conciliation SON 







Governor, Congress SON 
Administrative Tribunal, SON 




















Servicio Adm Tributaria (SHCP) 
‘Allocation of public resources: fiscal 
coordination law







Governor, Local Attorney TAMPS 








Governor, Congress, TAMPS 






PRI MA LOCAL JUDICIARY: President and 
Superior Tribunal of Justice, MOR 





22/99 MUN - Slndico 
Fresnillo, ZAC
PRD LOCAL LEGISLATURE 
Congress, ZAC
‘Functioning of institutions: integration 















Oaxaca de Juarez, OAX
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress OAX 








PRD LOCAL LEGISLATURE 
Congress, MOR





26/99 FEDERAL CONGRESS 
Lower Chamber
PRI MA FEDERATION / President, Ministry 
of the Interior, SHCP, CNBV 








PRI FEDERATION: President, SHCP, 
Lower Chamber, Senate 
‘Allocation of public resources: tax 





























31/99 MUN/Guadalupe, NL PAN Same
32/99 MUN/Guadalupe, NL PAN Same







‘Allocation of public resources: 
electoral use




Directora de la Contralorla 










Directora de la Contraloria 












Governor, Congress VER 

















Zacoalco de Torres, JAL
PRI STATE
Governor, Congress







PAN LOCAL JUDICIARY 










































Congress, Superior Tribunal of 














11/2000 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government
PRD FEDERATION
President, Senate, Lower Chamber 










Governor, Congress, EDOMEX 



















Huajuapan de Le6n, OAX 








Governor, Congress VER 
Other 210 Municipalities 





































Valle de Bravo, EDOMEX
PRI FEDERATION/ Federal Attorney for 
Environmental Protection 
‘Planning, infrastructure: suspension 




21/2000 LOCAL EXECUTIVE 
Governor EDOMEX
PRI LOCAL LEGISLATURE 
Congress EDOMEX 


























24/2000 LOCAL EXECUTIVE 
Governor, MOR
PRI STATE
Congress, Superior Tribunal of 
Justice, MOR

































‘Allocation of public resources: illegal 
















Papalotla de Xicohtencatl, 
TLAX
















32/2000 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government
PRD FEDERATION
President, Federal Attorney, 
Congress






33/2000 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
President of the Superior 
Tribunal of Justice MOR
STATE
Congress MOR









‘Allocation of public resources: illegal 




35/2000 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice AGS
STATE
Governor, Congress, AGS 
‘Other: Ley Patrimonial de AGS












37/2000 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Jefe Delegacional de 
Miguel Hidalgo, DF
PAN FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Jefatura de Gobiemo and others 





agreement which creates Unidad de 







Comision Federal de Competencia 















Soledad de Graciano 
Sanchez, SLP
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress SLP 






4/2001 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government
PRD FEDERATION
President, SHCP, Lower chamber 







5/2001 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government
PRD FEDERATION
President, Energy Minister, Minister of 
the Interior








Governor, Congress CHIH 









Governor, Congress GRO 








PAN FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government
•Other: decree in which the Federal 




9/2001 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
President of the Superior 
Tribunal of Justice, CHIS
STATE
Governor Pablo Salazar CHIS 


















Comisidn Federal de Competencia. 






Tulancingo de Bravo, HGO
STATE
Governor, HGO
•Functioning of institutions: municipal 
organic law






Governor, Congress JAL 
President, Congress 






Pachuca de Soto, HGO
PAN STATE
Congress, Governor HGO 
‘Municipal autonomy: organic Law: 













Naucalpan de Juarez, 
EDOMEX
PAN LOCAL JUDICIARY 










‘Appointment of the Slndico in the 







Governor, Congress NL 











Valle de Bravo, EDOMEX
PRI FEDERATION
Federal Attorney for Environmental 
Protection
‘Planning, infrastructure: definitive 




21/2001 Neighbours from the 




‘Appointment of the Slndico in the 




22/2001 FEDERAL CONGRESS 
Lower Chamber, Senate














Tulancingo de Bravo, HGO
PAN STATE
Congress HGO
‘Removal of Municipal President
PRI AM FOUN
25/2001 MUN







‘Functioning of institutions: municipal 
organic law





Amaxac de Guerrero and 
others from TLAX
STATE
Governor, Congress TLAX 




















Tulancingo de Bravo HGO
PAN STATE
Governor, Local Attorney 














FEDERATION: President, Congress 
INDIGENOUS LAW
33/2001 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
President of the Supreme 



















































‘Municipal autonomy: management of 
the municipal finances








































FEDERATION: President, Congress 
INDIGENOUS LAW
351/2001 MUN
Chilapa de Alvarez, GRO



































362/2001 MUN - Slndico 
Juarez, CHIH
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress CHIH 
‘Municipal autonomy: transfer public 




363/2001 Lerma, EDOMEX PAN Same
Governor, Congress EDOMEX 
‘Municipal autonomy: transit
PRI PAR FOUN 
02/10/2001 
22/04/2003
364/2001 MUN - Slndico 
Hermosillo, SON
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress SON 





365/2001 MUN /Santiago 
Juxtlahuaca, OAX
FEDERATION: President, Congress 
INDIGENOUS LAW
PRI DOES NOT 
PROCEED
366/2001 MUN -Regidor 
Nativitas, TLAX
PT STATE LEGISLATURE 
Impeachment Commission 







367/2001 LOCAL JUIDICARY 
President of the Supreme 
Tribunal, AGS
STATE
Governor, Congress AGS 
‘Appointment procedure to elect 
Magistrates. Reestructuring of the 









Naucalpan de Ju&rez, EDOMEX 








President and other authorities 








3/2002 FEDERAL DISTRICT 




PAN LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Judge (First instancia)











































President and other authorities





11/2002 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
President of the Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice TLAX
STATE








Huixquilucan de Degollado, 
EDOMEX
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress EDOMEX 
‘Administrative justice






Congress, Governor, SON 












Villa del Carbon, 
EDOMEX
PAN STATE
Congress, Governor EDOMEX 
‘Allocation of public resources: 













Tlalnepantla de Baz, 
EDOMEX
PRD Same
20/2002 FEDERAL DISTRICT 





Jefe de Gobierno del Distrito Federal





21/2002 EIGHT MUNICIPAL 
PRESIDENTS, DGO
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress DGO 







PAN Congress, Governor EDOMEX 
‘Allocation of public resources: 







Pachuca de Soto, HGO
PAN STATE










Congress, Governor EDOMEX 
‘Allocation of public resources: 







San Luis Rio 
Colorado, SON
PAN STATE
Congress, Governor SON 
‘Allocation of public resources: 



















Jefe de Gobiemo del Distrito Federal





28/2002 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Jefe Delegacional Benito 
Juarez
PAN Same








‘Allocation of public resources:





San Pedro Garza Garcia, 
NL
PAN LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Administrative Tribunal 





32/2002 FEDERAL CONGRESS 
Camara de Diputados del 
CU
PRI MR FEDERATION
President and other authorities 
(SHCP), Senate
‘Allocation of public resources: 




33/2002 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of government, DF
PRD FEDERATION
President and other authorities 
(Interior, Foreign Affairs), Senate 
‘Other: Presidential Decree 





Ejutla de Crespo, OAX
LOCAL JUDICIARY 









President and other authorities 
(SHCP), Senate






Villa de Zaachila, OAX
PVEM STATE
Governor OAX






37/2002 MUN / Mihuatlan de 
Porfirio Diaz, OAX
PAN Same
38/2002 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Local Assembly, DF
PRD FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of government, DF




















STATE /Congress NAY 








Governor, Congress, COL 





































‘Other: congressional agreement that 




















‘Responsibility of public servants: 







PRI LOCAL JUDICIARY/MUN 
Administrative Tribunal 
Nezahualcoyotl, EDOMEX 
‘Allocation of public recourses: 










Congress, Governor DGO 
‘Allocation of public recourses: mpal 









Congress, Governor DGO 










Congress, Governor Oax 






San Pedro Garza Garcia, 
NL
PAN LOCAL JUDICIARY 






San Luis Potosi, SLP
PAN STATE
Congress /Governor SLP 
‘Planning, infrastructure: urban 
development law
PRI PAR FOUN 
03/09/2002 
26/10/2005
54/2002 Filberto Zacarias Collegiate Tribunal XXVII District 















FEDERATION / President, SHCP 
















Local Fiscal Auditing Office 
President, SHCP,SAT 









Soledad de Graciano 
Sanchez, SLP
PAN STATE
Congress, Governor, SLP 








Local Fiscal Auditing Office 
President, SHCP,SAT 








President, lower chamber, Senate 
Governor, Congress EDOMEX 










Local Fiscal Auditing Office 
President, SHCP,SAT 





64/2002 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Local Assembly, DF
PRD FEDERATION 
Senate, Lower chamber 
‘Other: agreement which determines 






Valle de Bravo, EDOMEX
LOCAL JUDICIARY 










Congress, Governor, CHIH 
















Oaxaca de Juarez, OAX
CONV STATE
Governor, Congress OAX 





2/2003 LOCAL JUDICIARY 




‘Responsibility of public servants: 




3/2003 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Local Assembly
PRD FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government 
‘Functioning of institutions: creation of 
a decentralized body for the Water 







Congress, Governor GRO 




5/2003 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Superior Tribunal of Justice 
JAL
STATE
Governor, Congress JAL 













7/2003 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Superior Tribunal of Justice 
YUC
STATE
Governor, Congress YUC 











9/2003 FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 
President
PAN FEDERAL CONGRESS 
Senate






Teotitlan de Flores 
Magon, OAX
CONV STATE
Governor, Congress OAX 
‘Functioning and organisation of 


















PRI STATE / Congress ZAC






13/2003 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Local Assembly
PRD FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government 




14/2003 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Local Assembly
PRD FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government 






San Luis Potosi, SLP
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress SLP 







Congress, Governor JAL 
















‘Allocation of public resources: 








‘Allocation of public resources: 





San Luis Rio Colorado, 
SON
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress, SON 





21/2003 FEDERAL DISTRICT 





Head of Government 


















‘Administrative Agreement of the 
Communication Ministry about a 








President, SHCP, SEP 







Executive, Local Attorney 
QROO
PRI FEDERATION 
President, SHCP, SEP 








Governor, Congress, CHIH 







PRI STATE / Governor, Congress AGS 
‘Allocation of public resources: 













21/2003 FEDERAL DISTRICT 













PAN STATE /Congress AGS 








Governor, Congress MICH 
‘Allocation of public resources: 




































‘ Invasion of spheres of competence: 






PAN FEDERAL LEGISLATURE 
Lower Chamber 




















Governor, Congress VER 
‘Allocation of public resources: codigo 
hacendario municipal
PRI PAR FOUN 
30/04/2003 
09/08/2005
39/2003 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government
PRD FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Local Assembly









‘Functioning of institutions: creation of 



















‘Responsibility of public servants: 









‘Responsibility of public servants: 


















45/2003 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Superior Tribunal of Justice 
TLAX
STATE
Congress, Governor TLAX 
‘Allocation of public resources: 
budget expenditure






Congress, Governor BC 








Congress, Governor CHIH 






PRD FEDERATION: President, Lower 
chamber, Senate
STATE: Governor, Congress GRO 













Congress, Governor OAX 
‘Proposal to disappear the 
municipality




50/2003 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government
PRD FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Local Assembly
‘Appointment of citizen councilors of 










Santiago Ixcuintla, NAY 
















53/2003 Amulfo Gonzalez Local and federal Electoral Tribunal 







































President, SHCP, SAT 








Congress, Governor, EDOMEX 








PRD FEDERATION: President, lower 
chamber, Senate 
STATE: Governor, VER 








Martinez de la Torre, VER
PAN FEDERATION: President, lower 
chamber, Senate 
STATE: Governor, VER 








Ixhuatten del Sureste, VER
PAN FEDERATION: President, lower 
chamber, Senate 
STATE: Governor VER 









PAN FEDERATION: President, lower 
chamber, Senate 
STATE: Governor VER 









PAN FEDERATION: President, lower 
chamber, Senate 
STATE: Governor VER 









PRD FEDERATION: President, lower 
chamber, Senate







PRI FEDERATION: President, lower 
chamber, Senate







PRD FEDERATION: President, lower 
chamber, Senate















PAN FEDERATION: President, lower 
chamber, Senate 
STATE: Governor VER 






















STATE: Governor VER 





PRD FEDERATION: President, lower 
chamber, Senate 
STATE: Governor VER 















PAN FEDERATION: President, lower 
chamber, Senate 
STATE: Governor VER 










Congress, Governor COL 







































































Congress, Governor OAX 
‘Functioning and organisation of 
institutions: creation of decentralised 




























PAN STATE /Governor, Congress, CHIH 













88/2003 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
President of the Superior 


























PAN FEDERAL LEGISLATURE 
Lower Chamber 








Congress, Governor TLAX 









































Tlajomulco de Zuniga, JAL
PRI STATE 
Congress JAL
‘Allocation of public resources: 







Governor, Congress TLAX 
‘Responsibility: revocation of the 
municipal president’s mandate




Oaxaca de Juarez, OAX
CONV STATE Congress, OAX 
Senior Federal Auditing Body 
‘Allocation of public resources: 






PAN FEDERAL AND LOCAL 
JUDICIARIES














First Collegiate Tribunal and local 
Supreme Tribunal
* Administrative justice / Jurisdictional 
ruling
07/11/2003
101/2003 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
President Magistrate of the 
local judicial power QROO
STATE
Congress, Governor QROO 
‘Appointment of local magistrates: 







Congress, Governor GRO 
‘Functioning and organisation of 







Congress, Governor SLP 







Governor, Congress AGS 







Governor, Congress TAMPS 









President, Lower Chamber, Local 
Attorney
‘Responsibility: aprehension order 















Governor, Congress TAMPS 
*Responsibility:aprehension order 






PT FEDERATION /President 








Congress, Governor GRO 








‘Appointment/ Election of Councillors 




112/2003 MUN -President and 3 
Regidores
Ario de Rosales, MICH
STATE/MUN 
Congress, Governor, MICH 
Ario de Rosales, MICH 



















Jose Azueta Zihuatanejo, 
GRO
PRD STATE/Govemor, GRO 
‘Functioning and organisation of 





Jose Maria Izazagao, GRO
PRD STATE
Governor, GRO
‘Functioning and organisation of 





San Luis Potosi, SLP
PAN LOCAL JUDICIARY










‘Allocation of public resources












Tetela de Ocampo, PUE
PRI STATE
Governor, Congress PUE 














9/2004 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
President of the Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice, JAL
STATE
Governor, Congress JAL 








Congress, Local Attorney CHIS 






Martinez de la Torre, VER
PAN STATE
Congress, Governor VER 







Lower chamber, President 








Lower chamber, Senate, President 








Governor, Congress JAL 
‘Allocation of public resources: 
income law.






Congress, Governor CHIH 

























‘Executive: Minister of 
Communications and Transport 
‘Administrative internal agreements: 






PAN STATE / Governor, SON 
‘Functioning of institutions: creation of 














































































Invasion of spheres:not allowing 
audit procedures of the public account












*Functioning and organisation of 








STATE: Governor, Congress 
















Nextlalpan de Felipe Sanchez Solis 

















PAN FEDERAL CONGRESS 
Senate / Agrarian Tribunal 
‘Appointment/ratification of a 
Magistrate of the Agrarian Tribunal 




49/2004 STATE JUDICIARY 




















Governor, Local Attorney JAL 
‘Territorial conflict =Senate 















PT STATE/Congress TLAX 
‘Appointment of civil servants: 









Congress, Governor, JAL 
MUN Tepatitlan de Morelos 






San Miguel El Alto, JAL
PVEM STATE/Congress, Governor, JAL 
MUN Tepatitlan de Morelos 














Secretary of the 
Environment
PAN FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government, Local 
Secretary of the Environment 








Congress, Governor AGS 
















PRI STATE: Congress, Governor 








Lower Chamber, Senior Federal 
Auditing Office
‘Other: recommendations to the 
Energy Secretary and Commission for 




62/2004 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Urban Development 
Secretary
PRD FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Local Audit Office
‘Planning: jurisdictional ruling in 






PAN STATE Congress, MOR 
Magistrates of the Superior Tribunal 
‘Responsbility: impeachment against 
Governor





PRI STATE/Congress, EDOMEX 
‘Responsibility of public servants: 




65/2004 President, Vicepresident 
and 15 local congressmen 
QROO
MUN/STATE /Benito Juarez QROO 
Governor, Congress 





66/2004 President, Vicepresident 
and 15 local congressmen 
QROO
MUN/STATE/ Benito Juarez QROO 
Governor, Congress QROO 





67/2004 President, Vicepresident 
and 15 local congressmen 
QROO
MUN/STATE/ Benito Juarez QROO 
Governor, Congress 








Federal Attorney of Environmental 
Protection
‘Others: agreement that establishes 








Congress, Local Auditing Office BC 





70/2004 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Local Assembly
PRD FEDERATION
President, Lower chamber, Federal 
Attorney
‘Responsibility: case against the 







PRI LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Administrative Tribunal 
‘Administrative justice/jurisdictional 









Congress, Local Auditing Office BC 








Congress, Local Auditing Office BC 








Congress, Local Auditing Office BC 






Playas de Rosarito, BC
PAN STATE
Congress, Local Auditing Office BC 





76/2004 President of the Political 
Group Colosio DGO
Federal Electoral Tribunal 







PAN STATE /Congress ZAC 







PRD STATE/Governor, Congress, TAB 










President, Water Commission 







Congress, Governor CHIH 
‘Municipal autonomy: omission to 












Governor, Local Environmental 
Attorney










Congress, Governor, CHIH 
*Municipal autonomy: omission to 








Congress, Governor, CHIH 
‘Municipal autonomy: omission to 









Lower Chamber, Senate, Senior 
Federal Auditing Office 
Invasion: Fiscal Superior Law. 





San Jacinto, Amilpas 
OAX
PRD STATE
Governor, Congress OAX 





San Jacinto, Amilpas 
OAX
PRD STATE
Governor, Congress OAX 









‘Other: order to execute an exercise 














PRI LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Supreme Tribunal




90/2004 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
President of the Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice JAL
STATE 
Congress JAL




91/2004 President, Vicepresident 
and 15 local congressmen 
QROO
MUN/STATE 
Benito Juarez QROO 
Governor, Congress QROO 






E. Castillo Ruz is currently 
federal congressman
PRI STATE





93/2004 President of the Local 
Commission of Human 
Rights, CHIS
STATE
Governor, Congress, Tribunal CHIS 
‘Temporary removal of the President 








Magistrates of the Superior Tribunal 
‘ Impeachment against the Governor





Tribunal of Justice 
EDOMEX
PRI FEDERATION
Federal Attorney for Environmental 
Protection


















President, Ministry of the Interior 
‘Other: federal game and ballot 
regulations























100/2004 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Jefe Delegacional of 
Gustavo A Madero
PRD FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government, Local Assembly 





101/2004 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
President of the Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice, YUC
STATE
Congress YUC
‘ Invasion of spheres of competence: 




102/2004 Universidad Michoacana 
de San Nicolas de Hidalgo, 
MICH
STATE
Commission for the Access to Public 
Information, Executive MICH 





103/2004 Senator (substitute) VER FEDERATION
Senate




104/2004 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Head of Government
PRD FEDERATION/ Lower Chamber 
‘Allocation of public resources: local 







Congress, Administrative Tribunal, 
EDOMEX









Magistrates of the Superior Tribunal 







Congress, Governor COL 










Governor, Congress QROO 
‘Responsibility of public servants: 




109/2004 FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 
President
PAN FEDERAL CONGRESS 
Lower Chamber









Tribunal (District 43) 
Federal District
FEDERATION















3/2005 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice, JAL
STATE
Governor, Congress JAL 
*Appointment-Non ratification of 
Magistrates of the Administrative 
Tribunal
PAN PAR FOUN 
25/01/2005 
01/02/2008
4/2005 LOCAL JUDICIARY 




*Non-ratification of Magistrates of the 







Lower chamber, Senate, President 








Tepeji del Rio Ocampo, 
HGO
PAN Governor, EDOMEX 









Governor, Congress CAM 















9/2005 Electoral Institute BC STATE
Congress, Governor BC 







10/2005 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
President of the Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice BC
STATE
Governor, Congress BC 











Congress, Governor TAB 
‘Planning, infrastructure and 






(Tomas Brito: in 2008 
misuse of Ramo 033 funds)
PRD STATE
Congress, Governor TAB 
‘Planning, infrastructure and 









Governor, Congress NAY 
‘Allocation of public resources: 










Congress, Governor TAB 
‘Allocation of public resources: 
income law






Congress, Governor JAL 
*Allocation of public resources: 
income law































19/2005 LOCAL JUDICIARY 
President of the Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice BC
STATE
Congress, Governor BC 
‘Allocation of public resources




Acapulco de Juarez GRO
PRD STATE
Governor (Ren6 Juarez Cisneros) and 
other authorities GRO 
‘Allocation of public resources: 
federal participations











22/2005 STATE JUDICIARY 
Supreme Tribunal of 
Justice, YUC
STATE/Congress YUC 





23/2005 FEDERAL DISTRICT 
Local Assembly
PRD FEDERAL CONGRESS 
Lower chamber









‘Responsibility: Impeachment Head of 
Government IDesafuero AMLO
PRD PAR FOUN 
11/04/2005 
09/03/2006
25/2005 LOCAL JUDICIARY 






































PAN LOCAL JUDICIARY 
Supreme Tribunal of Justice 





30/2005 Electoral Institute of Baja 
California BC
STATE/ Congress BC 










Governor, Congress EDOMEX 







Governor, Congress JAL 








Governor and other authorities GRO 




San Luis Acatlan, GRO
PRD STATE / Congress, GRO 










STATE: Congress, Governor and 
other authorities QRO 
•Invasion of spheres of competence: 













PAN STATE/ Governor, TAMPS 
•Appointment of the Director of the 








•Invasion of spheres of competence: 






PRI STATE / Congress, TAB








Governor, Congress COL 





41/2005 STATE JUDICIARY 
President of the Supreme 
Tribunal of Justice, JAL
STATE LEGISLATURE 
Congress, JAL

























Governor, Congress, Col 










SHCP and local Finance Ministry 






PAN STATE Congress and other 
authorities, EDOMEX 









Governor, Congress, EDOMEX 








Governor, Congress, Tribunal AGS 




49/2005 STATE JUDICIARY 
JAL
STATE









PRI FEDERATION: Executive 




Naucalpan de Juiirez, 
EDOMEX
PAN STATE
Governor, Congress, EDOMEX 







Congress, Governor COL 















54/2005 FEDERAL CONGRESS FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 








Congress, Governor MOR 
‘Other: retirement-pension public 















Congress, Governor, JAL 
‘Creation of a municipality
PAN DISMISS
24/03/2006
58/2005 FEDERAL CONGRESS 
Senate
PRI FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 
President, Minister of the Interior, 






Public security Minister, NL
PAN STATE JUDICIARY 


















Congress, Governor, COAH 
Transparency Institute 


























Tepatitlan de Morelos, JAL
STATE 
Congress JAL 

















Ministry Urban Development 










STATE /Governor, Congress, BC 











‘Responsibility of public servants: 






PAN STATE JUDICIARY 
Superior Tribunal of Justice, COAH 








Governor, Congress, COL 









Governor, Congress, COL 





















Legislative and Judiciary, MOR 




74/2005 FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 
President
PAN FEDERAL CONGRESS
Lower Chamber, Senior Federal
Auditing Office








Governor, Congress, COL 
‘Responsibility of public servants: 





















77/2005 MUN . 
Huejutla, HGO
PAN STATE
Congress, Local Attorney HGO 





Huejutla de Reyes, HGO
PAN STATE
Congress, Local Attorney HGO 





Huejutla de Reyes, HGO
PRI STATE
Congress, Local Attorney HGO 






Huejutla de Reyes, HGO
PRI STATE
Congress, Local Attorney HGO 








Congress, Local Attorney HGO 








Congress, Local Attorney HGO 








Congress, Local Attorney HGO 





SOURCE: Supreme Court of Justice Data Bases.Actividad Jurisdiccional/Consulta de Expedientes/Textos 
de Engrose (http://www2.scin.qob.mx/expedientes/): Alex, Portal de Estadlstica Judicial, Suprema Corte 
de Justicia, Controversias Constitucionales (http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/alex/).
Notes:













DF Distrito Federal (Federal District)
DGO Durango
DISMISS Case analysed by the court Court and found lacking in foundation (sobreseido)













PAN Partido Accidn National, National Action Party
PAR FOUN Partially founded
PJ Policla Judicial, Judicial Police
PRI Partido Revolucionario Institutional, Institucional Revolutionary Party
PT Partido del Trabajo, Workers Party
PUE Puebla




REJECTED Not even analysed by the court (desechado)
SHCP Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico, Finance Ministry
SLP San Luis Potosi
SON Sonora
TAB Tabasco
TAMPS Tamaulipas
TLAX Tlaxcala
UNF Unfounded
VER Veracruz
YUC Yucatan
ZAC Zacatecas
